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Shareholder protection has been a focal point of the Greek legislator's agenda for years. 
Despite a series of reforms towards the direction of shareholder empowerment, the 
adequacy of the existing framework remains questionable. The thesis conveys the 
argument that the remedies for maladministration under Greek company law remain 
dysfunctional and need to be reformed in order to establish an effective and competitive 
legal framework for shareholder protection. It is argued that such initiatives are 
important in order to boost investor confidence and provide an effective monitoring 
mechanism of corporate governance. In order to assess whether and to what extent the 
Greek shareholder law attains these objectives, it is examined on a comparative basis 
with jurisdictions which recently reformed their shareholder law; namely the United 
Kingdom and Germany. 
The thesis analyses the imperfections of Greek law. The latter is devoid of a genuine 
derivative action and the existing functionally equivalent mechanism is unsuitable to 
overcome the challenges of shareholder litigation. The relevant law is exclusionary and 
rather biased against individual shareholders. It deters meritorious litigation and does 
little to ensure that proceedings do not run contrary to the company’s interests. Much 
of corporate misfeasance escapes the scope and content of the existing provisions and, 
effectively, corporate wrongdoing is left uncompensated for and undeterred. 
Furthermore, the broader legal framework cannot compensate for the absence of an 
appropriate mechanism to enforce directors’ duties and pursue corporate claims via 
shareholder-initiated litigation. However, the examination of the strategies followed by 
the UK and Germany provides useful insights for the way forward. The rationale for 
and the experience from the recently introduced provisions thereto are invaluable in the 
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thesis’ attempt to construct and propose a modern and functioning model of derivative 
actions for Greece. 
This research considers the law in Germany, Greece and the United Kingdom as 







This Thesis was written in times of great (yet not unprecedented) instability in my home 
country. Particularly towards the completion of my research, the Greek economy flirted 
dangerously with total collapse.  This situation had a twofold influence of my mentality. 
On one hand, the worries about the people I left behind and the uncertainty due to the 
rapidly changing legal and economic landscape were ever-present and demoralising. 
On the other hand, this economic malaise worked as a drive to research whether and 
how the very particular area of law constituting the topic of this Thesis should change, 
in order to make things better.  
This research has not been easy to complete; and was never meant to be easy. Selecting 
a challenging topic was a deliberate choice. Derivative actions and shareholder 
protection may be interesting, but at the same time they are possibly the most complex 
issues in the area of corporate law and corporate governance. Adding to the challenge 
of this task was researching in three different languages and the difficulties encountered 
in the accumulation of secondary resources. Nevertheless, the infinite Mercy of the 
Lord has kept me healthy and focused during this very demanding journey and I am 
grateful.  
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them, as a humble expression of my sincere gratitude for their love and nurture. 
Dr Marios Koutsias has been an exemplary supervisor. His thorough and profound 
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different areas of expertise may only be compared with his kindness and honesty. I 
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PART 1: Derivative actions in 




CHAPTER 1. Introduction 
 
1.1. The subject and the objectives of this thesis 
It would be an understatement to say that shareholder protection is (and has always 
been) an integral, yet highly complicated, part of modern company law. Jurisdictions 
go to great lengths to set intricate systems of checks and balances on the administration 
of corporate affairs and to devise armouries of rights exercisable in and against the 
company, elaborate in their construction and application, only to protect the varying 
interests of shareholders. As suggested by its title, this Thesis focuses on a mechanism 
of shareholder protection known as the derivative action.1 It aims to investigate whether 
the Greek shareholder law should be reformed and whether and how this mechanism 
should be introduced to it. The research purports to evaluate, from the perspective of 
                                                          
1 Capital letters will be used herein when referring to this Thesis, its Parts and Sections, in order to avoid 
the risk of confusion with other theses, sections or parts of statutes etc.  
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shareholder protection, the applicable Greek legal framework, identify its shortcomings 
and inquire how the derivative action may address them, with the view of re-
establishing the effectiveness and competitiveness of the national law. To achieve these 
ends, this Thesis conducts a comparative analysis with two jurisdictions which provide 
for derivative actions, namely Germany and the UK. 
Derivative actions can be broadly defined as follows: in cases where a wrong is 
suffered by the company, a (group of minority) shareholder(s) (otherwise barred from 
litigating directly in their own name and on their own behalf, by virtue of the no 
reflective loss principle and the principle that only the company may litigate its claims 
through its competent organs –the “proper plaintiff rule”) may be allowed to seek 
remedy on behalf of the company.2 In practice, a derivative action is useful, if not 
essential, in cases where those in control of the company (thus able to act – and litigate- 
on behalf of the company or to instruct those with such capacity) are the ones who 
wronged the company. The wrong will not be remedied, due to this conflict of interests, 
to the detriment of all involved in the company - and thus its shareholders - but for the 
wrongdoers, unless another person derives the right to sue them from the company, 
acting on behalf and for the benefit of the latter. 
Unlike personal shareholders’ claims, derivative actions serve the purposes of 
reinforcing the accountability of those in control of the company and protecting 
shareholders cumulatively.  They do so by removing the impasse which the “proper 
plaintiff rule” may create, when necessary.3 The direct beneficiary of a successful 
                                                          
2 This is the definition of what is referred herein as “genuine” derivative actions; see also the discussion 
on the features of derivative actions in Harald Baum and Dan Puchniak, “The derivative action: an 
economic, historical and practice-oriented approach” in Dan W. Puchniak, Harald Baum and Michael 
Ewing-Chow (eds), The Derivative Action in Asia: A Comparative and Functional Approach (CUP 
2012) 7. See Georgios Zouridakis ‘Introducing Derivative Actions in the Greek Law on Public Limited 
Companies: Issues of Legal Standing and Lessons from the German and UK Experience’ (2015) 26 
ICCLR 271, 272 regarding pp 17-20 in this Section. 
3 Known, under common law, as the rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 67 ER 189; (1843) 2 Hare 461. 
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derivative claim is the company only, whilst shareholders benefit indirectly or, more 
precisely, reflectively. However, the shareholders’ right to litigate on behalf of the 
company evidently constitutes a decisive interference to the ordinary administration of 
the corporate affairs. The law has therefore to facilitate the pursuit of meritorious 
derivative claims whilst, at the same time, weed out and deter litigation that would 
disturb the efficient running of the company and run contrary to the company’s and 
shareholders’ interests. The difficulty in this task resides in that filters against frivolous 
and vexatious litigation inherently run the risk of disenfranchising shareholders and 
preventing meritorious claims from being brought; whilst, any incentives to 
shareholders to enforce the corporate claims may be exploited by malicious litigants.  
Derivative actions have been considered by many academics as one of the most potent 
means of (minority) shareholder protection, assuming thus a cardinal role in corporate 
governance.4 Notwithstanding being a landmark feature of common law,5 they have 
progressively expanded to civil law jurisdictions.6 The outspread of provisions on 
derivative actions throughout Europe during the last decade is evidence of voluntary 
regulatory convergence, on a matter which institutional harmonisation - through the 
proposal for a fifth company law directive (whose article 16 provided a minimalistic 
form of a derivative action) - has so far been unsuccessful in the EU. 7 The recent history 
                                                          
4 Indicatively: Robert C Clark., Corporate Law, (Little Brown, Boston 1986) 639; Arad Reisberg, 
Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance: Theory and Operation, (OUP 2007) 9; see also Cohen 
v. Beneficial Industrial Corp, 337 US 541 (1949), 548 hailing the derivative action as “the chief regulator 
of corporate management”.   
5 See G R Sullivan, ‘Restating the Scope of the Derivative Action’ (1985) 44 C.L.J. 236: ‘Derivative 
actions have been allowed at least since Atwool v. Merryweather (1867) L.R. 5 Eq. 464n’. 
6 For categorisations of jurisdictions into “legal families”, see the seminal work of René David and John 
E.C. Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today: An Introduction to the Comparative Study of 
Law (Simon & Schuster, 1978). An explanation for the spread of statutory provisions on derivative 
actions across jurisdictions from the late nineties onwards may be the normative influence of the “Law 
and Finance” literature (see Subsection 2.4.3.2); evidence supporting this explanation can be found in 
Italy: see Paolo Giudici, “Representative Litigation in Italian Capital Markets: Italian Derivative Suits 
and (if ever) Securities Class Actions” (2009) 6 E.C.F.R. 246.    
7 OJ C 7 11.1.1991. 
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of one of the core continental jurisdictions of this study, Germany, supports this 
observation.8 Almost a decade ago, the Gesetz zur Unternehmensintegrität und 
Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts (“Act on Corporate Integrity and 
Modernization of Rescission Law"; hereinafter UMAG) 9 introduced the new section 
14810 to Aktiengesetz (German Stock Corporation Act of 1965) in an attempt to 
strengthen the protection afforded to minority shareholders.11 The emphasized word 
predisposes the reader of comparative corporate law as to the difference from the UK 
statutory provisions and English common law. Contrary to the continental European 
approach of conferring the right to sue on behalf of the company only to ex lege 
minorities, usually determined on the basis of participation in share capital, any 
shareholder can individually bring a derivative action under English law. This 
characteristic of derivative actions remained unchanged despite the advent of the new 
statutory provisions under the Companies Act 2006.12 What also remained largely 
unaffected, despite various reforms of its national company law statute, is the Greek 
approach of not providing for a “genuine” derivative action.13  
                                                          
8 Notable civil law jurisdictions having introduced derivative actions to their corporate law statutes 
during the past three decades include Belgium (since 1991 by virtue of Lois coordonnées sur les sociétés 
commerciales [Belgian Company Code] art.66bis, of July 26, 1991, Moniteur Belge [MB] [Official 
Gazette of Belgium]), Italy (since 1998, by virtue of Decreto Legislativo 24 febbraio 1998, n. 58 (It.); 
Testo Unico in Materia di Intermediazione Finanziaria [TUIF] [Rules and Regulations Concerning Stock 
Market Trading] art.129, D. Lgs. n.58); and (People’s Republic of) China (since 2005, by virtue of 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., October 27, 2005). For a historical overview of this incident of 
voluntary convergence, see Martin Gelter, “Why do shareholder derivative suits remain rare in 
continental Europe?” (2011–12) 37 Brook. J. Int’l L. 843, and Baum and Puchniak (n 2) 2.   
9 BGBl I, 2802. On the replacement of the older provisions, see indicatively Nikolaos Paschos and Kay-
Uwe Neumann, ‘Die Neuregelungen des UMAG im Bereich der Durchsetzung von Haftungsansprüchen 
der Aktiengesellschaft gegen Organmitglieder’ (2005) 33 D.B. 1779; Holger Fleischer, "Das Gesetz zur 
Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts“ [2005] NJW 3525; see also the 
decisions in OLG Hamburg, Beschluss vom 19.1.2007 - 11 Wx 33/06, AG 2007, 331 and Finanzgericht 
Hamburg Urt. v. 11.09.2009, Az.: 3 K 124/08, DStRE 2010, 594, making reference to the UMAG 
reforms on shareholder-led litigation. 
10 Entitled: “Complaint admission proceedings” (derivative actions). 
11UMAG also amended s.147, which constituted the only possibility for shareholder-initiated 
representative litigation, analogous and functionally equivalent to derivative actions. However, a form 
of derivative action was provided in the Law on Corporate Groups (Konzernrecht); see AktG ss.310, 
317, 318 and 323 
12 Now “derivative claims” (as the term applies under CA 2006, Pt 11). 
13 (Codified) Law 2190/1920 on (Public) Companies Limited by Shares (Sociétés Anonymes; SAs). 
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Alas, the Greek law on shareholder litigation on behalf of the company is obsolete.14 
Despite the fact that members of private limited companies may sue derivatively before 
Greek courts,15 the legislator has continuously refrained from introducing a similar 
mechanism to the law of public limited companies.16 The provision conceptually and 
functionally closest to a derivative action under the respective law is the “company’s 
action” whereby, a strong 10% minority may demand that the board brings the action 
and, in case the board does not comply with this request, the same minority may petition 
the court to appoint special representatives to bring the claim.17 The efficacy of the 
company’s action has been questioned widely and the need for the introduction of 
derivative actions into the Greek law on public limited companies has been pronounced 
by a variety of prominent Greek academics over time.18 However, attempts in that 
direction have so far been unsuccessful.19  
                                                          
14 Concurring Evanghelos Perakis ‘The Greek and International Discussion on Acceptance and 
Restriction of the Derivative Action brought by a Shareholder of a Public Limited Company’ in Hideo 
Nakamura, Hans Fasching, Hans F Gaul and Apostolos Georgiades (eds), Festschrift für Kostas E Beys 
dem Rechtsdenker in Attischer Dialektik (5th edn Eunomia 2003), 3700. The existing (functionally 
equivalent to derivative actions) remedy has not changed much since its introduction in the 1960s. On 
the evolution of legal rules see John Armour, Priya Lele, Simon Deakin and Mathias M. Siems, "How 
Do Legal Rules Evolve? Evidence from a Cross-Country Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor and 
Worker Protection" (2009) 57 Am. J. Comp. L. 579. 
15 This does not mean that the respective provisions in the law on private limited companies, whether in 
the form of EPE (limited liability company) or IKE (private capital company), are free from ambiguity, 
nor that they constitute optimal means of protecting members’ interests. Case law is virtually non-
existent and, regarding EPE, it is unclear whether the statute provides for a derivative action or another 
form of actio pro socio. 
16 See further explanations for the phenomenon in Subsection 2.4.3.3. 
17 L.2190/1920 art. 22b (1) & (3).  
18 See indicatively Georgios Triantafillakis, "From the Protection of the Minority to the Protection of the 
Shareholder", in Minutes of the 18th Panhellenian Conference on Commercial Law (collaborative work), 
Trends and Prospects of the Law of the Public Limited Company (Nomiki Bibliothiki, 2009), 117–119; 
Christina Livada, "Filing of company claims against the members of the Board of Directors" in Perakis 
Evanghelos (ed.), Sociétés Anonyme’s Law (3rd edn Sakkoulas, 2013), 1017–1018. Reference (not 
extensive) is made there to international literature on derivative actions, including Gower & Davies’ 
Principles of Modern Company Law, 9th edn, edited by Paul Davies and Sarah Worthington (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2012); Reisberg, Derivative Actions (n 4); and Susanne Kalss, "Shareholder Suits: Common 
Problems, Different Solutions and First Steps towards a Possible Harmonisation by Means of a European 
Model Code" (2009) 6 E.C.F.R. 324; as well as the European Model Company Law Act project. 
19 Significant efforts were made by professor Perakis; notably, his proposal to introduce derivative 
actions to the law of listed companies through the 2002 law on corporate governance (a similar approach 
of including provisions on derivative actions in a CG code is followed in the USA: the ALI’s Principles 
of Corporate Governance; see Stephen M Bainbridge, 'Independent Directors and the ALI Corporate 
Governance Project' (1992-1993) 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1034) was eventually dismissed. 
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Against this backdrop, this research embarks with one principal objective: to 
investigate whether the reform of Greek law and the introduction of the derivative 
action are desirable and whether and how they may improve shareholder protection in 
public limited companies. From the outset, this is a rather complex and challenging 
task.  
To begin with, it necessitates the identification of the perceived role derivative actions 
assume in shareholder protection, their function and their importance; in order to 
construe an analytical framework. The Thesis has therefore to explain which interests 
of shareholders this remedy is destined to protect, as well as the kinds of behaviour it 
is meant to protect from. Furthermore, it will examine why it is necessary to confer to 
shareholders the right to litigate on behalf of the company in order to protect such 
interests and the circumstances where this right may be invoked. Moreover, in order to 
better explain the importance of derivative action, this Thesis has to identify and 
explain the broader objectives of shareholder law this remedy helps pursue.  
Equally significantly, this Thesis’ primary objective calls for the evaluation of the 
broader Greek legal framework on shareholder protection, as compared to the 
derivative action. The desirability of reform depends on whether Greek law fails to 
protect shareholders effectively, in the ways the derivative action is meant to. The 
analysis thus needs consider not only the existing functionally equivalent remedy (the 
company’s action), but also other mechanisms of shareholder protection that do or may 
assume functions similar to those of the derivative action.20 This assessment of Greek 
shareholder law de lege lata also determines the impact any improvement on 
shareholder remedies may have on the overall levels of protection.  
                                                          
20 For an explanation of the term “functional equivalent”, see Section 1.3.1. 
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To achieve these objectives, this Thesis adopts a comparative methodology. Legal 
comparisons have great value as a cognitive exercise in evaluating national law and 
comparative law is a trusted companion in the quest for ways to conduct profound and 
critical analysis.21 Consideration of “foreign” rules broadens the horizons of the 
researcher, illuminating characteristics of his familiar law otherwise clouded by 
established doctrine and jurisdictional bias. Importantly for this Thesis, comparative 
law enables the researcher to “stress weaknesses [...] because he has not lived with 
them to the point where they have become second nature and thus acceptable”.22 
Therefore, the comparative analysis herein purports to remove any such doctrinal 
blindfolds and illustrate whether and how other jurisdictions address issues of 
shareholder protection better than Greek law does, with a rather refreshing element of 
objectivity. Accordingly, instead of using a hypothetical “ideal” derivative action as 
the benchmark for evaluation, a rather utopic benchmark to set a priori anyhow, this 
Thesis compares Greek law with the existing German and UK frameworks on 
shareholders’ derivative litigation.23 The comparative analysis also serves the purpose 
of assessing the competitiveness of the Greek levels of shareholder protection in an 
international context; a particularly worthy task given the effects of globalization on 
the market for equity investment. 
Building upon the findings accruing from the evaluation of the Greek law and the 
identification of its shortcomings, this research advances its proposals for reform, in 
order to complete its primary objective. After all, stripped to its essentials, this Thesis 
is a call for the Greek legislator to reconsider the law on the enforcement of corporate 
claims by shareholders. The proposals for a “Greek derivative action” aim to improve 
                                                          
21 Peter De Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World, (3rd edn, Cavendish-Routledge 2007), 22. 
22 Basil Markesinis, Foreign Law and Comparative Methodology, (Hart 1997) 17. 
23 “Derivative litigation” herein refers to shareholders’ litigation on behalf and for the benefit of the 
company; not litigation related to “derivatives” as financial instruments. 
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shareholder protection under Greek law and reassert its position in the international 
context.  
Comparative law played a cardinal role in pursuing these goals. On a level of diagnosis, 
it helped assert that some of the approaches undertaken by Greek law are unsatisfactory 
from certain points of view and should be reformed. But at the same time, it provided 
tangible examples of the “better law”. That is, it illustrated how foreign rules protect 
shareholders better than their Greek counterparts; it also highlighted the ways other 
jurisdictions attempt to address questions of shareholder protection not considered by 
the existing Greek legal framework.24 The utilisation of such insight accruing from a 
comparative analysis, in the formulation of reform proposals (the normative function 
of comparative law), constituted a further reason for selecting the methodology 
followed herein. Comparative law brings to surface a number of alternative solutions 
to given factual problems, whose effect is tested in practice, enabling the researcher to 
identify the ones suitable for his objectives. Accordingly, in devising proposals for a 
Greek framework for shareholders’ derivative litigation, an arduous task where fine 
equilibria must be met, this Thesis relied on the British and German experience with 
the remedy.  
 
1.2. Outline of the issues considered 
Throughout this study, three major questions are posited and addressed. The first relates 
to the ratio legis and the functions of the derivative action, inquiring whether it is 
important to protect shareholders by allowing them to sue on behalf of the company. 
                                                          
24 Rudolf B Schlessinger, Hans W Baade, Mirjan R Damaska and Peter E Herzog, Comparative Law, 
Cases-Text-Materials (5th edn, Foundation Press 1988) 6. 
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Chapter 2 provides an affirmative response, advancing its arguments from three 
perspectives. The first perspective is that of shareholders’ property and proprietary 
interests. It is explained that the derivative action provides a refuge for shareholders 
suffering reflective losses in their property, by allowing remedy thereof, a remedy 
designed to benefit shareholders as a group and to not frustrate the application and the 
objectives of fundamental principles of company law. The next viewpoint is that of 
corporate governance. Focus is therein attributed to the role of derivative actions in the 
alignment of shareholders’ interests with those of other constituencies within the firm. 
It is illustrated how, by means of compensation and deterrence of misfeasance at a 
board level, derivative actions shelter shareholder interests from both the directors’ and 
fellow shareholders’ opportunism. It is further argued that, by effecting the 
accountability of corporate management, derivative actions assign a stewardship role 
to the shareholder-litigant, to the benefit of all interests involved in the company. 
Lastly, the importance of this form of shareholder protection is assessed from an 
economic perspective.  The first level of assessment looks into the function of the 
derivative action as a means to minimise agency costs and internalise externalities, 
building upon the discussion in the “corporate governance perspective”, as well as it 
examines the implications derivative litigation has on corporate wealth. The second 
level of assessment moves away from the concrete concept of the firm, towards the 
more abstract theme of the market and the economy as a whole. It is argued that 
provisions on derivative actions, as a form of shareholder protection, may determine 
investors’ (prospective shareholders/corporators) confidence in corporate business and 
the equity market, and therefore form part of initiatives and policies in favour of stock 
market development and economic growth.  
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Having identified the importance and the implications of provisions on derivative 
actions and given the jurisdictional focus of this Thesis, a second question suggests 
itself: in which ways and how successfully does the Greek legal framework attempt to 
protect shareholders, in the ways the derivative action is meant to? Addressing this 
question is the task of the second Part of this Thesis. Accordingly, Chapter 3, availing 
itself of the cognitive function of comparative law, compares the laws of two 
jurisdictions providing for derivative actions, with the Greek functional equivalent 
remedy of the corporate action. In essence, this Chapter aims to provide a diagnosis on 
the respective Greek provisions, identifying their problems and comparative 
disadvantages, from the viewpoint of shareholder protection. Studies on derivative 
actions often focus on the respective substantive legal rules, usually found in corporate 
law statutes, as well as rules on allocation of litigation costs and the availability of 
contingency fees arrangements. But there is more to derivative litigation than that. A 
comparative study on this topic needs to consider issues that are usually found 
elsewhere than in the provisions on derivative actions or functionally equivalent 
remedies, in order to illustrate whether this avenue of litigation is a viable option for 
shareholders to protect their and their company’s interests. Such issues include the 
allocation of litigation expenses, waiver and settlement of corporate claims, ratifiability 
of breaches of directors’ duties, as well as access to corporate information. This is 
precisely the approach of Chapter 3, in an effort to provide an accurate and objective 
analysis. 
Nevertheless, rules and practices within a legal system may perform the same or similar 
functions as a rule in another legal system. Therefore, Chapter 4 investigates whether 
the Greek law provides for effective substitute or alternative (to the derivative action) 
mechanisms of shareholder protection, outside the narrow scope of Law 2190/1920 
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article 22b, in order to conclude the task of the second Part of this Thesis. This question 
is answered in the negative, following a comparative analysis on oppression remedies, 
direct shareholder claims, actions challenging the validity of corporate resolutions, as 
well as the ability of shareholders to contractually arrange the conduct of corporate 
affairs. This Chapter also offers an updated view on the levels of shareholder protection 
offered by Greek law, in a comparative and international context. It is illustrated that, 
despite some laudable efforts to make the Greek legal framework more protective, it 
still suffers from comparative disadvantages. The analysis also leads to the conclusion 
that an improvement of shareholder remedies against mismanagement could result in 
an “upgrade” of shareholder protection under Greek law. 
The final question to be poised concerns how the Greek law on shareholder-initiated 
litigation on behalf of the company should be, de lege ferenda. This is the normative 
Part of this Thesis. Chapter 5 avails itself of the diagnosis in Part 2, in order to formulate 
and substantiate its suggestions, envisaging a derivative action that truly lives up to its 
important role in shareholder law.  The proposed framework for a Greek derivative 
action aims to capture the merits of the respective German and UK laws and learn from 
their mistakes whilst, at the same time, duly considers the intricacies of the Greek legal 
system. The structure of and the issues considered in Chapter 5 accord to those of 
Chapter 3.  
Even though the suggestions de lege ferenda purportedly avoid to call for a radical 
review of Greek company law as a whole, the proposed framework markedly distances 
itself from the existing standards on shareholder litigation. It consists of an individual 
shareholder right to sue on behalf and for the benefit of the company, free from 
arbitrary constraints on legal standing. The scope of the cause of action is inclusive, 
aiming to accommodate the enforcement of directors’ duties and the protection of 
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shareholders’ interests. The proposed framework removes barriers from shareholder 
litigation, enabling shareholders to take over pending litigation and allowing suits to be 
brought against the management of connected companies. It prevents wrongdoers from 
keeping their misfeasance concealed, by providing claimants with access to litigation-
related information. Furthermore, it relieves claimants from excessive pecuniary risks, 
by making the company, as the direct beneficiary of the proceedings, the bearer of 
litigation costs by default. Most importantly though, the proposed Greek derivative 
action puts the company’s interests to the fore and respects the organisational structure 
of the company. The court, as a neutral arbiter, is called in admission proceedings to 
weigh the views of claimants and of the company’s board, in order to decide whether 
the suit at hand is important enough for the company to proceed. The Thesis concludes 
in Chapter 6, summarising the findings and the arguments of this research and 
delineating its implications. 
 
 
1.3. The comparative methodology followed by this thesis 
Reference has been made above to the adoption by this study of comparative law as 
methodology. The ensuing paragraphs explain the latter in better detail. In particular, 
they delineate the general approach followed by this research in comparing laws and 
formulating reform proposals, as well as justify and delimitate the jurisdictional 
context.  
 
1.3.1. A functionalist approach 
A common feature among most treatises on comparative law is that they avoid 
prescribing a coherent method of comparative legal research. To an extent, this can be 
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understood in the light of the perception held by many scholars that the latter is a 
method, nothing more. 25 
Nevertheless, a central tenet in comparative methodology, even outside the narrow 
ambit of legal studies, is the need for a “tertium comparationis”; a point of reference to 
which the studied subjects are compared.26 Functionalism identifies a tertium in 
(hypothetical) factual circumstances in need of a legal solution. Functionality thus 
involves contemplating about how the law addresses factual problems.27 Accordingly, 
rules that may differ in their wording may be functional equivalents, in that they 
provide a similar solution to a given problem. Functionalism can be said to have its 
ancestry in social sciences; it followed the precept that social systems should be 
compared on the basis of how they “satisfied certain needs”.28 The “functional method” 
of comparative law, introduced by Zweigert and Kötz, can be considered as the most 
accepted method of legal comparisons.29 
The methodology herein employed is primarily functional. Hence, the analysis selected 
and compared rules on the basis of the functions they perform in the contexts of 
shareholder protection and corporate governance. For instance, it examines how the 
selected jurisdictions protect shareholders from reflective loss and how they address 
certain agency problems, by considering - in tandem with the functional method -, an 
array of functional equivalents. Within the course of analysis, such relatively broad 
questions are followed by more specific ones, such as “how can a shareholder enforce 
                                                          
25 Schlessinger et al (n 24), 1. Comparative law (“Rechtsvergleich”) has been considered a form of legal 
methodology, a “species of law” and a discipline or a science in its own right; see De Cruz (n 21) 231-
2. 
26 M Bogdan, Comparative Law (Kluwer 1994) 60. 
27This definition also reflects Kaden’s description of “Dogmatic comparison” (“dogmatische 
Rechtsvergleichung”); see HC Gutteridge Comparative Law, An Introduction to the Comparative 
Method of Legal Study & Research (CUP 1946), 7. 
28 Mathias M Siems, Comparative Law, (CUP 2014) 25. 
29 M Graziadei, ‘The Functionalist Heritage’ in P Legrand and R Munday (eds), Comparative Legal 
Studies: Traditions and Transitions (CUP 2003) 101. 
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a breach of directors’ duties”, “on what grounds may a shareholder pursue the 
company’s claims” and “what criteria does a claimant have to satisfy in order to enjoy 
legal standing?”.     
 
1.3.2. Legal transplants and the approach followed by this thesis in formulating 
suggestions de lege ferenda 
As stated previously, comparative law is a useful tool for de lege ferenda 
considerations. However, utilisation of the insight offered by comparative law, in the 
form of adoption or “transplantation” of foreign rules, is a much-debated topic. A 
number of academics have found support from early recorded legal transplants in 
exalting the value of comparative research;30 whilst Legrand, somehow controversially, 
claimed that legal transplants are “impossible”.31 
Legrand’s claim is probably right, only as regards legal transplants narrowly defined. 
If we are to conceive legal transplants as the verbatim transposition of a legal rule from 
one legal order to another, without any modifications and with the expectation that the 
transferred rule shall have identical an application in the donee jurisdiction, experience 
shows that such expectation will be frustrated. In this sense, indeed, (successful) legal 
transplants are impossible.32 
The task of the methodology employed in this Thesis instead, is to seek avenues for 
cross-fertilisation of legal thought on the topic of shareholder protection. This is an 
objective clearly discernible from that of legal convergence and harmonisation of laws. 
                                                          
30 Alan Watson, Legal Transplants, (University Press of Virginia 1974). 
31 Pierre Legrande, 'The Impossibility of Legal Transplants' (1997) 4 MJECL 111. 
32 Frederique Dahan and Janet Dine, 'Transplantation for transition -discussion on a concept around 




Essentially, this study constitutes “Applied Comparative Law”.33 The comparative 
considerations have a purpose, a telos, which is the identification of problems in 
shareholder protection and measures the legislature may take to solve the latter, within 
the context of the national company law. From the outset, it is recognised that the 
jurisdictions selected operate in an environment of regulatory competition and it is also 
on this foundation where the normative part of the Thesis is built. As will become 
obvious, the proposed framework for shareholder litigation is neither a verbatim 
transposition of the "better law", nor the result of regulatory "cherry-picking". What it 
is instead, is the synthesis of the elements that - by virtue of the preceding comparative 
analysis in Part 2 - are found to be in tandem with the objectives of effective shareholder 
protection and to be compatible with the principles of Greek Law.  
 
 
1.3.3. The jurisdictional focus of the thesis 
The development and evolution of the laws in question not only are duly considered in 
the analysis herein, but also determined the selection of countries and national rules to 
be compared. Given that the Greek law on public limited companies does not provide 
for derivative actions and that the existing functional equivalent is disused and 
presumed to be problematic, it would make little sense to compare it with a jurisdiction 
where derivative actions have long comprised an every-day phenomenon. In the latter 
case, the law expectedly would be currently focused more in constraining abuse of the 
remedy, than asserting its role in shareholder protection and corporate governance. On 
the contrary, it stands to reason to examine the law of jurisdictions which find 
themselves in an evolutionary stage closer to the Greek one; that is, where recent 
                                                          
33 Gutteridge (n 27) 9. 
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legislative efforts aim to make shareholder litigation on behalf of the company a 
workable and appealing option. Germany and the UK are therefore suitable candidates 
for this research, whereas Delaware is not.  
The analysis concerns comparable legal rules and practices, in the effort to produce a 
meaningful comparative study. Comparability, the compelling yet frustratingly vague 
methodological commandment that “like must be compared with like”, 34 is contingent 
on the focus of the comparison and, more profoundly, intertwined with its purpose.35 
A functional study, as this Thesis is, follows an approach purposive in character. 
Therefore, contrary to contextualist approaches, it focuses more on the objectives of 
the laws under comparison, paying less attention to (yet not disregarding) the general 
cultural context in its search for comparables.  
In any case, the selected countries have been jointly the subjects of various comparative 
legal studies on a broad range of topics, company law included. It is nowadays common 
ground that the selected jurisdictions belong to comparable legal families. Yet, even 
the notion of “legal families” often divides jurisdictions more than they deserve to. 
Considered in a global context, the laws in general and company law in particular of 
the UK, Germany and Greece share a good deal of proximity. They are far closer to 
each other than to many of the central Asian countries for instance. The proximity and 
comparability of the German, Greek and UK legal systems is further reasserted by 
recent research on the categorisation of jurisdictions.36     
                                                          
34 ibid, 73. 
35 Antonios Emmanuel Platsas, The Functional and the Dysfunctional in the Comparative Method of 
Law: Some Critical Remarks, vol. 12.3 ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 
(December 2008), <http://www.ejcl.org/123/art123-3.pdf> accessed12 September 2014. 
36 Professor Siems conducted research based on statistics methodology, the results of which group the 
aforementioned countries in the same cluster; M Siems, ‘A Network-Based Taxonomy of the World's 
Legal Systems’ (2014) Durham Law School Working Paper March 2014 




Some general observations are useful at this point. First, apart from the commonly 
applicable European Union legislation, the sources of law vary among the legal orders 
comprising this research’s domain. In the UK, common law assumes an important role 
as a source of law and often influences the content and application of statutory 
provisions.37 The role of precedent (stare decisis) and the congruent fact that “the life 
of the law has not been logic: it has been experience”, constitute defining characteristics 
of this jurisdiction.38As opposed to the heirs of Westminster, the heirs of Rome do not 
regard precedent to have the status of hard law. 39 In the cases of Germany and Greece, 
precedent mostly serves the role of providing interpretation of the applicable (statutory) 
law. The above basic differences must be kept in mind when reference is made 
hereinafter to the “law”.  
Secondly, the domain of this thesis is shareholder rights protection in public limited 
companies. As such can be defined corporate bodies exhibiting corporate personality, 
freely tradable shares, centralised management and membership based on capital 
contributions with limited liability.40 Therefore, reference will be made to other 
corporate types and formations only when necessary. The first point of divergence 
among the examined jurisdictions lies in that the law of public limited companies is 
encompassed in statutes ad hoc constructed for this purpose in Germany and Greece, 
whereas in the UK a gigantic statute covers limited liability companies more generally 
and reference to public limited companies therein constitutes the exception rather than 
the rule. Further divergence exists from the perspective of numbers of public limited 
                                                          
37 This Thesis focuses mostly on the law of England and Wales. 
38 Oliver W Holmes Jr., The Common Law, 1881, <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/2449/2449-h/2449-
h.htm>1 accessed 15 May 2015 
39Maurice Sheldon Amos, Frederick Parker Walton, Alexander Elder Anton, Amos and Walton's 
Introduction to French law, (Clarendon Press 1963), 4.                                                                                                             
40 Reinier Kraakman, John  Armour, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, 
Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda & Edward Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law A Comparative and 
Functional Approach (2nd edn OUP 2009) 5. 
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companies registered in each country. In Greece, public limited companies are the 
backbone of the economy and for long have constituted the most widespread corporate 
formation. A look at the Greek registry for commercial companies suggests that this 
situation has not changed significantly, despite the emergence and recent popularity of 
the Private Capital Company (IKE).41 In this respect, the Greek corporate landscape 
differs prima facie from the German and UK ones. In the UK, the overwhelming 
majority of companies are registered as private limited companies and in Germany the 
equivalent Gesellschaft mit Beschränkter Haftung (GmbH) has traditionally been the 
most popular.42 However, a closer look at the factual reality reveals that most Greek 
companies registered as public limited ones, exhibit a strong “personal” element, 
drawing thus them closer to the British “ltd”.43 Accordingly, case law in the latter two 
countries on private companies is of comparative interest for this Thesis, to the extent 
that it concerns rules applicable to public companies as well. 
Given that this is a thesis written in English, it encountered the challenge of using the 
same term (in English) for three jurisdictions, even though each one of them speaks a 
different language.44 In the majority of the legal terms examined herein, further 
explanation was redundant, as both the original and the translated term stand for 
                                                          
41 By the time this Thesis was concluded, there were 3,581 registered SAs, 6,184 private limited 
companies (EPE) and 10,349 IKEs; data available online at 
<http://www.businessportal.gr/search_1.php>. IKE is an initiative similar to the German 
Unternehmersgesellschaft (UG) and the French Société par actions simplifiée (SAS). However, one 
should be cautious with the growing numbers in the first years of IKE’s life. The German experience 
showed that a similar trend to opt for the newly introduced corporate type was followed by an equally 
significant number of de-registrations shortly afterwards. Apparently, many incorporators established 
UGn only to avoid the minimum share capital restriction, without having good prospect of running the 
company sustainably; see Heribert Hirte and Christoph Teichmann The European Private Company - 
Societas Privata Europaea (SPE) (de Gruyter 2012), 337; see also Georgios Zouridakis, 'Contractual 
Freedom and the Corporate Constitution; A Study on where Greek Law Stands in a Comparative Context 
and the Way Forward' in David A Frenkel (ed), Selected Issues in Public Private Law (Athens Institute 
for Education and Research 2015) 69ff 
42 See Janet Dine and Marios Koutsias The Nature of Corporate Governance (EE 2013) 275. 
43 To that effect Peiraeus Court of Appeal 277/2005 DEE 2005, 685. 
44 All translations herein were conducted by the author, save for the instances where it is expressly stated 
that this is not the case. 
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identical concepts (e.g. “limited liability”), familiar to lawyers across the world. Often 
though, further explanation of the terminology is offered, as the translation of the 
original word may refer to a narrower or wider notion. 45  
Another challenge was, in admittedly rare instances, to devise an English term for a 
concept not found in UK law, or vice versa; an example being the term “company’s 
actions” (etairikí agogí). “Company’s actions” are considered to be functional 
equivalents of derivative actions (which in turn should translate into Greek as “parágogi 
agogí”).46 Yet, as explained in detail in Section 3.1.2, reference to them as derivative 
actions would be inaccurate and would lead to confusion. 
Overall, "[t]here are certain terms in every system of law which cannot be translated 
into another language simpliciter but must be explained at some length"47 and this 
Thesis duly considered the importance of the use of language and terminology in its 





1.4. The contribution of this study 
This study aspires to bring a breath of fresh air to a highly complex and challenging 
topic of shareholder protection. Considering each of its Sections in concreto, this Thesis 
makes a good number of original claims. Taken as a whole however, much of its 
                                                          
45 M Van Hoecke in M Van Hoecke (ed) Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law  (Hart 
2004) 175; Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Tony Weir tr, 3rd 
edn, OUP 1998) 44 ff; De Cruz (n 21) 222 
46 To that matter see Cypriot law, which provides for a derivative action [exceptions to the rule in Foss 
v Harbottle (1843) 67 ER 189] under this heading; see Theodoros Pirillis and another v. Eleftherios 
Kouis Civil Appeal No. 11387 (2004) 1A S.C.J. 136. 
47 Gutteridge (n 27) 125 
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originality resides in its topic’s temporal and spatial setting and accrues from its 
methodological approach.  
Temporally, this research coincided with a number of significant developments in 
German, Greek and UK law on shareholder claims. To mention but a few, as regards 
Greece, a modest number of decisions on shareholders’ claims for reflective loss and 
the enforcement of directors’ duties has emerged in the past three years. Some of them 
touched upon matters never considered before in case law, whilst others built upon 
existing judicial interpretation of statutory law, sometimes crystallising while other 
times obfuscating its content. Meanwhile in Germany, the discussion on the inadequacy 
of the statutory derivative action culminated into the resolution of the German Jurists 
forum that AktG section 148 on derivative actions has to be amended. In the UK, a line 
of case law has gradually developed regarding the availability of multiple derivative 
actions, settling in a decisive way the dispute in academia on whether shareholders can, 
following the advent of CA 2006, sue on behalf of a connected company. Furthermore, 
the number of decisions on derivative claims under Part 11 of the UK CA 2006 
continued to grow, allowing thus for informed conclusions to be reached regarding the 
judiciary’s attitude towards allowing shareholder claims to proceed, the weight 
attributed to each of section 263 discretionary factors, the procedural intricacies of the 
prima facie stage and the profile of the derivative claimants. These and other 
developments in the studied jurisdictions not only render the analysis herein 
academically interesting, but also differentiate its subject from previous studies, 
comparative or otherwise, on the topic of derivative actions, providing it with a 
significant degree of originality.  
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However, possibly the most original feature of this Thesis resides in its research 
domain.48 It is the first study conducting a profound and systematic comparison among 
German, Greek and UK provisions on shareholder-initiated enforcement of corporate 
claims. So far, most academic works and doctoral theses on the broader subject of 
shareholder protection under Greek law, either considered foreign laws with 
remarkable brevity,49 or picked only one jurisdiction for more detailed legal 
comparisons.50 In any case, an in-depth and systematic comparative study of Greek law 
on the subject of shareholder claims for mismanagement has been missing and this 
Thesis aims to fill this void.  
Accruing from the comparative approach herein espoused is a further element of 
originality, in that this is the first work on Greek company law, at least to my 
knowledge, proposing a framework for derivative actions in elaborate detail and 
substantiated on the insights offered by the German and UK provisions. Thus far, 
suggestions de lege ferenda have occupied only a marginal space in Greek academic 
works, without clear justification on whether and why they are (the most) suitable for 
Greek company law.51 On the contrary, the proposals advanced by this Thesis are the 
product of a meticulous comparative and functional analysis which, by evaluating 
alternatives, substantiates its arguments on why and how Greek company law should 
change on an array of matters relevant to the studied form of shareholder (derivative) 
litigation.  
                                                          
48 On how originality can be attained by means of comparative methodology, see Mathias M Siems 
'Legal originality' (2008) 28 OJLS 147, 151. 
49 A Mikroulea, Scope of Corporate Managers’ Duties and Liability (Nomiki Bibliothiki 2013), A 
Spyridonos, Minority Rights in the Company Limited by Shares, (Nomiki Bibliothiki, Athens 2001). 
50 Vasiliki Stergiou ‘The complex relationship of concentrated ownership structures and corporate 
governance’ (DPhil thesis, The London School of Economics and Political Science 2011). 
51 Derivative actions are usually discussed in Greek academia within broader contexts. An example is 
the very recent work of Mikroulea (n 49), who devotes a chapter in her book on “corporate managers’ 
duties and liability” to briefly consider derivative actions in nine jurisdictions, presenting her de lege 




CHAPTER 2. The right to sue on behalf of the company, 
shareholder protection and corporate governance: the 
importance of an effective shareholder remedy for wrongs 
against the company 
 
2.1. Introduction.  
As illustrated in Chapter 1, derivative actions are gaining ground internationally, being 
considered as a potent means to facilitate enforcement of directors’ duties and 
shareholder protection. However, is this perception justified and, if so, why? What are 
the functions of the derivative action in shareholder protection and what is its 
importance in the broader framework of company law and corporate governance? 
These challenging questions emerge at the very outset of this research. In essence, they 
inquire into the rationale for the shareholders’ right to enforce the company’s claims 
and its role in protecting certain interests.  This Chapter employs three, interrelated, 
perspectives to explain why an effective framework on shareholder protection against 
wrongs done to the company is important.  
The first perspective is discussed in Section 2.2 and concerns the protection of 
shareholders’ proprietary interests. This explains how considerations on property serve 
as the rationale for granting shareholders with rights in the company in general; and 
that the right to sue on behalf of the company in particular assumes an integral role in 
protecting shareholders’ property. The second perspective is that of corporate 
governance, as explored in Section 2.3. This focuses on the role of derivative actions 
in addressing conflicts of interests within the company. It places the issue of protection 
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of shareholder wealth within the theoretical framework of “agency problems”, 
explaining how derivative actions protect shareholders, from which and whose 
behaviour they protect and the relationship between such protection and the interests 
(and, indeed, wealth) of other corporate stakeholders.  The last perspective relates to 
economic efficiency. This is a particularly topical theme, due to the ongoing struggles 
the Greek economy and recent stock market experience. Section 2.4 investigates the 
economic implications of the agency problems which derivative actions seek to 
address. To that end, it considers the role of derivative actions in addressing “agency 
costs” and internalising externalities, and the effects, direct and indirect, derivative 
litigation has on corporate and shareholders’ wealth. It then examines whether 
derivative actions, as a means of shareholder protection, have further macroeconomic 
effects. In doing so, it assesses differing views on the role of shareholder law in 
promoting stock market development, reaching and applying its conclusions to the 
contemporary Greek corporate reality. Section 2.5 summarises and concludes.     
 
2.2. The importance of allowing shareholders to sue on behalf of the company: 
the proprietary perspective 
 
2.2.1. Introduction 
In Greek academia, advocacy in favour of the introduction of derivative actions to the 
legal system is largely based on the premises of protection of shareholders’ property.
1 Derivative actions are viewed as an ingenious device for remedying shareholders’ 
reflective loss; references to jurisdictions which provide for such a remedy often betray 
                                                          




envy for the “better solution”.2 This Section will explain the important role that 
shareholder litigation on behalf of the company assumes in the protection of 
shareholders’ proprietary interests.   
 
2.2.2. Shareholder protection, shareholder rights and private property 
In order to avoid a petitio principii in formulating a position based on the premise of 
shareholders’ proprietary interests, we should consider whether shareholders do 
actually possess property rights by their status as members of the company per se and, 
if so, on which property spheres do they extend to. It is internationally accepted, 
including the jurisdictions studied within this Thesis, that shares are “an item of 
intangible personal property”, representing a variety of rights.3 However, it is not an 
easy task to provide a conclusive definition of the incidents and the precise subject of 
this kind of property. The multiplicity of rights accruing from share ownership 
complicate any such endeavour.4   
                                                          
2 This impression is left by the perusal of Nikolaos K Rokas, ‘Corporate Organisation and Shareholders’ 
Individual Action’, (2007) NH’ EEmpD 1, 18 who, following a (very) brief overview of the European 
and American derivative actions posits that “in Greek practice, particularly in comparison with other 
countries, the ineffective protection of the minority is particularly noticeable” [emphasis added]. 
3 Regarding the UK, see CA 2006, s.541: shares are "personal property [...] and are not in the nature of 
real estate"(in Scotland: moveable property); cf Sarah Worthington, ‘Shares and shareholders:  property, 
power and entitlement: Part 1’ (2001) 22 Comp Law, 258. Regarding Greece, the prevailing opinion is 
that Gr. Constitution, art. 17 protects merely the shareholders’ rights in rem, yet the share as property is 
protected by the ECHR: see Supreme Court Plenary Session 14/1999 DEE 1999, 1017 and Supreme 
Court 795/2000, ΝοV 2001, 1307; A. Alexandropoulou, ‘«squeeze-out» kai nomiká zitímata pou 
anakýptoun apó tin efarmogí tou’  [2008] DEE 404. Regarding Germany, see Grundgesetz, art. 14 
(Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany); to that end the decisions of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court: BVerfG 20.09.1999 ZIP 1999, 1798; NJW 2000, 349 (Walter/Daimler-Benz) and 
BVerfG 23.08.2000 NJW 2001 279; ZIP 2000 1670 (Moto Meter). Regarding the European Convention 
on Human Rights (Annexed Protocol 1, art. 1), to which they are all parties, despite the use of the term 
“possessions”, it is clear that Article 1 is about the right of property, particularly so by looking at the 
travaux préparatoires: see Marckx v Belgium (1979-80) 2 E.H.R.R. 330, 355.    
4 As held in Company S. and T. v. Sweden, no. 11189/84, Commission decision of 11 December 1986, 
DR 50,  138: “a company share is a complex thing. It certifies that the holder possesses a share in the 
company together with the corresponding rights. This is not only an indirect claim on company assets 
but other rights, especially voting rights and the right to influence the company, may follow the share”.  
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In legal terms, shareholder “ownership” of the corporation and its assets is, at best, 
“indirect”.5 Any contrary assertion6 is hard to reconcile with the fundamental principle 
of company law: that the company is a person distinct from its members and is therefore 
the proprietor of its own assets and the subject of its own liabilities (the separate juristic 
personality principle;7 in German: Trennungsprinzip; in Greek: archí tis aftotéleias tou 
n.p.).8 Therefore, unlike the members of unincorporated business formations, the 
shareholders’ sphere of property is, abuse notwithstanding, clearly distinguished from 
that of the company’s.9 The oft-cited example in Greek literature, that the sole 
shareholder of the company commits a criminal misdemeanour when damaging an 
asset of the company, so illustrates.10 The decision of the Athens Court of Appeal, 
according to which not even the sole shareholder of a company can sue for a loss 
suffered by the latter, draws the same conclusion.11 It follows that neither the 
corporation nor its assets form the item of shareholders’ property in law and therefore 
                                                          
5 See Supreme Court Plenary Session 14/1999 DEE 1999, 1017 and Supreme Court 795/2000, ΝοV 
2001, 1307. 
6 Cf the opinions of Paddy Ireland ‘Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership’ (1999) 62 
MLR 32 and Reinier Kraakman, John  Armour, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gerard 
Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda & Edward Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law A Comparative and 
Functional Approach (2nd edn, OUP 2009) 14. 
7 Known under common law as the rule in Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1896] AC 22 
8 As is under German Law “bound for the purpose of business” (Zweckbindung des 
Gesellschaftsvermögens); see also Greek Supreme Court, 1285/1980EEmpD LB’ 394, 397.   
9 Under exceptional circumstances, the corporate personality may be overridden and shareholders can 
be held personally liable. “Piercing the corporate veil”, as per the English legal jargon, dates back to the 
exceptions to the rule in Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1896] AC 22 and is common to the subsequent 
case law in Greece (indicatively: Greek Supreme Court Plenary Session 2/2013 DEE 2013, 321) and 
Germany (indicatively: BVerfG, BVerfGE 13, 331 and BGH, BGHZ 20, 4; NJW 1956, 785). For a 
comparative perspective, see Georgios Zouridakis, ‘Tortious liability of parent companies - some 
thoughts in light of the recent English case law and a comparative law overview’ [2015] DEE 990. The 
recognition by the law of the fact that shareholders are capable of (ab)using the corporate form as a 
façade, concealing the true owners of the corporate assets and/or the true debtors, shows that there is an 
element of truth in the notion of “indirect ownership” of the firm.  
10 Evanghelos Kourakis, ‘Division of Share Capital in Shares’ in Evanghelos Perakis (ed), Sociétés 
Anonyme’s Law, (3rd edn, Nomiki Bibliothiki 2013) 552. Similar example is provided by common law: 
R. v. Phillipou [1989] Crim. L.R. 559; see Janet Dine 'Fiduciary duties as default rules, European 
influences and the need for caution in the use of economic analysis' (1999) 20 CoLaw. 190, 191  
11 Athens Court of Appeal 924/1998 Dikaiosyni 1999, 407. 
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shareholders are not afforded the ordinary legal remedies for property infringement 
regarding corporate assets.  
Shareholders may not own the company from a legal perspective, but they undeniably 
own their shares. The share is protected as an item of property not only in the 
jurisdictions examined by this Thesis, but also under the ECHR.12 It represents the 
membership of its holder in the company and confers a bundle of rights (or powers),13 
exercisable against others.14 It is this aggregation of rights - which may vary not only 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and company to company, but also among the shares 
of the same company - that defines the shareholding’s status and value as property, as 
well as the protection thereof. An important implication of this view is that the level of 
protection afforded by law to shares, due to their status as property, will accord to these 
different “species” of rights and their importance in the shareholding. Thus, it is 
acceptable for a minority to be squeezed out of the company and be compensated for 
the financial value of their shares, even though their participation rights are in such a 
way nullified.15 
                                                          
12 See footnote (n 3). 
13 See Evanghelos Perakis, Contractual Restrictions of the Shareholder’s Voting Right (1976) 100, 
viewing the share as enshrining a single right to membership, from which various powers stem; see also 
BGH, BGHZ 90, 92, 95.    
14 Brenda Hannigan seems to arrive at a similar conclusion in 'Altering the articles to allow for 
compulsory transfer - dragging minority shareholders to a reluctant exit' [2007] J.B.L. 471, 489, 491. 
For the theory according to which property consists of bundles of rights, exercisable against others, see 
A.M. Honoré, ‘Ownership’, in Guest A G. (ed), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (OUP, 1961), 113. W 
N Hohfeld proposes a slightly different construction of the bundle of rights theory, in ‘Fundamental 
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1916) 26 Yale LJ 710. This theory is particularly 
useful regarding intangible property, as the approaches on what constitute rights in rem cannot reflect 
the practical and conceptual complexity of many forms of intangible property and particularly financial 
instruments. See discussion in Zachary Douglas, Joost Pauwelyn and Jorge E. Viñuales, The 
Foundations of International Investment Law: Bringing Theory Into Practice (OUP 2014) 370ff.  
15 This issue has been considered by German case law. See BVerfG, BverfGE 14 263, 276ff (Feldmühle); 
BVerfG, BverfGE 100, 289, 301ff (DAT/Altana); BVerfG 23.08.2000 NJW 2001 279; ZIP 2000 1670 
(Moto Meter). For the Greek (concurring) perspective see I Papadimopoulos, ‘Ta dikaiómata tou 
squeeze-out kai tou sell-out ypó to fos tis Odigías 2004/25/EK schetiká me tis dimósies prosforés 
exagorás’ [2005] DEE 396. 
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The fact that shares are an item of property helps explain the extent to which the share 
is protected against expropriation and why a minimum array of rights is necessary for 
the logical (and legal) construction of the share as such an item. However, in order to 
comprehend the full scope, rationale and purpose of shareholder participatory and 
monitoring rights, we have to consider the close interrelationship between the two, 
otherwise distinct spheres of property: that of the company and that of shareholders.  
Investment in shares is temporally indefinite16 and its returns are uncertain and 
contingent upon the profitable running of the company.17 Accordingly, a share may 
contribute to its holder’s wealth if, for example, it is sold for a price greater than it was 
purchased for, or if dividends are paid to it. But these primary forms of financial return 
depend on the performance of the company; if the company suffers losses, then the 
shareholders’ investment suffers too, either yielding no dividends or diminishing in 
value. It is the unique dependency of the enjoyment of share property on the status of 
corporate property, which helps explain the scope, rationale and importance of 
shareholders’ rights. The administration of corporate property (and therefore the 
latter’s fortunes) rests on its organs, which are comprised of a certain number of 
persons. These persons, however, may (and often do) take decisions - negligently, 
recklessly or in order to benefit at the expense of the company – which, by damaging 
the company, diminish or even eradicate share property. It follows that the enjoyment 
of share property absolutely depends on decision-making at the micro-level of the 
company. Absent of any right to partake in or monitor the administration of corporate 
affairs, investing in shares would be an irrational option due to its residual character 
                                                          
16 This indefinite character of investment in shares comes in contrast with the finite life of humans and 
therefore renders, along with the low ranking of shareholders in insolvency proceedings, the right to the 
proceeds in the liquidation of the company a very uncertain right as to its enjoyment.  
17 From this perspective only, shareholders possess merely a “chose in action”, as pronounced in 
Colonial Bank v Whinney [1886] AppCas 426, (FitzGerald LJ). 
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and the uncertainty involved in its dynamic nature, at least compared to other forms of 
investment.18 Creditors, for example, have claims of a value stipulated independently 
from the fluctuations in corporate value, claims that become due (and enforceable) at a 
contractually specified point in time, insolvency notwithstanding, on terms that cannot 
be unilaterally changed by the company’s management. If investing in shares loses 
rationality, then the very purpose and nature of the corporation as a capital company 
(i.e. an institution created to accumulate capital contributions) is frustrated. On the 
other hand, shareholders can be expected to have the incentive to see the company do 
well, due to this proprietary dependency. From a certain perspective, these 
considerations provide the shareholders’ rights, both proprietary and administrative in 
character, with a doctrinal justification. 19 
Therefore a share constitutes a complex item of property, whose value enjoyment 
depend on the property of another (juristic) person, distinct from the shareholder. This 
dependency explains the rationale behind and the importance of shareholders’ rights. 
On a different reading, the previous paragraphs suggest that the protection of 
shareholders’ proprietary interests can only be effective if it addresses the detrimental 
effects that expropriation of or damage to the corporate property may have on their 
shares. Due to the interdependence between the two spheres of property - the share and 
the company - the law’s objective of protecting the share as an item of property may 
be frustrated, if the company is left prey to the malicious intents of those seeking to 
achieve private benefits at its expense. Rights to participate in the administration of 
corporate affairs may assist in this respect, principally in a preventive manner, by 
ensuring that the persons at the helm of the company are trusted by the shareholders to 
                                                          
18 See Ross B. Grantham, 'The doctrinal basis of the rights of company shareholders' (1998) 57 CLJUK 
554, 583. For an institutionalist perspective, see Oliver Williamson, 'Corporate Governance' (1983-84) 
93 Yale L.J. 1197, 1210, 1227   
19 Grantham (n 18), ibid. 
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preserve and grow corporate wealth and by reserving part of the corporate decision 
making directly to the latter. The preventive potential of shareholders’ (participatory) 
rights is of great significance in non-listed companies, where the effects of 
dissatisfactory governance cannot be avoided by nimbly switching companies. 
However, when damage to corporate property has occurred, litigation emerges as the 
primary option to protect either or both spheres of property. Nevertheless, the company 
itself may not litigate, particularly in cases where its centralised management is liable 
for the proprietary damage. Accordingly, the derivative action, being the right to litigate 
on behalf of the company, emerges as a prima facie potent and important element of 
shareholder protection. In order to better comprehend its importance, we shall now 
focus on the inability of shareholders to sue on their own behalf for damage suffered 
by the company. 
 
2.2.3. Setting the boundaries of shareholders’ property protection: the “no 
reflective loss principle” 
The principle that shareholders cannot litigate on the grounds of their “reflective loss" 
(in Greek: “anaklastikí zimía”; in German: “Reflexschäden”) is commonly accepted 
across jurisdictions.20 What the shareholders may view as damage suffered by their 
investment is not recoverable by direct action, unless the damage of the shareholder’s 
property resulted directly from the wrongdoing. Accordingly, if someone, including 
the company’s directors (by breach of the directors' statutory duties or otherwise), 
damages the company, the entity vested with the right to sue is normally the company; 
                                                          
20 For a comparative study, see Bas J. De Jong, ‘Shareholders' claims for reflective loss: a comparative 
legal analysis’ (2013) 14 EBOR 97. Regarding Germany, see Theodor Baums, ‘Ersatz von 
Reflexschäden in der Kapitalgesellschaft‘ [1987] ZGR 554; regarding England, see Stephen Griffin, 
'Shareholder remedies and the no reflective loss principle - problems surrounding the identification of a 
membership interest' (2010) 6 JBL 461; regarding Greece, see Konstantinos G Pampoukis, ‘Liability of 
corporate directors for shareholders’ reflective loss’ (1995) A’ EpiskED 333. 
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not the shareholders. The adverse effect the wrongdoing may have on stock property is 
considered reflective of the loss suffered by the company; it may amount to a drop in 
the (market) value of the shares (particularly if listed), lower expectation to dividend - 
the importance of which cannot be overstated in non-listed companies - or restricted 
access to the proceeds of liquidation.21  
The inability of shareholders to achieve redress for their reflective loss seemingly runs 
contrary to what was previously discussed as the rationale for shareholder rights and 
protection, namely the share as an item of property. However, the “no reflective loss 
principle” sits comfortably with the orthodox perception of shareholders’ property and 
its relation with that of the company. The underlying rationale behind the rule is based 
on the fundamental principle, in company law, of separate legal personality.22 In 
corporations, where members are not equated with the company itself, the former 
cannot receive compensation owed to the latter. Within the Greek legal context, this 
becomes apparent from the reoccurring wording in court decisions: 
In such cases of a damaging act or omission against the legal 
person […] the claim for compensation belongs only to the legal 
person suffering direct loss […], which is exclusively entitled to 
bring the action […]. The individual shareholders of the 
company, if they have suffered losses, which may consist of a 
decline in the market value of their shares, the diminution of their 
                                                          
21 See also Christina Livada, "Filing of company claims against the members of the Board of Directors" 
in Perakis (n 8) 1018-1019; Gower & Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law, 9th edn, edited by 
Paul Davies and Sarah Worthington (Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) 664; Uwe Hüffer, Aktiengesetz, (Zehnte 
Auflage C.H. Beck 2012) 637. 
22 It follows that in cases where this principle does not or should not apply, according to the judging 
court, then direct recovery may be possible for the shareholders, who in this case voluntarily attempt to 
“pierce the veil” in order to establish their position as the wronged persons and therefore acquire legal 
standing to sue. See Agrotexim and Others v. Greece (A/330) (1996) 21 E.H.R.R. 250 [65]. 
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real value or the distribution of lesser dividend […] do not have 
a parallel claim for compensation for this loss.23 
A similar, if not identical, view is undertaken by English law. As stated by Lord Millett 
in Johnson v Gore, Wood & Co:  
A company is a legal entity separate and distinct from its 
shareholders. It has its own assets and liabilities and its own 
creditors. [...] If the company has a cause of action, this is a legal 
chose in action which represents part of its assets. Accordingly, 
where a company suffers loss as a result of an actionable wrong 
done to it, the cause of action is vested in the company and the 
company alone can sue.24  
Setting aside the doctrinal basis for the no reflective loss principle outlined above, it 
has to be noted that any proposal to allow direct shareholder claims for reflective loss 
would have a multiplicity of adverse effects and lead to controversies, in theory and in 
practice.  
First, recovery directly by the shareholders would deprive the company of its own 
respective right. Such deprivation would prejudice not only the rest of the members, 
but also corporate creditors; voluntary or not.25 The “no reflective loss” principle can 
thus be said to serve the maintenance of corporate capital.26 Even though it can be 
argued that the remaining shareholders could join the action, since they suffered 
                                                          
23 Athens Single-Member Court of First Instance 9669/2014 DEE 2014, 1055, 1056. This wording 
appears also, indicatively, in Greek Supreme Court 1888/2005 DEE 2006, 392; Athens Court of Appeal 
5864/2011 DEE 2012, 468; Athens Court of Appeal 252/2007 EpiskEmpd 2007, 558; Thessaloniki Court 
of Appeal 2500/1994 Armenopoulos 1995, 1424; Athens Court of Appeal 3469/1991 EEmpD 1993, 424. 
The wording originates from Greek Supreme Court, 1285/1980EEmpD LB’ 394, 397. 
24 [2000] UKHL 65 [2002] 2 AC; at [61]. Lord Millett repeated his position in Waddington Ltd v Chan 
Chun Hoo Thomas [2009] 2 BCLC 82. 
25 See concurring rationale in BGH 20.03.1995, BGHZ 129, 136, 166, (Girmes). 
26  This concurs with the German decisions BGH 10.11.1986 ZIP 1987; 29 WM 1987 13, 16 and BGH 
11.07.1988 ZIP 1988, 1112, 1115. 
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damage arising from the same wrong, this is not always easy or profitable; and, in any 
case, this argument does not consider the adverse effects direct recovery by 
shareholders may have on the interests of creditors of any sort.  
Direct recovery of corporate losses by shareholders could also result in double recovery 
and double jeopardy (“Doppelschaden”); the wrongdoer might have to compensate 
twice for the same wrong and shareholders would benefit not only directly by their 
recovery, but also indirectly by the company recovering its losses.27 Furthermore, such 
a possibility would frustrate the organisational distribution of powers within the 
company. In Greek and German literature, shareholders’ individual direct action for 
reflective loss is primarily precluded on the premises of the strict delimitation of powers 
within the company and the character of shareholders' membership; investment in 
shares follows the fortune of the company, the latter being placed in the hands of 
directors.28 If shareholders were allowed to sue directly for their reflective loss, on the 
same factual grounds as the company, then the board would be deprived of their power 
to run the company effectively.29 In this respect, the continental views and the common 
law approach coincide.30 In British literature and case law, the argument is that the 
power to manage and distribute the company’s assets is normally vested to the board,31 
and - where permitted by law or contract – to shareholders acting collectively; any 
receipt of compensation in advance of the company would amount to a de facto 
distribution that bypasses the core corporate characteristic of centralised 
                                                          
27 The oft-cited English decision supporting this argument is Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co [2000] UKHL 
65; [2002] 2 AC 1; [2001] 2 WLR 72; [2001] 1All ER 481. For the German and Greek concurring legal 
perspectives see Hüffer (n 21), 511 and Pampoukis, “shareholders’ reflective loss” (n 20), 338. 
28 See Eleftherios Levantis, Commercial Law: Companies with Limited Liability, (Ant. Sakkoulas Edt, 
Athens, 1998) 560; Hüffer (n 21) 637. 
29 To that effect the German decisions: BGH, BGHZ 94, 55, 58ff; BGH, BGHZ 105, 121, 130ff. 
30 The English decision in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No2) [1982] Ch 204, 
224 (Brightman LJ) illustrates this point succinctly: “[w]hen a shareholder acquires a share he accepts 
that the value of his investment follows the fortunes of the company”. 
31 See B Hannigan, ‘Drawing boundaries between derivative claims and unfairly prejudicial petitions’ 
[2009] JBL 606, 613. 
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management.32 Johnson is illustrative of how direct recovery of reflective loss would 
frustrate this organisational structure: 
If he (Mr Johnson) were allowed to do so then, if the company's 
action were brought by its directors, they would be placed in a 
position where their interest conflicted with their duty; while if 
it were brought by the liquidator, it would make it difficult for 
him to settle the action and would effectively take the conduct of 
the litigation out of his hands.33 
A final point is that bypassing the no reflective loss principle could potentially frustrate 
the company’s interests as a whole. This returns to the argument against depriving the 
company of its claim, but extends well beyond that given the damage litigation may 
cause to the business.  For example, litigation may incur bad publicity for the company 
in cases where the board sits in court as a defendant; this is a cost to be borne by the 
company and not offset by the litigant shareholder’s direct recovery. It is a strong 
argument that some (corporate) claims are better left not litigated and it is precisely for 
this reason that shareholders may not always sue even on behalf of the company. We 
will revisit this issue in Chapter 3. 
 
2.2.4. Synthesis: shareholders’ property, reflective loss and the importance of 
being able to litigate on behalf of the company 
The no reflective loss principle leaves shareholders dependent on the company to 
litigate its cause of action and thus achieve recovery for their losses. However, in cases 
where the company does not pursue its claims, the shareholders’ loss remains. In view 
                                                          
32 Gower & Davies’ (n 21) 664. 
33 [2000] UKHL 65 [2002] 2 AC, [66] (Millet LJ). 
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of the earlier discussion about the rationale for shareholder rights residing, at least in 
part, in the protection of shareholders’ proprietary interests, it becomes evident that this 
rationale is largely frustrated if the shareholders’ arsenal of rights cannot address such 
situations. The no reflective loss principle can lead to injustice, a fortiori if adherence 
to the rule creates an impasse in cases where the competent corporate organs are 
indifferent, negligent or even in conflict of interests regarding the prospect of 
litigation.34  
Let us now focus on the last point. As explained above, one of the doctrinal bases for 
the no reflective loss principle is the organisational structure of the company. However, 
from a proprietary perspective, this structure may fail its cause if the authorised bodies 
do not promote the proprietary interests of the company. In most jurisdictions the 
authority to pursue these interests, and litigate on behalf of the company, normally rests 
with the board(s) of directors. This is the case under the Greek law on public limited 
companies, whereby the board is granted a general (delegable) power of representation 
by statute,35 and its power and duty to litigate on behalf of the company is expressly 
stipulated in law.36 However, the board may opt against bringing a claim, particularly 
in instances where the damage suffered by the company resulted from their 
wrongdoing. In view of the possibility that an omnipotent board would deplete 
corporate and shareholders’ property and remain unpunished, the authority to litigate 
corporate claims is shared with other corporate organs. Accordingly, in all three 
jurisdictions considered by this Thesis, the shareholders’ assembly - the GM - enjoys 
competence to decide whether corporate claims are litigated; particularly when they 
                                                          
34 This is the prevalent opinion in Greek academia. See Rokas ‘Corporate Organisation’ (n 2) 16. For the 
German, concurring, perspective see Baums, ‘Ersatz’ (n 20) 561. 
35 L. 2190/1920 art. 18 & art. 22.  
36 Ibid, art 22b (1).  
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consider claims against the board.37 Germany goes a step further, adding an extra organ 
competent to litigate such claims, namely the supervisory board.38 In a similar vein, 
independent directors are gaining popularity across jurisdictions;39 from a legislative 
point of view, this trend can be evidenced in the requirement to have independent 
directors in listed companies under the Greek Law on Corporate Governance.40 
Nevertheless, this strategy does not always yield satisfactory results for the company 
and its shareholders.  The board may be unwilling to litigate claims against its 
members. A dual board structure on the other hand does not in itself provide a solution: 
particularly if the supervisory board itself appointed the delinquent management board, 
as the German experience shows.41 Independent directors do not have a good record in 
pursuing corporate claims42 and neither is the GM’s authority always sufficient in 
protecting shareholders’ property.  In cases where ownership of the shares is widely 
dispersed - and therefore voting power is demarcated - shareholders suffer from a 
collective action problem.43 Even in cases where this problem is overcome, due to the 
concentration of voting power in the hands of a few, injustice may still occur, as it is 
                                                          
37 Regarding Greece: L. 2190/1920, art. 22b (1). Regarding Germany: AktG, s. 147. Regarding England: 
The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/3229), Model Articles For Public 
Companies, arts. 3 & 4; Alexander Ward & Co Ltd v Samyang Navigation Co Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 673 
(but see also John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw [1935] 2 KB 113). 
38 Indicatively: Rokas ‘Corporate Organisation’ (n 2) 14; Hans C Hirt, The Enforcement of Directors' 
Duties in Britain and Germany: A Comparative Study with Particular Reference to Large Companies 
(Peter Lang 2004) 262ff. On the influence and the implications of this model at EU level see Janet Dine 
'Implications for the United Kingdom of the EC Fifth Directive' (1989) 38 ICLQ 547, 548-550 
39 Indicatively: Arad Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance: Theory and Operation, 
(OUP 2007). 
40 L.3016/2002, art. 3. 
41 See, among many others, Klaus J Hopt, ‘Die Verantwortlichkeit von Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat: 
Grundsatz und Praxisprobleme – unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Banken’ [2013] ZIP 1793, 
1794. 
42 Special Litigation Committees exhibit similar “solidarity” to directors; see John C. Coffee, Jr 
‘Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement 
of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions’ 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669, 721: “On the evidence to date, 
it appears that these committees almost invariably recommend to dismiss derivative suits”. 
43 Reisberg (n 39) 26; Kraakman et al (n 6) 62; Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public 
Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard University Press 1965).  
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these few who appointed the board; their acquiescence in the wrongdoing is a genuine 
possibility. 
Accordingly, if the board composition and the majority rule do not work towards 
protecting the company’s proprietary interests, the right of shareholders to achieve 
redress for their reflective loss, as is the derivative action, assumes an important role in 
the protection of their property. The absence of this right, in such cases, denies 
shareholders access to justice to protect their proprietary interests, creating a void 
hardly reconcilable with the ratio of shareholders’ rights and protection resting on the 
dependency of their interests to those of the company. This restriction of access to 
justice raises in turn further legal concerns, as the latter - apart from constituting a 
human right44 - is protected constitutionally at a national level.45 
These considerations are particularly relevant for Greece, as evidenced by the 
multiplicity of court decisions dismissing shareholders’ claims on the grounds of the 
“no reflective loss principle”. This “trend” has gained momentum since the early 
eighties and continues, with slight detractions, to this date.46 By fate or coincidence, it 
                                                          
44 ECHR art. 6 (right to a fair trial). Also of relevance is ECHR art. 13 (right for an effective remedy).  
45 Art. 20 Greek Constitution. Concerns about the shareholders’ access to justice under Greek law have 
been voiced by Athanasios Liakopoulos, Zitímata emporikoú dikaíou IV (Sakkoulas 1997) 179, 188, 189 
and Georgios Mentis, ‘Liability of Corporate Administrative Organs for Investor’s Loss’ in Minutes of 
the 11th Panhellenian Conference of Greek Corporate Lawyers (collaborative work), The Societe 
Anonyme and the Stock Market. The Protection of the Investor (A. Sakkoulas edt. 2003) 105. 
Notwithstanding the validity of these arguments under Greek Constitutional Law (which has yet to be 
attested before the Greek Courts), the contention of some Greek academics, that the absence of a 
shareholders’ right to bring an action in respect of damages suffered by the company constitutes a 
violation of ECHR art. 6, was dismissed in Agrotexim and Others v. Greece (A/330) (1996) 21 E.H.R.R. 
250 [73]; despite the dissenting opinions of Judge Walsh and four Commissioners which, by and large, 
resonate with the views of the aforementioned Greek academics. However, the ECtHR did not consider 
in this case - for procedural reasons (ibid [75]) - whether such violation or a violation of art.13 ECHR 
exist when neither the company “nor its shareholders ha[ve] any remedy whatsoever” against the 
wrongdoers (ibid [74]). Anyhow, such considerations would probably make no particular difference in 
the particular case, as the Court found that the liquidators performed their tasks diligently (ibid [70]).  
46 Athens Single-Member Court of First Instance 9669/2014 DEE 2014, 1055, 1057; Athens Court of 
Appeal 877/2014 DΕΕ 2014 505, 506; Athens Court of Appeal 5864/2011 DEE, 2012, 468; Piraeus 
Single-Member Court of First Instance 3884/2011 EEmpD 2012, 684; Thessaloniki Court of Appeal 
2399/2005 EpiskEmpD 2006 486; Greek Supreme Court 1888/2005 DEE 2006, 392; Athens Court of 
Appeal 924/1998 Dikaiosyni 1999, 407; Greek Supreme Court 1405/1998 DΕΕ 1998, 972; Thessaloniki 




also happens that Greece sat as defendant in the leading case on the subject before the 
ECtHR, Agrotexim.47 The explanation for this undesirable phenomenon resides mainly 
in the unavailability of an existing remedy against maladministration, functionally 
equivalent to the derivative action, to shareholders owning a small portion of the 
company’s share capital. As will be explained in Chapters 3 and 5, legal standing in 
such cases is, for questionable reasons, severely restricted and the whole procedure is 
cumbersome and unappealing to shareholders.48 Further explaining the magnitude of 
the problem of reflective loss is the incapacity of other shareholder rights under Greek 
law to provide remedy and act as alternatives to the derivative action, as explained in 
Chapter 4.  
Adding to the importance of the right to sue on behalf of the company, in protecting 
shareholders’ property, is the fact that it uniquely provides this function, leaving the 
“no reflective loss principle” intact. The direct beneficiary of any award is the 
company, not the shareholder-litigants. Double jeopardy is avoided and both the 
maintenance of corporate capital and the separate legal personality are respected. Apart 
from adherence to doctrinal orthodoxy, this characteristic of derivative litigation has 
important practical implications. First, the complications regarding the computation of 
the shareholders’ loss are avoided. Assessment of the damage on shareholder property 
caused by a wrong to the company is challenging, particularly regarding the calculation 
of the losses suffered by members individually.49  Derivative actions strike this problem 
at its heart, as by remedying the company as a whole - and thus shareholders 
                                                          
47 Agrotexim and Others v. Greece (A/330) (1996) 21 E.H.R.R. 250. 
48 See Chapters 3 and 5.  
49 This computation has puzzled some Greek academics. See for example Pampoukis, “shareholders’ 
reflective loss” (n 20), who views the shareholders’ reflective loss as one of an uncertain value, due to 
the residual character of the shareholders’ investment; cf Lucas Kokkinis, ‘I zimía ton metóchon kai i 
apokatástasí tis. Sképseis me aformí tis AP Ol 14/1999 kai AP 795/2000’ (2002) 6 DEE 574. Kokkinis 
supports the idea that the shareholders’ reflective loss is nothing else than the difference between the 
proprietary value of the share prior to and following the event of the wrongdoing.   
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reflectively - the need to compute is eclipsed. Furthermore, a derivative claim provides 
compensation not only to the claimant, but also to all fellow shareholders. As such, 
derivative actions are a means of collective redress, similar to class actions.50 In the 
contrary case of a direct claim for reflective loss, any award directly to the shareholder-
claimants would entail the danger of prejudicing both the proprietary interests of the 




The primary conclusion is that the shareholders’ right to achieve redress for wrongs 
done to the company assumes an integral role in the protection of their property. Due 
to the dependence of the latter on a different sphere of property - that of the company’s 
- and the impasse resulting from the “no reflective loss principle” regarding judicial 
redress for their losses, the shareholders’ right to sue on behalf of the company emerges 
as a necessary element in an effective framework of protection. Moreover, a derivative 
suit has the merit of not frustrating the “no reflective loss principle”; a rule based on 
solid doctrinal grounds and worthy of respect. Derivative suits also protect shareholders 
collectively, avoiding the pitfall of protecting the interests of some equity holders to 
the detriment of others. Lastly, it was illustrated that the need for derivative litigation 
emerges in cases where the corporate organs entrusted with the administration of the 
company’s property do not act. The next Section focuses on this last point, from a 
different standpoint: that of (enforcement of) responsible corporate governance 
practices. 
                                                          
50 Paolo Giudici, “Representative Litigation in Italian Capital Markets: Italian Derivative Suits and (if 
ever) Securities Class Actions” (2009) 6 E.C.F.R. 246, 249; Theodor Baums and Kenneth E. Scott, 
‘Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously? Corporate Governance in the United States and Germany’ 
(2005) 53 Am.J.Comp.L. 31, 50. 
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2.3. The importance of allowing shareholders to sue on behalf of the company: 
the corporate governance perspective 
 
2.3.1. Introduction 
In corporate governance literature, an oft-invoked justification for derivative actions is 
their role in addressing “agency problems”.51  The notion of agency problems has 
assumed a prominent position in the study of shareholder law and corporate governance 
since its emergence in economics literature in the mid-seventies.52 As an explanatory 
mechanism, they provide valuable insight for legal research, as they highlight the intra-
corporate conflicts of interest and provide a framework of analysis.53 The task of this 
Section is to explain what they are, how derivative actions and functionally equivalent 
rules relate to them and why the latter shareholder remedies have the potential of 
assuming an important role in corporate governance: one that goes beyond shareholder 
protection and becomes, essentially, a public good. 
 
                                                          
51 “Agency” in economics does not necessarily coincide with the homonymous legal term. According to 
Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure’, (1976) 3 J. Financial Econ. 305, 308: “We define an agency relationship as a 
contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform 
some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent.” 
52 Indicatively: Eugene F. Fama, 'Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm' (1980) 88 Journal of 
Political Economy 288. 
53 As an explanatory mechanism, “agency problems” retain their suitability for legal analysis even under 
the perception of the company as a real entity (cf the “legal fiction” assumption of Jensen and Meckling 
‘Theory of the Firm’ (n 51) 310, 311), because they focus on the intra-corporate relations underlying the 
legal and organisational structure of the company. Concurring Lia Athanasiou, Shareholders’ activism 
and corporate monitoring (Nomiki Bibliothiki 2010). 
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2.3.2. The management-shareholders agency problem: derivative actions as a 
means of shareholder protection 
The modern corporation has the distinctive characteristic of centralised and delegated 
management. Shareholders, being members of the company, entrust the administration 
of the corporate property with the board, thereby ceding control of the company to the 
directors and officers. Centralised management provides experienced, specialised, 
swift and efficient decision making at corporate level: this would be impossible if the 
multitude of members had to convene for every corporate decision. It also enables 
shareholders to pursue other ventures and/or invest in a multiplicity of companies, by 
relieving them from the time and other costs involved in corporate decision-making.54 
Shareholders therefore hand the fortunes of their investment to a management they 
perceive as efficient, basing their decision on reputation, the past and prospective 
profitability of the company and, in the case of listed companies, market performance. 
Of course, when these considerations do not apply, as in single-member entrepreneur-
owned companies, shareholders expectedly take the helm of the firm themselves. 
All this is hardly new for a corporate law study, but these considerations are essential 
for understanding the substratum of the first agency problem examined herein, namely 
the one related to the conflicts of interest between the management and the 
shareholders. Akin to an agency relationship, shareholders being the (indirect) owners 
of the firm - the “principals”, entrust the promotion of their interests to the corporate 
decision-makers - the “agents”.55 The “management-shareholders agency problem” 
refers to the divergence of pursued interests between those principals and agents.  
                                                          
54 Mike Wright, Donald S. Siegel, Kevin Keasey, Igor Filatotchev, The Oxford Handbook of Corporate 
Governance (OUP 2013) 99. 
55 Jensen and Meckling (n 51) 308. 
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Reference to the relevance of the “agency theory” to the thesis of Adolf Berle and 
Gardiner Means, on the “separation of ownership and control” in the “modern 
corporation”, has become a cliché in the study of corporate law, but a few words are 
necessary.56 Much of the analysis in the Modern Corporation and Private Property 
focuses on the observation that, in companies showcasing diffuse share ownership, 
those who have their stakes in the company do not run it, whilst the converse is equally 
true;57 to put it otherwise, directors and officers administer, in the words of Adam 
Smith, “other people’s money”.58 Why this observation is valid and relevant from a 
legal perspective is obvious, in light of the preceding discussion and explanation in 
Section 2.2 regarding the shareholding’s dependency on corporate property. What 
aggravates the disparity between ownership and control in diffuse share capital 
structures are the practical difficulties for any control to be exerted on the management, 
due to the collective action problems shareholders face. Hence, directors and officers 
in the “Berle and Means Corporation” enjoy sizeable power and privilege: they control 
the company and shareholders’ wealth, while being de facto situated beyond and above 
the latter constituency’s reach.  They are presented with opportunities to enrich 
themselves, to the detriment of the company and the shareholders, and in the absence 
of any monitoring, lack the incentive to provide quality services.  
In an effort to address this agency problem, the law imposes rules and standards of 
behaviour upon corporate decision makers.59 Rules refer to the outright prohibition of 
                                                          
56 Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (first published 
1932; Macmillan 1962). 
57  Franck Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard 
University Press 1996), 91 argue that the less the corporate management’s wealth is tied to the company, 
the less they are expected to run the latter efficiently. 
58 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (R.H. Campbell, A.S. 
Skinner and W.B. Todd eds, first  published 1776, Clarendon Press 1976) 741. 
59 This is the “standards strategy” in corporate governance; Kraakman et al (n 6) 39, 40. For the 
application of this strategy on shareholder litigation see Hirt (n 38) 63ff. 
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certain activities or the prescription of actions to be taken in given circumstances.60 
Standards on the other hand are more open-ended and usually come in the form of 
director’s duties, as they are pronounced in company law statutes;61 further - usually 
more precise - standards of conduct may be found in Corporate Governance Codes, 
whether as a matter of mandatory law or soft-law.62 Focusing on directors’ duties, the 
effort to address the management-shareholder agency problem is all too obvious in 
jurisdictions where the company’s interests are conceived as those of shareholders as a 
whole, present and future. This is because the basic directors’ (fiduciary) duty, the duty 
of loyalty in the positive sense, is pronounced as the duty to promote the 
interests/success of the company, placing the corporate interests above their own 
individual ones; in doing so, directors are expected to exhibit certain levels of diligence 
(duty of care). But even in jurisdictions where shareholders do not enjoy such 
exclusivity, their interests form part of the corporate ones.63 Accordingly, despite the 
fact that directors’ duties are typically owed to “the company”, the ultimate (and often 
exclusive) beneficiaries of the duties are the shareholders. 
However, within both rules and standards strategies an essential component is 
enforcement.64 The management cannot be expected to abide by these standards simply 
because of its goodwill. Every human being, including the people ultimately deciding 
                                                          
60 Kraakman et al (n 6) 39. 
61 E.g. directors’ duties as applicable under Greek law, L.2190/1920 art 22a; under German law AktG, 
ss 93, 116; under the UK CA 2006, ss. 170-177. 
62 E.g. the UK Corporate Governance Code and the German Corporate Governance “Kodex” (available 
at: <http://www.dcgk.de//files/dcgk/usercontent/en/download/code/2015-05-
05_Corporate_Governance_Code_EN.pdf> accessed 12 August 2015), both soft law in nature and 
following a comply-or-explain approach; cf Greek L. 3016/2002 on Corporate Governance, which is 
mandatory in nature. 
63 The perception that the company’s interests refer to the company as an abstract, autonomous entity 
has been pronounced most prominently by Otto von Gierke Das Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht 
(Wissenschaftliche Buchgemeinschaft 1954; first published in 1868) and Walther Rathenau Vom 
Aktienwesen – Eine Geschäftliche Betrachtung (1917). This view is not generally followed in academia 
and deservedly so, as beneath the company lies a socio-economic phenomenon.   
64 Kraakman et al (n 6) 40. 
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and acting on behalf of the company, carries their own perfections and imperfections. 
It is to be expected that some directors and officers, at some point in time, will take 
advantage of their power positions in order to promote their individual interests, to the 
detriment of others involved in the corporate business.65 
Enforcement of directors’ liability can and does come from various sources. The public 
enforcer has an interest in ensuring that the controllers of the company do not act 
against the law, particularly in view of the impact corporate decision-making has on 
the economy and society. However, the public enforcer has neither the infrastructure, 
nor the political fiat in liberal Western economies, to closely observe the conduct of 
corporate affairs and intervene in every case where the management-shareholders 
agency problem gets out of hand. Even in jurisdictions with the reputation of strong 
public enforcement of corporate governance, authorities are mainly concerned with the 
securities market and therefore their monitoring is limited to the companies listed 
therein.66 In any case, close state supervision of the broader spectrum of corporate 
activity would be impractical in economies with tens of thousands of registered 
corporations, such as the economies forming the study area of this Thesis.  This would 
necessitate vast amounts of public funds and large numbers of personnel in order to 
have any effect.67  
Another source of enforcement may be a body of monitors within the board structure 
of the company. Looking at the company laws of different jurisdictions, we observe 
that executives answer to the board of directors; independent (non-executive directors) 
                                                          
65 These are known in economic terms as “agency costs”. I do not refer here exclusively to a breach of 
the duty of loyalty; in discharging their duties in a negligent manner and in breach of the duty of 
care/diligence, the corporate management also promotes its own interest, as they place less effort in their 
work while maintaining their position (shirking).  
66 This is the case with Australia and its national Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC). See 
also Alexandra Mikroulea Scope of Corporate Managers’ Duties and Liability (Nomiki Bibliothiki 
2013) 290 
67 See also John Coffee Jr, ‘Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as 
Bounty Hunter Is Not Working’ (1983) 42 Md. L. Rev. 215  
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members are put in place and, in some cases, supervisory boards are assigned with the 
task of monitoring the management.68 The main problem with this strategy is that those 
monitors have, at best, as much a stake in the company’s performance as the 
management. Their exposure to opportunities for taking advantage of the company may 
be minimal compared to that of the management (as they have the task of monitoring 
rather than managing), but at the same time they have no material incentives to prevent 
the latter from exploiting their power position.69 On the contrary, they have good 
reasons to not displease the persons at the helm of the company, as they would if they 
embroiled them in litigation. The monitors’ career prospects depend - or may at some 
point in time depend - on those who may stand as defendants. The market for the 
services of corporate management and directorship is a narrow one; those who may 
assume office as monitors may later run a company and vice versa. This may be true 
not only for independent directors, but also (even more so) for members of supervisory 
boards, where applicable.70  
The derivative action, being an enforcement mechanism, suggests itself as an important 
part of a strategy to address the agency problem between management and 
shareholders. It does so in two ways. First, it is a means of compensating directly the 
company and, indirectly, the shareholders. As was explained in Subsection 2.2.4, the 
derivative action has the benefit of remedying shareholders’ reflective loss en masse, 
along with safeguarding other corporate constituencies’ interests, as any reward goes 
to the company rather than the claimant. The effect of this function of the remedy 
obviously takes place ex post facto, as does any form of compensation.  
                                                          
68 E.g. UK CGC B.1.2 (2014), requiring half of the board to be comprised of Non-Executive Directors 
(NEDs) in FTSE 350 companies. 
69 Wolf-Georg Ringe ‘Independent directors: after the crisis’ (2013) 14 EBOR 401, 417-418. 
70 Klaus J Hopt in Klaus J Hopt, Hideki Kanda, Mark J Roe, Eddy Wymeersch and Stefan Prigge, 




The second function of the derivative action in corporate governance is more 
complicated and, as elaborated in the next Section, is similarly – if not more - important 
than the compensatory function. The threat of enforcement, so far that it is a credible 
threat, deters misfeasance on the part of those running the company. This tenet, quite 
familiar to the criminal lawyer,71 has an application to civil matters within the corporate 
context that is well discussed in academia72 and evident in the ratio legis of modern 
legislation.73 Accordingly, the persons in charge of the corporation have reasons to 
abstain from wrongful behaviour, in view of the possibility that they will be punished. 
“Punishment” within the context of corporate governance should not be understood 
under the narrow prism of compensating the damage caused to the company, but 
instead should be perceived to include further effects, such as the reputational damage 
incurred by the defendants in such litigation.74 Those in control of the company have 
thus a disincentive to behave opportunistically in view of the possibility of being 
“punished” (prevention), and in cases where an action has successfully been brought 
against them, to avoid behaving in such a way again (recidivism). Deterrence can also 
be said to be reinforced by the accumulation of relevant precedent. Actions brought by 
shareholders not only signal that misfeasance does not go unpunished, but also help 
clarify the boundaries of acceptable behaviour in the administration of corporate 
affairs.75 The deterrent effect of shareholder litigation enforcing directors’ duties can 
thus be seen as taking place ex ante, despite the fact that litigation is a corporate 
governance mechanism operating ex post.76  
                                                          
71 Indicatively, Dan M Kahan ‘Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence’ (1997) 83 Va. L. Rev. 
349. 
72 E.g. J D Cox 'Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as boundaries for Derivative Suit Procedures', 
(1984) 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 745; John Coffee Jr, ‘New Myths and Old Realities: The American Law 
Institute Faces the Derivative Action’ (1992-1993) 48 Bus. Law. 1407, 1428ff. 
73 Coffee ‘New Myths’ (n 72) 1428, referring to the ALI’s Principles of Corporate Governance s. 7.10(b). 
74 ibid, 1437. 
75 Reisberg (n 39) 53. 
76 ibid, 51. 
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A counterargument to the deterrent function of derivative actions may be the existence 
of Directors’ and Officers’ (D & O) Liability insurance schemes. Indeed, having the 
company pay for insurance raises the possibility of moral hazard on the part of the 
management, as it effectively shelters their private wealth from the financial 
consequences of their wrongdoings. On balance though, D & O insurance enhances the 
prospects and magnitude of compensation.77 Furthermore, it would be a misstatement 
to say that all sorts of misconduct are covered by insurance, in practice or by law. Fraud, 
dishonesty and wilful illegality are usually exempted, not only because of insurance 
practices, but also because the law so prohibits on the grounds of public policy.78 In 
fact, insurance can be viewed as a complement to the safe harbour for business decision 
making set by the Business Judgment Rule, protecting negligent decisions taken in 
good faith, which fall outside the ambit of the latter exemption from liability. 
Moreover, misconduct may well translate into an increase in insurance premia, an 
unwelcome event for the company, which may weigh heavily against directors. Lastly, 
any argument that D & O insurance nullifies deterrence completely disregards the 
reputational damage litigation may have on the management and its deterrent effect.   
For these reasons, D & O insurance can be held to have marginal adverse effect on the 
role of derivative actions in shareholder protection and corporate governance. 
 
2.3.3 The minority shareholders- majority shareholders agency problem: 
derivative actions as a means of minority protection 
The considerations outlined above are relevant to the Greek Corporate Governance 
landscape. To begin with, accountability of corporate directors is a long standing 
                                                          
77 Deirdre Ahern ‘Directors' duties: broadening the focus beyond content to examine the accountability 
spectrum’ (2011) 33 D.U.L.J. 116 
78 This is the case under Greek law; see analysis (with comparative considerations on German Law) in 
Mantha Varela ‘I kálypsi tis améleias sti genikí asfálisi tis astikís efthýnis’ [2008] DEE 412 
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problem for Greece, one that can be accounted for by the lack of an effective 
shareholder remedy against directors’ misfeasance and the absence of a “genuine” 
derivative action. An influential Greek academic whose contribution to the study of 
Greek company law and whose impact is impossible to overstate, summarises the 
problem in a few lines:  
Two are the essential elements for the sustainable operation of 
public limited companies: substantial oversight and activation of 
the provisions for civil liability of members of the BoD. [...]In 
Greek practice of corporate law, precisely these two crucial 
points are the most disused. In particular, rare are the judicial 
decisions dealing with the issue of directors' liability, even rarer 
to the point of non-existence are the ones ordering directors to 
compensate.79 80    
Despite being published more than a decade ago, this observation retains its relevance. 
The volume of reported decisions on the enforcement of directors’ duties has remained 
low in the past two decades.81 In view of the problematic construction of the statutory 
provision on the enforcement of directors’ duties, as explained in Chapter 3, this is an 
expected phenomenon.  
Absence of civil liability litigation does not mean that misfeasance does not occur. This 
concern bears relevance in the German context too, as can be deduced by Chancellor 
Merkel’s declaration in 2008, in which she asserted that statutory rules on directors’ 
                                                          
79 N Rokas, ‘comments on Athens Multi-Member Court of First Instance 4831/1992’ [1993] EEmpD 
596 
80 See Georgios Zouridakis ‘Introducing Derivative Actions in the Greek Law on Public Limited 
Companies: Issues of Legal Standing and Lessons from the German and UK Experience’ (2015) 26 
ICCLR 271 
81 A review of the most comprehensive legal database reveals that since 2005, less than 20 decisions 
have been reported. See also Annex I. 
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liability are practically unused.82 Germany has been struck by various corporate 
scandals over the years, the most recent being the Volkswagen gas emissions debacle.83 
Allegations and complaints for directors’ misfeasance in the Greek context may not be 
of such a magnitude to attract frequent international media attention, due to the small 
size of the national economy, yet they exist and they are numerous.84 Notable examples 
of proceedings attracting extensive domestic media attention include the claims related 
to the Greek bubble-stock saga in 199985 and a recent series of litigation against the 
boards of several Greek Banks, such as the Hellenic Postbank86 and Proton Bank.87 The 
Proton Bank case is an exquisite example of the inadequacy which the applicable 
framework exhibits on the enforcement of directors’ duties in allowing shareholders to 
achieve redress for their losses; this issue is further discussed in Chapter 4. 
Enforcement of directors’ duties is an existing problem for Greek law, yet its roots are 
not identified in the separation of ownership and control in the given national context. 
The management-shareholders agency problem, as defined above, has only limited 
                                                          
82 Declaration by Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel, Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksachen und Protokolle 
[BT] 16/181, Oct. 7, 2008; see also Gerhard Wagner ‘Officers’ and Directors’ Liability Under German 
Law — A Potemkin Village’ (2015) 16 (1) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 69, 71. Cf Klaus J Hopt ‘Die 
Verantwortlichkeit von Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat: Grundsatz und Praxisprobleme – unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der Banken‘ [2013] ZIP 1793, 1794.  
83‘Why Volkswagen’s share price has fallen so far’ The Economist (21 Sep 2015) 
<http://www.economist.com/news/business-and-finance/21665452-18-billion-fine-not-carmakers-
only-worry-why-volkswagens-share-price-has-fallen-so> accessed 25 Sep 2015. 
84 A notable exception is that of the “Koskotas” scandal in the nineties (where $ 210 million disappeared 
from the Bank of Crete), which made the cover of Time magazine (13/3/1989). 
85 “The “bubble” period of the ASE coincided with repeated instances of fraudulent practices and 
corporate scandals”, claim Apostolos Dasilas and Stergios Leventis, in ‘Corporate Governance, 
Dividend Status, Ownership Structure, and the Performance of Greek Seasoned Equity Offerings’ (2013) 
20 International Journal of the Economics of Business 387, 390. Forty-two defendants were recently 
acquitted in criminal proceedings before the Athens Three-Member Criminal Court of Appeal, on 
allegations of market manipulation. Proceedings before the Greek Supreme Court against the appellate 
decision are pending at the time of completion of this Thesis; see Kollia Eleftheria ‘Areios Págos gia 
metochés- foúskes: Oi dikastés den ángixan tin ypóthesi «Chastoúki» to skeptikó tis aítisis anaíresis apó 
to anótato dikastírio’ To Vima (Athens 15/03/2014)  
< http://www.tovima.gr/society/article/?aid=577096> accessed 1 Oct 2015. 
86 See Ioanna Mandrou, ‘Se díki 35 átoma gia ta dáneia ekatommyríon evró tou T.T.’ Kathimerini 
(Athens 30/09/2015) <http://www.kathimerini.gr/832828/article/epikairothta/ellada/se-dikh-35-atoma-
gia-ta-daneia-ekatommyriwn-eyrw-toy-tt> accessed 1 Oct 2015. 
87 See Athens Single-Member Court of First Instance 12468/2012 EEmpD 2012, 275 and Athens Single-
Member Court of First Instance 9669/2014 DEE 2014, 1055.  
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relevance for Greek companies. The reason for this is that very few companies are 
diffusely owned and, in the international context, Greece exhibits high levels of share 
ownership concentration.  LaPorta et al. provided the first available comprehensive 
empirical evidence of the ownership structure of Greek firms, studying the largest 20 
listed corporations in the Athens Stock Exchange in 1999. Their results showed that 
almost two-thirds of them were owned by block-holders (mainly families), 30% were 
state-owned whilst the remaining 5% were diffusely owned.88 Comparatively, the study 
showed that Greece stood in the extreme of ownership concentration, exhibiting higher 
levels than most continental European countries, including Germany and Italy, whilst 
the UK and other Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions stood at the opposite extreme with high-
level share ownership diffusion.89 Later country-specific studies by Greek scholars 
show that ownership concentration has remained high during the past decade.90  
Of course, we should not overlook the fact that the few companies with diffuse 
ownership have large capitalisation and are important participants in the Greek market 
and economy as a whole.91 Another factor that should not be ignored is the projected 
privatisation of most of the state-owned Greek companies, which may have the effect 
of shifting the ownership paradigm, by introducing a multiplicity of institutional 
investors. In all three Memoranda of Understanding on structural economic reforms 
                                                          
88 Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, 'Corporate Ownership Around the 
World' (1999) 54 The Journal of Finance 471, 493; statistics at a 10% shareholding cut-off. 
89 ibid. The UK exhibited 90% of studied firms being widely held, the percentage for Germany being 
35% of firms studied. 
90 Panayotis Kapopoulos and Sophia Lazaretou ‘Corporate Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: 
evidence from Greek firms’ (2007) 15 Corporate Governance: An International Review 144, 147; 
Loukas J Spanos, “Corporate Governance in Greece: developments and policy implications”, (2005) 5 
Corporate Governance: the International Journal of Business in Society, 15, 22. 
91 The most diffused listed corporations are those active in health services, financial services and 
construction; see Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (n 90) 155.   
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Greece has signed with its lenders, extensive privatisations have been agreed and some 
have already taken effect.92  
Yet, in order to properly comprehend the lack of enforcement of directors’ duties in the 
Greek Corporate Governance context and the importance of an effective minority 
shareholder remedy, we should switch focus to the other agency problem, namely that 
which exists between majority shareholders and minority shareholders (the “majority-
minority agency problem”). In concentrated ownership, shareholders owning 
significant blocks of the share capital are perceived to be able to both monitor and 
influence the management.93 Control of the company thus remains with shareholders, 
or more precisely some shareholders. Their ability to influence management has the 
potential not only of minimising the management-shareholders agency problem, but 
also of disenfranchising minorities, by virtue of decisions taken - at least typically - at 
board level. 
As illustrated previously, directors’ duties are owed to the company and thus to 
members as a whole. Adherence to directors’ duties therefore serves the purpose of 
minority protection, as the term “members as a whole” excludes the discriminatory 
placement of some intra-corporate interests above others.94 It so follows that a breach 
of duty may arise despite directors serving the interests of some shareholders, even if 
the latter hold the majority of the shares. In concentrated ownership structures, directors 
may act to the detriment of the company and hence against the interests of minority 
shareholders, only to serve the (conflicting) interests of the majority. They have good 
incentives to do so. Majority shareholders appoint and remove directors, have a 
                                                          
92 Including the most recent in 2015 (at the time of conclusion of this thesis: “Paragraph C”; available 
online <http://www.taxheaven.gr/laws/law/index/law/705> and NOMOS database). 
93 See Andrei Shleifer and Robert W Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’ (1997) 52 The Journal 
of Finance 737. 
94 As Evanghelos Perakis observes in Rights of Minority Shareholders, (Bruylant 2004) 33, the principle 
of equal treatment flows naturally from the directors’ duty of loyalty. 
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decisive say on their pay and seek to be closely involved in the administration of 
corporate affairs, as a large part of their private wealth is bound with the fortunes of 
the company.95 It is also not so rare for the majority shareholder to reserve a key 
position on the board for himself, where ownership concentration is high.96   
However, majority shareholders do not always think and operate under the criterion of 
benefitting the company as a whole. Their power position presents them with the 
opportunity to extract private benefits, at the expense of all others involved in the 
company. Having subdued the corporate board to their will, they can expect the board 
to actively effectuate or, at least, forebear their opportunistic behaviour. Conversely, 
opportunism on the part of the management as a whole, to the detriment of minorities, 
is easily facilitated when the only constituency left to be persuaded not to hold them 
liable is a familiar – and often amicable - majority. In such cases, those primarily 
affected by such behaviour – and consequently having the incentive for seeking 
prevention and remedy thereof - are minority shareholders. It so follows that the 
efficacy of the derivative action much depends on its availability to minority 
shareholders, as this would entail practical difficulty for delinquent directors to 
“greenmail” a multiplicity of shareholders not to sue.97 
These considerations lead by necessity to the conclusion that the enforcement of 
directors’ duties is of significant relevance to the majority-minority agency problem. 
This is why derivative actions are construed as an individual or minority shareholders’ 
right, even in jurisdictions with concentrated ownership. This rationale can also be 
traced in the fact that in such jurisdictions, the scope of defendants in a derivative action 
                                                          
95 So suggests behavioural economic theory; see Martin Gelter and Geneviéve Helleringer, 'Lift not the 
veil! To whom are directors' duties really owed?' [2015] U. Ill. L. Rev. 1069, 1117. 
96 Empirical studies in the Greek context affirm this assertion. Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (n 90) found 
significant correlation between block-ownership and shareholder-held positions in corporate boards. 
97 See also Subsection 5.3.1.  
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often extends to persons exerting influence on decision making at board level.98 It 
follows that derivative actions aim to address either the management-shareholder 
agency problem or the majority-minority issue, or both scenarios, depending on the 
given corporate ownership context. The remedy focuses on control of the company 
effectuated at board level and the effects that the conflict of interest between those in 
control and the company may have on shareholders as a whole, irrespective of whether 
these effects originate in the pursuit of private benefits by the board, majority 
shareholders or both. Accordingly, the compensatory and deterrent value of derivative 
actions retains relevance in concentrated ownership structures. The wording employed 
above, using terms such as “those in control of the company” instead of “the directors”, 
was not a stylistic touch; rather, it was a deliberate choice to show that these functions 
of derivative actions fit within the contexts of both agency problems. 
Given the concentrated ownership structure of Greek companies and in light of the 
above considerations, the need for an effective remedy against director’s misfeasance 
in the Greek corporate legal context is significant. This is particularly so in view of a 
recent decision by the Greek Supreme Court, published only a few months prior to the 
completion of this Thesis.99 Even though the only (short) commentary available thus 
far is authored by one of the litigating attorneys, Professor Skalidis, its perusal leads to 
worrying conclusions from a corporate governance perspective, as does the fact that 
the wording of the decision allows for such interpretations to have taken place (at least, 
it cannot be seen to refute them).100   
The Court held that the authority to decide whether the company’s claims against its 
directors are litigated or not, rests exclusively with the body of shareholders; unless the 
                                                          
98 E.g. the German AktG, ss. 147 (1), 148 (1).  
99 Greek Supreme Court 320/2015 DEE 2015, 531. 
100 Lefteris Skalidis, ‘Three issues of corporate lawsuit in limited companies (Autonomous exercise by 
the board of directors. Joint and several liability. Statute of limitations)’ (2015) 4 DEE 305, 307.  
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directors damaged the company in fault.101 The decision thus upheld the Larissa Court 
of Appeal102 rejection of the claim brought by the chairman of the board of directors, 
on the grounds of lack of legal standing.103 The Supreme Court therefore seems to 
suggest that, absent a shareholders’ initiative - be it a majority GM resolution or a 
petition by shareholders representing 10% of share capital- the board or members 
thereof are unable to pursue a claim against negligent directors.104 However, the fact 
that in this case the litigating chairman of the board acted under his broad statutory 
powers of representation, without being prior authorised “either by the board or the 
GM”, obfuscates the ratio decidendi.105  
Greek Private Law does not follow the common law’s approach of binding authority 
of judicial precedent. Therefore this decision may not be followed by other courts in 
the future, or it may at least be further clarified -as should be the case in my opinion. If 
the contrary happens and courts follow an interpretative approach that denies corporate 
boards the power to decide upon litigation against their delinquent members, there are 
reasons for concern. First, in the few companies where ownership is somewhat 
dispersed, the GM cannot always be expected to be alert and willing to champion the 
company’s interests, due to the collective action problems, information asymmetry and 
rational apathy. Second, this decision puts to question the raison d'être of independent 
directors, at least regarding their ex post monitoring capacity. Third, in companies 
where ownership is highly concentrated, this decision paves the way for block-holders’ 
unquestionable dominance, by eliminating any prospect of their or their affiliated 
directors’ accountability. Greek companies may have thus become, by virtue of the 
                                                          
101 Greek Supreme Court 320/2015 DEE 2015, 531, 532. 
102 No 284/2014 (unreported). 
103 Greek Supreme Court 320/2015 DEE 2015, 531, 533. 
104 ibid, 532; Skalidis (n 100).  
105 ibid, 532. The Chairman’s powers of representation accrued from the Law on the Operation of Bus 
Services, L. 2963/2001 art. 26.  
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Supreme Court’s decision, the undisturbed playground for delinquent directors and 
anyone with a majority equity stake, particularly in view of the practical unavailability 
of any derivative remedy to individual and minority shareholders.106  
  
2.3.4. The corporate controllers-stakeholders agency problem: derivative actions 
as a public good 
There is currently a reignited discussion on whether the third agency problem in 
corporate governance, concerning the management and non-shareholder 
constituencies, should be “internalised” in the standards of behaviour designated for 
management.107 In legal jargon, the issue is whether the interests of the company, the 
subject of the directors’ duty of loyalty, should be perceived to coincide with those of 
its shareholders or whether the interests of other constituencies should be included. 
Even though “corporate interests” constitute a core, yet often vague in its content, 
concept of corporate governance, there is certainly no uniformity of definition, neither 
among academic views, nor within the definitions given by different jurisdictions.108 
Accordingly, in some countries the company’s interests are equated with those of its 
shareholders,109 whilst in others the interests of the company are co-defined by those 
of various stakeholders.110 For sure, most jurisdictions nowadays distance themselves 
from the strict and complete disregard of non-shareholder interests, while at the same 
time reserving a special place for (long-term) shareholder value in defining corporate 
                                                          
106 See Chapter 3. 
107 The discussion’s origins in the US can be traced in Merrick E Dodd Jr 'For Whom are Corporate 
Managers Trustees' (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145. 
108 The topic has been extensively discussed by Janet Dine and Marios Koutsias, The Nature of Corporate 
Governance (EE 2013); Michael Galanis and Alan Dignam The Globalization of Corporate Governance 
(Ashgate 2013). 
109 Shareholder primacy/supremacy is perceived as a characteristic of the US and, particularly, the law 
of Delaware 
110 The most commonly referred example is that of Germany; see Dine and Koutsias (n 108) 272-275. 
Similar observations apply to French law and Chinese law. 
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interests. National laws can be said to be converging on this matter, yet differences in 
detail and emphasis pertain.111  
The UK CA 2006, section 172 (1) now pronounces that the board has to consider a 
range of stakeholders in promoting the “success of the company for the benefit of its 
members as a whole”, in the long term.112 Whilst the precise content of this provision 
has not yet been satisfactorily clarified by the judiciary, it resonates a move towards an 
“Enlightened Shareholder Value” approach,113 prescribing consideration of other 
stakeholders’ interests in the course of running the company, up to the extent that such 
consideration accords to the pursuit of corporate profit, value maximisation and 
therefore shareholders’ – present and future - benefit.114 However, the fact that only 
shareholders fall under the definition of “members” within the company law statute, 
has led academics to conclude that shareholders remain the point of focus for corporate 
management under the statutory duties.115  
Similarly, the prevailing – if not undisputed - view in academia and case law regarding 
Greek company law, perceives the company’s interests to be its long-term profitability 
and sustainability, for the benefit of the members.116 Of course, the precise content of 
terms such as “sustainability” within the context of directors’ duties is a long-standing 
issue of academic debate, going beyond the scope of this thesis; however, for the 
                                                          
111Mathias M Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law (CUP 2008) 178-182 aptly observes that 
convergence takes place on two levels: both in law and in practice. 
112 See also UK Corporate Governance Code, A.1 (2014) 
113 Both title and content of the ESV are reminiscent of Professor Jensen’s “Enlightened value 
maximization” and “enlightened stakeholder theory”; see Michael C. Jensen, 'Value Maximization, 
Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function' (Apr., 2002) 12 Business Ethics Quarterly 
235. 
114 Gower & Davies’ (n 21) 542 
115 Gower & Davies’ (n 21) 542; Dine and Koutsias (n 108) 183 
116 Georgios Triantafillakis, To Symféron tis Epicheírisis os Kanónas Symperiforás ton Orgánon tis AE 
(Sakkoulas 1998)122; Harris E Apostolopoulos The Business Judgment Rule and the challenge of the 
firm’s insolvency (Nomiki Bibliothiki, 2014) 16; Eleni Karamanakou Shareholders’ Fiduciary Duties 




purposes of the argument advanced in this Section some remarks can be made. The 
emphasis on the long-term perspective can also be identified in the European 
Commission’s objectives117 and the OECD’s guiding principles118 and is said to 
consider the benefit of all stakeholders in the company, as only in a prosperous business 
can the persons dealing with and involved in it prosper themselves.119  As in the UK, 
Greek company law does not seem to allow corporate decisions to disregard 
shareholders. Rather, it recalibrates the content of the protected shareholders’ interests 
within the ambit of general directors’ duties, so as to fit a prudent running of the 
corporate business (which, for instance, may permissibly decide against prospects of 
short-term profit if so demanded by the company’s long-term strategic planning of 
growth), whose purpose remains closely interrelated to the benefit of shareholders 
(namely corporate profit and the augmentation of corporate value). Of course, these 
considerations do not apply for companies established for non-profit or non-
commercial purposes, up to the extent permissible by national company law and the 
numerus clausus of corporate forms and types.  
On the other hand, Germany, despite being regarded traditionally as the example of 
corporate pluralism, is observed to be moving towards a more shareholder-orientated 
paradigm.120 The voices in academia favouring a more shareholder-friendly approach 
                                                          
117 See European Commission, Action Plan: European Company Law and Corporate Governance - A 
Modern Legal Framework for More Engaged Shareholders and Sustainable Companies, Brussels, 12 
December 2012, COM(2012) 740/2; Commission Recommendation 2014/208/EU of 9 April 2014 on 
the quality of corporate governance reporting (‘comply or explain’ ) [2014] OJ L 109/43. 
118 G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance <http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Corporate-
Governance-Principles-ENG.pdf> accessed 21st November 2015. 
119 See also Jensen ‘Value Maximization’ (n 113) 236. 
120 Siems Convergence (n 111) 178-180. Galanis and Dignam (n 108), in their general advocacy for an 
inclusive approach lament that, in the aftermath of the global financial and economic crisis, Germany is 
“in the crossroads” instead of leading the way towards what they perceive to be the appropriate response 
to the problem. 
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are growing stronger and recent reforms reflect this viewpoint.121 This does not deny 
that other stakeholders’ interests, and particularly those of employees, are no longer 
considered independently under German company law. Rather, it demonstrates that 
shareholders are enjoying increasing priority within the context of German corporate 
governance, from academic, statutory and factual points of view. 
Therefore, the enforcement of directors’ duties, as long as it aims to align their 
behaviour with “corporate interests”, protects –or, at least, aims to protect- the interests 
of all constituencies included in the definition of the latter term. Accordingly, 
derivative actions can be said to attain a broader social value than merely protecting 
shareholders. Semble, this conclusion involves a contradiction: a corporate 
constituency, whose (short-term) interests might conflict with the rest, is perceived to 
champion the interests of all constituencies. A closer look on the nature of derivative 
actions resolves this conundrum. 
 It is true and reasonable that the underlying motive behind derivative litigation can 
generally be expected to be compensation of the claimant’s reflective loss, as explained 
in Section 2.2. However, the final arbiter in shareholder-initiated derivative litigation 
is the court and derivative actions are brought on behalf of the company, not the 
shareholder-claimant. Accordingly, in cases where the complained behaviour relates to 
alleged breaches of directors’ duties, only the court will judge whether such breaches 
occurred and should be remedied.  Given that the duties sought to be enforced are owed 
to the company and that the content of these duties is defined in and by the law, courts 
can and should be reasonably expected to reach a decision not on the basis of the 
claimant’s underlying interests and motives, but instead on the basis of the interests 
                                                          
121Academic views and legislative trajectories be considered as interdependent. Academia influences 
legal drafting, something evident from the impact that leading German professors’ reports had on 
UMAG, as well as from the assignment of the drafting of Law 3604/2007 to a group of Greek scholars.  
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protected by virtue of directors’ duties.122 Therefore, if the behaviour complained for 
ran against a particular interest of (some) shareholders, such as the short-term 
maximisation of their investment’s value, but did not run against the company’s 
interests as they are defined by law, then courts ought to reject the derivative claim. In 
this case, derivative actions have the effect of protecting the right-holder’s welfare to 
the extent that other corporate constituencies are not adversely affected. Conversely, 
directors’ behaviour against the company’s interests, even where the statute defines 
them as coinciding with those of shareholders, may often affect all persons involved in 
the company. This might be the case where such behaviour directly affects corporate 
assets, or where directors’ negligence is such that their decisions put the corporate 
business in danger. The compensation achieved on behalf of the company and the 
effected disciplining of the wrongdoers, if litigation is successful, achieve a benefit 
enjoyed as much by shareholders, as by employees, suppliers, creditors etc.  
It follows that the ultimate recipients of judicial redress within the ambit of the 
enforcement of the directors’ duties may well extend beyond the claimants and 
shareholders in general. Therefore the “bundling of atomistic individual interests and 
the observance of diffuse or corporate interests on the part of the shareholders” is 
attempted by the law.123 This consideration is reflected in the Germanic doctrinal basis 
for the derivative claimant as a Gesetzliche Prozessstandschafter; that is, the procedural 
steward, on behalf of the company, by virtue of law. Derivative actions can thus be 
viewed as enabling - or even ascribing - a stewardship role on shareholders. The 
successful exercise of right to enforce directors’ duties - by bringing an action on behalf 
of the company - thus becomes a public good, enjoyable not only by shareholders 
                                                          
122 Cf the interests protected by other shareholder rights and remedies, such as the right to dividend and 
the unfair prejudice remedy, which are closely connected with the protection of individual shareholders.  
123 Anne van Aaken ‘Shareholder Suits as a Technique of Internalization and Control of Management: 
A Functional and Comparative Analysis‘(2004) 68 RabelsZ 288, 289. 
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2.4. The economic implications of derivative actions 
2.4.1. Introduction 
Section 2.3 focused on how derivative actions and functionally equivalent rules relate 
to issues of corporate governance, as foregrounded within general academia by 
economists. This Section takes a step further and seeks to discover the economic 
implications of this kind of shareholder-initiated litigation. It first examines the 
economic effects of derivative litigation on a corporate level. To that end, it shows how 
the function of derivative litigation as a minimiser of agency problems translates in 
economic terms and whether it yields tangible economic results. The discussion moves 
to the macroeconomic implications an advanced (and competitive) framework for 
shareholder protection may have. The focus of the analysis is the potential of legal 
provisions on shareholder protection to operate as a drive for market and economic 
development. This section will evaluate the different positions regarding the matter 
(hereinafter referred to as “the causality issue”), in order to reach its own conclusions.  
The objective is to examine whether reasons of economic efficiency call for an effective 
and internationally competitive national legal framework on shareholder remedies. 
                                                          
124 Van Aaken (n 123) 317-18. 
75 
 
2.4.2. Agency costs, related economic perspectives on intra-corporate conflicts of 
interest and the role of derivative litigation 
In economics, agency problems entail costs for the parties.125 Following the discussion 
in Section 2.3, it is no surprise that much of the advocacy for derivative actions rests 
squarely on the arguments surrounding the existence of “agency costs” and the role of 
law in minimising them. As succinctly put by Posner:  
The derivative suit is a monument to the problem of agency 
costs; it would make no sense to allow a shareholder to bypass 
the corporate management in bringing a suit against an officer if 
one could be confident that management always acted in the 
shareholders’ interests126 
Jensen and Meckling identified three kinds of “agency costs” within the firm, alongside 
the costs for incorporation: monitoring costs, incurred by the shareholders to constrain 
the management/controller’s opportunism; bonding costs, incurred by the 
management/controller to assure shareholders of not frustrating their interests; and 
residual loss, namely the decrease in welfare experienced by the shareholders due to 
the divergence of interests with the management/controller, in an action or omission of 
the latter.127 
The role of derivative actions in addressing the last type of costs can be adduced by the 
analysis in Section 2.2. Reflective loss arising from directors’ misfeasance falls under 
the definition of residual loss, as it constitutes the decrease in shareholder welfare due 
                                                          
125 Cardinal elements of the “agency costs” analytical schema can be traced in Williamson’s “transaction 
costs economics” analysis, which identified the costs involved in contracting with the company as an 
institution, suggesting that, due to the uncertainty involved in shareholders’ contracting with the 
company, private ordering may not suffice to safeguard shareholders’ interests and shareholder 
monitoring over the board is justified. See Williamson (n 18) 1204-05, 1228.  
126 Richard Posner Economic Analysis of Law (3rd edn Little Brown 1986) 389. 
127 Jensen and Meckling ‘Theory of the Firm’ (n 51) 308.  
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to a conflict of interests between shareholders as “principals” and directors and/or 
insiders as “agents” (in economic terms).128 Derivative actions constitute the means of 
recovering reflective/residual loss collectively for all shareholders. 
Legal provisions on the enforcement of directors’ duties also aim to minimise the other 
two categories of agency costs. They provide constraints on managerial behaviour (set 
by directors’ duties) with a “bite”. Therefore, they reduce the expenditure on the part 
of shareholders to seek guarantees from the corporate controllers that they will not 
misappropriate perquisites from the company and,129 conversely, limit expenditure on 
the part of controllers to ensure shareholders that their behaviour will not be 
opportunistic. In both cases, directors’ duties provide parties with an agreeable 
framework of controller’s behaviour; derivative actions, as a threat of enforcement, 
attempt to guarantee that this framework will be respected. They relieve both 
shareholders and controllers from the time, effort and money involved in reaching 
contractual arrangements to protect their investment in the company.  
These studies examine intra-corporate affairs in general and, as such, only provide a 
starting point in understanding the economic implications of shareholders’ derivative 
suits. Van Aaken’s analysis however, is better focused on the issue. In her view, the 
damage directors’ misfeasance may cause on the private wealth and utility of 
shareholders and other constituencies is viewed as an externality.130 She concludes that 
derivative actions help internalise those externalities and, apart from “individual utility 
                                                          
128 ibid. 
129 See Davide Lombardo and Marco Pagano ‘Law and equity markets: A simple model’ in Joseph A 
McCahery, Piet Moerland, Theo Raaijmakers, and Luc Renneboog (eds) Corporate Governance 
Regimes: Convergence and Diversity, (OUP 2002) 343. 
130 “Externalities are those consequences of decisions or actions which affect other persons than the 
decision-maker, without the former being compensated (if it is a negative externality) or without these 




of internalisation”, they provide a public good, as the utility of the enforcement of the 
company’s claims is shared with all corporate constituencies.131  
On a similar note, recent studies show that the strength of shareholder remedies against 
expropriation significantly diminishes the cost of capital for firms, affirming the 
intuitive conclusion that the higher the risk of insider expropriation the greater the 
returns prospective shareholders would demand from the firm in order to decide to 
invest.132 It follows that the existence of legal safeguards, such as the derivative action, 
is financially beneficial for firms, as it encourages equity investment at a lower cost.  
Of particular interest for the Greek corporate landscape is the study of Davis, who 
found that derivative actions have significant compensatory value for non-listed 
closely-held corporations.133 However, a different picture is painted by earlier 
American empirical studies, suggesting that derivative suits have little compensatory 
value and may not result in a significant increase of share value.134 These studies should 
be read with caution by comparatists and, a fortiori, non-American policy-makers. 
Originating from the US, their results are bound to the characteristics of American 
derivative suits. Accordingly, whilst the methodology followed therein may be of good 
and direct use to non-American scholars, any wholehearted espousal of their 
conclusions outside the US would be arbitrary, unless a jurisdiction bears many 
similarities with the US in that respect. The unique characteristics of derivative 
                                                          
131 Van Aaken (n 123) 317 
132 The most recent study focuses on the impact of the “universal demand rule” in the US, Joel F. 
Houston, Chen Lin, and Wensi Xie, ‘Shareholder Protection and the Cost of Capital’ (September 16, 
2015). Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2661292>, accessed 1st October 2015. Similar 
studies on the broader topic of shareholder rights are Kevin C. W. Chen, Zhihong Chen and K. C. John 
Wei, ‘Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow and the Effect of Shareholder Rights on the Implied Cost of 
Equity Capital’ (2011) Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 46, 171; Joan Elston and Laura 
Rondi ‘Shareholder Protection and the Cost of Capital: Evidence from German and Italian Firms’ (2007) 
18 (2) Statistica Applicata 153. 
133 Kenneth B Davis, ‘The Forgotten Derivative Suit’ (2008) 61 Vand. L. Rev.  378 
134 For an overview of related empirical studies see Bryant G. Garth, Ilene H. Nagel and Sheldon J. 
Plager, 'Empirical Research and the Shareholder Derivative Suit: Toward a Better-Informed 
Debate'(1985) 48 LCP 137; see also Reisberg (n 39), 56 ff.    
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litigation in the US, such as the absence of the loser pays principle, the widespread 
practice of contingent fees and the crude amount of settlements should be born in mind 
when trying to draw conclusions for one’s own jurisdiction.  
In any case, these studies have been much disputed by academics and to date have not 
been espoused either by the American legislator or by the American legislator nor by 
the influential American Bar Association (ABA) and American Law Institute (ALI).135  
The strongest line of argument against them rests in that the deterrent effect of the 
derivative suit is either overlooked or not properly considered.136 In their defence, 
deterrence – unlike compensation - is not readily quantifiable.137 Whereas 
compensation can be readily measured by focusing on the outcomes of litigation, 
deterrence is situated in the mentality of its recipients.138 However, it would be wrong 
to underestimate the potential which deterrence of managerial misconduct has for the 
promotion of good corporate governance. Deterrence has its own economic 
implications. To clarify, a decision finding against a defendant in derivative litigation 
may not only deter him/her from future misfeasance, but also signal to the management 
of all other companies within the jurisdiction that misconduct is not tolerated.139 One 
outcome then may be that agency costs are minimised within the jurisdiction as a whole 
and corporate directors and managers think twice before making decisions that are 
potentially value-decreasing. 
 
                                                          
135 The ALI placed considerable focus in the design of the derivative action under its Principles of 
Corporate Governance, as did the ABA in the context of Model Business Corporations Act (MBCA) (§ 
7.40). 
136 See John Coffee Jr, ‘The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation’, 
(Summer 1985) 48 LCP 5-81, 10; Reisberg, Derivative Actions, (n 39) 57. 
137 Coffee, ‘New Myths’ (n 72) 1437. 
138 Reisberg, Derivative Actions (n 39) 60. 
139  Empirical studies also demonstrate that derivative actions are correlated with changes towards better 
CG standards; Stephen P. Ferris, Tomas Jandik, Robert M. Lawless and Anil Makhija, 'Derivative 
Lawsuits as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Empirical Evidence on Board Changes Surrounding 





2.4.3. Macroeconomic implications of shareholders’ litigation rights: hard law as 
a facilitator of equity investment, market development and economic growth 
2.4.3.1. Introduction 
The suggestion that shareholder protection, individual or minority, incentivises 
investment in shares, appears to constitute conventional wisdom amongst legislators 
internationally. Even a cursory look at the preambles to recent company and securities 
law reforms reveals that the rationale for shareholder protection is often based on such, 
purely economic, considerations.140 Despite its popularity though, the idea that 
protection attracts investment has not been unanimously embraced by academics. In 
fact, a fruitful academic debate, initiated originally by economics scholars, has 
occupied much of the contemporary literature on company law and corporate 
governance, focusing on this causal relationship between law and financial 
development. In particular, this unidirectional causality thesis has been questioned on 
a variety of grounds and rival theses suggest alternative explanations of the law-market 
relationship. Given that, as explained, derivative actions are a means of protecting 
minority shareholders, it is interesting to scrutinise the relevant discussion and attest 
the normative claim in favour of strong shareholder protection, from the 
(macro)economic perspective of market efficiency.  
 
                                                          
140See for example the reasoning in the Company Law Reform White Paper (Cm6456), DTI, London, 
March 2005 s.  3. Regarding international organisations, prominent examples are the OECD and the 
World Bank. The latter bases its “Doing Business” index methodology on Simeon Djankov, Rafael 
LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer ‘The law and economics of self-dealing’, 
(2008)  88 Journal of Financial Economics, 430, as stated in its website 
<http://doingbusiness.org/methodology> accessed 21st November 2015. 
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2.4.3.2. The Law Matters position 
Almost two decades ago, a group of academics (better known by the acronym “LLSV”) 
led by Professor Rafael LaPorta produced a comparative study that could rightfully be 
considered a “breakthrough” in the fields of company law and corporate governance; 
namely the “Law and Finance” study.141  
LLSV’s original “Legal Determinants of External Finance” and “Law and Finance” 
studies, alongside the related works that followed from the members of the group,142 
argue that “legal protection of outside investors limits the extent of expropriation of 
such investors by corporate insiders, and thereby promotes financial development”.143 
Much of their argumentation in support of this main theory, as well as their 
methodology, was original.144 LLSV paved the way for “law and finance” studies, 145 
influenced a number of reforms146 and provided a strong indication that an 
interdisciplinary approach has much to offer to comparative law studies, especially 
regarding comparative methodology.  
LLSV hypothesized that the better the protection afforded to investors, the more 
developed the respective debt and equity markets are and, therefore, economic 
disparities can be attributed to the differences among legal frameworks.147 In order to 
empirically attest this hypothesis,148 the group engaged in an innovative comparative 
                                                          
141 Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, Andrei Schleifer and Robert W Vishny. ‘Law and 
Finance’, (1998) 106 Journal of Political Economy 1113. 
142 Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, ‘The Economic Consequences of 
Legal Origins’ (2008) 46 Journal of Economic Literature 285; Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez de 
Silanes, Andrei Schleifer and Robert W Vishny ‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’ (1997) 52 
Journal of Finance 1131-1150. 
143LaPorta et al ‘Law and Finance’ (n 141) 1121. 
144 Mark J Roe ‘Corporate Law's Limits’ (2002) 31 J. Legal Stud. 233, 252. 
145Even at a higher education level. A visit to the SOAS University of London website 
(<https://www.soas.ac.uk/courseunits/C338.html> accessed 21st October 2015) for example, shows that 
there is a course on the topic which, among other things, teaches how to interpret the regression results 
of LLSV. 
146 An example is the introduction of derivative actions to Italian law; see Giudici (n 50). 
147 LaPorta et al., ‘Law and Finance’ (n 141) 1114. 
148 This was not so original an assumption eo ipso, as betrayed by their reference to Robert Clark, 
Corporate Law, (Little Brown, 1986). 
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law method. Akin to econometrics, this “numerical comparative method”, 
“comparative statistical analysis”149 or (as subsequently named by another duet of 
scholars) “leximetrics”, 150 essentially attempted to quantify the legal protection 
afforded to “external investors” (including shareholders), in order to associate its 
results with the data collected on the accessibility to external finance and thereby 
establish a link between law and investment. The hypothesis was supported by the 
results of their statistics and the conclusion they reached is important for the objectives 
of this Thesis. Their study suggests that a causal relation between law and investment 
exists, in which it is investment that follows; otherwise put, “legal rules do matter. It is 
not just the stance of the law or the political sentiment of the day that shapes financial 
markets”.151 
The second hypothesis LLSV made is that with low shareholder protection comes 
concentrated ownership.152 The underlying reasoning for this assumption is twofold. 
First, should protection for shareholders be inadequate, block-holders have to raise high 
percentages of shares so as to monitor managers; as the group points out, in such a case 
concentrated ownership becomes a substitute for protection by law.153 Apparently, this 
argument is based on the works of agency theorists and the analysis on agency costs. 
Second, they argued that minority investors’ demand for low prices regarding their 
perspective investment discourages firms to issue new stock and consequently 
ownership remains concentrated.154 The empirical study conducted by LLSV 
confirmed their primary assumption that efficient protection is an incentive for 
                                                          
149 LaPorta et al., ‘Law and Finance’, (n 141) 1115. 
150See Mathias M Siems ‘Shareholder Protection around the World (Leximetric II)’ (2008) 33 
Del.J.Corp.L.  , 111 and Priya P Lele and Mathias M Siems, ‘Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric 
Approach’ (2007) 7 JCLS 17.   
151 Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert  W. Vishny, ‘Investor 
protection and corporate governance’ (2000) 58 Journal of Financial Economics 3. 
152 LaPorta et al., ‘Law and Finance’, (n 141) 1145. 
153 This argument is reminiscent of Jensen and Meckling (n 51). 
154LaPorta et al., ‘Law and Finance’ (n 141), 1145. 
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investors in equity and leads to dispersed ownership; the more enhanced protection 
shareholders enjoy, the more dispersed the ownership of the corporation.155  
Moreover, by considering the law-structure linkage in conjunction with later findings 
and related works, the group concluded that countries showcasing diffuse ownership 
structures, also exhibit thriving financial markets.156 This finding logically aligns with 
the other conclusion the group reached, that the strength of equity markets depends on 
investor protection. Interestingly, the group went further to claim that high-level 
(minority) investor protection leads to general economic growth at a national level, in 
tandem with Levine and Zervos’ finding that “stock market liquidity and banking 
development are both positively and robustly correlated with contemporaneous and 
future rates of economic growth”.157 However, there is one (important) caveat here: 
LLSV did not conduct a longitudinal study. It would be interesting to examine if the 
“inducted” correlation between shareholder protection and economic (rather than 
market) growth would be supported by longitudinal data, if their model is followed; 
yet, any result of such a study might still be debatable, due to the fallacies in their 
methodology, explained below. 
In drawing their conclusions in the “Law Matters” study, LaPorta et al. formulated the 
“Legal Origins” thesis.158 In summary, it argues that legal traditions are determinative 
of the protection afforded to investors and therefore of corporate structures and firm 
growth. LLSV concluded that common law countries are the most protective, French 
origin countries are the least protective, and German and Scandinavian origin countries 
                                                          
155 ibid, 1148. 
156 ibid, 1150. 
157 LaPorta et al., ‘Law and Finance’ (n 141) 1152; Ross Levine and Sara Zervos, ‘Stock Markets, Banks, 
and Economic Growth’ (December 1996). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1690; 
A1.213 Working Paper No. 297, 29. 
158 LaPorta et al., ‘Legal Origins’ (n 142). For the classification regarding comparative law scholarship, 
see Raffaele Caterina, ‘Comparative Law and Economics’ in M. Jan Smits, (ed.), Elgar Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law, (Edward Elgar Publishing 2012), 191. 
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are situated in the middle, but closer to the French standards than the common law 
ones.159 
There is overlap in the above theses. As part of the “Law Matters” theorem, the 
essential goal of the “Legal Origins” thesis is to ascertain the optimal legal framework 
for protecting investors. As a logical construction, it does not dismiss the existence of 
a competitive market of legal culture; rather it aims to track the best available solutions 
to similar problems and eventually offers suggestions to national legislators, although 
the group (almost) never explicitly advocated for reform.  
LLSV’s findings were impressively original, yet they did not avoid controversy or 
criticism. Criticism focused mainly on the fact that their methodology was incomplete 
and inaccurate.160 More specifically, critics persuasively argued that the variables used 
by LLSV did not address all aspects of shareholder protection.161 For example, LLSV’s 
research did not include the right to request a special audit, the right of the General 
Meeting to have a say on executive pay and the right to remove directors, particularly 
those appointed by individual shareholders by virtue of corporate bylaws. Their 
approach failed to consider all solutions provided by jurisdictions to the factual 
problems posited, as the design of the “Law and Finance” indices appears to reflect an 
element of bias towards American legal and corporate culture and practice. This is 
demonstrated by the “focus on protection of shareholders from directors and the 
comparative disregard of the expropriation of minority shareholders by majority 
blockholders”.162 In comparing the solutions given to the shareholder-management 
                                                          
159 LaPorta et al., ‘Law and Finance’ (n 141) 1151. 
160 To list a couple, Udo C Braendle ‘Shareholder Protection in the USA and Germany – “Law and 
Finance” Revisited’ (2006) 7 (3) German Law Journal 257 and Mathias M. Siems ‘What does not work 
in comparing securities laws: a critique on La Porta et al's methodology’ (2005) 16 I.C.C.L.R. 300. 
161 For detailed re-examinations of the indices used in the “Law and Finance” thesis, see Lele and Siems 
“Leximetric” (n 150) and Holger Spamann, ‘Law and Finance Revisited’, Harvard Law School John M. 
Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 12, 2/2008. 
162 Lele and Siems “Leximetric”, (n 150) 5 & 6. 
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agency problem within the 49 jurisdictions examined, their study did not duly consider 
the minority-majority shareholder conflict, which – in contrast to the situation in the 
US and the UK - is of paramount importance for countries where concentrated 
ownership prevails, as in Greece and Germany. Indeed, subsequent works by LaPorta 
et al. have admitted some initial shortcomings and enriched the criteria used to measure 
protection, albeit reaching conclusions similar to their original studies.163  
Focusing on the construction of indices often diverts attention from the most significant 
problem of the “Law and Finance” study, namely that “a qualitative assessment of the 
rights seems to be missing”.164 Of particular interest for the purposes of this thesis is 
the fact that LLSV did not take into account the preconditions bound to the enactment 
of the rights attested, such as the right to bring a derivative suit. As will become 
apparent in Chapter 3, legal rules may look similar when read superficially and in 
isolation, whereas they showcase significant divergence when studied in detail and 
within the legal context in which they operate. A slight, prima facie, differentiation in 
the law may matter significantly when comparing otherwise similar rules. Japanese 
derivative actions are an example, whereby an amendment on the law on costs led to 
an exponential increase in shareholders’ derivative litigation. A further problem of 
LLSV is that they looked at the system of legal provisions on shareholder protection, 
without examining the matter as a system. For instance, certain rights provided by 
different jurisdictions were evaluated as equals, without considering how legal 
principles or other legal rules, such as procedural rules, may affect their operation. 
Furthermore, the group did not elaborate on whether some rights are more important 
than others from the shareholders’ perspective; in the jargon of statistics, variables were 
                                                          
163 See Djankov, LaPorta et al, ‘The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing’ (n 140)   
164 Perakis Minority Shareholders, (n 94) 102. 
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not weighed. The end result is thus somewhat confusing; for instance, it is debatable 
whether “oppression remedies” should rank equally with “proxy voting”, especially 
within the context of concentrated ownership structures.165  
Another point of critique had to do with the grouping of countries into legal families 
or, in their words, “legal origins”.166 Apart from arguments on the effect of 
globalisation and supranational authorities on shareholder law, there are instances 
where criticism on their approach is definitely warranted; for example, regarding 
certain jurisdictions whose civil code was drafted to emulate the German BGB, but 
whose company law was based the French Code Commerciale, LLSV opted to classify 
them as German origin, without producing a persuasive argument. 
How did the above lacunas slip the attention of LLSV? In my opinion, all the 
methodological shortcomings attributed to the “Law and Finance” thesis are 
inextricably connected to the background of the authors. The group are not comparative 
law scholars and no lawyers were properly involved in the process of their early 
research.167 This absence of legal expertise inevitably led to systemic flaws. Key 
elements for a comparative legal study include: objective, contextual and systematic 
interpretation of legal provisions; knowledge and understanding of case law and its 
varying significance among jurisdictions; meticulous research into academic literature. 
Without these fundamentals, there is high risk of comparing incomparables. The 
“fallacies” of the LLSV methodology may also be explained by the fact that there was 
no previous work of the kind to rely upon. Their approach of quantifying law became 
                                                          
165 “Proxy voting” represents a right which aims at facilitating participation in the collective organ of the 
General Meeting, whose authority does not cover the totality of corporate decision making, whilst 
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166 See Siems “Critique” (n 160) 304ff 
167 In contrast to Spamman’s (n 161) study. 
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a notable contribution to legal and economic academic research;168 however, being the 
first of its kind in the field of comparative company law, it navigated uncharted waters. 
Despite the numerous attempts of notable scholars to refine it, no quantitative index on 
shareholder protection can claim yet to be perfect. 
When it comes to derivative actions, the LLSV approach did not get everything wrong. 
Notably, later work by members of the LLSV group focused on case-study functional 
comparisons, whose subject is directly related to derivative litigation and the legal rules 
connected to it.169 The study posits a hypothetical situation of minority expropriation 
facilitated at board level and involving a controlling shareholder, examining the legal 
avenues which different jurisdictions avail minority shareholders in order to protect 
their investment. This comparative study differs from the original LLSV papers, not 
only as a matter of focus, but also as a matter of detail. Despite the deviations from the 
original paradigm, significant correlations between shareholder protection and stock 
market development were still observed. This refined methodology attracted 
international attention and is currently endorsed by the World Bank in its Doing 
Business reports, published annually.170  
Later “leximetric” studies also found significant statistical correlations between the 
levels of shareholder protection afforded by provisions on derivative actions and stock 
market capitalisation, despite finding no significant correlations between other 
shareholder rights and the latter.171 The consistency between these studies regarding 
                                                          
168 Among many other proponents, see Lele and Siems ‘Leximetric’ (n 150), Cristoph Van der Elst, ‘Law 
and Economics of Shareholder Rights and Ownership Structures: How Trivial are Shareholder Rights 
for Shareholders?’, Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) Law and Economics Discussion Paper 
No. 2010-009; Tilburg Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 008/2010 February 15, 2010). 
169 Djankov et al (n 140). 
170 Two of the six indices (“extent of director liability” and “ease of shareholder suits”) directly concern 
derivative litigation; see fn 140. 
171 M Siems, 'Private enforcement of directors' duties: derivative actions as a global phenomenon', in 
Stefan Wrbka, Steven Van Uytsel and Mathias Siems (eds.), Collective Actions: Enhancing Access to 
Justice and Reconciling Multilayer Interests?, (CUP 2012)  115. 
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the findings on derivative actions - studies which are in other respects contradictory in 
their results - is explicable. The key difference between derivative actions and other 
variables used in “leximetric” and similar indices, is their applicability as a means of 
shareholder protection to different ownership-structural contexts. As previously 
explained, derivative actions are designed to combat both shareholder-orientated 
agency problems and minimise the related agency costs. Therefore, a focus on 
derivative actions evades the perils involved in the use of a catch-all, multi-shareholder-
rights coding, as the latter may provide a confusing picture on how the law addresses 
different agency problems, in different jurisdictions, with different ownership 
structures. Even if we are to consider LLSV’s work to rest on ordo-liberal theoretical 
underpinnings, derivative actions would be one of the least (if not the least) 
controversial (from an ordo-liberal perspective) determinants of market efficiency 
within the ambit of shareholder protection; trust on a market cannot exist without 
legality of corporate decisions and a proper means to enforce it (as is the derivative 
action). In fact, one of the very few normative suggestions the LLSV group voiced 
explicitly and confidently for European countries with low investor protection was that:  
legal reforms may need to be considerably more radical in 
nature, and give shareholders explicit rights to either prevent 
expropriation or seek remedy when it occurs, such as the 
opportunity to sue directors (perhaps through derivative or class 
action suits) for oppressive conduct 172   
However, Professor Siems, despite finding a correlation between the availability of 
derivative actions and market capitalisation, refrains from asserting that a causal 
relationship exists between the two, a fortiori so between general shareholder 
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protection and market development.173 He is not alone. Other academics have also 
pronounced their doubts. A different view on “the causality issue”, concerning law and 
economic (corporate) structures and market performance, suggests that the latter 
precede rather than follow the former. Consequently, two different theories have been 
formulated on the emergence of strong and diffuse equity markets, namely the “Law 
Follows” and the “Path Dependencies”. 
 
2.4.3.3. The response to “law matters”: refutations and clarifications  
The “Law Follows” thesis has been best articulated by Professor John Coffee Jr. 174 His 
position is that strong and diffuse private equity markets can arise even in the absence 
of a robust protective regulation and that historical evidence suggests different 
conditions for the occurrence of such a trend towards investment in equity.175 More 
specifically, Coffee argues that what gave rise to the corporate governance model of 
the “separation of ownership and control” in Anglo-Saxon countries was private 
initiative and not political sentiment,176 or high levels of regulatory investor protection;  
private institutions -- most notably, stock exchange rules 
and bonding mechanisms by which investment bankers 
pledged their reputational capital -- probably played a 
greater role than mandatory legal rules in the early rise of 
dispersed ownership.177   
                                                          
173 M Siems, 'Private enforcement’ (n 171) 115. 
174 John C.  Coffee, Jr, ‘The Rise of Dispersed Ownership’ (2001) 111 Yale L.J. 1. 
175 ibid. The author further supports his argument with case studies in England, the U.S. and the 
Netherlands. 
176 i.e. it did not matter whether a socialist or conservative party or leader was in power (Coffee ‘The 
Rise [n 174] 71ff). Evidence for this observation can be found in the Greece Stock Exchange ratings, 
which were at their highest while the Panhellenic Socialist Movement was in power. 
177 Coffee, ‘The Rise’ (n 174) 87, 88. 
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Accordingly, legislative action follows actual developments, as “the legislature cannot 
anticipate problems that it has never seen […] law appears to be responding to changes 
in the market, not consciously leading it”.178 Essentially, it is argued that regulatory 
action is only taken in hindsight. Concerning the legislations that offered original 
solutions to given factual problems, such an explanation on the causality issue is utterly 
logical, particularly from the viewpoint of Legal Realism. Human law-making is the 
product of a rather complex cognitive process and therefore cannot be parthenogenesis. 
Supporting this position in the corporate law context is the fact that new regulation on 
corporate governance is usually a response to a pathogen or, in John Coffee’s words, 
“scandal driven”.179 Indeed, most of the recent significant reforms on corporate 
governance followed notorious scandals; notably, the Sarbannes-Oxley Act180 was a 
response to Enron and WorldCom and the Dodd-Frank Act was a response to the 2008 
economic crisis.181  
From a certain point of view, this observation does not disprove the “law matters” thesis 
and can even be understood as fortifying it. It concedes that a shift in regulation can 
adjust inefficient corporate practices.182Coffee’s historical perspective does not posit 
that law has no relevance to the size of equity markets, rather it claims that strong 
markets initially grew in the absence of a strong investor protection framework. A lato 
sensu definition of this framework, as encompassing general legal protection outside 
the narrow confines of securities regulation, makes in my opinion the validity of his 
                                                          
178ibid, 65, 81. 
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180 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
181 Coffee ‘The Rise’ (n 174) 30. 
182 On the position that mandatory rules may restore confidence to markets see Troy A. Paredes, ‘A 
Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn't the 
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claim more nuanced. In any case, law is not denied its role in fostering the development 
and sustainability of equity markets, even in Coffee’s view. As he concedes:   
Even though equity markets can arise in the absence of strong 
minority protections, it hardly follows that they can develop to 
their full potential in such an environment.183    
In essence, the “law follows” approach qualifies the claim that strong legal protection 
of minority investors is conditio sine qua non for market development, adding private 
initiative –or, defined negatively, absence of state interventionism- to the debate, as a 
factor in the emergence of a reliable market. Examined closely, the empirical results 
and conclusions reached by LLSV and Professor Coffee provide valuable insight into 
two distinct issues. While LLSV elucidate on why common law countries display 
disperse corporate ownership structures (providing a “snapshot” of how the corporate 
world was in the late nineties, rather than a time-series study), Coffee discovered the 
preconditions that led to the emergence of this corporate model. As long as these 
conditions are met, regulation has to follow as a proxy for trust on the part of investors 
that they will not be expropriated, or as Coffee summarises: “[u]ltimately, this Article 
has advanced two claims that are novel only to the academic world: law matters, and 
trust is efficient”.184 
Another perspective on the evolution of capital markets and the prospects of 
convergence towards an efficient model of share ownership structures and investor 
protection regulation, suggests that history matters, as it shapes the trajectories (paths) 
upon which persistent disparities depend.185 Accordingly, continuing regulatory and 
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Governance and its Implications’,(1998-1999) 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 641, 707. 
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functional divergence is attributed to the archetypal corporate structures and rules that 
vary among jurisdictions and set unswerving trajectories. What path dependencies 
suggest, under the obvious influence of the homonymous economic theory, is that these 
“paths” are not necessarily determined by efficiency considerations.186 As long as 
corporate rules and practices arise, whether efficient or not, they stand a chance of 
becoming persistent according to this strand of literature.187 Evidently, this theory is in 
stark contrast with the view that a universally optimal model of corporate governance 
will eventually prevail, leading to global legal and structural convergence due to its 
predominance over alternative economically inefficient models.188  
“Path dependencies” provide valuable insight regarding the forces resisting change 
towards different ownership structures and patterns of investor protection. Bebchuk 
and Roe posit that “a country’s initial pattern of corporate ownership structures 
influences the power that various interest groups will have in the political process that 
produces corporate rules”.189Accordingly, in a jurisdiction such as Greece, dominant 
block-holders are expected to lobby against any pro-minority legislation. This might 
have been the case during the 2007 reform of Greek company law, when suggestions 
to introduce a form of “genuine” derivative action were eventually dismissed: in the 
words of a prominent Greek scholar: “the legislator’s ado […] conceals adherence to 
big, strong shareholder interests”.190 
                                                          
186 See Brian W. Arthur, ‘Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical 
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hesitated to introduce a … ground-breaking, for Greek standards, provision”, referring also to K. 
Pampoukis, “Comments on Thessaloniki Court of Appeal 2186/06” [2006] EpiskED 1034, 1036. 
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Indeed, actors benefitting from an established corporate structure and legal framework 
can be expected to resist any change to the status quo. But they will do so only as long 
as they benefit. Equally, interest groups themselves may demand change, when the 
system that their practices rely upon collapses. It could be the case that in such 
situations, different interest groups will become more active. Bebchuk and Roe do not 
pay due attention to those considerations. For instance, in their analysis on the path-
dependent trajectory of block-ownership, they disregard the influence of minority 
shareholders and its potency: “[s]urprisingly they do not describe another sort of 
pressure on the existing system, namely the role of the minority shareholders. If the 
latter are not happy with their yield, they can sell the shares.”191 Block-holders and 
managers may indeed have an interest in maintaining their power position in the firm, 
alongside political leverage to pursue this interest at a regulatory level. However, if 
minority investors flee to more attractive destinations, within or outside the 
jurisdictional borders, the firm’s value diminishes to the loss of the incumbent 
shareholders, the company and the market as a whole. Accordingly, by exiting the firm, 
minority shareholders can exert considerable pressure to both block-holders and 
efficiency-minded policy makers. 
Yet again, the persistence of a given regulatory framework may be explained for 
reasons other than efficiency or the influence of interest groups. McCahery et al give a 
convincing explanation for this phenomenon, availing themselves of the teachings of 
psychology. They focus on the persons drafting and passing statutes, an “elite” group 
of “legislators, judges, practitioners, regulatory agencies, professional groups and legal 
scholars”.192 They posit the reason behind their inaction lies in behavioural psychology, 
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as “people exhibit a "status quo bias," in that, all else equal, they prefer to leave things 
as they are”.193This might in part explain not only the slow and frustratingly 
incremental development of Greek company law in the past decades, but also the 
continuing presence of obsolete terminology (such as the “prudent pater familias” 
standard for directors’ diligence, until 2007) and the use of classical Greek in a 
company law statute otherwise worded in modern Greek (Law 2190/1920).  
 
2.4.3.4. Synthesis: the role of law 
The examination of the above views helps crystallise the relationship between 
regulation, economic performance and structures. The attested theories differentiate on 
how strong a link there is among these three notions, as well as on whether regulation 
is the cause or the effect of corporate structures. However, synthesis remains possible. 
This Section concludes accordingly, that shareholder protection has a pivotal, yet not 
exclusive, role in attracting investment in equity. It acts as a positive catalyst, in the 
sense that it accelerates a reaction amongst different reagents.194  
The approaches examined on the causality issue help to identify the reagents in this 
chemistry-related allegory: these can be grouped in three categories. 
Macroeconomically, it is the economic strength of a country and a pro-shareholder, 
non-interventionist public policy that encourages investment in equity. Meso-
economically, it is interest groups that influence such a policy.195 Microeconomically, 
it is the corporate structures and the existing “agency” relations that could attract (or 
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repulse) investors within the firm. None of the above factors can independently 
determine the prosperity of the market. Consider the following, abstract example. Α 
functioning market could be the outcome of a successful public policy, which adhered 
to the demands of interest groups formulated in accordance to the existing corporate 
environment. Now consider excluding each of the factors. Without the voice of 
pressure groups, there would be little incentive for policy makers to work towards 
creating a suitable business environment. Without a coherent investment policy, 
business could be subject to extensive state intervention that dissuades 
entrepreneurship (e.g. red tape, disproportionately high taxation, or an outdated 
corporate framework). Lastly, even if both the Macroeconomic and Meso-economic 
paragons cooperate towards attracting investment, incumbent shareholders and 
directors may themselves decelerate the equity market, if they consider the 
maintenance of ownership control as beneficial. This example, albeit general and brief, 
highlights an otherwise conventional truth that is not readily discernible in the works 
of the “law and finance” theorists: successful financial markets are the outcome of 
numerous variables, working in perfect harmony. There is no silver bullet solution to a 
problematic market.     
Law is rightfully the coordinator of interaction between the aforementioned factors, 
determining their outcome. Concerning policies, the law expresses political will, being 
its main “tool” - at least in the modern Western civilization. From a positive law 
perspective, legislative initiative always reflects existing or (ideally) anticipated social 
needs that should be treated by policy-making. Accordingly, when it comes to a policy 
that favours investment in equity, instead of high debt financing leverage, appropriate 
implementation necessitates a competitive shareholder protection array of provisions. 
This is evidenced in the reports preceding the Companies Act 2006 as well as the Law 
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2190/1920 reform in 2007. Regarding the CA 2006, the white paper published by the 
Department of Trade and Industry preceding the final bill is clear as to the objectives 
of the latter:  
Our framework must reflect the challenges of modern capital 
markets in which business and investment decisions are 
increasingly determined by global conditions […] investors can 
choose where to put their money.196  
The wording in the preamble of Law 3604/2007 reforming the Greek Company Law 
statute is similar: 
The dynamics of the evolution in the fields of corporations, 
market economics and competition imposed the adjustment of 
the existing framework to the new facts regarding the markets’ 
function and international competition197 
Reading between the lines, it becomes evident that both acts took into consideration 
the fact that investors worry about the value of their investment, be it short-term or 
long-term. If investors fear that their prospective shareholding is imperiled by potential 
expropriation by the insiders, the anticipated high risk of the respective stock will be 
deterrent to any decision to purchase and other options provided by more competitive 
legislations will be preferred. The protection to shareholders afforded by company law 
thereby becomes crucial to building trust in an equity market. By principle, trust is 
crucial for investment.198 The Greek legislator is not unaware of its importance, as seen 
                                                          
196 Company Law Reform White Paper (Cm6456), DTI, London, March 2005, page 9. 
197Explanatory statement (preamble) to Law 3604/2007, 
<http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/2f026f42-950c-4efc-b950-340c4fb76a24/a-eurodikaio-
eis.pdf> page 1.  [Accessed 20th November 2015]. 
198 This notion is supported by Mariassunta Giannetti and Andrei Simonov’s empirical study, 'Which 




in the preamble of Law 3604/2007.199 To summarise the position undertaken in this 
Section, regulatory action should be considered as an inaugural part of a pro-
shareholder policy, not just an accompaniment. 
Such a policy may well be influenced by the pressure enacted by contemporary 
shareholder groups. Such pressure groups are usually formed during crises, whether 
scandal-driven or not. Legislative action is then a response to concerns regarding 
liquidity and management by the firms’ members; such concerns are usually expressed 
in the financial press.200 Yet, incumbent shareholders are not the only to benefit by a 
pro-shareholder legislation; prospective shareholders benefit too and they can exert 
influence, voluntarily or inadvertently, towards such a policy. However, external 
shareholders (“outsiders”) complicate the issue. In a globalised economy, their options 
are anything but national; their decisions largely depend on the comparisons made by 
themselves or by credible institutions regarding investment prospects. Jurisdictions are 
aware and should be mindful of this reality; they are reportedly engaged in regulatory 
competition. This is a “race to the top” rather than a “race to the bottom”, as legislators 
struggle to offer the most efficient and competitive shareholder rights protection.201 
Thereby, outsiders can push for regulatory incentives even by choosing not to invest in 
a jurisdiction.  
It is to be expected that individuals focus at the firm level when considering a 
prospective investment. If their interests could be easily compromised by insiders, then 
buying the firm’s shares is not good business. As a matter of fact, insiders are often 
                                                          
199 In my translation: “as is proven, empowering the shareholder’s position constitutes an investment 
incentive and contributes to creating a climate of trust in the market. Law 2190/1920 has never been 
friendly to shareholders and the minority”, 1. 
200 “Already much of the pressure to act on directors' remuneration has been generated by the media 
maintaining a focus on the issue, which forces politicians and regulators to respond”. Brenda Hannigan, 
‘Board failures in the financial crisis: tinkering with codes and the need for wider corporate governance 
reforms: Part 2’ (2012) 33 Comp. Law. 35, 36. 
201  Kraakman et al (n 6) 26; Andrew Johnston and Phil Syrpis ‘Regulatory competition in European 
company law after Cartesio’   (2009) 34 E.L. Rev. 378.  
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willing to take the risk of making the firm unpopular to investors, for the simple reason 
that extracting short-term private benefits has always been a luring option.202 
Consequently, it is up to mandatory legal provisions to adopt the substantial role of 
formulating an investor-friendly environment. Accordingly, shareholders would feel 
safer if they can be remedied for unfair prejudice or fraudulent management.203 
Moreover, they would be interested in appointing auditors, dismissing them or even 
contesting their reports in order to monitor their investment.204Additionally, investors 
(even those least interested in actively participating in corporate decisions) would be 
in dire straits if the GM could adopt a resolution that would compromise their interests 
(even without prior notice); either by altering the ownership structure of the company 
or by waiving corporate rights to compensation.205 Shareholders are also concerned 
with their right to dividend: its allocation, its percentage of the annual profit and any 
bonuses that the law might offer. Notwithstanding this enumeration of shareholder 
rights being indicative, the point is clear; enforceable mandatory rights are important 
for investment decisions. 
As regards the shareholders’ rights explored within this Thesis, there is no 
comprehensive qualitative study available, to the best of my knowledge, on whether 
provisions on derivative actions strengthen investor confidence in a market. However, 
as mentioned above, “leximetric”, “law and finance” and other empirical studies seem 
to point to an affirmative conclusion. Examination of the yearly fluctuations on share 
value in different jurisdictions paints a similar picture:  
                                                          
202 See Rui Albuquerue and Neng Wang 'Agency Conflicts, Investment, and Asset Pricing' 63 (2008) 
The Journal of Finance 1. 
203 E.g. UK CA 2006, Pt 11 and Pt 30, French Code de Commerce, art. L. 225-252, German AktG, ss. 
147-149, Greek L.2190/1920 art. 22b.  
204 Eg. AktG, s. 142, 258, 260, Code de Commerce, arts. L. 225-218 et seq.  
205 See AktG, ss. 93, 116, 117, 302, 309; L.2190/1920, art. 35.  
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Year  Fluctuation in stock 
market turnover ratio 
compared to previous 
year206 where statutory 
derivative action came 
into force 
Mean fluctuation 
of stock market 
turnover ratio  in 
18 richest 
economies207 
Median fluctuation in 
stock market turnover 

























The jurisdictions in the table above experienced a rise in their stock market turnover 
ratio, in all instances where statutory derivative actions were introduced. Also, this rise 
dwarfed the performance of their foreign counterparts at the time. It is notable that other 
countries coming close to such increases in the given timespan either introduced a 
similar kind of shareholder protection or reformed their existing statutory provisions 
on derivative actions. In 2005 for instance, Italy lowered the quorum thresholds for 
                                                          
206 Ratio of the value of total shares traded to average real market capitalization; see World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators, available at <http://www.worldbank.org/data/> accessed 21st November 2015. 
Fluctuation calculated as the difference between values in a given year (t1) and the year before (t2), 
divided by the value of the previous year (t2), Δ(Vt1-Vt2)/Vt2.  
207 According to annual GDP (constant 2005 US$) data, retrieved from the World Bank’s website 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD?order=wbapi_data_value_2004+wbapi_data
_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=asc&page=2> [accessed 21st November 2015]. The countries 
considered are Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Korea Republic, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK and the USA. 
208 UMAG came into force late in the year (November 2005). However, the examined variable continued 
to exhibit an increase for the following year (2006), in the rate of 0.189601. 
209 Companies Act 2006 (Commencement No. 3, Consequential Amendments, Transitional Provisions 
and Savings) Order 2007 (SI 2007/2194) art.2(1)(e). 
99 
 
legal standing in derivative suits and South Korea introduced class actions, exhibiting 
a rise in their stock market turnover ratio, with rates of 0.277322 and 0.214683 
respectively. Whether the newly introduced statutory provisions on derivative actions 
account exclusively for the above observations cannot be said with absolute certainty. 
For example, in most instances, the reform of national company or securities laws 
touched upon a broader array of issues. The CA 2006 changed much of UK company 
law as we previously knew it; UMAG considered matters such as shareholders’ 
rescission suits and the Italian Legislative Decree 58 (of year 1998) introduced ideas 
other than just the derivative action that were novel to Italian law, such as mandatory 
bid rules. In any case, the fact that the table reflects a repeated phenomenon cannot be 
ignored. 
Nevertheless, some may argue that a vibrant equity market is not necessary for 
corporations to grow. This might be true for jurisdictions where debt financing can 
support the liquidity of firms, to an extent that the need to turn to the market as a source 
of finance is rendered minimal. This is not necessarily the case for many European 
countries today, and is definitely not so regarding Greece. Predictably, the aftermath of 
the crisis as regards debt finance was a globally significant increase in the reluctance 
of banks to lend. Europe, in particular, experienced such an effect as early as 2009; 
“[a]ccording to the European Central Bank, loan rejection rates in the Euro zone 
increased from 12% to 18% between the first and second half of 2009”.210 The main 
reason for such a response by the financial institutions is obvious: banks suffered a 
critical hit in their financing options and subsequently sought to reduce the volume of 
outgoing capital by tightening debt and credit terms. 211 Switching focus to Greece, the 
                                                          
210 J Potter and J Thompson ‘Government responses to the impact of the global crisis on finance for 
young and small enterprises’ (2011) 20 Strat. Change 145, 147. 
211  ibid, 146.  
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picture gets even darker for companies, particularly for Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs); Greek banks were the most reluctant financiers in Europe during the first 
semester of 2013.212 This observation reflects the general economic situation in the 
country and the abrupt change of factors affecting standard practices. More 
specifically, lending is traditionally based upon collaterals in Greece; mostly in the 
form of mortgages.213 Given that property prices are still experiencing a dramatic 
decrease, the securities Greek companies have to offer are of minimal value.214 This 
downgrade of corporate assets is mirrored in the increasing leverage ratios these 
companies exhibit.215 Both asset and leverage ratios are primary conditions for lending; 
conditions that have become even stricter nowadays in Greece.216 It has to be noted, 
though, that the crisis effect on debt financing seems to be less severe when it comes 
to larger companies.217 
Greek SMEs finance themselves internally, by making use of the equity available by 
the founding family.218 Nowadays, only 24% of them are able to continue this practice, 
thereby becoming the sector most needing external finance in Europe.219 As the study 
by Daskalakis et al. reports, the SMEs preferred method of financing is debt, since it 
does not affect corporate control.220 Keeping in mind, however, the fact that Greek 
                                                          
212 “With respect to banks’ willingness to provide loans, SMEs in all countries, with the exception of 
Germany (6%), reported, on balance, a deterioration, which was especially strong in Greece (-46%), 
Spain (-38%), Italy (-34%), Portugal (-32%) and the Netherlands (-30%)”;  European Central Bank 
“Survey on the access to finance of small and medium- sized enterprises in the euro area” (ECB 2013) 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/accesstofinancesmallmediumsizedenterprises201304en.pdf?
bb16b7e4d7d49e53249f2be976653b18 > accessed 20 November 2014 (“SAFE”), 12. 
213 “This is the case in Greece. Banks to mitigate the risk in financing a firm demand collaterals – 
guarantees or securities and they do not practice any control over the firm’s activities as stakeholder 
theory suggests”, Themistokles Lazarides and Elektra Pitoska, ‘Corporate Governance and Debt to 
Equity Ratio’, (2009) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1408408> accessed 25.6.2013. 
214 See Nikolaos Daskalakis, Robin Jarvis and Emmanouil Schizas, ‘Financing practices and preferences 
for micro and small firms’, (2013) 20 Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development 80. 
215 SAFE (n 212) 3. 
216 With asset depreciation, leverage increases. 
217 Potter and Thompson (n 210) 146. 
218 “Own funds are a priori the main financing equity source”, Daskalakis et al (n 214) 89. 
219 SAFE (n 212) 4. 
220 Daskalakis et al. (n 214) 94. 
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SMEs consider “Access to Finance” to be their primary problem, according to the ECB 
statistics, alternative ways of financing should be investigated.221 This conclusion is 
particularly significant for the so-called “young” firms (recently incorporated 
companies), as they do not have capital reserves sufficient to support their operative 
needs. 
Greek firms, particularly small and micro corporations, meticulously avoid using 
external equity as a way to finance themselves.222 Nevertheless, from a corporate 
finance perspective, bank financing – which is closely connected with concentrated 
ownership -, can be viewed as a less efficient alternative. A major reason for such 
inefficiency, according to Lanoo and Khachaturyan, is that “[t]he banking market may 
be dominated by a few players, who may not be interested in financing certain higher-
risk segments of the market”.223 Indeed, financing ventures that involve a respectable 
amount of risk is a task for developed and wealthy financial intermediaries; not exactly 
the case for the majority of Greek banks. At the time of completion of this Thesis, 
Greek Banks were bailed-out once again and capital controls were instituted for the 
first time in Greek history.224 Why then is not equity a sought after method of financing 
among Greek firms? 
To concisely answer this question, two factors should be considered: willingness and 
interest. By willingness I mean the incumbent shareholders’ volition to issue new share 
capital or sell a percentage of their stock. In the case of Greece, should there be a benefit 
in control, incumbents are adamant to hold their controlling position. This could be to 
a great extent due to the corporate legal framework; “[t]hese benefits, in countries like 
                                                          
221 ECB statistics available at <http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/surveys/sme/html/index.en.html> 
(accessed 5 October 2015). 
222 Daskalakis (n 214) 84, 94. 
223 Karel Lanoo and Arman Khachaturyan, ‘Reform of corporate governance in the EU’, (2004) 5 EBOR 
37, 40 
224 See ‘Recapitalising Greek banks: The damage’ The Economist (London, 7 November 2015), 79. 
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Greece (weaker investor protection, lower tax compliance, less independent press and 
poorer accounting rules), are larger than in Anglo-Saxon countries [sic]”.225 
Nevertheless, benefits only occur with good corporate performance, a phenomenon 
becoming less common in Greece. 20% of Greek Medium-sized firms reported an 
increase in their need for equity already in 2012; the largest in the ECB’s sample by 
far.226 Is then the incumbents’ reluctance to use equity as a financing instrument the 
sole reason why investment in equity remains low in Greece; as the high concentration 
levels show? 
An alternative explanation may be given by the factor of interest by the market players 
in investing in Greek firms. The data on portfolio investment proves that Greek 
companies are not the investors’ first option. Indeed, the number of incoming portfolio 
investments are decreasing year by year; interestingly, Greek residents’ investment in 
foreign equity is gradually increasing.227 It is thereby concluded that Greek stocks are 
less attractive in comparison to foreign ones, as residents show an increasing interest 
in foreign stock, whilst incoming foreign investment experiences a continuous decline. 
The reverse scenario would provide a massive relief for Greek firms’ financial 
problems. 
 
2.4.4. Summary and conclusions 
The above considerations suggest that the time is ripe for efforts to be made to 
reinstitute investor confidence in the Greek equity market. A revision of the Greek 
framework for shareholder protection against mismanagement, by means of the 
                                                          
225 Lazarides and Pitoska (n 213), ad finem. 
226 ECB statistics, Q5. 
227 Statistics by the Bank of Greece, online at 
<http://www.bankofgreece.gr/Pages/en/Statistics/externalsector/balance/transactions.aspx#portfolio> 
accessed 15 October 2014. 
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introduction of a genuine derivative action, could help in that respect, as long as it 
increased the levels of shareholder protection. This would minimize agency costs, 
resulting in economic and financial benefits at both a firm and a market level. Of 
course, such an increase cannot be expected to render the Greek Stock Market efficient 
on its own. However, as part of a general pro-investment strategy and perhaps a broader 
reform of corporate and securities law, an introduction of derivative actions to Greek 




This Chapter has inquired into the functions and the role of the derivative action in 
shareholder law and corporate governance. As was explicated, the derivative action 
serves the purpose of remedying the infringement of certain interests, directly those of 
the company’s shareholders whilst, indirectly, those of corporate stakeholders, 
shareholders – present and future - within a given jurisdiction and the market as a 
whole. 
The nature of these interests, from a shareholders’ perspective, is predominantly 
proprietary at firm level. Derivative actions constitute a means of recovering reflective 
loss, protecting the proprietary interests of all members of the company, as 
compensation goes to the company and not the shareholder-claimant exclusively.  
Protection is provided against the opportunistic behaviour of corporate management, 
notwithstanding whether the latter originates in the promulgation of directors’ or 
controlling shareholders’ interests. Similar protection of welfare is afforded to all 
stakeholders in the company, to the extent that it is affected by a diminution in 
corporate property.  
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Derivative actions assume an important role in the alignment of conflicting interests 
within the company and help effectuate one of the basic objectives of corporate law, 
namely the regulation of intra-corporate affairs. By facilitating the enforcement of 
directors’ duties, derivative actions provide the latter with meaningful content. They 
thus ensure that corporate decision-making at board level accords to the tenets of law 
and does not frustrate the interests which company law aims to protect. 
From a financial perspective, derivative actions reduce agency costs. They not only 
provide a means of redeeming residual loss, but also reduce the cost of capital for firms, 
as they reinstate investor confidence in corporate management. This has further, 
economic implications, as confidence is the most important factor in the development 
and sustainability of equity markets.   
This Chapter effectively justifies the advocacy in favour of derivative actions. Many of 
the arguments herein are particularly topical for Greece, due to the native concentrated 
corporate ownership structures and the contemporary (un)available financing options. 
At the same time, this Chapter outlined the desiderata of provisions on shareholder 
remedies against maladministration in general, by explaining the objectives, functions 
and operation of an effective remedy. Accordingly, the ensuing Chapter will evaluate 
the applicable Greek “company’s action”, the functionally equivalent provision to 
derivative actions, against these desiderata. 
Finally, this Chapter has demonstrated that law matters in investment decisions. In the 
age of globalised investment decisions, the implication of this conclusion is that the 
effectiveness of a national framework on shareholder protection is weighed against its 
foreign counterparts by prospective investors. From this perspective, the comparative 





PART 2: Derivative actions de lege lata: 
a comparative and functional analysis 
 
CHAPTER 3: Comparison of Functionally Equivalent Rules 




3.1. Introduction  
3.1.1. Preliminary remarks 
As stated in Chapter 1, there have been numerous calls, sometimes fervent, sometimes 
reluctant, for a review of shareholder remedies under Greek Law. Most of them focus 
on the introduction of a derivative action under Greek law. The reason is that the 
currently available functional equivalent mechanism, the “company’s action” or 
“corporate action”, has been repeatedly characterised as dysfunctional.1 Are such calls 
warranted though? 
                                                          
1 The inquest for “The Holy Grail” is used as a metaphor for legislative attempts to optimise rules on 
shareholder litigation by Harald Baum and Dan W. Puchniak, The derivative action: an economic, 
historical and practice-oriented approach in Puchniak W Dan, Baum Harald, Ewing-Chow Michael 
(eds), The Derivative Action in Asia: A Comparative and Functional Approach, (CUP 2012), 88 
1 The egregious (due to the obscurity of its wording) text of L.2190/1920 Art. 22b can be translated as 
follows: ‘1. Corporate claims against the members of the board of directors arising from the management 
of corporate affairs shall be mandatorily pursued, if the general meeting so decides, by resolution reached 
according to paragraphs 1 and 2 article 29 and paragraph 1 article 31, or if shareholders representing one 
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It is illustrated hereinafter that shareholder-initiated litigation on behalf of the company 
is a highly complex issue, as the law has to strike a fine balance between the availability 
of the remedy and its abuse. Its availability might guarantee the enforcement of the 
company’s claim and work towards the protection of every interest involved, in the 
ways explained in Chapter 2; but at the same time, a readily available remedy may 
increase the possibility of undesirable litigation, providing the frivolous with access to 
court and presenting the extortionists with the means to coerce. A truly protective 
remedy thus has to make the best of both worlds. The law-maker and the judge are 
therefore caught amidst the struggle between those two opposing forces which, as is 
shown below, carve the content of the law and its application.  Accordingly, this 
Chapter shows that, depending on the jurisdiction, different responses are expected to 
the question: under which circumstances and how can a shareholder enforce a 
company’s claim? This divergence accrues from balancing the aforementioned 
competing goals and transcends rules on costs allocation, legal standing, the cause of 
action, procedure and admissibility of the claim, as well as rules on access to litigation-
related information. 
                                                          
tenth (1/10) of the registered (paid up) share capital so demand from the board of directors or the 
liquidators. This percentage may be reduced by the corporate constitution. The minority’s petition is 
considered only if it is ascertained that the petitioners became shareholders three (3) months at least prior 
to the petition. The conditions set in the first sentence are not required in case damages are due to the 
members of the board of directors’ fault (dolus). 
2. The action shall be brought within six months from the day the general meeting was convened or the 
petition was submitted. 
3. The general meeting may appoint special representatives regarding the conduct of proceedings. If 
pursuit of the claim is demanded by the minority or in case that the deadline set in the above paragraph 
lapses without any action being brought, the Chair of the Court of First Instance in the district where the 
seat of the company is situated may, upon application of the minority submitted within one month from 
the expiration of the deadline set in the above paragraph, under the procedure set in article 634 
Civ.Procedure, appoint special representatives of the company for the conduct of judicial proceedings. 
The court expenses for appointment of special representatives and pursuit of the company’s claims are 
borne by the latter’.  
See Georgios Zouridakis ‘Introducing Derivative Actions in the Greek Law on Public Limited 
Companies: Issues of Legal Standing and Lessons from the German and UK Experience’ (2015) 26 
ICCLR 271. Slightly different translation can be found in Lambadarios Law Firm (trans. & edts.) Law 
2190/1920 On Companies Limited by Shares (Sociétés Anonymes) Law 3190/1955 On Limited Liability 




This Chapter uses the above considerations as a compass in comparing the company’s 
action with the German and UK derivative actions. Firstly, alongside the explanation 
of the nature of the rights to be examined and the terminology to be used herein, it 
expounds on how it perceives and evaluates shareholders’ protection within the ambit 
of the enforcement of corporate claims. It then progresses to examine the regulatory 
strategies adopted in each jurisdiction. The first matter to be considered is that of the 
allocation of litigation costs. Then, this Chapter will examine in detail the rules in place 
that aim to restrict excessive litigation. The grouping of these rules is purportedly 
detached from the categorisations found in the national statutes of the core jurisdictions. 
Therefore, the first two restrictions on litigation apply to every form of civil (including 
corporate) action; who is permitted to sue and for which cause of action. The rest are 
more connected with the nature of derivative actions; whether the board’s misfeasance 
can be ratified, whether the action serves the corporate interests and, finally, whether 
and to what extent by initiating proceedings for the same cause can the board block 
shareholder litigation. Section 3.4 examines shareholders’ access to litigation-related 
information and, before concluding, this Chapter considers the intricacies involved in 
the conduct of the proceedings post-admission. The comparative study directly serves 
two objectives. Firstly, it purports to explain the relevant law and bring to the surface 
any problems in its construction and function. Secondly, it aims to show how protective 
the Greek framework is compared to the German and UK ones. The ensuing analysis 
identifies a variety of problems regarding this facet of Greek shareholder law and 
illustrates that other jurisdictions protect shareholders better, in many respects. 
Contingent upon these conclusions is the further objective, to identify the points where 
Greek law is in need of change and the ways in which the comparative considerations 




3.1.2. Conceptual considerations and their relevance to regulatory design 
Chapter 2 illustrated that derivative actions have the potential to assume an important 
role within a legal system and an economy. Furthermore, as stated in Chapter 1, many 
jurisdictions provide for derivative actions, even more provide for rules functionally 
equivalent to derivative actions. Yet, those rules are designed and perform very 
differently compared to each other. The reason for this divergence resides in the 
complexity involved in this kind of shareholder litigation. This Subsection explains 
that, in order for a shareholders’ remedy to become protective for shareholders and 
assume the role envisaged in Chapter 2, its regulatory design has to consider and respect 
this complexity.   
Derivative actions (and functionally equivalent remedies) are construed as a minority 
shareholders’ remedy in view of the impasse created by the no reflective loss principle 
and the possibility that the collective intra-corporate organs fail to achieve redress on 
behalf of the company. From this perspective, the effectiveness of the remedy depends 
on its availability to minorities and individual shareholders. As is illustrated in the 
ensuing sections, this is determined primarily by rules on legal standing. The more 
shareholders enjoy access to justice, the better the availability of the remedy and the 
greater the possibility for recovery of their reflective loss.  Availability of the remedy 
is further determined by the admissibility of claims, based on the nature of the 
complaint. The scope of corporate misfeasance shareholders are allowed to seek 
judicial redress for, is directly connected with recovery of their reflective loss. To 
explain, this kind of litigation may achieve recovery of shareholders’ losses, only 
within the boundaries of the scope of misfeasance it is designed to remedy, 
notwithstanding the fact that other forms of misfeasance may equally harm 
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shareholders’ interests. Similar considerations apply to the number of potential 
defendants to the suit, as a variety of actors within and outside the company are 
potential wrongdoers; directors, shadow directors and contracting parties, to name but 
a few. Lastly, the use of the remedy relates to the availability of corporate information 
to shareholders. Litigation cannot be expected to be brought, at least not with any 
possibility of success, if shareholders are unaware of the reasons and the persons 
responsible for their reflective loss, or if they cannot support their claims with sufficient 
evidence.   
Recovery of reflective loss via compensation on behalf of the company and – indirectly 
- shareholders as a whole, falls under the topics of corporate governance, agency 
problems and agency costs. In Section 2.4 we saw that the dilution of recovery among 
all shareholders may act as a disincentive for claims and thus incapacitate much of the 
derivative action’s potential in addressing agency costs. In such a case, the aggregate 
welfare of shareholders is endangered due to the irrationality involved in the pursuit of 
the individual welfare of the derivative claimant, when he/she has to bear alone the 
costs and the risk of litigation, but also share recovery with everyone else in the 
company. It is illustrated below that incentivising shareholders and addressing free-
rider concerns are key elements of regulatory design, situated mainly within the ambit 
of the allocation of litigation costs, in recognition of the derivative and representative 
nature of the remedy. 
Staying with agency problems and costs, derivative actions and functionally equivalent 
remedies address them not only by providing a means of compensation, but also a 
means of deterrence. For this deterrent function to take effect, enforcement of corporate 
claims should be a credible and considerable threat. Accordingly, the effectiveness of 
the remedy from that perspective depends on the possibility for a claim to be brought, 
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even more so for a claim to be brought successfully. This possibility runs back to the 
issues of shareholders’ accessibility to and incentives for derivative litigation, given 
that enforcement is initiated by them. Furthermore, deterrence also depends upon the 
severity of punishment, as in case the extraction of private benefits outweighs 
compensation wrongdoers are less likely to be inhibited.2 
It so follows that a derivative action - or a functionally equivalent remedy - is as much 
protective for shareholders’ interests as it is available to them. But this is only half the 
story. Litigating on behalf of the company may run to its detriment and therefore be 
against the interests of shareholders as a whole, sometimes including even the 
shareholder-claimant. This is because litigation engages much of the company's 
resources. In fact, in order to assess the efficacy of derivative actions following this 
rationale, recovery should be offset by the costs involved in the litigation and 
thereafter.3 Taking into consideration the time, human capital and expenses engaged in 
the court proceedings, it is doubtful that the compensatory order, if achieved, will 
always make up to them. Cases like Prudential illustrate that the litigation costs may 
reach dazzling heights, 4 whilst cases like Smith v Croft show that the protraction of 
proceedings may render proceedings a “shambles”, especially where the claim does not 
eventually meet with success.5 Also likely to be affected by such litigation is the market 
value of the shares, regarding traded companies. The stock market is an information-
sensitive sector and, even though any signal of incoming compensation may raise 
demand of the company's stock,6 publicity of court proceedings against the 
                                                          
2 Arad Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance: Theory and Operation, (OUP 2007) 
64 
3 (indicatively) Susanne Kalss ‘Shareholder Suits: Common Problems, Different Solutions and First 
Steps towards a Possible Harmonisation by Means of a European Model Code’ (2009) 6 ECFR 324, 332. 
4 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204; the temporal length and 
the enormity of litigation costs involved in this case added to the notoriety of the common law derivative 
action. 
5 (1987) 3 B.C.C. 218, 258 (Knox J). 
6Kalss (n 3) 332. 
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management of the company might result in loss of confidence by the investors, at least 
in the short run.7 A derivative claim may also be detrimental to the interests of the 
company, if it results to the resignation of directors who, due to their unique personal 
and professional qualities, are irreplaceable for the company. This concern was 
apparent in the affidavit of Mr Baldock, director of a minority shareholder (Wren Trust) 
opposing the derivative proceedings brought by other minority shareholders in Smith v 
Croft (No 3):  
I am of the view that Mr. Soames represents the principal asset 
of the company. […] There is therefore no reason why if Mr. 
Soames became so disenchanted with the present litigation he 
could not either set up business on his own account in this 
country or seek alternative employment in the same industry in 
the US.8    
Consequently, when shareholders attempt to initiate litigation on behalf of the 
company, an agency problem is created between the shareholder-litigant and the 
company as a whole, due to the representative nature of the remedy. The minority 
shareholder becomes the “agent” in such cases, upon whose hands depend the interests 
not only of fellow shareholders, but also of all persons contracting with (or otherwise 
involved in) the company. This agency problem’s severity is determined by the degree 
to which the law allows a shareholder having interests competing to those of the 
company's to bring proceedings with the sole objective of extracting private benefits. 
If no safeguards are in place, agency costs may skyrocket and firms be left helpless to 
                                                          
7 Mark L Cross, Wallace N. Davidson, and John H. Thornton "The Impact of Directors and Officers' 
Liability Suits on Firm Value," (1989) 56 Journal of Risk and Insurance 128-36. 
8 (1987) 3 B.C.C. 218, 257. The irony in this statement is that derivative suits in the US were far more 
numerous than those of the UK… 
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be plundered by predatory shareholders, rendering the corporate environment a 
miserable view and unattractive to investors.  
The aforementioned considerations on safeguards against undesirable litigation 
permeate much of the legal thought. Apart from the rather rich literature on the matter, 
the wording of the consultation and preparatory reports prior to the statutes introducing 
such a form of litigation, alongside the relevant case law, reveal that the fear of 
excessive litigation is seriously contemplated;9 from the earliest stages of rule-making 
to judicial interpretation and application.10 The importance of such considerations for 
the purposes of this Thesis is paramount since, reportedly, the threats of frivolous and 
predatory litigation have vehemently influenced the Greek law-maker not to take any 
incisive step regarding the matter during the 2007 reform of the Greek Corporate Law; 
impugning the contrary voices from the academia.11 As will be seen, many of the 
differences among jurisdictions derive from the approaches taken so as to prevent abuse 
of the remedy. In order to constrain frivolous and vexatious litigation, they impose 
restrictions on legal standing, on the cause of action, as well as they subject the decision 
to sue to court’s review, under various criteria. The availability of the remedy to 
shareholders is thus curtailed, in view of the detrimental effects litigation may have on 
the company and shareholders as a whole. 
                                                          
9 Exquisite analysis in Anne van Aaken ‘Shareholder Suits as a Technique of Internalization and Control 
of Management: A Functional and Comparative Analysis‘(2004) 68 RabelsZ 288 with numerous 
references to American and German scholarship. 
10 see Andrew Keay and Joan Loughrey, ‘An assessment of the present state of derivative proceedings’, 
in Joan Loughrey (ed), Directors’ Duties and Shareholder Litigation in the Wake of the Financial Crisis, 
(EE, 2013)187 ff;  Janet M. Dine and Brian R. Cheffins 'Shareholder remedies: lessons from Canada' 
(1992) 13 CoLaw 89. 
11 Among others, Panagiotis K Panagiotou, ‘Actio pro socio and the principle of fiduciary duty as a 
means to limit the latter in company law’, (2013) B’ EEmpD, 291, 301; Christina Livada, "Filing of 
company claims against the members of the Board of Directors" in Perakis Evanghelos (ed.), Sociétés 
Anonyme’s Law (3rd edn Sakkoulas, 2013)1018-1019; and Georgios Triantafillakis, "From the 
Protection of the Minority to the Protection of the Shareholder", in Minutes of the 18th Panhellenian 
Conference on Commercial Law (collaborative work), Trends and Prospects of the Law of the Public 
Limited Company (Nomiki Bibliothiki, 2009), 116-117  
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It therefore follows that an effective and truly protective shareholders’ remedy against 
wrongs to the company is the one that strikes the right balance between its availability 
and the restrictions to its abuse. This is so because only in such a way can this type of 
litigation fulfil its full potential in assuming the role envisaged in Chapter 2. Otherwise, 
the law runs the risk of not remedying shareholders’ reflective loss, but instead 
allowing for further loss to occur; it runs the risk of not mitigating agency problems 
and their costs, but creating additional ones instead; and, finally, it runs the risk of 
devastating investors’ confidence in a market, instead of promoting it. 
 
3.1.2.1. Nature, typology and terminological considerations 
 
The very nature of derivative actions interlocks with Civil Procedure rules and 
principles.12 They effectively constitute a means to circumvent the ordinary rules on 
the legal standing of juridical persons; in the common law parlance, a derivative claim13 
is an exception to the “proper plaintiff rule”, as established in Foss v Harbottle.14 
Further procedural matters are also dealt within the ambit of the law on derivative 
actions, such as litigation costs and the extent to which a decision becomes res 
judicata.15 On the other hand, derivative actions, being a form of corporate redress 
against managerial misconduct, constitute part of the substantive company law. 
Interestingly, even their procedural aspects are usually dealt with in company law 
                                                          
12 This is evident in the differentiations in terminology made in CA 2006 with respect to Scottish Law; 
further evidence of this “dual” nature of derivative claims is the fact that CPR Part 19 and Practice 
Direction 19 C supplement the provisions under CA 2006, Pt 11. 
13 According to the wording of the statutory provisions, CA 2006, ss 260 et seq. 
14 (1843) 67 ER 189. 
15 Evanghelos Perakis ‘The Greek and International Discussion on Acceptance and Restriction of the 
Derivative Action brought by a Shareholder of a Public Limited Company’ in Hideo Nakamura, Hans 
Fasching, Hans F Gaul and Apostolos Georgiades (eds), Festschrift für Kostas E Beys dem Rechtsdenker 
in Attischer Dialektik (5th edn Eunomia 2003), 3679; reaching further analytical detail on the matter is 




statutes.16 These observations are important, for the implication that a comparative 
study on such rules needs to consider the applicable procedural law.  
Consistent with the procedural nature of derivative actions is the fact that shareholders 
are required to go through an admission stage for their claim to proceed. Given the 
expenses involved in and the potential length of proceedings, until the court reaches 
decision on the merits, the examined jurisdictions attempt to filter out frivolous and 
vexatious suits early on, in order to protect parties from such undesirable effects; by 
entrusting this task with courts and setting certain criteria upon which permission to 
pursue/continue a claim may be granted. Evidently, procedure plays its rule in the 
pursuit of regulatory objectives.  
In Germany, admission proceedings take place in a single hearing and attest the 
standing to sue of the claimant(s) based on the criteria set in AktG, section 148 (1).17 
Similarly, the petition for appointment of a special representative under Greek law18 
can be seen as an admission procedure for the claim to be asserted.19 In the UK, a two- 
stage procedure is provided for permission to continue the derivative claim. In fact, a 
late entry to the statute was the procedural screening mechanism of adjudicating, in a 
separate stage (ex parte), whether the claimant has a “prima facie case”.20 However, 
the law seems to be unclear as to whether establishing a prima facie case is an exercise 
clearly discernible from the examination as to whether the claimant has standing based 
                                                          
16 See, for instance, AktG, s. 148 (2), where court jurisdiction is determined, along with other procedural 
matters (eg suspension of limitation period); matters which could well be addressed within the ZPO. 
17 AktG s. 148 (2). 
18 Law 2190/1920, art. 22b (3).  
19 Hans C. Hirt, ‘The enforcement of directors' duties pursuant to the Aktiengesetz: present law and 
reform in Germany: Part 1’ [2005] I.C.C.L.R. 179, 187) described the then equivalent procedure under 
German Law as “preliminary” 
20 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (9th 
Edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 659. If the application is successful at first stage, the court may give 
directions as to the evidence to be provided by the company (s. 261 (3)), in what resembles an 
intermediate stage in the application for permission; see Janet Dine and Marios Koutsias Company law 
(8th edn Palgrave MacMillann 2014) 206.   
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on the criteria set in CA 2006, section 263; a task also for the second stage (inter 
partes).21 The criteria, in their majority reflecting the rules formulated under common 
law, fall under two categories. Under the first one (section 263 subsection 2), should 
the set requirements not be met by the claimant, the court must refuse permission.22 
Under the second category (section 263 subsections 3 and 4), a non-exclusive list is set 
of factors which the court must consider in exercising its discretion to give 
permission.23 In judicial practice, considerations under section 263 (3) and (4) have 
intruded most of the judgments in the early cases under the new statute.24 Interestingly, 
the parties may in some instances opt to merge the two-stage admission procedure in a 
single hearing, as this would save time and money. The courts seem not only to permit 
but also to applaud such initiatives, as can be adduced by the words of Floyd J in 
Mission Capital; 
Sections 261 and 262 of the Act describe a two−stage process 
for the granting of permission to continue such an action which 
is given effect to by CPR 19.9(a). In the first stage, the court 
considers on paper whether there is a prima facie case for 
                                                          
21 One would expect that establishing a prima facie case would necessitate only satisfaction of the formal 
requirements in filing a claim, such as membership status of the claimant, legal and factual basis of the 
action specified and relevant to the procedure etc (requirements specified in CA 2006, s. 266, for 
derivative actions in Scotland). However, courts have occasionally taken a different view, adding to 
these elements the criteria and requirements in CA 2006, s. 263; see, regarding Scotland Wishart v 
Castlecroft Ltd & ors [2009] CSIH 65 [31] (Lord Nimmo Smith Lord Reed Sir David Edward, QC), 
regarding England Stimpson v Southern Landlords Association [2009] EWHC 2072 (Ch) [2010] B.C.C. 
387 [46] (Pelling QC). Further discussion in Chapter 5 and Keay and Loughrey (n 10), 192-193.  
22 “Leave” in Northern Ireland; and Scotland (CA 2006, s. 266). As noted in Geoffrey Morse (ed), 
Palmer's company law (Sweet & Maxwell 2015) para 8.3717, regarding the Scottish provisions: “The 
delay in having to seek permission to commence proceedings (which does not arise in English law) is a 
serious defect in the Scottish provisions, since it might result in the substantive claim prescribing before 
the necessary action to recover loss can be commenced”. 
23 In Mission Capital plc v Sinclair [2008] B.C.C. 866 (Ch) 874 the application of CA 2006, s. 263, was 
described as follows “Section 263 explains the basis on which the court is to consider the giving of 
permission. The relevant part here is section 263(2)(a) [...] This section is mandatory in character. If the 
relevant facts are established the court must refuse leave. Section 263(3) sets out the discretionary 
consideration” (Floyd J). Regarding Scotland, we read in Palmer’s (n 22) para 8.3721 “Section 
268 mirrors the provisions applicable in England and Wales and Northern Ireland (s.263) and decisions 
on those provisions will carry considerable weight in Scotland.” 
24 See on the discussion Keay and Loughrey (n 10) 190 ff. 
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permission to be given. If so, a permission hearing is held on 
notice to the company; in this case the parties have sensibly 
agreed to combine the two parts of the process.25  
It is therefore likely that the ex parte and inter partes stages will in practice often be 
held in a single hearing; and, in any case, telescoping of the criteria set in section 263 
may be facilitated in adjudicating a prima facie case.26 
Some clarifications regarding the terminology used in the ensuing analysis are 
necessary at this point. The adjective “genuine” used for derivative claims under CA 
2006, Pt 11 is selected predominantly in the light of two considerations. First, the 
general derivative action continues the long tradition of the common law rule and 
temporally precedes the (somehow inaccurate) translation as such of foreign provisions 
that bear comparative similarities to it; thus exhibiting an element of originality.27 
Second, despite the existence of a provision for a minority shareholders’ action in the 
same statute (section 370), only claims regulated in CA 2006 Part 11 are explicitly 
described as derivative ones. It is therefore clear that the English term is coined 
exclusively for (individual) shareholder actions brought in their own name for the 
benefit of the company; any broader use of it merely serves purposes of convenience.28 
It follows that use of the term “derivative action” when referring to Greek (Codified) 
Law 2190/1920, article 22b (and its German equivalent old version of Aktiengesetz, 
section 14729) would amount to coining an academic misnomer for what actually is the 
                                                          
25 Mission Capital plc v Sinclair [2008] B.C.C. 866 (Ch) 874 (Floyd J, emphasis added). 
26 See also David Gibbs 'Has the statutory derivative claim fulfilled its objectives? A prima facie case 
and the mandatory bar: Part 1' (2011) 32(2) Comp. Law. 41. 
27 Note that, following the CA 2006, derivative claims are to be brought only under CA 2006, Pt 11. 
However, Pt 19 CPR on derivative claims proceedings applies to claims brought under CA 2006, Pt 11 
“or otherwise”. This is of significant importance regarding multiple derivative actions as will be 
illustrated below. 
28 Gower and Davies’ (n 20) 649 describe s. 370 as the other “statutory derivative action”. 
29 L.2190/1920, art. 22b was modelled after the old (German) AktG s. 147; see Themis K Skouras, 
‘appointment and replacement of special representatives in the societe anonyme’[1983] EEmpD 553; 
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ad hoc replacement of the board with “special representatives” of the company, by 
court decision, with the (exclusive) mandate to initiate litigation against the misfeasant 
board of directors.30 Arguably, this procedure pays more resemblance with the 
provisions of the Greek Civil Code on the placement of “interim administration” for 
the company - by court decision -31 in cases where the incumbent directors are found 
in conflict of interest, than the common law's "genuine" derivative action.32 Thereby, 
claims are asserted indirectly by shareholders: instead of bringing the claim 
themselves, all they can do is apply to court for appointment of an ad hoc administration 
to carry the task of litigation. Whereas, a core component of derivative actions is that 
shareholders maintain their own legal standing33 in the main proceedings.34 It is thus 
inaccurate to refer to this remedy as a derivative action, as German scholars observed 
for their strong functional equivalent provision (old version of section 147 of AktG). 35 
An alternative could be the term: “shareholders’ action”. However, even this 
terminological convention is problematic, as it is not shareholders that actually bring 
proceedings before court by virtue of this remedy. Therefore, for the purposes of 
                                                          
Ioannis Passias To Díkaion tis Anonýmou Etaireías (1969) 685, 691. For a translation of the old German 
law see Gerhard Wirth, Michael Arnold, Mark Greene Corporate Law in Germany (C.H. Beck, 2004). 
30 Proceedings follow the non-contentious jurisdiction procedure of article Greek Code of Civil 
Procedure (GrCivPrC), 786 despite the reference of L.2190/1920, art. 22b to the latter’s predecessor, 
GrCivPrC art.634. See Arvanitakis ‘Article 786’ in Michael Margaritis & Anna Margariti (eds) 
Commentary on the Code of Civil Procedure (vol. II, PN Sakkoulas 2012) 1551. 
31 Greek Civil Code (GCC) art. 69.  
32 Nevertheless, GCC art. 69 is of narrower scope, from certain perspectives, compared to the company’s 
action under L.2190/1920 art 22b; for instance, it does not cover inaction of the board to pursue corporate 
claims or instances where the board operates under the directions of the majority of the share capital. 
See Nikolaos K Rokas, ‘Corporate Organisation and Shareholders’ Individual Action’, (2007) NH’ 
EEmpD 16; Leonidas N Georgakopoulos, To Díkaio ton Etaireión vol 4 (Sakkoulas publications1991) 
208-210. See also Patrai Court of Appeal 226/1997 DEE 1997, 591, 592 (with commentary by Lucas A 
Kokkinis), asserting that GCC art. 69 application to conflicts of interest is strict and does not extend to 
cases of maladministration/mismanagement.  
33 In German: “eigener Klagebefugnis”; see Karsten Schmidt and Marcus Lutter, Aktiengesetz: 
Kommentar, (Otto Schmidt 2010) 2130. Part of the analysis on legal standing featured herein has been 
published in Georgios Zouridakis ‘Introducing Derivative Actions in the Greek Law on Public Limited 
Companies: Issues of Legal Standing and Lessons from the German and UK Experience’ (2015) 26 
ICCLR 271, 271-283. 
34 Baum and Puchniak ‘The Derivative Action’ (n 1) 7. 
35 See further Hirt, (n 19), 184, reaching similar conclusions regarding the German provisions. 
118 
 
consistency and clarity, the literary translation of the Greek provision will be preferred 
- corporate (or company’s) action(s) - and (pre-UMAG) section 147 of Aktiengesetz 
and article 22b of the Greek statute will otherwise be referred to as indirect and quasi-
derivative actions. Conversely, claims under Part 11 or section 370 of the UK CA 2006 
and the common law exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle all fall under the 
definition of “direct” or “genuine” derivative actions, yet reference herein to the 
“derivative action under UK law” points to CA 2006, Pt 11, unless stated otherwise.36 
In a similar fashion, sections 148 and 149 of the German Act and the derivative action 
of Konzernrecht both qualify as “direct” or “genuine” derivative actions, but reference 
to the “German derivative action” normally connotes the former sections. For all the 
above provisions, the umbrella term “derivative actions” may generally apply for the 
economy of this study, only in cases where a distinction among the different notions is 
not of substance.  
 
3.2. Removing the disincentives to commence litigation; the strategies adopted 
regarding costs allocation 
Let us first examine the jurisdictions that provide for direct derivative actions. Both the 
UK and Germany adopted the strategy of imposing procedural hurdles on shareholders. 
In neither of them are the barriers of economic/financial nature; both rejected the idea 
of making derivative litigation expensive.37 From the perspective of equal access to 
justice, such a decision is rather justified. Besides other obvious jurisprudential reasons 
                                                          
36 The statutory term “derivative claims” will be used for the provisions under CA 2006, Pt 11 
interchangeably. 
37 See Carsten Paul, ‘Derivative Actions under English and German Corporate Law –Shareholder 
Participation between the Tension Filled Areas of Corporate Governance and Malicious Shareholder 
Interference’, (2010) 115 ECFR 81, 110 ff. 
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not to use costs as a means of restricting the volume of litigation, there are efficiency 
considerations suggesting that such a strategy is not optimal. First, such measures do 
not guarantee that the volume of litigation will remain to reasonable standards for the 
right reasons. Even though they would be an important deterrent to rational actors, not 
all actors in the trade act rationally (in the economic sense of the term). In fact, the 
Japanese experience on derivative actions shows that quasi-rationally/irrationally-
motivated proceedings are anything but a rare phenomenon.38 A costs strategy might 
thus impede litigants whose action will in effect be beneficial for the company, whilst 
it would leave undeterred wealthy claimants, who purport to disrupt - or even damage 
- the corporate business, by inducing the company in (possibly lengthy) litigation. 
Second and more importantly, derivative actions are destined to operate as checks and 
balances against bad corporate governance. In effect, they constitute a mechanism for 
shareholder activism, by disconnecting the harm caused personally to each shareholder 
from the cause of action and availing direct redress for the company exclusively. 
Therefore, due to their nature, derivative actions are a cost that the claimants should 
not prima facie bear, as the claim to be enforced is the company’s and compensation 
goes (directly at least) to the company. 
Accordingly, an enabling approach is suggested regarding litigation costs. The 
perspective that the minority is a disadvantaged, weaker party to the corporate dispute 
in (among others) economic terms, suggests that, in order for the protection to be 
effective, there should be some relief from the costs entailed; at least when the litigation 
is not vexatious.  This consideration encompasses also the problems of “free-riding” 
and “rational apathy” inherent in derivative actions. Simply put, it is hard to explain 
                                                          
38 Ground-breaking examination of the phenomenon by Dan W. Puchniak and Masafumi Nakahigashi 
‘Japan's Love for Derivative Actions: Irrational Behavior and Non-Economic Motives as Rational 
Explanations for Shareholder Litigation’, (2012) 45 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1; cf  MD West 'Why 
Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from Japan' (2001) 30 JLS 351. 
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rationally why litigants should undertake a costly and potentially lengthy procedure for 
the benefit of the company; a shared benefit, that they can only reflectively enjoy 
through the economic output of the shares owned. It is submitted that, to do away with 
the claimants’ concerns as to free-riding, an award/incentive strategy must be 
implemented.39 That is, upon a successful claim the claimant should be directly entitled 
to part of the award, or the award should go directly to the body of shareholders.40 Such 
an approach is not followed in the countries herein examined. Nevertheless, the matter 
of costs has, as already stated, much occupied the legal thought.41 The general 
impression is that the solutions adopted eventually attempt not to enrich the claimants, 
but at least not to leave them worse off. 
The continental law provisions follow the strategy of costs indemnification by the 
company, thus curbing the “loser pays” (otherwise: the "English rule") principle. Given 
that the Greek provisions confer a right only to appoint special representatives, who 
will in turn assert the corporate claims against the management, it is only reasonable 
that Law 2190/1920, article 22b (3) does not put any further qualification to such relief. 
It is one of the very few “novelties” introduced to the article by the 2007 reform and 
has met with academic applause.42 Deservedly so, as bearing the litigation costs in what 
essentially is a preliminary procedure to the substantive claim (which is pursued by the 
special representatives) would be too high a burden for petitioners to carry. However, 
the rule displays some disparity regarding the provisions on special audit, where the 
                                                          
39 Indicatively, Andreas Cahn ‚‘Vorstandsvergütung als Gegenstand rechtlicher Regelung‘ in Stefan 
Grundmann, Brigitte Haar, Hanno Merkt, Peter O Mülbert, Marina Wellenhofer, Harald Baum, Jan von 
Hein, Thomas von Hippel, Katharina Pistor, Markus Roth, Heike Schweitzer (eds) Festschrift für Klaus 
J. Hopt zum 70. Geburtstag am 24. August 2010: Unternehmen, Markt und Verantwortung (W.de 
Gruyter 2010), 452. 
40 Baum and Puchniak (n 1) 37. 
41 For an illuminating discussion in the European context, see Kalss (n 3), 332 ff. 
42 Livada (n 11). 1022. 
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court is afforded discretion to allocate (part or the total of) the expenses to the 
petitioner.43  
The latter approach resembles that of the German derivative action. The sixth paragraph 
of AktG, section 148, distinguishes between costs in the admission proceedings and the 
ones to be determined in the final judgment. Regarding the former, shareholder-
applicants bear the costs, unless the company’s behaviour is to blame for them bringing 
an unmeritorious claim; by not notifying them of opposing corporate interests, in case 
the application is dismissed on such grounds.44 However, if shareholders succeed in the 
admission proceedings but eventually lose the case of damages/compensation, they 
should bear the costs only when they were culpable or grossly negligent in bringing the 
claim.45 Apparently, German derivative claimants have fewer chances in being 
reimbursed by the company for their litigation expenses than Greek petitioners in a 
company’s action; this disparity with the holistic “company-pays” Greek approach is 
only mitigated by an applicable cap on litigation expenses.46 
The English approach, as per the common law exceptions to the rule in Foss, provided 
indemnity, only pursuant to a relevant order by court. What was subsequently called a 
“Wallersteiner order”,47 assuming the name of the decision where such indemnity was 
first granted, much resembles the German rule on the decision on costs in the final 
hearing. Unless the claim is not reasonable, the company should bear full costs 
regardless of the outcome of the proceedings; the test to be applied to attest the 
reasonableness was that of the “independent director”.48 Nowadays, the rule has 
                                                          
43 L.2190/1920, art. 40a(2).  
44 AktG, s. 148 (6).   
45 Uwe Hüffer, Aktiengesetz, (Zehnte Auflage C.H. Beck 2012) 872. 
46 Under Greek law (L. 4194/2013 “Attorneys’ Code”; art. 63), a statutory minimum cap also applies, 
based on a scaled ratio and depending on the value of the claim.  
47 Wallersteiner v Moir (No2) [1975] QB 373, 391ff, (Lord Denning). 
48 Ibid, 404, (Buckley LJ). 
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statutory footing in the Civil Procedure Rules: Practice Direction 19 C 2 (2), on the 
claim form, makes reference (yet not express) to the rule in Wallersteriner, providing 
also some guidance regarding when such an order can and should be sought.49 
Consequently, it appears to be possible to have the expenses covered in full following 
such practice, provided that the court so orders.  
It can thus be held that a claimant (or petitioner) with some possibility of success will 
at least not be worse off in all the examined jurisdictions. Why do shareholders pursue 
derivative claims so scarcely then? The oft cited – and maybe deplored - argument of 
lack of incentives is substantiated, yet it does not provide a full explanation. For one 
thing, culture seems to have little to do with the phenomenon regarding the countries 
comprising this study’s domain. Investors in German, British and Greek companies are 
not litigation-averse; in fact, quite the contrary should be asserted. There have been 
recent nation-wide studies on the frequency of shareholder litigation in both Germany50 
and the UK51 (yet none in Greece) which show that, if anything, frustrated members do 
actually bring matters before court. Aside claims under article 22b, excessive litigation 
has been for long a major concern in Greece and recent amendments to the Civil 
Procedure Code made big effort to lower the workload of the Courts of First Instance 
by reallocating jurisdiction on several matters to minor courts.52 A third reason for the 
                                                          
49 See also Paul (n 37) 96-97. 
50 Theodor Baums, Florian Drinhausen and Astrid Keinath, Anfechtungsklagen und Freigabeverfahren. 
Eine empirische Studie, [2011] ZIP 2329, 2331. Notice that this study concerns actions challenging the 
validity of GM resolutions, an individual right under German law. Court decisions [BGH 29.1.2001 
NJW 2001, 1428; AG 2001, 263 (Aqua-Butzke); also BGH, BGHZ 146, 179; NJW 2001, 1425 (MEZ)] 
and recent legislation (UMAG) have placed restrictions to abuse. See also Mathias M Siems, 
Convergence in Shareholder Law (CUP 2008) 122. 
51 Roman Tomasic and Folarin Akinbami, Shareholder Activism and Litigation against UK Banks in 
Joan Loughery (ed) Directors’ Duties and Shareholder Litigation in the Wake of the Financial Crisis, 
(EE 2013) 143ff; a Westlaw-based research, evidencing rather scarce occurrence of derivative claims (8 
in number) over the last decade. However, there is evidence that since CA 2006, Pt 11 came into force 
litigation is becoming more frequent, yet not reaching the American standards. Concurring David 
Milman, “Shareholder litigation in the UK: the implications of recent authorities and other 
developments”, (2013), 342 Co. L.N 1, 1-2. It is submitted that actions under CA 2006, s. 994, are more 
frequent. 
52 Indicatively, see the amendments by L. 3994/2011, L. 4055/2012 and L. 4139/2013. 
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scarcity of shareholders’ litigation on behalf of the company lies in the construction of 
the provisions themselves. As is demonstrated below, this is probably the most 
persuasive explanation. The applicable restrictions on a variety of matters (other than 
costs and award allocation) related to this form of litigation determine its possibilities 
of success and expectedly influence the quantum of claims brought before court; few 
would pursue a lost cause. In any case, economic incentives are not the exclusive factor 
to be considered regarding the availability of derivative actions.  
 
3.3. Restrictions on litigation in particular 
3.3.1. Legal standing53 
3.3.1.1 Legal standing in general 
The primary observation as to who enjoys legal standing under the different forms of 
derivative (or corporate) actions, is that such right is conferred either to individual 
members or to a minority of the contributors to share capital. Indeed, the span of the 
rights holders has much occupied the legislators’ thought in recent reforms. 
Accordingly, the selection of a 1% qualified minority (Minderheit) threshold by the 
German legislator, purports to make derivative actions available to a bigger forum than 
that of the action in section 147 of Aktiengesetz, as it stood before the UMAG.54 
Remarkably, the Greek legislator also considered this facet of the availability of 
corporate actions in the 2007 reform, but preferred to lower the then existing threshold 
to one tenth of registered capital, instead of introducing genuine derivative actions to 
                                                          
53 See Zouridakis (n 33) 274-280. 
54 See further Hüffer (n 45) 865: “Forum of only 1% of the share capital participation or the amount of 
100,000 Euros is low, especially in smaller AGs; what actio pro socio on one hand and de lege ferenda 
makes unnecessary, on the other hand could strain the authorization procedure”; T Bürgers & T Körber 
(ed.), Heidelberger Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz, (C.F. Müller 2008), 970; Schmidt and Lutter (n 33). 
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the law on public limited companies.55 This reform also introduced a novelty; it enables 
the corporate bylaws to limit the requisite threshold to petition for a corporate action, 
to what could in practice amount to one share.56 The practical impact this contractual 
freedom may have on shareholder protection is questionable, being a matter of the 
founders’ and the majority’s discretion.57 
In the selected jurisdictions and regarding both derivative and company’s actions, legal 
standing to sue or file the relevant petition is afforded to minority shareholders. 
Minority protection is indeed an objective of such rules, as explained above. At least 
concerning company’s actions, as is the one of Law 2190/1920 article 22b, minority 
protection is necessitated by the alleviation of the right to request the company to 
pursue a claim to the body of the General Meeting. In light therefore of the possibility 
that the GM, because of interlocking interests with those of the wrongdoers, fails to 
enact this right, it is fair for the minority to be empowered to take action.58 A similar 
rationale seems to apply to the German and UK jurisdictions, yet in neither of them is 
the inaction of the shareholders’ majority a mandatory precondition for a claimant to 
sue. The GM retains, of course, the power to demand the Aufsichtsrat to assert 
corporate claims under section 147 of the German statute, but inaction thereof is no 
precondition to bringing a claim under AktG, section 148.  
A point where the examined jurisdictions differ materially though, is the definition of 
“minorities” capable of initiating proceedings. The continental ones define as such the 
holders of a proportion of the company’s share capital, whereas the UK statute does 
not limit the availability of the remedy in such a way and considers each shareholder 
                                                          
55 Explanatory statement (preamble) to Law 3604/2007, available at 
<http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/2f026f42-950c-4efc-b950-340c4fb76a24/a-eurodikaio-
eis.pdf> accessed 15. 08.2015. 
56 L. 2190/1920, art. 22b (1) & (3). 
57 Triantafillakis, (n 11) 116. See also Section 5.3.1.2.1.  
58 Athens Court of Appeal 3494/2007 DEE 2007, 1191. 
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to be a minority for the purposes of CA 2006, Pt 11.59 The said ownership thresholds 
employed by Greek and German law are supposed to constitute a screening device to 
frivolous litigation.60 As the argument goes, a contribution of one percent or more 
reflects a stronger connection with the corporate interests than that of a single share; 
and renders slimmer the possibility of predatory litigants buying shares with a view to 
damage the corporate interests.61 
Nevertheless, restrictions on legal standing based on share capital participation may 
necessitate a number of shareholders to cooperate, in order to reach the requisite 
thresholds. The plethora of claimants (petitioners in the case of Greece), in such 
situations, may give rise to a variety of problems. The first concerns the collective 
action itself. Shareholders need undergo the additional costs of forming alliances with 
the view to litigate, a task further hindered by the hardships of identifying counterparts 
willing to participate in this endeavour. The German legislator instituted the 
“shareholders’ forum” to that end, in an effort to alleviate some of these costs.62 
However, nothing similar exists under Greek law. An additional burden for minority 
shareholders, is the requirement that the ownership thresholds are maintained 
throughout the proceedings. If part of the applicants lose their membership status or do 
not wish anymore the claim be pursued and the remaining shareholders do not satisfy 
the requisite threshold, the claim (or petition) will be rejected.63 Further perplexing the 
law on legal standing are cases where the claimants’ aggregate participation in the 
company diminishes in the course of proceedings, for reasons beyond their control, 
                                                          
59 CA 2006, s 260 (5), confers locus standi to both members and non-members to “whom shares in the 
company have been transferred or transmitted by operation of law”. 
60 Baum and Puchniak (n 1) 88. 
61 Paul (n 37) 104. 
62 See Nikolaos Paschos and Kay-Uwe Neumann, 'Die Neuregelungen des UMAG im Bereich der 
Durchsetzung von Haftungsansprüchen der Aktiengesellschaft gegen Organmitglieder', (2005) Heft 33 
DB 1779, 1780. 
63 Concurring Ioannis Delikostopouos and Labros D Sinaniotis ‘Mi peraitéro stírixi ton eidikón 
ekprosópon anónymis etaireías sto 1/3 tou metochikoú kefalaíou tis’ [2000] Diki 990. 
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such as a capital increase. This seems to be a concern mainly for petitions to appoint a 
special representative, as the latter’s appointment is contingent upon the minority’s 
mandate. Under the German derivative action such requirement does not seem to exist, 
yet the position of German law remains unclear. 64   
The German statute further attempts to combat abusive litigation, by imposing another 
temporal restriction; regarding “the point in time” the claimants became members. This 
provision targets “professional” litigants buying shares with the mere intent of 
engaging the board members and the company to court proceedings, in order to serve 
interests that do not align with corporate ones. Mitigating this restriction is the setting 
of the benchmark according to actual or imputed knowledge (instead of occurrence) of 
the complained act or omission;65 to a great extent this mirrors the civil law approach 
regarding calculation of limitations on claims.66 Therefore, a constraint is imposed that, 
although not necessarily in contrast with the approach adopted by the CA 2006, section 
260 subsection four (where it is expressly provided that it is “immaterial” whether the 
claimant became a member after the cause of action arose), is not to be found among 
the mandatory restrictions under UK Law. It is expected, however, that courts – in 
exercising their discretion - consider whether claimants purchased their shares in view 
of prospective litigation, within the ambit of good faith.67 Such a concern was 
contemplated in Smith v Croft (No2) by the representative of the company (Aldous 
QC);  
                                                          
64 T Bürgers and T Körber, Heidelberger Kommentar Aktiengesetz (CF Müller 2013) 1290: the 
prevailing opinion is that the quorum is necessary only when filing the application; cf the opposing view 
in Gerold Bezzenberger and Tilman Bezzenberger ‘Aktionärskonsortien zur Wahrnehmung von 
Minderheitsrechten’ in Georg Bitter, Marcus Lutter, Hans-Joachim Priester, Wolfgang Schön, Peter 
Ulmer (edts) Festschrift für Karsten Schmidt zum 70. Geburtstag (Otto Schmidt 2009) 105, 112ff.  
65 S. 148 (1)(1). 
66 See GCC art. 937 (torts only) and s. 199 (1) (2). 
67 Keay and Loughrey (n 10) 211. 
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It is said that even if the board is independent, and 99 per cent, 
of the shares were to be held by "outsiders," the remaining one 
per cent could bring a derivative action; if that were so it would 
have far reaching consequences, since it would enable a trade 
rival to buy single share in order to maintain a derivative action 
for wholly improper reasons68 
It can further be observed here that the above temporal restriction, is not to be found in 
the pre-UMAG section 147 of Aktiengesetz. This evidences the legislators’ effort to 
keep frivolous claimants at bay, by imposing further screening mechanisms on a direct 
action which is perceived as more attractive than the regime of special representatives.  
Greek law imposes a strict restriction in its functionally equivalent provision; 
petitioners have to adduce evidence of possessing membership status three months 
prior to filing the petition.69 However, criticism on the Greek approach regarding the 
duration of membership status, as too harsh compared to the German one, would be 
unjust. It is worth noticing, by contextual reading of the German provisions, that 
duration of membership, as a requirement for legal standing that is disconnected from 
the occurrence of the directorial wrong (thus similar to the Greek approach), found its 
way through  AktG, section 142, to derivative proceedings. According to the latter, the 
applicant minority for a special audit has to prove membership for at least three months 
preceding the petition and maintain it throughout the audit procedure.70 Given the 
importance that discovery of evidence has with the filing of derivative claims and the 
fact that the special audit under the aforementioned section is, effectively, the only 
worthy means of facilitating such discovery under German law, the scope of section 
                                                          
68 [1988] Ch. 114, 142. 
69 Art. 22b(1). 
70 OLG München Beschl. v. 11.5.2010- 31 Wx 14-10 NZG 2010, 7884; ZIP 2010, 1032. 
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148 (1) (1) is curtailed.71 Therefore, save for the cases that there is no need to resort to 
such a procedure,72 petitioners under section 148 have, in practice, to satisfy a strict 
requirement of long-standing membership in the company. 
It is safe to adduce that UK law is more generous regarding legal standing. Not only 
the right to bring a claim under Part 11 is an individual one, but also contemporaneous 
ownership of shares might only be considered in court within the context of good 
faith.73 As regards Germany and Greece, the “minority approach” is followed. 
Nevertheless, given that the German provisions confer a form of direct derivative 
action, the justification of such an approach lingers on the controversial argument of 
“substantial share of and commitment to the corporate interests”; thereby, the German 
solution is doctrinally questionable, leading to the outcome that an action aiming to 
safeguard the corporate interests and constituting a control mechanism for good 
corporate governance is rendered a “millionaire’s action”.74 Indeed, in case of large 
(capitalisation) corporations, 1% of registered capital (its trade value can be far 
greater) can lead to some level of eclecticism; a  minori ad maius, this applies to rules 
requiring larger percentages, such as the old version of section 147 Aktiengesetz and 
the default minority threshold set in article 22b Law 2190/1920. As professor Baums 
persuasively illustrated in anticipation of the KonTraG,  
(i)n the case of Daimler Benz, for example, with an equity 
capital of about DM 2.3 bn this means that one would have to 
hold shares with a nominal value of DM 230 million or gather 
                                                          
71 The duration of ownership requirement in s. 142 applied similarly to s. 147 (pre-UMAG). 
72 E.g. in case of “whistle-blowing”. 
73 Explanatory notes on CA 2006, s.260: "subsection (4) provides that a derivative claim may be brought 
by a member in respect of wrongs committed prior to his becoming a member. This reflects the fact that 
the rights being enforced are those of the company rather than those of the member and is the position 
at common law". 
74 G. Bezzenberger and T. Bezzenberger, ‘section 148’, in K Hopt and H Wiedemann (eds) 
Großkommentar AktG (De Gruyter 2008) at para 81. 
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and convince other shareholders with equivalent 
shareholdings.75 
Imposition of a threshold therefore entails an amphisemy. It may reflect a policy that 
favours block holders in listed corporations one the one hand; on the other hand it may 
suggest that the rule is intended for closely-held non-listed corporations, where 
ownership of high percentages of share capital is more common. In any case, other 
filters may work in the same direction with less ambiguity as to their rationale. A closer 
and systematic look at the relevant case law across jurisdictions provides evidence in 
support of this assumption; the Greek experience, compared to the British one as it 
stands since the CA 2006, exhibits comparable numbers of reported cases in the past 
seven years, in view of the difference in size between the two economies.76 Importantly, 
there is evidence that, even though the “floodgates” remained sealed in the UK, 
claimants whose shareholdings would fall short of the Greek (and even German) 
threshold were successful in their applications in the UK, whilst others who held much 
bigger percentages of the company's share capital were not. 77  Apparently, a qualitative 
approach can achieve the same results in restricting the numbers of litigation with a 
quantitative one.  
However, one cannot help but notice that minorities in Greece have a role to play only 
in the preliminary proceedings. It is thus important to further elaborate on legal 
standing post-admission; as already explained, there lays the fundamental difference 
between direct derivative actions and corporate actions. Instead of the applicant 
                                                          
75 Theodor Baums, 'Personal Liabilities of Company Directors in German Law', (1996) 9 ICCLR 318, 
322. 
76 See Annex 1. 
77 In Stainer v Lee [2010] EWHC 1539 (Ch) the successful applicant held about 0.08% of the company’s 
share capital and was judged to be acting according to the company’s interests in bringing a derivative 
claim; cf Kleanthous v Paphitis [2011] EWHC 2287 (Ch), where the unsuccessful applicant held 15.5 
% of the company’s shares. 
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shareholders, it is special representatives who have standing in the “main” proceedings 
(on the merits of the action), on behalf of the company and it is up to the court’s 
discretion to select the special representatives of its preference.78  
 Benefitting from the comparative nature of this study, useful insights can be drawn 
from the German experience of the "special representatives" regime in order to assess 
the merits and demerits of the Greek approach. Notably, the German “enhanced” 
minority right to appoint special representatives by court decision had a very short 
lifespan; section 147 (3) was introduced by the KonTraG only to be removed seven 
years later.79 In fact, the approach was deemed problematic from the very beginning, 
for a variety of reasons, including the very institution of special representatives.80 Even 
though the theoretical bases of the rule promulgated the incompatibility of mere 
member status with that of corporate representative, drawing on the strict separation of 
powers within the company, the underlying rationale was bluntly to dis-incentivise 
(unmeritorious) litigation.81 Indeed, due to petitioners having no further control over 
the course of the proceedings, company’s actions are not an appealing option; however, 
this applies equally to both shareholders wanting to bring an action that is to the 
company’s benefit and predatory litigants. There seems to be little reason for a member 
(or group of members) to invest time and money in a procedure they have no longer 
control of from the point the court makes the respective appointment.82 Furthermore, it 
                                                          
78 The Court is by no means bound by the petitioners’ submissions as to who should be appointed special 
representative. See Alexandra Mikroulea Scope of Corporate Managers’ Duties and Liability (Nomiki 
Bibliothiki  2013) 254; A. I. Freris ‘Judicial enforcement of corporate claims against the members of the 
Board of Directors’ in VG Antonopoulos & Sp Mouzoulas, Sociétés Anonymes, Vol II (Sakkoulas 2013) 
208. Similarly under the old s.147 of the German Aktiengesetz: see AG Nürtingen AG 1995,287; ZIP 
1994, 785. 
79 (Gesetz zur Kontrolle-und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich) BGBl. I, 786. 
80 Cf the contributions of Adams, Baums, Hopt, Kübler, Lutter and Wenger in : ‘Die Aktienrechtsreform 
1997’ [1997] AG-Sonderheft 6/1997. 
81 Hirt (n 19) 188. 
82 Baums, ‘Personal Liabilities‘ (n 75) 322; Hirt (n 19) 189-190; Peter Ulmer, ‘Die Aktionärsklage als 
Instrument zur Kontrolle des Vorstands- und Aufsichtsratshandelns’ (1999) 163 ZHR 290, 334- 336; 
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can be argued that the alienation of the petitioner from the background and the 
consequences of the claim might result in a prudent and objective conduction of the 
proceedings; however, it might also result in relative lack of interest from the part of 
the representative. This comprised one of the arguments in favour of reform, as it is 
highly unlikely that the appointed representative exhibits similar zeal to a member that 
suffered a reflective loss in pursuing a claim.83 The possibilities for moral hazard are 
obvious: the special representatives enjoy only an interim and ad hoc position in the 
administration of corporate affairs, have no stakes in the company and therefore have 
few incentives to discharge their duties diligently. In such a case, instead of mitigating 
existing agency costs, the procedure prescribed by article 22b creates new ones. 
 
3.3.1.2 Multiple derivative actions 
An important dimension of legal standing is the possibility of “multiple” derivative 
actions. In situations where a company is controlled by a parent corporation, the boards 
of the two corporate entities may have the same composition. Even when this is not 
expectedly the case, as for example in Germany where the interlocking composition of 
boards in parent-subsidiary structures is precluded by law,84 the independence of the 
board members may be questionable; after all, particularly in cases of sole 
proprietorship, it is the owner company who appoints and dismisses the board. In such 
cases, where the parent company owns the subsidiary, the damage made to the 
subsidiary by its directors can only be remedied by the parent company assuming action 
                                                          
Jens Koch, 'Das Gesetz zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts 
(UMAG)' (2006) ZGR, 769, 771. 
83 See, on the matter of special representatives, the works of the two academics who heavily influenced 
UMAG: Theodor Baums ‘Empfiehlt sich eine Neuregelung des aktienrechtlichen Anfechtungs- und 
Organhaftungsrechts, insbesondere der Klagemöglichkeiten von Aktionären?’in Gutachten F zum 63. 
Deutschen Juristentag Leipzig 2000 (C.H. Beck 2000) and Ulmer (n 82).  
84 AktG, section 100. See further Hüffer (n 45) 537-536. 
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and thus the process reaches an impasse. Therefore, unless there is an option for a 
shareholder in the parent company to instigate litigation on behalf of the subsidiary 
(double derivative action) the wrong cannot be remedied; this is especially the case 
where the subsidiary is fully owned by the parent, because of the absence of other 
potential "champions" of the company's claim. 
At first glance, the requirement that only a member of the company has standing to sue 
under the UK CA 2006 seems dismissive of multiple derivative actions; or, at best, is 
silent as to the matter. British scholarship, in its early responses to the newly introduced 
statute, identified the issue and highlighted the adverse consequences that might arise 
from the abolishment of multiple derivative actions. Reisberg in particular contrasted 
the effect Part 11 might have on this matter in relation to the approaches followed by 
other members of the common law family, hinting at a potential comparative 
disadvantage.85 His concerns over the availability of multiple derivative claims have 
now been addressed, by and large, by the decision in Universal Project Management 
Services Ltd v Fort Gilkicker Ltd and others,86 which refuted his prediction that English 
courts would respond negatively to such a possibility. Regarding the intent of statutory 
provisions, Briggs J asserted that 
(t)here is, [...], no persuasive reason why Parliament should have 
wished to provide a statutory scheme for doing justice where a 
company is in wrongdoer control, but none where its holding 
company is in the same wrongdoer control.87 
                                                          
85 Arad Reisberg, ‘Shadows of the Past and Back to the Future: Part 11 of the UK Companies Act 2006 
(in)action’ (2009) 6 ECFLR 219, 241 ff. 
86 [2013] EWHC 348 (Ch). 
87 At 173. Note the reference (repeatedly in the judgment) to “wrongdoer control”. Following Briggs J’s 
rationale that, the statute being silent, multiple derivative actions can be brought under common law, 
common law rules extend generally to admissibility and particularly to standing to sue; Thereby, 
reintroducing inter alia, in their former might, the criteria of “wrongdoer control” and “fraud on the 
minority” in the context of multiple derivative actions. Abouraya v Sigmund [2014] EWHC 277 (Ch) 
followed this rationale. See also Milman, (n 51). 
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Briggs J went further to conclude that the statute should be interpreted as allowing 
multiple derivative actions;88 and that the admission procedure in the Civil Procedure 
Rules clearly applies also to multiple derivative actions.89 It is interesting to note that 
in reaching his decision the judge considered academic writings (including Reisberg’s), 
alongside foreign case law.90 This observation demonstrates the complementary role 
the literature still assumes in adjudicating matters where the statute offers little 
guidance. Notably, much of the scholarship referred to in this decision offers a 
comparative law overview on multiple derivative claims and expresses concerns as to 
the efficiency of the UK statutory provisions if interpreted as not permitting such 
claims.91 Considering the judgment in Gilkicker, it may be inferred that the court opted 
to assert the English legal framework on shareholders’ protection as an internationally 
competitive model. 
In the light of these considerations, there seems to be a significant caveat in the 
continental jurisdictions.92 No action can be initiated by the shareholder of a parent 
company against the management (and the persons connected to the wrong 
complained) of the subsidiary, on behalf of the latter. Doctrinally, multiple derivative 
actions can be perceived to frustrate the sacrosanct principle of separate legal 
personality.93 However, the latter principle is common amongst all jurisdictions 
examined; particularly in the UK. The relevant rule in Salomon v Salomon is applied 
in utmost strictness but, as evidenced by Briggs J’s rationale that derivative actions 
                                                          
88 At 175. 
89 At 53. 
90 Arad Reisberg and D.D. Prentice 'Multiple derivative actions' (2009) 125 LQR 209; Waddington Ltd 
v Chan Chun Hoo Thomas [2009] 2 BCLC 82 (Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal). 
91 Eg Sh Goo, ‘Multiple Derivative Actions and Common Law Derivative Action Revisited: A tale of 
Two Jurisdictions’ (2010) JCLS 255. 
92 Similar concerns expressed by Pavlos Masouros, 'Is the EU Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously?: 
An Essay on the Impotence of Shareholdership in Corporate Europe', (2010) 7 ECL, 195, 203 (pre-dating 
Gilkicker). 
93 Milman (n 51), 2. 
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constitute a procedural exemption designed to prevent injustice, such doctrinal 
obstacles proved to be surmountable.  
   
 
3.3.1.3 Assessment 
Restrictions on locus standi formed an integral part of the continental legislators’ 
strategy to combat abusive litigation. The arguments put forward by the German and 
the Greek legislator do not seem persuasive, as the approach therein followed carries 
the danger of barring meritorious actions.94 Importantly, inquorate minorities face a 
dead end regarding their reflective loss, becoming easy prey for opportunistic directors 
and block-holders.95 Furthermore, multiple derivative actions under continental law 
regimes do not enjoy the availability they do under common law. Therefore, it can be 
asserted that in respect of who can bring a claim before court, the British approach is 
more protective to shareholders. The German and, to a greater extent, the Greek 
provisions prevent shareholders who are unable to reach the legal standing 
requirements from enforcing the company’s claims, restricting their access to justice to 
recover their reflective loss while, at the same time, they limit the numbers of potential 
claimants and therefore increase the possibility that wrongs remain unpunished.  
 
3.3.2. Restrictions regarding the scope of misfeasance remediable and the 
persons against which the action may be brought  
Considering the persons a derivative claim may be brought against, the limitations on 
the scope of the UK statutory remedy are slight. The CA 2006, Part 11, provides that 
                                                          
94 Baum and Puchniak,(n 1) 88. 
95 A problem aggravated when no other remedy is available; see Chapter 4. 
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defendants may be persons in breach of their directors’ duties and/or third parties, even 
non-shareholders.96 Similarly, yet somewhat more restrictively, in Germany, the 
derivative action may be brought against a variety of defendants,97  ranging from the 
members of the boards to persons exerting their influence to the latter.98Article 22b of 
the Greek Law 2190/1920 is thus rather restrictive regarding this matter, given that 
“third parties” are nowhere mentioned, even though express reference is made99 to the 
persons stipulated in article 22 paragraph 3, limiting therefore the scope of the remedy 
to directors and persons to whom they delegated powers.100 
The view that law in the UK is more protective in this regard is reinforced by the 
recently re-asserted availability of multiple derivative actions, extending thus the scope 
of defendants to persons wronging a connected company. The divergence in approach 
herein identified is of obvious practical significance as, in some jurisdictions, holding 
jointly and severally liable everyone involved in the complained misfeasance may not 
be as possible as it would be in others. Congruently, in the UK and Germany, claimants 
stand a better chance to hold a variety of persons extending beyond the incumbent 
administration accountable and thereby achieve for the company relief which 
materially reflects the damage caused. Greek law is lacking also from a deterrence 
perspective, as the threat of civil liability is not felt outside the confines of the board. 
101   
                                                          
96 S. 260 (3). 
97 Section 148 (1) in conjunction with AktG, section 147 (1).  
98 AktG s. 117, alongside the persons connected with the formation of the company and the corporate 
issuers, ss. 46-48, 53. 
99 para 4. 
100 However, the consensus in Greek academia is that the definition of “director” within the ambit of 
L.2190/1920 arts. 18 et seq. includes de facto directors. 
101 Further problematic is the approach taken by Volos Single-Member Court of First Instance 141/2011 
DEE 2011, 686 which, on a rather narrow and mistaken interpretation of the law, considered inadmissible 
any petition to appoint special representatives in order to pursue a claim against former directors.  
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An idiosyncrasy of German law has to be highlighted here. As already stated, a tradition 
of particular legislative focus to the regulation of (de lege and de facto) groups of 
companies (Konzernrecht) exists. Within the ambit of the law applicable to domination 
agreements,102 a form of direct derivative action is procured, whereby the scope of 
defendants extends to the legal representatives and the directors of the controlling 
enterprise.103 The action under section 309 relates to domination agreements, which ex 
lege are express and written, but its scope is broadened by virtue of sections 310, 317, 
318 and 323 to other structures of inter-corporate control.104 Two observations are of 
particular interest. First, the rule significantly predates the general statutory derivative 
action. The fact that a genuine derivative action was available to shareholders in inter-
corporate disputes arising from mismanagement by the controlling enterprise’s 
representatives, whilst for intra-corporate ones105 the only way to remedy a wrong done 
to the company was through the appointment of special representatives, is rather 
astonishing on its own.106 This approach evidences a disproportionate evolution of the 
law on groups of companies, compared to general anti-mismanagement rules. 
Secondly, Aktiengesetz section 309 is seemingly more permissive for any shareholder 
of the controlled company to instigate litigation. Locus standi is afforded to individual 
shareholders and there is no "screening" process or other equivalent demands to limit 
litigation. Therefore the conundrum arises that, whilst the Konzernrecht derivative 
action assumes a complementary role regarding wrongs that fall within the ambit of 
                                                          
102 Under the German Law on groups of companies, domination agreements put the subsidiary under the 
directions of the parent company.  
103 AktG, s 310. 
104 Baums ‘Personal Liabilities‘(n 75) 322. 
105 I.e. claims accruing from the mis-management of a given company.   
106 The provision is particularly intended for litigation brought by the subsidiary’s shareholder(s) against 
the controlling company’s management; according to Martin Schwab Das Prozeßrecht 
gesellschaftsinterner Streitigkeiten (Mohr Siebeck 2005) 81, the very reason that the parent might hold 




Aktiengesetz sections 147-149, the latter action undergoes much less judicial scrutiny 
regarding its admissibility. Furthermore, there appears to be some mismatch regarding 
costs, as there is no provision equivalent to that in section 148 (paragraph six) within 
the ambit of Konzernrecht-litigation. This is one of the reasons (along with its limited 
scope of intra-group affairs) put forward for its obsolescence, as up until 1999 it 
remained “completely without any function in 30 years of its existence.”107 Nothing 
much has changed ever since.108 
In any case, this approach is remarkable in its uniqueness. There is nothing similar to 
be found in the other two countries herein considered. Functionally, accountability of 
the parent company’s management, if its influence had a damaging effect to the 
subsidiary, can be enforced in the UK by means of the general statutory derivative 
action, up to the extent that their influence is connected with a breach of the subsidiary 
company’s directors’ duties.  However, there appears to be no such leeway available 
under Greek law, as the wording of article 22b specifically refers to the “company’s 
directors” and their delegates as the only possible defendants to such litigation. 
This difference as to who may stand as defendant is not entirely connected to 
differences in the nature of the misfeasance giving rise to the action. In all three 
jurisdictions, it is principally directors’ breach of law or duty that is considered in the 
provisions for derivative actions.109 Consequently, even the scope of the persons to be 
held liable against the company is curtailed. Indeed, the Explanatory Notes to the UK 
CA 2006, section 260, pronounce that  
Subsection (3) also provides that the cause of action may be 
against the director or against a third party, or both. Derivative 
                                                          
107 Martin Gelter, “Why do Shareholder Derivative Suits Remain Rare in Continental Europe?” (2011-
2012)37 Brook. J. Int'l L. 843, 879 quoting in translation Ulmer (n 82), 300. 
108 Indicatively, Hirt, (n 19) 192. 
109 For Germany, AktG s.148 para 1 (3); for Greece, L. 2190/1920 art. 22b (1).  
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claims against third parties would be permitted only in very 
narrow circumstances, where the damage suffered by the 
company arose from an act involving a breach of duty etc on the 
part of the director.  
However, a closer look on the relevant provisions and their application in court reveals 
that the Greek and UK remedies cover a broad range of wrongs done to the company, 
whilst their German counterpart is reserved only for gross violations and misfeasance. 
A company’s action may be brought under Law 2190/1920 art. 22b in respect of claims 
“accruing from the management of corporate affairs”.110 The scope of the remedy 
therefore not only covers breaches of directors’ duties, as they are prescribed by the 
company law statute or corporate bylaws, but also extends to other forms of 
misfeasance. The UK CA 2006 follows a similar, if not more permissive, approach 
regarding the matter. But this has not always been the case.  
The 2006 "codification" of derivative actions in the UK resulted in a remarkable change 
as to the scope of misfeasance covered.111 Until then, the "fraud on the minority" rule, 
formulated under common law, operated as a restriction to shareholder litigation; 
arguably, it was the only true ground upon which derivative actions could proceed.112 
It is argued that, along with the expenses involved, this rule constituted the most 
significant reason why derivative actions scarcely occurred in the UK, contrary to the 
                                                          
110 The quoted phrase can be viewed as a restriction to the cause of action, as it does not cover 
misfeasance not accruing from the management of corporate affairs; see, regarding a similar provision 
of Chinese law, Li Xiaoning, a comparative study of shareholders’ derivative actions, (Kluwer 2007). 
Indeed, Greek scholarship makes reference to the facilitation of “internal” (i.e. intra-corporate) liability 
of directors, when analysing L.2190/1920, art. 22b.  
111 The reader should not be misled that CA 2006, Pt 11, had the purpose of simply codifying the common 
law rules. The intention was to introduce a new, statutory, derivative action; this can be adduced by the 
wording of the Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies (Law Commission No 246, 1997) para 1.21: " 
we still consider that it would be desirable for a new derivative procedure to be introduced along the 
lines of the provisional recommendations" 
112 Possibly alongside ultra vires etc, as long as they were not grounds for a personal action. Derek 




other prominent member of the common law legal family; the USA.113 In fact, the 
replacement of the aforementioned grounds with breach of duty, breach of trust, default 
and negligence as causes for action led to concerns over a possible increase in litigation 
numbers.114 As made obvious in this Chapter, the increase is not dramatic and certainly 
the UK is way afar from experiencing the American numbers of derivative suits being 
filed annually.  
From the early cases applying the newly-introduced statutory derivative claim, it 
became apparent that a change in approach was indeed effected. In Wishart, Lord 
Ordinary held that "one of the objects of the 2006 Act was to introduce more flexible 
criteria than the former “fraud on the minority” exception to the rule in Foss v 
Harbottle".115This dictum can be viewed as reference to the provisional 
recommendations found in the Law Commission’s report(s).116 That wrongdoer control 
and fraud on the minority do not constitute mandatory preconditions for bringing a 
derivative claim, was further affirmed in Bamford v Harvey,117 where explicit reference 
to Wishart was made (despite the latter Scottish decision not being binding).118 To 
paraphrase the wording in Gower & Davies’ regarding the rule in Foss v Harbottle, 
“fraud on the minority” seems to be “consigned to the dustbin”.119 The impact of the 
                                                          
113 See Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard S. Black, Outside Director Liability Across Countries, (2006) 84 
TEX. L. REV. 1385, 1463, 1404-1405. 
114 Ss. 260 (3) (for England, Northern Ireland and Wales) and 265 (3) (for Scotland). The move towards 
remedying negligence is significant, as under the “fraud on the minority” regime the additional 
requirement that the negligent wrongdoer benefitted individually had to be fulfilled for a derivative 
action to proceed. See Pavlides v Jensen [1956] Ch 565; cf Daniels v Daniels [1978] Ch 406. According 
to Victor Joffe, David Drake, Giles Richardson, Daniel Lightman and Timothy Collingwood, Minority 
Shareholders, Law, Practice and Procedure (4th edn, OUP 2011) 38, the restrictions in Pt 11 regarding 
the remediable misfeasance do not apply when a derivative claim is brought following an order under 
CA 2006, s. 994.  
115 At 38. 
116 Shareholder Remedies (Law Commission No 246, 1997) para 1.13 See also explanatory notes on CA 
2006, s. 260: “a derivative claim may be brought in respect of an alleged breach of any of the general 
duties of directors in Chapter 2 of Part 10, including the duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and 
diligence (section 174).” 
117 [2012] EWHC 2858 (Ch) [2013] B.C.C. 311. 
118 At [29]. 
119 (n 20) 654.  
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widening of the scope of misfeasance covered by the statutory remedy is all the more 
apparent from the fact that only one application has so far been refused on the grounds 
that the complained conduct fell outside that scope.120 Fraud on the minority might 
conceptually retain relevance though, in the context of ratifiability, as such misconduct 
“inherently” cannot be ratified under the approach determining ratifiability on the basis 
of the nature of the wrong.121  
Turning to the other facet of the common law regime, on the appropriate cause of action 
in respect of which a derivative claim may be brought, wrongdoer control has also been 
“downgraded” in judicial practice to a discretionary factor in formulating a judgment. 
Still, this development cannot be seen as welcome. There is a problem inherent in what 
amounts to “wrongdoer control”, regarding the possibility that a derivative claim meets 
with success; it is not easy to track down ownership and de facto control of the 
shares.122 It is even more difficult to prove by evidence that the wrongdoers are in 
control in large companies, should the question be on whose behalf the shares are held. 
This situation arises particularly when disclosure requirements fail to identify actual 
ownership.123 Disclosure of shareholdings is, remarkably, an area of law where the 
realms of company law and the law of finance meet.124 Therefore, unless the latter is 
highly developed, particularly regarding disclosure of actual (end) share ownership, the 
concept of wrongdoer control may (to a large extent) insulate directors. Given that no 
express reference to the criterion is made in the statute, wrongdoer control survived 
                                                          
120 Re Seven Holdings [2011] EWHC 1893 (Ch). 
121 See Parry v Bartlett [2011] EWHC 3146 (Ch [2012] BCC 700 [79].    
122 Keay and Loughrey, (n 10) 218. 
123 ibid, 217-220. The Kay report [‘The Kay review of UK equity markets and long-term decision 
making’ (2012) available at: <http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/kay-review-of-equity-markets-
final-report.pdf> accessed 30 August 2015] attributed much significance to the matter. 
124 For reflections on this international phenomenon see Triantafillakis, (n 11) 115. See also Nicolaos 
Vervessos, ‘The relationship between the Law on Societes Anonymes and the Law of Capital Markets’, 
in Michael-Theodoros Marinos (ed), The Public Limited Company among Company, Insolvency and the 
Law of Capital Markets, (P.N. Sakkoulas, 2011), 328-56. 
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through the context of ratifiability, ratification and the views of disinterested members. 
It remains to be seen whether wrongdoer control will feature as a decisive factor in 
future cases, given that the list of discretionary factors in CA 2006, section 263 is not 
exclusive. 
Another matter related with the cause of action is the availability of alternative 
remedies. This, again, is a factor to be considered by the deciding court in exercising 
its discretion in the UK.125 The rationale is simply that, in case another remedy exists 
(in UK law this usually is the unfair prejudice remedy under CA 2006, Pt. 30), it might 
be more appropriate for shareholders to pursue the same cause of action in their own 
right, otherwise than by derivative action; the latter being an exceptional means of 
redress to reflective loss suffered by the shareholders and enforcement of directors’ 
duties. This is evident in the very recent decision in Bridge v Daley:  
The focus of Mr Bridge's complaints […] are not upon breaches 
of duty owed to the company, but are complaints that he has been 
disadvantaged as a shareholder by the way in which the company 
has been managed and operated by the present Board126 
Indeed, despite the apparent advantage, from the disgruntled shareholder’s perspective, 
of the unfair prejudice remedy in that it compensates (if successful) petitioners directly, 
shareholders may opt to “dress” their claim as a derivative one only to avail themselves 
of a Wallersteiner order.127 
                                                          
125 Ss 263(3)(f), 268(2)(f). 
126 [2015] EWHC 2121 (Ch) [82] (Hodge QC). 
127 See Kleanthous v Paphitis [2011] EWHC 2287 (Ch); [2012] BCC 676, [80] (Newey J) “One is left 
with the suspicion that Mr Kleanthous has chosen to pursue derivative proceedings alone in the hope 
that that he will be able to obtain a costs indemnity”. 
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In fact, there was the impression that under common law the availability of another 
remedy constituted an absolute bar for a derivative claim to proceed;128 mainly because 
of the “sixth principle” set by Gibson LJ in Barrett v Duckett;.  
The shareholder will be allowed to sue on behalf of the company 
if he is bringing the action bona fide for the benefit of the 
company for wrongs to the company for which no other remedy 
is available. Conversely if the action is brought for an ulterior 
purpose or if another adequate remedy is available, the court will 
not allow the derivative action to proceed.129 
This is certainly not the case nowadays. Under the statutory regime, such availability 
is a matter to be considered and quite often adds to weigh against permitting a 
derivative claim when the Court exercises its discretion;130 on its own, however, it does 
not render an application impermissible.131  
It can be observed that in its early application, the new statutory derivative claim has 
been challenging for the judiciary. References made to the Law Commission’s 
consultation papers and reports, alongside academic works, reveal a laborious effort to 
grasp the rationale behind legislation. On the other hand, parallels are sought in case 
law to bridge any gaps between the pre-existing rules and the provisions in force. In 
                                                          
128 In Hughes v Weiss [2012] EWCH 2363 (Ch) [61], Keyser QC dismissed the idea that the “alternative 
remedy” criterion constituted an absolute bar to derivative claims pre-2007, citing the decisions in 
Mumbray v Lapper [2005] EWHC 1152 (Ch) and Konamaneni v Rolls Royce Industrial Power (India) 
Ltd [2003] BCC 790; [2002] 1 WLR 1269. 
129 [1995] BCC 362, 367. 
130 See Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd [2009] EWHC 2526 (Ch) [2010] BCC 420 (at 126) and Mission 
Capital (at 46). 
131 Indicatively, Roth J in Stainer (n 77); “I consider that given what is at the heart of the present case, a 
derivative action is entirely appropriate and therefore the theoretical availability to the applicant of 
proceedings by way of an unfair prejudice petition is not a reason to refuse permission.”(at 52) See also 
Kiani v Cooper [2010] EWHC 577 (Ch); [2010] B.C.C. 463 [38]-[40] (Proudman J) and Cullen 
Investments Ltd v Brown [2015] EWHC 473 (Ch). 
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any case, the early experience on the statutory regime signals a more permissive 
approach regarding the cause of action. 
The approach as to the misfeasance covered by the provisions on derivative actions is 
quite different in Germany. According to section 148 (1)(3), only “dishonesty or gross 
violation of the law or of the articles of association” constitute grounds for derivative 
claims. Apparently, the German statute is more restrictive regarding the cardinal matter 
of the cause of action. Dishonesty has to reach “criminal” levels of disloyal behaviour, 
whilst “gross violations” are understood as absolutely unacceptable and extraordinary 
wrongs, in terms of both their nature and their effect on the company.132 Case law so 
far has rejected a complaint about excessive (well above average) remuneration of 
officers as not meeting this requirement.133  
It is a peculiar phenomenon that such a restriction survived the UMAG; much criticism 
had been levied by academics on the equivalent rule found in the old version of section 
147(3) of AktG, yet this screening mechanism was introduced to the direct derivative 
action.134 This restriction creates a disparity between duties and their enforcement by 
shareholders. As will be further argued in Chapter 5, this approach is dysfunctional, 
unjust and partly responsible for the practical insignificance of the stillborn German 
derivative action. Accordingly, it is asserted that German law suffers a comparative 
disadvantage, as the cause of action has little to do with restricting the admissibility of 
shareholders’ claims/petitions in the other jurisdictions herein examined. The UK 
Companies Act and Greek Law 2190/1920 are more permissive in this regard, placing 
                                                          
132 Hüffer (n 45), 867. 
133 See LG München I, Beschluss vom 29. 3. 2007 - 5 HK O 12931/06 AG 2007, 458 and the relevant 
commentary (m. Anm. Spiekermann) ‘LG München: Zur Frage der Angemessenheit der 
Vorstandsvergütung Beschluss vom 29.03.2007 - 5 HK O 12931/06 | AktG § 148 | AktG § 87’ [2008] 
CCZ, 157, available at <http://beck-
online.beck.de/?vpath=bibdata%2fzeits%2fccz%2f2008%2fcont%2fccz.2008.157.1.htm> accessed 
1.7.2014. 
134 Klaus Ulrich Schmolke, 'Die Aktionärsklage nach § 148 AktG – Anreizwirkungen de lege lata und 
Reformanregungen de lege ferenda' [2011] ZGR, 398, 419-22, Hirt (n 19) 190ff. 
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no restrictions upon the duties to be enforced, therefore compensating the company in 
more instances and deterring directors from breaching their duties in toto.  
 
3.3.3. Ratification and equivalent means and possibilities for insulation of 
liability; the views of the body of shareholders 
Ratification, as the word suggests, constitutes the expressed assent of the members to 
actions taken by the management; including some that would otherwise amount to a 
breach of duty or negligence. It is a competence of the GM that interlocks with those 
of the management and, in effect, it is a way to legitimise the actions taken by the latter.  
It is important to note that, as regards German Law on Public Limited Companies, 
ratification does not substantiate any sort of waiver for claims against the 
management.135 As Wirth et al conclude, “ratification is only of symbolic 
significance”136. Nevertheless, if a proposed resolution to ratify the works of the 
management does not pass, there is an adverse consequence for the board. In Germany, 
a no-confidence vote is likely to follow such an incident, and this empowers the 
Supervisory Board to dismiss the Vorstand.137 Similarly in Greece, following the 
introduction of article 22a to Law 2190/1920, article 35 adopted a quasi-ceremonial 
character and ratification does not constitute anything more than a vote of 
confidence.138 Therefore, “ratification” in these two countries emulates the respective 
parliamentary procedures of reviewing the legitimacy of the serving Government;139 
fortifying the observation that, indeed, company law often mimics constitutional and 
                                                          
135 AktG ss 119-120. 
136 Gerhard Wirth, Michael Arnold, Ralf Morshäuser and Mark Greene, Corporate Law in Germany (2nd 
edn CH Beck 2010) 133. 
137 S. 84 (3) AktG. 
138 Similar wording in Hüffer (n 45) 661: “a trust proclamation for the future management of the 
Company”. 
139 Vote of confidence under article 84 of the Greek Constitution. 
145 
 
administrative law.140 Of particular comparative interest are the similarities in wording 
between the Greek and the German text: in both cases the word “discharge” is used as 
the equivalent of "ratification".141   
However, one should not assume that the management boards in continental law 
jurisdictions cannot be excused under any circumstance for their misfeasance by the 
body of shareholders. There is some discretion afforded to the GM to waive corporate 
claims against members of the management. Such discretion is more limited under 
German law, as the decision has to be taken three years after the claim arose (instead 
of two years under Greek Law), by GM resolution excluding the prospective 
defendant’s votes142 and provided there is no disagreement (expressed by negative 
vote; abstention does not constitute disagreement)143 by one tenth of the registered 
share capital (contrary to one fifth under Greek Law).144 Intriguingly, there exists some 
disparity under German law regarding the percentages of capital contribution necessary 
to block a waiver of corporate claims and those needed to commence a derivative 
action.145 The need for assembling a minority ten times bigger than that required by 
section 148 in order to block a waiver is problematic, but is limited by the condition 
that a respectable amount of time shall elapse before the latter can take place. What 
should be further noted is the antithetic position German Law adopts regarding 
employees and their say in corporate matters regarding the issue of waiver. Contrary to 
the rule in Germany that it is the task of the Supervisory Board (and therefore 
                                                          
140 See Stephen Bottomley ‘Shareholder Derivative Actions and Public Interest Suits: Two Versions of 
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141 German: “Entlastung”; Greek: “Apallagí”.  
142 AktG s. 136(1).  
143 Similarly under Greek law; Vassileios Antonopoulos, Law of Societes Anonymes and Limited 
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employees’ representatives, should there be codetermination) to assert claims for 
maladministration, waiver thereof is bestowed upon the stockholders. This can be 
viewed as a “loophole” in the pro-stakeholder orientation of the German system. 
However, courts have explicitly provided that the Supervisory Board is under an 
obligation to investigate whether the company suffered damages and to assert claims 
respectively.146 
Following the comparative approach adopted herein, the functionally equivalent 
continental law rule to that of ratification under UK Law is the discharge/waiver rule. 
This assertion is made due to the fact that Law 2190/1920, article 22a and AktG, section 
93, are effectively the solutions provided by law to the problem of whether and how 
management irregularities can be excused by the GM; whilst, under CA 2006, s. 239 
the GM is capable of providing an ex-post amnesty to mismanagement, effectively 
waiving the members’ and the company’s rights. Nevertheless, the difference in 
approach is substantial. Without any provision for a blocking minority, the UK CA 
2006 adopts the pragmatic stance of disallowing members connected with the person 
whose conduct is to be ratified to vote, discarding the idea of statutorily set blocking 
minority thresholds.147 Ratification can take place with no temporal constraint whilst, 
on the contrary, waiver of corporate claims under continental law cannot take place for 
a given amount of time; often sufficient for proceedings to be initiated. However, it 
would be completely incorrect for any student of law to claim that all wrongs are 
ratifiable under UK law.148 On the whole, the rule reveals a totally different approach 
to the issue, much dependent on the court’s judgment. 
                                                          
146 BGHZ 135, 244 (ARAG/ Garmenbeck). See further Wirth et al (n 136) 115. 
147 CA 2006, ss. 252 & 254 offer some guidance as to who is an "interested party". 




It can be concluded that the management of British companies is afforded a significant 
means of relief from misconduct. This evidences the importance of the role assumed 
by this corporate organ in the administration of the company’s affairs, compared to 
what applies in the continental law jurisdictions. Therefore, shareholders have ample 
discretion to provide immunity for a board they trust; the right to object to such a 
motion should be considered a minority one and be read in conjunction with the 
provisions on derivative claims. Focusing on the Greek approach, it can be asserted 
that it adopts a somehow middle ground; the blocking minority threshold is higher and 
the temporal threshold lower than the German standards, whilst - in the absence of a 
Supervisory Board and any possibility for a derivative action -, the only constituency 
that can bring a claim for mismanagement before court is mainly the board itself.  
It follows that the provisions for waiver of corporate claims should be studied in 
conjunction with the possibilities for raising a derivative claim. In the absence of the 
latter, the proprietary interests of a minority might be frustrated by a majority resolution 
waiving the company's rights. On the other hand, ratification may limit the possibilities 
of bringing a derivative action successfully before court.  
Nevertheless, only the UK CA 2006 expressly considers ratification a condition for a 
derivative claim to proceed, within the wording of the provisions on derivative claims. 
The statute adopts a two-fold approach in addressing the issues of ratification (or 
authorisation) and ratifiability. First, a resolution passed that ratifies (or authorises) the 
acts of the board absolutely bars any claim; the old common law principle in Northwest 
Transportation v Beattie remains good law.149 However, ratifiability of the complained 
wrong, which under the pre-existing law would normally bar the derivative action, 150 
                                                          
149 [1887] LR 12 App Cas 589. 
150 As happened in Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064. 
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remains relevant to the statutory derivative claim merely as a discretionary factor. 
Ratifiability, as an absolute bar to derivative actions, has been met with disdain by 
academics and considered significantly ambiguous regarding some of its facets.151 In 
fact, this rule effectively limited derivative litigation to non-ratifiable actions; actions 
nowadays considered in section 239 (7). It should be mentioned that section 239 (3) 
and (4) arguably introduced some novelties to ratification, excluding “connected” 
persons152 from a vote on ratification and thus making the requirements stricter. The 
approach towards derivative claimants is (seemingly at least) further relaxed by the 
substitution of “possibility” with “likelihood”. Thus, a breach of duty has not only to 
be ratifiable but it must also be likely to be ratified by the members’ resolution in order 
for the directors to be exculpated. Of course, ratifiability is also considered in the 
context of whether an effected resolution can be challenged. The problem inherent in 
ratifiability though, is that there is as yet no clear-cut answer as to what constitutes 
ratifiable behaviour and what does not.153 Accordingly, despite the fact that ratification 
was rightly inserted as an absolute bar to derivative claims in order to facilitate 
commercial certainty, as it would make no sense to entangle parties to lengthy 
proceedings where no cause of action exists, the very content of the law on ratifiability 
entails for the moment some levels of legal (and commercial) uncertainty.154 Some 
guidance is offered by references in several dicta to cases where a director cannot be 
excused in such a way for misfeasance.155 Simpliciter, a rule of thumb accruing from 
                                                          
151 Arad Reisberg, ‘Theoretical Reflections on Derivative Actions in English Law: The Representative 
Problem’ (2006) 3 ECFR 69, 77. 
152 As per CA 2006, s. 252 
153 As acutely stated in Gower and Davies’ (n 20) 625, this issue “has troubled a number of other writers”.   
154 See Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies (Law Commission No 246, 1997), paras 6.83-6.86 
155 See Mayson, French and Ryan, (n 112) 564 ff, referring to Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman 
Industries Ltd (No2) [1981] Ch 257, Taylor v National Union of Mineworkers (Derbyshire Area) [1985] 
BCLC 237, Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134. 
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the study of the majority of common law precedent would be that when dishonesty is 
involved, misfeasance is inherently non-ratifiable.  
It remains to be seen which stance the courts will adopt, as the line of relevant case law 
is up to now narrow. Franbar was one of the early post-2006 cases to consider the very 
concept of ratifiability156 and strongly reflected the wrongdoer control-orientated157 
approach, in that emphasis was placed on disinterested votes. A similar rationale 
eventually followed in Parry v Bartlett.158 The problem with this approach is that the 
disinterestedness of shareholders is difficult, lengthy and costly to ascertain.159 In 
practice and law, “interested persons” may extend well beyond those enumerated in 
CA 2006, section 252 (i.e. the wrongdoer’s family members, partners etc) and any 
judgment on bias largely depends on a complex and painstaking process of considering 
the facts at hand.  
Ratification is not the only context where the views of the shareholders are considered 
for permission to continue a derivative claim under British law. Another point, within 
the ambit of CA 2006, is where the views of disinterested members are considered by 
the court in exercising its discretion.160 This is reminiscent of the rule in Smith v Croft 
regarding the “majority of the minority”.161 This rule, despite being based on a rationale 
that fully aligns with the exceptional nature of derivative claims, displays considerable 
ambiguity. For one, it is very difficult to ascertain what constitutes the majority of the 
minority. In the absence of a holistic approach, such as fixed percentages determining 
                                                          
156 [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch); [2008] B.C.C. 885. 
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159 Keay and Loughrey, (n 10) 206. 
160 S. 263 (4). 
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the requisite quora, attention may be shifted to those interested in the insulation of the 
directors: this might lead courts to the undesirable outcome of striking out meritorious 
claims, simply because they were misled that disinterested members did not favour 
such action. Furthermore, ascertaining from a multitude of shareholders who is 
interested and who is not is challenging, especially in traded companies. It remains to 
be seen whether courts will bar proceedings in public companies due to subsection four. 
So far, there has been one (very recent) case concerning allegations of mismanagement 
in a public company, where the factor of section 263 (4) played a significant role in 
dismissing the application to continue a derivative claim.162 Thereto, it was the 
company which sent a questionnaire to its major shareholders, regarding their view on 
the prospect of litigation.  
 In any case, it is to be noted that the judgment in Smith v Croft concerned a private 
company. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s argument against the independence of the 
other minority shareholder’s judgement (Wren Trust), on grounds of a lack of evidence 
to ascertain that a biased decision to the detriment of the company was made.163 In 
public companies however, where ownership is dispersed and sometimes hardly 
identifiable,164 ascertaining the true view of the majority of the minority is complicated 
due to shareholders’ apathy. This is a general phenomenon and it is rather unfair to 
consider any abstention from expressing disagreement with the management’s 
practices as affirmation or even tolerance. Even when apathetic shareholders express 
such assent, they may do so without considering the company’s interests and without 
genuine consideration of the issue at hand, whilst their sheer numbers render it 
                                                          
162 Bridge v Daley [2015] EWHC 2121 (Ch). 
163 (1987) 3 BCC 218, 258 (Knox J): “there is no sufficient evidence that in relation to the present 
question whether these proceedings should continue Wren Trust has reached its conclusion on any 
grounds other than reasons genuinely thought to advance the company's interests”. 
164 At least regarding the end owner/beneficiary. 
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impossible for the court to examine if their views are biased. For these reasons the 
Smith v Croft criterion is more suitable for private companies; at least, it is a positive 
step that it was downgraded to a discretionary factor.  
 
3.3.4. Whether the action serves the corporate interest and is brought in good 
faith 
3.3.4.1 The company’s interests criterion 
A common criterion used to filter vexatious litigation in both the UK (including CA 
2006, s. 371) and Germany is whether the action is brought in the interests of the 
company.165 Interestingly, such provisions constitute an attempt by the court to put 
shareholder-claimants into the shoes of directors who initiate proceedings in good faith 
and in accordance with their fiduciary duties; as we shall see, there are some 
qualifications. Given that ordinarily these standards apply to directors as the expressers 
of the corporate mind when they represent the company in litigating its claims, such a 
rationale is justified. Due to the very essence of the derivative action, claimants should 
thereto be expected to pursue the corporate interests, in substituting the directors within 
the ambit of corporate litigation, and not to serve exclusively their individual 
interests.166 The latter point provides an extra justification as to the criterion posed; 
should litigants pursue their individual interests, in conflict with the corporate ones, the 
derivative action would in effect be a means of absolute circumvention of the no 
reflective loss principle. 
In this vein, the UK CA 2006 poses the mandatory requirement that the claimant must 
satisfy the court that the action serves the corporate interests; if “a person acting in 
                                                          
165See Zouridakis (n 33) 280-283.  
166In Gower & Davies’ (n 20) 662, it is rightly submitted that a quasi-agency relationship is created in 
derivative actions.  
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accordance with section 172 (duty to promote the success of the company) would not 
seek to continue the claim”, permission is refused.167 However, the requirement as it 
stands in this subsection is anything but draconian. As Lewison J held in Iesini: 
In my judgment therefore (in agreement with Warren J. and Mr 
Trower QC) s263(2)(a) will apply only where the court is 
satisfied that no director acting in accordance with s.172  would 
seek to continue the claim. If some directors would, and others 
would not, seek to continue the claim the case is one for the 
application of s 263(3)(b). Many of the same considerations 
would apply to that paragraph too168 
It therefore appears that a claimant is unlikely to encounter difficulties satisfying the 
mandatory requirement, save for manifestly unfounded applications.169 However, the 
dictum reveals that considerations on whether the claimant is acting in accordance with 
the duty under s.172 might eventually prove to restrict litigation significantly; the 
discretionary factor in section 263(3)(b) sets a higher threshold, by directing the court 
to additionally look into the importance attached to such a claim. In fact, an array of 
matters, many of which are factual, 170 can be considered in assessing the importance a 
person acting under s.172 would attach to the claim.171 For instance, in Kleanthous v 
                                                          
167 S. 263 (2) (a). 
168 At 86. The “hypothetical director test” can be said to have first appeared under the exceptions to the 
rule in Foss v Harbottle. See Airey v Cordell [2007] BCC 785. 
169 In the UK, five applications (out of almost 20 reported cases) have so far been dismissed on the 
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“hypothetical director test”, within the context of the common law exceptions to Foss v Harbottle. 
171 See Keay & Loughrey, (n 10) 199-200. 
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Paphitis,172 Newey J was persuaded that the damaging effect the litigation would have 
on one of the defendants (Mr Paphitis, a well-known businessman and public figure) 
would also affect the reputation of the company; and thus it was not important for the 
company to continue the claim.173 Case law so far shows that, in practice, the failure to 
satisfy the discretionary factor in s 263(3)(b) appears in most judgments dismissing an 
application.174 
The German approach seems to be more permissive. Section 148 (1)(4) makes 
reference to “preponderant reasons opposing” the claim to be brought. Thus, it is 
submitted (and following the explanatory notes, purported) that this requirement would 
bar a claim only in exceptional circumstances;175 that is, when balancing the arguments 
before it under the spectrum of the company’s interests, the court becomes of the 
opinion that “the arguments against the claim weigh significantly heavier against the 
shareholders’ action”.176 This proviso has its ancestry in the landmark 
ARAG/Garmenbeck decision, where it was held that the Supervisory Board, despite its 
general duty to assert corporate claims, might opt not to do so in view of overriding 
corporate interests.177 Nevertheless, the “gross violations” restriction on the grounds 
upon which a derivative action may be brought (AktG, section 148 I (2) n. 3) can also 
be held relevant to the company’s interests criterion for a derivative action to proceed; 
it may be presumed that in such cases of misconduct it is always in the company’s 
interests that shareholders bring a claim. Therefore, as in Britain, German Courts treat 
shareholder-claimants as ad hoc substitutes for the corporate organ normally 
                                                          
172 [2011] EWHC 2287 (Ch) [2012] B.C.C. 676. 
173 At 696. 
174 See Annex 1. Consider that in Iesini (n 130) [102] (Lewison J) the application was mainly dismissed 
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175 RegE-UMAG, BT-Drucks 15/5092, 22. 
176 Schmidt and Lutter (n 33), 2142. 
177 BGHZ 135, 244; NJW 1997, 1926. Hüffer (n 45) 866. 
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responsible to litigate corporate claims, levying similar duties upon them. In essence, 
by examining whether the derivative action accords with the corporate interests, both 
jurisdictions rest permission to proceed with the claim on the discretion of the court.  
Greek law adopts a diametrically different approach. Not only are the board and the 
court not allowed to review, on such grounds, the petitions to bring a claim or to appoint 
special representatives, but special representatives are also under a duty to bring the 
claim irrespective of whether it promotes the company’s interests or not.178 It so 
appears that the General Meeting and the 10% minority are the only arbiters of the 
desirability of litigation. This can only be explained by the legislator’s confidence in 
these constituencies to voluntarily promote the interests of the company as a whole. 
However, this approach does not exclude the possibility that the 10% minority may use 
the company’s action as a means of extortion or that special representatives are 
appointed, with a duty to bring a claim, on the frivolous initiative of this minority; the 
fact that costs for proceedings on appointment of special representatives are born by 
the company increases these possibilities. In such cases, the company’s action ceases 
to be truly protective for shareholders en masse, allowing suits detrimental to their 




3.3.4.2 Good Faith 
This section does not purport to provide a comparative analysis of the general term 
“good faith” and its functionally equivalent counterparts179 as they operate in each legal 
                                                          
178 Succinct review by Ioannis Delikostopoulos, ‘Procedural powers of a minority shareholder in AE’, 
(2010) DΕΕ 1282, para 10. 
179 Greek: “kalí písti“ , German: “Treu und Glauben“. 
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framework taken as a whole. The issue has been extensively discussed in comparative 
law literature, particularly concerning the families of German, Romanistic and 
Common Law; in my opinion, there is little to add to the exquisite analysis by 
Markesinis et al.180 The aim of this Section is instead to shed light on how and when a 
derivative or corporate action might be dismissed on the premises that it was brought 
in bad faith. Little effort has been made regarding the matter thus far, in comparative 
company law studies whose domain includes non-common law jurisdictions. Good 
faith is of particular importance for the mechanics of such litigation, given that a 
common concern to legislators internationally is the prohibition of strike actions; an 
issue conceptually connected with the very essence of good faith in enforcing a right. 
It might be for this very reason why the British statute goes a step further by expressly 
pronouncing good faith as a criterion for derivative claims.181 However, such 
criteria/requirements are bound to the uncertainty entailed in the application of the 
general term to corporate law. 
As a requirement for an application to proceed, good faith featured in various cases 
under the common law regime, such as the decision in Barrett v Duckett, where it was 
submitted that personal interests (a “family feud”) that were disconnected from the 
purposes of the claim would infer lack of good faith; permission was therefore refused. 
182  Good faith being a matter of motives, the question is raised as to whether the 
inclusion of collateral motives that do not conflict with those of the company should 
bar a claimant from proceeding with a derivative action. An identification of good faith 
exclusively with the intent to relieve damages to the company would stultify the social 
value and purpose of the derivative action.  The Japanese experience shows that much 
                                                          
180 Basil S Markesinis, Hannes Unberath, Angus Johnston, The German Law of Contract:a Comparative 
Treatise (Hart 2006), 119-132 
181 CA 2006, s. 263 (3) (a). 
182 [1995] BCC 362. 
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of the litigation may be undertaken by activist shareholders who want to make an 
example of bad corporate governance.183  
It is therefore suggested that collateral incentives in filing a claim should be considered 
as immaterial as long as they do not overshadow the purpose of benefiting the 
company; it should only be when the action contravenes this essential purpose of 
derivative actions that a claim is struck out on the grounds of (absence of) good faith. 
Lewison J was of that opinion in Iesini.184 The primary issue at hand was that the 
company allegedly failed to defend diligently against rescission of a license contract. 
The defendants contended that the claim was brought so as to benefit the company 
(GGG) in the joint venture entered to exploit the license instead of the company where 
they were members (Westrip); they grounded their claim on the fact that the claimants 
had a costs indemnity provided by GGG, which was proved before court to have terms 
aiming for a “safe exit” from the joint venture. The claimants rebuked that continuance 
of the claim would benefit Westrip, even considering the indemnity terms and 
conditions. The learned judge concluded, relying on the decision in Nurcombe,185 that 
“(i)t cannot, in my judgment, be said that but for the collateral purpose, the claim would 
not have been brought at all. The claim is, in my judgment, brought in good faith.” 
186Accordingly, a proper claimant in such litigation is expected not to use the 
mechanism of derivative actions (or claims) in a manner that constitutes abuse of 
process.  
                                                          
183 These activists can be environmental or other lobby groups. It is questionable to what extent such 
activism would lead to a successful derivative claim under CA 2006. See Puchniak and Nakahigashi (n 
38), 7. 
184 At 448. 
185 Nurcombe v Nurcombe (1984) 1 BCC 99,269; [1985] 1 WLR 370. 
186 At 449. Similarly in Konamaneni v Rolls Royce Industrial Power (India) Ltd [2003] BCC 790; [2002] 
1 W.L.R. 1269 (Collins J). 
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A subsequent case where good faith of the applicant was considered was Hughes v 
Weiss.187The judge followed the line in Iesini, and negatively defined the requirement 
of good faith as not bringing the action exclusively for an ulterior purpose.188 What can 
be concluded, regarding the application of the court’s discretion to strike out a claim 
that is brought mala fide, is that the situation is not as bleak as feared in the early days 
of the statute. Despite the fact that good faith has been contended by defendants in 
many applications under Part 11 so far, courts have been parsimonious in ascertaining 
lack by claimants thereof; only one petition has been dismissed on such grounds.189  
In the continental courts and under the applicable (quasi-) equivalent provisions, 
despite there being no express requirement for the claimant in derivative proceedings 
or the petitioner in proceedings to appoint special representatives to instigate them in 
good faith, the latter concept forms a general clause permeating much of the applicable 
private law. As regards Greece and Germany, however, allegations on such grounds 
were virtually inexistent in the cases herein examined (as they were reported). This is 
in contrast to the perceived “animosity” of British litigants regarding good faith and 
illustrates how an already embedded concept in the British derivative claims culture 
retained its significance by being put on a statutory footing.190 Of course, abuse of the 
right to sue on behalf of the company and the corresponding court procedure may lead 
a petition to be struck out even in Greece, yet only in limited circumstances;191  what 
could amount to abuse of right, is filing a petition (mala fide) when the defendant has 
                                                          
187 [2012] EWCH 2363 (Ch). 
188Ibid, 47 (Keyser QC). 
189 Stimpson and ors v Southern Private Landlords’ Association and ors [2009] EWHC 2072 (Ch) [2010] 
B.C.C. 387, where it was held, regarding the weight which considerations on good faith carry, that: 
“(w)hether strictly this demonstrates a lack of good faith is not material – it is certainly relevant because 
Section 263(3) is not exhaustive of the matters that require to be considered and in my judgment 
motivation of this sort is a negative factor so far as this application for  permission is concerned” (per 
Pelling QC at 44).  
190 Keay and Loughrey (n 10) 207. 
191 GCC art. 281, GrCivPrC art. 116.  
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the reasonable impression that the right would not be enforced.192 All in all, the 
question of good faith is not that significant for the setting of the continental law rules 
on the herein examined types of shareholder litigation, neither has it been considered 
in the relevant case law, nor does it occupy any length of analysis in the relevant 
literature.193 
 
3.3.5. The Principle of Subsidiarity and the “Demand Rule” 
A common denominator between derivative actions - in all their guises - and Law 
2190/1920 article 22b paragraph 3 is the requirement, in order for a shareholders’ 
petition/application to proceed, that the company (through its competent organs) 
refrains from commencing proceedings itself (“subsidiarity principle”).  
Aktiengesetz, section 148 paragraph 1 (2), sets the onus on shareholders to prove that 
their calls for the company to take action were ignored. This provision (together with 
paragraph 3 of the section) is an expression and facilitator of the principle of 
subsidiarity.194 From certain viewpoints, it is reminiscent of the “demand rule”, as it is 
known in the US.195 Its underlying rationale is that absent any rule limiting 
shareholders’ litigation to cases where the company itself fails to assert its claims, 
corporate personality and boards’ competences would be emptied of substance. The 
company retains the right to usurp (unconditionally and at any time) pending litigation 
                                                          
192 See Greek Supreme Court 1844/2009 EllDni 2012, 687. An agreement to waive the minority right 
under Law 2190/1920 art 22b which contravenes the law, cannot substantiate on its own such an 
impression according to Athens Multi-member Court of First instance 6881/2005 NOMOS Databank; 
DEE 2006, 625. In the same judgment, an allegation of an “ulterior purpose”, behind the company’s 
action, to circumvent a shareholders’ agreement, was also dismissed.  
193 As regards Greece, the exception confirming the rule is the work of Panagiotou (n 11).  
194 Concurring view by Paul, (n 37), 108. 
195 For the application of the rule under the law of Delaware, see E Welch, A Turezyn and R Saunders, 
Folk on the Delaware General Corporation Law, (Wolters Kluwer 2013) at 17-1003.1. Supporting the 
view that the German legislator has "borrowed heavily" from US law, see Ingo Saenger ‘The best 
Interests of the Corporation, Procedural Questions of Enforcing Individual and Corporate Rights and 
Legal Actions against Board Members’. (2015) 26 EBLR 13, 24. 
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for its claims against mismanagement.196 This is again viewed as a means to constrain 
malicious litigants, as the company’s power to overtake pending proceedings may act 
as a disincentive to them.197  
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Law 2190/1920 article 22b ostensibly work in a similar vein; 
only following six month’s inertia by the board to initiate litigation are shareholders 
entitled to apply for the appointment of special representatives. There is though some 
ambiguity in the wording of the provision, despite the fact that it has been largely 
unaffected by recent reforms. Namely, the third sentence of article 22b paragraph 1 
pronounces fault as a condition upon which the board is under the duty to bring a claim, 
notwithstanding a shareholder’s petition; however, paragraph 2 (on the timeframe 
within which the board should bring the claim) makes no reference to that condition, 
despite referring to the remaining two. Given that paragraph 3 of the same article 
requires the deadline of paragraph 2 to have passed before shareholders petition before 
court for the appointment of special representatives, a void seems to exist in the 
provision, leading to confusion for academics and petitioners. Three possible 
interpretations emerge: a) shareholders do not have to comply with any deadline in 
such cases,198 b) the deadline in paragraph 2 begins from the point in time the wrong 
was committed or became known to shareholders-petitioners, or c) the deadline begins 
at the time a shareholders’ petition is submitted.  The first interpretation is not 
convincing from a literary point of view. Article 22b paragraph 1 refers to the 
obligation of the board to bring the claim. Fault can therefore only be understood as an 
exception to the conditions for such an obligation to arise and cannot be held to extend 
                                                          
196 Paul (n 37), 108. 
197 ibid.  
198 Nikolaos K Rokas Commercial Companies (Sakkoulas 2006) 312; Filippos Doris, ‘I schési ton 
árthron 69 AK, 22b § 3 n.2190/1920 kai 786 § 3 KPolD os rythmíseon gia tin apotropí tou kindýnou 
exypirétisis symferónton antithéton pros ta symféronta tou ekprosopoúmenou nomikoú prosópou’ 
(2002) B’ ChrID 865, 878, 883; Freris (n 78).   
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to the deadline prescribed for shareholders to petition for the appointment of special 
representatives, as paragraph 3 makes explicit reference to the “set deadline”. As 
regards the second position, it can be supported only when fault is complained for. 
Nevertheless, case law so far points to an interpretation in which six months have to 
lapse between the time demand was made to the board and the hearing, for a petition 
to appoint special representatives to be admitted.199 Remarkably, under Law 
2190/1920, the board’s inertia to initiate proceedings has to be culpable; otherwise, 
shareholders are not automatically entitled to request the appointment of special 
representatives when the six month’s deadline expires.200 
There is little to be found in the wording of CA 2006, Pt 11 regarding the company’s 
inertia to bring the claim before court.201 It can only be found within the non-exhaustive 
list of subsection 3,202 that the court shall have particular regard of whether the 
company “decided not to pursue the claim”.203 Professor Kershaw considers that 
reference to “the company” may include the shareholders’ meeting, yet this 
interpretation would only produce confusion and would call the importance of this 
subsection to question, as the criteria of ratification, ratifiability and the views of 
disinterested members have a similar effect.204 Whatever the case may eventually prove 
to be before courts, this criterion should be understood as the only one among the 
discretionary factors listed in CA 2006, section 263 (3), demanding courts to consider 
the board’s views on litigation.  
                                                          
199 See Larissa Court of Appeal 24/2014 DEE 2014, 965, 966; Athens Court of Appeal 44/2008 NOMOS 
Databank; Greek Supreme Court 1256/2011 DEE 2012, 29. 
200 Athens Court of Appeal 1076/2006 NOMOS Databank; EpiskED 2006, 248. 
201 cf Birch v Sullivan [1958] All ER 56; [1957] 1 W.L.R. 1247, 1250 (Harman J). 
202 S. 263; s 268 (2)(e) for Scotland. 
203 ibid. Paul (n 37) largely overlooks s. 263(3)(e), possibly because of its discretionary character. 
204 David Kershaw, 'The Rule in Foss v Harbottle is Dead; Long Live the Rule in Foss v Harbottle' (2015) 
3 JBL 274, 288-290. 
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In fact, the UK CA 2006 adopts a different approach compared to its continental 
counterparts. As already explained regarding ratification, focus has traditionally been 
given to wrongdoer control. Where this is the case, the board cannot be expected to 
commence litigation with the intention to achieve an order against it, neither can it 
lawfully be insulated by manipulating the shareholders’ resolution via associated votes. 
However, this is not the only way for the wrongdoers to escape liability. Another 
strategy would be to make use of their capacity to initiate litigation in order to “torpedo” 
(to borrow a term from private international law jargon) any potential derivative claim 
against them. Hence, pending proceedings would be carried out by the claimants with 
a view to acquit the defendants. Such abuse of procedure is considered by the company 
law statute, by enabling individual shareholders to take over proceedings initiated by 
the company in an abusive/negligent manner.205 According to CA 2006, section 262 
(2):  
“A member of the company may apply to the court for 
permission (in Northern Ireland, leave) to continue the claim as 
a derivative claim on the ground that 
(a) the manner in which the company commenced or continued 
the claim amounts to an abuse of the process of the court, 
(b) the company has failed to prosecute the claim diligently, and 
(c) it is appropriate for the member to continue the claim as a 
derivative claim.”  
This is remarkably different to the continental rules and particularly the German 
provisions on derivative actions. Conceptually, the British sections can be characterised 
as a quasi-reversal of the demand rule and can be viewed as contrary to and 
                                                          
205 CA 2006, s.262. See Zouridakis (n 33) 278 
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incompatible with the German approach on the principle of subsidiarity.206 Indeed, 
there is no such provision in the German statute. However, considered in conjunction 
with the company’s right to usurp pending litigation, the absence of such provisions 
can be seen as running contrary to the very essence of derivative actions, as it would 
increase the prospect of success for directors “strategically” bringing an action in order 
to bar aggrieved shareholders from pursuing the corporate claims diligently. The only 
proviso against such abuse is the last sentence of Aktiengesetz section 148 paragraph 3, 
providing that shareholders who initiated proceedings shall be summoned to join if the 
company assumes action, as non-parties. However, joining the proceedings as such has 
little practical importance, as the claim initially brought is extinguished and 
shareholders’ participation in the assertion of the claim is curtailed.  
Similar conclusions are reached by examination of the Greek provision on corporate 
actions. There is nothing to prevent the incumbent administration and the acquiescent 
majority from blocking subsequent proceedings, by bringing the action first or 
appointing the special representatives of their preference in order to frustrate a potential 
shareholders’ petition.207 Adding to this problem of accountability is the fact that the 
board is afforded ample time to “torpedo” the shareholders’ petition, due to the 
temporal threshold for “demand” being set at six months.  
It is even ambiguous as to whether and how the special representatives could be 
substituted/replaced (by shareholders’ petition) in cases where they do not perform 
their task diligently. In the absence of any express reference to the matter by Law 
2190/1920 article 22b, recourse to Civil Procedure Code article 786 (the procedural 
                                                          
206 CA 2006, ss 262 and 267. 
207 As happened in Patrai Court of Appeal 266/2011 NOMOS Databank; Armenopoulos 2013, 293. See 
also Livada (n 11) 1019. Recall that a restriction to voting equivalent to the UK rule on “disinterested 
votes” is not applicable to Greek Company Law due to incompatibility with the nature of shareholders’ 
rights and their exercise.  
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complement of Greek Civil Code article 69 on appointment and removal of interim 
administration) may provide such possibility should there be a “good cause”.208 
However, the procedure under article 22b (3) is mandatory law, prescribing its 
particular requirements and restrictions regarding the appointment of special 
representatives by court. Therefore, strict interpretation of the applicable law would 
subject the replacement of special representatives that are negligent, culpable or in 
conflict of interests to all the procedural hurdles imposed to minorities under Law 
2190/1920 article 22b.209  Adding to the complexity is the fact that the Civil Procedure 
rules address individual claimants (“anyone” having legal interest), in contrast to the 
shareholder “minorities” prescribed by Law 2190/1920.210 This is a confusing state of 
affairs, as if the Civil Procedure Code’s approach is applied by analogy, the objectives 
pursued by the quorum requirement in article 22b would be frustrated.211  
 
3.4. On accumulation of information and the need thereof 
For litigation to be initiated and to have any prospect of success, the availability of 
information related to the management of corporate affairs is critical. The adequacy of 
the solutions provided by law has been repeatedly questioned in all three examined 
jurisdictions212 and concerns have been expressed by the judiciary in recent 
decisions.213 
                                                          
208 “The Court […] may by application of anyone who has legal interest replace the interim 
administration or liquidators for good cause” (from 1.1.2016 jurisdiction will be conferred to the court 
of first instance) 
209 Cf the German approach under AktG s.147: Hüffer (n 45) 862. 
210 Livada (n 11) 1022-1023. 
211 Concurring and proposing a teleological contraction of art. 786 GrCivPrC is Doris (n 198), 884 
212 Indicatively Baum and Puchniak (n 1) 43-46; Reisberg ‘Shadows’ (n 85) 234, regarding the UK and 
the US; Paul (n 37) 92-96, regarding UK and Germany; Mikroulea (n 78) 281, regarding Greece. 
213 Franbar v Patel [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch); [2008] BCC 885, [15], [22] (Trower QC).   
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A common point between the two selected continental European jurisdictions is that 
detailed inspection of corporate affairs is left for shareholder-appointed special auditors 
(Sonderprüfer). This mechanism has merits and demerits. For one, auditors are 
empowered to conduct thorough investigations relevant to the management of the 
company.214 Except for contemporaneous/continuous ownership, the prerequisites for 
such an appointment by and large conform to those for legal standing and admissibility 
in a derivative action; facts have to raise suspicion for gross violation of law and a 
minority of at least 1% or 100,000 Euros of registered capital can only apply.215 In fact, 
the alignment of section 142 with section 148 was intentional, as it was the legislator’s 
aim to facilitate fact-finding for derivative actions through this mechanism.216 Greece’s 
position is similar, albeit no such alignment is observed regarding the corporate action 
under article 22b. Law 2190/1920 article 40, introduced by the 2007 reform, confers 
the right to the “small” minority of 5% of registered share capital to ask for the 
appointment of special auditors, should there be suspicion of a breach/violation of the 
law, a general meeting’s resolution or the corporate bylaws. The rather restrictive 
approach regarding the scope of (suspected) misfeasance substantiating cause of action, 
compared to that of article 22b, is mitigated by the fact that a larger minority (20%) 
may apply for a special audit when a breach of the duty of care and skill is suspected.217 
It is to be noted that petitions under both Greek and German provisions are adjudicated 
under the procedural rules on non-contentious jurisdiction.218 The upshot is that in 
some respects, such as the requisite quorum, the German provisions are more 
                                                          
214 AktG s. 142 (1).  
215 See OLG Köln Beschl. v. 22.02.2010, Az.: 18 W 1/10, where it was held (in a decision where s 148 
was considered) that “suspicion in the meaning. of § 142 para 2 AktG is only given if actual 
circumstances exist that make bad faith or gross violation seem not only possible, but probable” (at 28). 
216 ibid, referring (at 26) to BR-Drs. 3/05, 44. See also Hüffer (n 45) 847. 
217 L.2190/1920 art. 40 (3).  
218 FamFG for Germany; Greek CivPrC arts 739 et seq.  
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permissive and in other respects the Greek provisions take the lead, such as the scope 
of suspected misfeasance covered. What really makes the difference is the matter of 
costs, as the default Greek rule is that they are borne by the applicant (including the 
remuneration of the auditors), whilst in Germany indemnification by the company can 
only be refused to applicants by the court in exceptional circumstances.219  
Under the UK statute, the power to appoint special auditors rests primarily with the 
Secretary of State.220 Therefore, a comparative disadvantage might be that 
shareholders, by virtue of their capacity as members, are afforded limited access to 
corporate information. Indeed, Paul makes such an assertion.221 What he fails to 
consider within the ambit of the information available in the context of the proceedings 
is that, apart from the fact that section 261 subsection 3 provides the court with the 
power to order the company to provide evidence, shareholders have access to corporate 
documentation free from any cost, ranging from the annual accounts to the directors’ 
and auditors’ reports.222 Accordingly, before bringing the claim, shareholders may 
resort to the provisions in the CA 2006 to inform themselves about whether a cause of 
action exists and substantiate their prima facie case and, following the filing of the 
claim, courts are enabled to make an ad hoc discovery order.223 In any case, 
shareholders can obtain an investigation order via their capacity as claimants, by virtue 
of the Civil Procedure Rules.224 This pre-trial form of discovery attempts to bring 
litigation closer to American standards.225 
                                                          
219 See also Paul, (n 37) 155. 
220 Similar State supervision is provided by Greek Law, yet limited to the “legality check” audit; see L. 
2190/1920 art. 40 par. 1.  
221 (n 37)113. 
222  CA 2006, ss. 146, 431, 432, 1145. Cf the approach under Greek law, as succinctly described by 
Mikroulea (n 78) 281, whereby shareholders have to indicate the specific page and even paragraph of 
the documentation to which access is requested. 
223 Reisberg ‘Shadows’ (n 85)234. 
224 CPR 31.16. 
225 See Baum and Puchniak, (n 1) 46. 
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Once again, the British approach stands as an outlier. Systematically, inspection of the 
corporate affairs is therein provided for the claimant in the capacity of plaintiff and 
individual shareholder, rather than that of a minority. From this viewpoint, British law 
seems to be less restrictive as to who obtains information of the corporate affairs, as 
the continental jurisdictions -conforming to the general considerations on derivative 
and corporate actions - follow a minority approach. This adds to the problem of 
collective action, as it necessitates that shareholders satisfy the requisite quorum for 
two proceedings; that of the special audit and that of the derivative claim. 
 
3.5. Restrictions regarding the claimant’s discretion following success in the 
admission stage 
If the shareholder-petitioner/claimant succeeds in the admission stage, the “main” 
proceedings on the substantive action are by principle similar to proceedings between 
the company and the defendant wrongdoers in all three jurisdictions, given the 
representative nature of this form of shareholder-initiated litigation.226 For the very 
same reason though, some intricacies exist. 
In Germany, in a highly controversial manner, it is the company rather than the court 
who maintains control over the proceedings. The successful applicant under AktG, 
section 148 (1) & (2), may bring a claim only if three months lapsed after the decision 
on the application became res judicata and is subject to the burden to request that the 
company brings an action for a second time (second “demand”). The company’s 
substitution right can be invoked any time.227 As explained in Section 3.3, this is a 
disincentive for shareholders to enforce the company’s claims, as it raises the 
                                                          
226 It has to be noted that, given that no claim has been yet successful in the German admission 
proceedings, no guidance exists on the matter in case law. 
227 AktG s. 148 (3) & (4). 
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possibility that all their efforts go back to ground zero. Their participation to the 
proceedings is, in such a case, limited to that of intervenor (“streitgenössischer 
Nebeninterventiente”), who may support the claimant corporation. The company, 
unless it substitutes the shareholder-claimant, in the way discussed above, is also called 
to join the proceedings in a similar capacity, given that under German Civil Procedure 
Law it cannot be a (nominal) defendant or claimant.228 
Under Greek law, shareholders do not participate in the trial in their own name, by 
means of intervention or otherwise.229 Proceedings are brought in the name of the 
company; the only difference with ordinary litigation on such issues lies in the 
representation of the corporate entity by the special representative(s), instead of the 
board or persons to whom this power is delegated. This difference matters, as their 
appointment took effect on the initiative of the minority shareholders. Consequently, if 
the minority waives their right to initiate a company’s action, the special representatives 
lose their powers and proceedings are discontinued. Furthermore, settlement or waiver 
of the dispute is not entirely in the special representatives’ hands, as it is the company’s 
rights which are enforced; Law 2190/1920 article 22a paragraph four applies, as 
explained above (Section 3.3). Unless waiver or settlement of the company’s claim 
takes place in the ways prescribed by the latter article, the company retains full claim 
for the wrongs suffered. Aside from the tenets of article 22a, ordinary rules of contract 
and procedural law apply as to the validity of settlements between the company and 
defendant directors. Under Greek law, settlements possess a dual nature, belonging to 
the realms of both contract and procedural law.230 They are an expression of private, 
                                                          
228 Hüffer (n 45) 868. 
229 Cf the opinion in German academia regarding the pre-KonTraG s.147 of AktG, on the ability of 
individual shareholders to intervene in certain circumstances: Hans Wilhelmi and Sylvester Wilhelmi, 
Godin/Wilhelmi Aktiengesetz Kommentar vol I (Walter de Gruyter 1967) 807. 
230 C. Calavros, Civil Procedure-General Part (2nd edn, Ant.N.Sakkoulas Publishers 2006), 444. 
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contractual, initiative; but at the same time, they need to satisfy the requirements set by 
the Civil Procedure Code in order to effectively conclude proceedings. The Greek Civil 
Procedure Code recognises as valid only settlements that undergo judicial or notarial 
supervision and conform to the requirements set by the Law of Obligations.231  
Accordingly, a contractually invalid agreement to settle (e.g invalid because it is 
contrary to bonos mores) cannot bind the court or the parties, neither can a settlement 
which is procedurally invalid (e.g. because it was not notarised or stated before the 
judge) terminate the dispute. It follows that a contractually valid but procedurally 
invalid settlement does not bind the judging court or future hearings. However, it can 
still be used as a defence against any claim related to the dispute it settled.232     
Given that in most jurisdictions a decision on the merits becomes res judicata between, 
on the one hand, the company and the shareholders and, on the other hand, the 
defendants,233 termination of derivative proceedings by means of settlement raises 
significant issues and deserves attention.  By itself, such a practice does not cause 
particular concern and speedy settlement of disputes is often preferable to lengthy court 
procedures. Yet, due to the very nature of the derivative action as a form of 
representative litigation, the risk emerges - for the company and the shareholders as a 
whole - that the derivative litigant reaches a settlement which is not in the best interests 
of the company, yet is binding for the latter. From a certain viewpoint, such practice 
would run contrary to the objectives of the derivative action as a mechanism of 
addressing agency problems – as an agency conflict would emerge between the 
                                                          
231 Art. 293 GrCivPrC. 
232 Calavros (n 230) 451. 
233 See Greek CivProC 329; German AktG s. 148 (5); this is the reason why the company is a defendant 
under UK derivative claims: see Joffe et al. (n 114) 43.  
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derivative claimant and other shareholders/stakeholders - and would reduce their social 
value. American empirical studies confirm that this scenario is far from hypothetical.234  
The studied jurisdictions, via ad hoc functionally equivalent and functionally 
alternative rules, attempt to minimise such risk; a risk already lowered in the UK and 
Germany, due to the determination needed by the prospective claimants to go through 
the filters of the respective admissions stages.  The UK Companies Act considers 
settlement of claims mainly within the ambit of the permission stage, in s. 261 (4) (a); 
which pronounces that the court may “give permission […] to continue the claim on 
such terms as it thinks fit”.235 Read in conjunction with CPR 19.9F, it follows that 
permission to continue proceedings may be on such terms, that further permission of 
the court is necessary to discontinue or settle the claim. According to this approach, 
review by the court, of the conformity a settlement might have with the company’s 
interests, depends upon a decision at an early stage of the derivative claim and only on 
a case-by-case basis. The practical use of both provisions is doubtful, as one might not 
expect a court to grant permission to continue the claim at all, if there are such doubts 
regarding the claimants’ good faith236 and pursuit of the company’s interests237 
throughout the conduct of proceedings, as to make at an early stage an order subjecting 
to the court’s review the parties’ discretion to discontinue or settle the claim. It comes 
as no surprise, therefore, that no such order has yet been made.    
The other derivative action within the CA 2006 takes a different stance. S. 371(5) 
reserves to courts the power to permit or not a settlement (or discontinuation) of the 
claim in all cases and at any stage of the proceedings. This section reflects the 
                                                          
234 R. Romano, ‘The Shareholder Suit - Litigation without Foundation’ (1991) 7 J.L.Econ.& Org. 61. 
European literature is lacking such studies on the topic of derivative litigation, probably due to lack of 
available data. 
235 See Joffe et al. (n 114) 60; Paul (n 37) 109. 
236 CA 2006, s.263 (3). 
237 CA 2006, s. 263 (2)(a), 263 (3)(b). 
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recommendations of the Law Commission regarding the Pt 11 derivative claim, as well 
as assimilating the wording of other jurisdictions’ statutes.238 It remains to be seen, with 
the growth of the number of cases that reach conclusion, whether the decision of the 
legislature not to follow the Law Commission with regard to Part 11 of the CA 2006 
proves to be regretful; supposing, of course, that the terms of the settlements are 
disclosed.   
The German derivative action does not impose any form of judicial control upon 
discontinuation or settlement of the claim, but instead follows a “name and shame” 
strategy in its effort to discourage hasty and unfair settlements.  Section 149 was 
inserted to AktG by the UMAG to that effect, mandating public disclosure of both the 
application to pursue a claim derivatively and any agreement that brings proceedings 
to a close.  The section goes further to demand that any agreement connected with the 
termination of proceedings is disclosed in the “company’s designated journals”, as a 
condition for it to become binding. The rationale behind this rule is that, apart from 
notifying any third party with an interest in the proceedings of the pending or concluded 
litigation, public disclosure in the popular media foregrounds the names and strategies 
of predatory shareholders.239 The German approach has the merit of providing a good 
amount of legal certainty and predictability.240 
The German legislator decided to restrict the provision’s scope of application to public 
listed companies only. This choice stands to reason, but at the same time betrays the 
unidimensional approach of the AktG in ensuring that derivative claims do not run to 
the detriment of the company. Indeed, the German experience shows that professional 
litigants have wealthy corporations as their primary prey, where the stakes of litigation 
                                                          
238 As noticed by Joffe et al (n 114) 59. 
239 Hüffer (n 45), 873. 
240 Baum & Puchniak (n 1) 60. 
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are particularly high and their greenmail may yield substantial returns.  From this 
perspective and a practical point of view, placing such an obligation to disclose 
information about the proceedings upon small or medium sized companies would be 
unjustified, particularly considering that another layer of costs would be added to the 
companies in question.  
The primary conclusion is that German and UK law pay more attention to the conduct 
of the main proceedings, compared to the approach followed by the Greek legislator 
and make greater efforts to ensure that derivative litigation runs to the interests of the 
company as a whole - and is thus truly protective of shareholders. This distrust of the 
shareholder-claimant can be justified on the presumption that he will place his 
individual interests over the company’s, even though those sets of interests may not 
necessarily coincide. However, as explained, the institution of special representatives 
is not free of the risk of moral hazard either. Coupled with the convoluted procedure to 
replace incumbent special representatives, this is a problematic state of affairs. 
Mitigating the agency problem between the special representatives and the company is 
their liability for their actions and omissions in discharging their task of litigating, now 
(controversially) pronounced in the reformed Code of Civil Procedure.241 Yet again, 
the only person capable of enforcing this liability is the company. This is frustrating 
for minority shareholders, as they need to initiate a separate claim to hold special 
representatives accountable, particularly in cases where the latter “coordinate” with the 
interests of the wrongdoers. A further conclusion is that, for the time being, the UK 
provisions ostensibly take into account the complexity of derivative proceedings in the 
least controversial way, entrusting their supervision on courts and allowing them a fair 
amount of discretion in undertaking this task.    
                                                          





The preceding analysis identified several drawbacks of the Greek company’s action. 
The problem with it lies partly in the institution of special representatives, as they are 
situated beyond the reach of the minority shareholders who initiated the procedure. 
They lack the incentives of procuring the corporate interests with utmost diligence, 
being complete outsiders. Even worse, they themselves might be reproachable by the 
wrongdoers. But even when the court (in exercising its discretionary powers under 
Greek law) eventually appoints the petitioner shareholder(s) or their designated persons 
as special representative(s),242 the further requirement that the latter’s mandate is 
subject to the maintenance of the petitioners’ shareholding up to the level required by 
law (10% of registered and paid-up share capital) also renders the provision 
unappealing to shareholders and impractical.243 From the outset, the very characteristic 
that distinguishes the company’s action from derivative actions accounts for the 
ineffectiveness of the remedy. 
The analysis showed that the very design of the company’s action is controversial and 
inoperative in many respects. Availability of the remedy is severely restricted and is 
subject to a number of arbitrary conditions, as is the petitioners’ ownership of their 
shares for three months preceding the filing of the petition. Furthermore, its narrow 
scope creates a sizeable leeway to wrongdoers to evade accountability. For instance, 
“defrauding” a subsidiary company is a practice not considered by Law 2190/1920, 
article 22b, nor is wrongdoers’ “torpedoing” of the company’s claim by initiating 
proceedings first. The law does little to facilitate the initiation of meritorious corporate 
                                                          
242 This was the case in Athens Single-member Court of First Instance 4421/1970 EEmpD 1971, 42 [with 
commentary by N Rokas (at 114)]. 
243 Concurring Perakis ‘The Greek and International’ (n 15) 3679, 3681. 
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claims, even when shareholders meet the demanding criteria of article 22b, as their 
access to information relevant to the wrongdoing is restricted in the first place. 
Ostensibly, the only silver lining in the company’s action apparatus is the matter of 
costs, which are assumed throughout the proceedings by the company. On a careful 
reading though, this approach may run to the detriment of the company’s interests, 
when the 10% minority invokes article 22b in a frivolous or vexatious manner. 
Overall, the comparative analysis illustrates that the Greek legal framework for 
shareholder litigation on behalf of the company, as encapsulated in the company’s 
action, suffers - both as a whole and (especially) regarding most of its particular 
elements - from a comparative disadvantage in terms of shareholders' access to justice 
and protection of their proprietary interests. The question arises why did not Greece 
follow the example of article 22b’s mother jurisdiction which, despite operating for a 
number of decades under the corporate action regime, 244 moved on a decade ago to 
introduce its statutory derivative action in an effort to enhance shareholder protection 
and the enforcement of directors’ duties.245 
The reluctance of the Greek lawmaker to render Law 2190/1920 more permissive and 
protective of shareholders in this respect can be explained by the influence of block-
holders (as a pressure group) and legislative status quo bias, resulting in the 
proliferation of a path-dependent trajectory. Officially, the Greek Committee 
responsible for the reform of corporate law opined that the introduction of “any form 
of Derivative Action” would constitute an “abrupt” and “spectacular” amendment of 
the relevant law, pointing to a potential reluctance ex parte the directors to assume 
                                                          
244 See Karsten Schmidt ‘Verfolgungspflichten, Verfolgungsrechte und Aktionärsklagen: Ist die 
Quadratur des Zirkels näher gerückt?Gedanken zur Reform der §§ 147-149 AktG vor dem Hintergrund 
der Juristentagsdiskussion des Jahres 2000’ (2005) NZG 796: “The dissatisfaction with AktG s.147 
accompanied the already 40-year old history of the 1965 Aktiengesetz”. 
245 Janet Dine and Marios Koutsias, The Nature of Corporate Governance (EE 2013) 286. 
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office, at least in the short term.246 In view of the fact that derivative actions - on their 
own, as a concept - do not necessarily open wide the floodgates of litigation, as was 
made clear herein, this concern seems exaggerated, to say the least.  
As for the comparison between the two jurisdictions conferring genuine derivative 
claims, it is not surprising to a lawyer familiar with common law that the UK 
Companies Act attempts to strike a balance between legal certainty and judicial 
flexibility. Legal certainty was indeed a matter considered by the reform 
committees.247However, this study confirms that some of the common law pathogens 
survived the advent of the statutory procedure, possibly “swinging the pendulum” 
towards the wrong direction.248  The comparative analysis makes clear that the 
flexibility introduced by the 2006 statute did not completely eschew the complexity 
inherent in common law derivative actions; contrary to the clarity exhibited by the 
German provisions. Despite both statutes’ provision for a judicial evaluative judgment 
to take place at the preliminary stage, only the UK statute provides a "non-exhaustive" 
roadmap to the courts regarding what should be considered in allowing a petition to 
proceed. Undoubtedly, many of these factors are and will be taken into account by the 
German judiciary in the context of ascertaining whether the action serves the interests 
of the company.249 However, the English judiciary has for long granted much weight 
on these considerations and thus, their application under the statutory provision will 
alone determine the levels of predictability and legal certainty offered by CA 2006, 
Part 11, as case law accumulates.  
                                                          
246 Livada (n 11) 1018. 
247 Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies (Law Commission No 246, 1997), paras 6.73, 6.83, 6.85, 
29. 
248 Concurring Paul, (n 37) 115. 
249 Paul (n 37), 100, exemplifies low value claims as a matter to be taken into account when examining 
a derivative action pursuant to s.148 (1)(4). Such consideration can well fall under the ambit of CA 2006, 
s. 263(3)(b), i.e. "the importance" to be attributed to claims by a person acting under the duty of s. 172.    
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What can be said for the German derivative action is that, in fear that companies would 
be “killed by kindness”, eventually the provision itself was killed in its cradle. Up to 
now, the application of the rule in courts has largely been an uncharted area; relevant 
case law is very scarce. What is more, a survey based on statements of the chairs of the 
Commercial Courts (the Courts having jurisdiction to hear derivative claims) on the 
application of section 148 illustrated that, in the very few cases judged on such grounds, 
no applicant was successful.250 Therefore, what led to such an aversion from the part 
of shareholders to make use of this enforcement mechanism cannot be easily identified, 
as there is no sufficient evidence in judicial practice. At first glance, it could be the 
minority quorum requirement; however, much of the recent litigation in the UK was 
brought by shareholders owning a percentage of registered share capital well beyond 
that of 1%.251 What also might have deterred shareholders is the restricted scope of 
misfeasance covered. It could also well be the double demand rule, as shareholders-
claimants might find it frustrating that the company may assume litigation at will. Most 
likely, absence of litigation can best be understood by all the above explanations 
combined; whatever the case might be, German derivative actions have been of much 
less use than their (almost contemporaneous) British statutory counterparts. 
Considering that even British litigants have been so far rather parsimonious in the use 
of Part 11, it can be argued that the German provisions, albeit of less ambiguous 
content, by and large perform disappointingly even regarding the deterrent role 
derivative actions have in the context of corporate governance.  
                                                          
250 The regional courts of Cologne, Berlin and Munich reported one case each. In all occasions petitions 
were dismissed. See Martin Peltzer “Das Zulassungsverfahren nach § 148 AktG wird von der Praxis 
nicht angenommen! Warum? Was nun?”, in Ulrich Burgard, Walther Hadding, Peter O. Mülbert, 
Michael Nietsch & Reinhard Welter (eds) Festschrift für Uwe H: Schneider zum 70. Geburtstag 763, 
764–65 (Otto Schmidt 2011), 955. 
251 Concurring Baum and Puchniak (n 1) 88. 
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A few words must be dedicated here to the “law and finance” and “leximetric” studies 
on private enforcement mechanisms. The comparison herein illustrates their 
inadequacies in providing evaluative conclusions. Consider first the work of LaPorta 
et al.252 In their “anti-director” index, private enforcement of directors’ duties 
constitutes just one of the seven variables, whereas derivative actions were meshed 
with oppression remedies and appraisal rights. Thereto, just the possibility of enforcing 
any of those rights,253 notwithstanding the procedural hurdles and the scope of the 
remedy in question, would equal a score of 1; absence thereof would equal zero. The 
“refined” leximetric index by Siems and Lele follows a similar yet more meticulous 
approach, taking into account constraints on the availability of the remedy; again rather 
holistically, as presence of any such constraint would lower the score.254  However, as 
already explained, a change on the screening mechanisms purportedly makes a 
significant impact on the availability and efficacy of the rules in question; not all 
constraints should rank equal. In general, none of these studies duly considered the 
scope of the remedies and factors important to their efficacy, such as rules on costs and 
accumulation of evidence available, to their full extent; astoundingly, none of them 
considered multiple derivative actions. The paradox then arises that, in this regard, the 
State of Delaware might score similarly to, say, Germany in leximetric indices.255 Yet, 
in the former, this form of litigation is a major tool for shareholder activism and 
constitutes an economy in its own right; whilst in the latter, ten years after the 
introduction of AktG, section 148, the relevant case law is developing very slowly, if 
                                                          
252 'Law and Finance', (1998) 106 Journal of Political Economy 1113. 
253 Unless it is allocated only to minorities representing more than 10% of share capital. 
254 Priya P Lele & Mathias M Siems, ‘Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric Approach’ (2007) 7 JCLS 
17.  
255 As happens should we revise the LaPorta et al. index; see Sophie Cools, ‘The Real Difference in 
Corporate Law between the United States and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers’ (2005) Vol. 
30 Del.J.Corp.L 697. Similarly regarding Lele and Siems (n 254). 
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at all. Evidently, a comparison based on leximetric methodology might not always 
furnish an accurate picture of the protection afforded by the legal systems in question 
and might not capture the interaction among different legal rules. This observation is 
not dismissive of the relevant scholarship in its entirety; rather, it warns for a more 
detailed construction of the models and careful reading of the respective results by the 






CHAPTER 4: The Greek framework for shareholder 
protection in a comparative context and the (in)existence of 




A scholarly comparative analysis on derivative actions should not stop at the 
comparison of provisions on shareholder litigation on behalf of the company, before 
reaching the conclusion that reform is necessary. The broader context of shareholder 
protection has also to be taken into account for two main reasons. First, to examine 
whether other forms of shareholder protection do or may substitute derivative actions 
in their functions and purpose within the legal framework, thus filling in the void left 
by the ineffectiveness of the company’s action. The reason for doing so is that the 
necessity for an effective framework of shareholder derivative litigation depends on 
the absence of alternative means for shareholders to protect their interests from wrongs 
which the derivative action is designed to remedy. Second, it is important to provide a 
better picture of the overall level of shareholder protection provided by national law, 
in order to understand the magnitude of the improvement in those levels a reform of 
shareholder remedies against maladministration may effect. 
Hence, this Chapter comparatively examines shareholder rights and remedies which 
seemingly overlap with the derivative action in their function. Accordingly, the 
analysis considers not only the existing Greek framework, but also foreign rules and 
practices which could be transplanted to or adopted by Greek law and corporate 
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practice, evaluating at the same time whether such transplants would render the 
introduction of the derivative action redundant. The examination of British and German 
law not only avails a broader menu of alternatives to be considered, but also provides 
an assessment of the overall level of shareholder protection under Greek law, in relation 
with its foreign counterparts. 
The Chapter analyses the core mechanisms of shareholder protection that are 
considered in literature to have the potential to address the same problems as derivative 
actions. Accordingly, it first examines whether private contracting in a corporate 
context suffices as an alternative to derivative actions. It then looks into direct 
shareholder claims and whether they do or can fill the gaps left due to the inadequacy 
of the corporate action in protecting shareholders and disciplining management. 
Subsequently, it considers whether "general clauses"
1 against oppressive or unfair treatment and shareholder suits against the validity of 
General Meeting resolutions constitute viable alternatives to derivative litigation. 
Furthermore it is demonstrated that the right to exit the company can neither substitute 
for derivative actions as a means of shareholder protection, nor does it constitute a 
viable option for shareholders in Greek listed corporations, let alone non-listed 
companies. The Chapter continues with an assessment of the recent reforms of the 
Greek framework on shareholder protection, which focused mainly on rights connected 
with the general meeting. It is illustrated that, despite ironing out some comparative 
disadvantages, the post-2007amendments to the Greek statute on public limited 
companies reflect EU initiatives to a respectable extent. Section 4.8 summarises and 
concludes. 
                                                          
1 This term, though not used by common law jurisdictions, is employed by A Spyridonos, Minority 





4.2. Contractual freedom as a means of shareholder protection2 
It has been suggested that hard law rules and rights protecting (minority) shareholders 
are either of trivial importance or even redundant.3 The argument goes that private 
initiative is not only sufficient, but may even be more effective than hard law provisions 
in ensuring that corporate affairs are carried out to the benefit of all involved in the 
company.4 This suggestion might call to question the very fabric of the derivative 
action as a means to address agency problems.  
Nevertheless, unlike the UK, continental law jurisdictions - including Germany and 
Greece - restrict in their laws on public limited companies the ability of shareholders 
to “write their own tickets”.5 Focusing primarily on the most fundamental and enduring 
contractual arrangement within the corporation, its corporate constitution,6 this Section 
investigates the implications of the Greek approach on shareholders’ contractual 
freedom regarding shareholder protection, as well as considering whether a move 
towards a more enabling approach would render the need for a better framework on the 
enforcement of corporate claims less imperative. 
                                                          
2 An expanded version of this section, entitled 'Contractual Freedom and the Corporate Constitution; A 
Study on where Greek Law Stands in a Comparative Context and the Way Forward', appeared in David 
A Frenkel (ed), Selected Issues in Public Private Law (Athens Institute for Education and Research 
2015) 69.   
3 Bernard S. Black, ‘Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political AND Economic Analysis’ (1989-1990) 84 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 542.  
4 ibid. 
5 Frank H Easterbrook and Daniel R Fischel ’The Corporate Contract’, (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev., 1416, 
1417 
6 Be that constitutional document the Memorandum of Association, the Articles of Association of CA 
2006, the Satzung of AktG, or any akin document. See Andreas Cahn and David C. Donald, Comparative 
Company Law: Text and Cases on the Laws Governing Corporations in Germany, the UK and the USA, 
(CUP 2010), 261. Even though the only statute to expressly recognise the contractual nature of the 
corporate constitution is the UK CA 2006, s 33 (1), the contractual nature of corporate bylaws is 
recognised under Greek and German law, despite the respective statutes being silent. Regarding Greek 
law see M.Varela in Evanghelos Perakis (ed) Sociétés Anonyme’s Law (2nd edn Sakkoulas, 2010), 112 
ff; Rodopi Multi-Member Court of First Instance 29/1995 EEmpD 1997, 722. Regarding German law 
see Uwe Hüffer, Aktiengesetz, (10th edn, C.H. Beck 2012), 105 stating that the nature of the bylaws is: 
“sui generis, which can be considered as a debt contract and organization constitution”. 
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Under English law and throughout its long historical course, the corporate constitution 
has been considered of paramount importance in providing shareholders with rights 
and protection, contractual in their nature.7 Nowadays the contractual nature of the 
rights conferred by the articles of association is reflected in the UK CA 2006, Section 
33 subsection 1.8 This approach is highlighted in early decisions such as Borland's 
Trustee v Steel Brothers & Co Ltd.9 According to Farwell’s J definition of (rights 
attached to) shares: “A share is […] an interest measured by a sum of money and made 
up of various rights contained in the contract, including the right to a sum of money of 
a more or less amount.”10 
Despite the numerous legislative changes since Borland’s, a paradigm shift has not yet 
materialized. Shareholders and founders of companies maintain the broad discretion to 
decide how they are going to conduct their business.11 This freedom is only limited by 
what is regulated by hard law; whatever is not prohibited is permitted.12 Party 
autonomy remains thus sacrosanct in Britain. As a starting point, parties are free to 
reach the agreement that suits their interests best and this agreement might only be 
constrained by the Law.  
                                                          
7Section 12 CA 1862. See also Wood v. Odessa Waterworks [1889] 42 Ch D 636, 642 [Stirling J]: “The 
articles of association constitute a contract not merely between the shareholders and the company, but 
between each individual shareholder and every other” Its wording is not different from the preceding 
Joint Stock Companies Act 1856. For further discussion see Richard C Nolan ‘Shareholder rights in 
Britain' (2006) 7 EBOR 549, 550.  
8“The provisions of a company's constitution bind the company and its members to the same extent as if 
there were covenants on the part of the company and of each member to observe those provisions.” 
9 [1901] 1 Ch 279. 
10ibid, 288.   
11 See Nolan ‘Shareholder rights’ (n 7) 554. See also Harben v. Phillips, (1883) 23 Ch.D. 14, [35]-[36], 
(Bowen L. J): “[W]hen persons agree to act together in the conduct of a business, the way in which that 
business is to be carried on must depend in each case on the contract, express or implied, which exists 
between them as to the way of carrying it on”. 
12 Len Sealy and Sarah Worthington Cases and Materials in Company Law (9th edn, OUP 2010) 178; 
Paul Davies & Sarah Worthington, Gower & Davies Principles of Modern Company Law (9th edn, Sweet 
& Maxwell 2012) 64.  
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Germany provides a contrasting case.13 The starting point in formulating the German 
Articles of Association (Satzung) is the (statutory) Law, which might in a few instances 
permit a level of party autonomy.14 More specifically, German Law on public limited 
companies is rigid; the vast majority of the provisions included in the Aktiengesetz are 
mandatory, leaving very little room for entrepreneurs to regulate corporate affairs 
themselves.15 For this reason, the underlying principle of “stringent law” (Prinzip der 
Satzungstrenge) is viewed by German scholars as one of the disadvantages the German 
public limited company has against its limited liability company counterpart.16 The 
principle is said to be founded on the rationale of protecting unsuspicious investors 
from exploitative contractual arrangements.17 However it appears that, to a great extent, 
the inflexibility of the provisions encapsulated in the Aktiengesetz fails to mirror the 
corporate reality in Germany. Many of the public limited companies are small and 
medium-sized businesses, more resembling the corporate model that the limited 
liability company (GmbH) is designed for, than the ideal corporate form of a big 
(public) capital company. In fact, the abolishment of the principle was proposed in the 
67th German Jurists Forum in Erfurt in September 2008.18 Unsurprisingly, the motion 
met with strong opposition. Participants - most notably practitioners - rejected the idea 
outright as being contrary to a well-established legal tradition and practice, by an 
                                                          
13 See Marcus Lutter and Herbert Wiedemann Gestaltungsfreiheit im Gesellschaftsrecht: Deutschland, 
Europa und USA : 11. ZGR-Symposion "25 Jahre ZGR", (Walter de Gruyter, 1998) 123-148, 187-215.   
14 As observed by Evanghelos Perakis, The New Law of the Société Anonyme, (Nomiki Bibliothiki 2007) 
5; contrary to what applies to common law jurisdictions (such as the Law of Delaware, where 
“everything is permitted, unless expressly prohibited”), in continental law jurisdictions “everything that 
is not permitted is prohibited”. 
15 AktG, s. 23 (5) sentence 2:“the Constitution can derogate from the rules of this statute only when it is 
so expressly permitted”. The similarity with the Greek law on the matter is also identified by Perakis 
The New Law (n 14) 4, referring to GCC, art. 3. 
16 Martin Schulz & Oliver Wasmeier, The Law of Business Organisations, (Springer 2010), 40.   
17 See also Gerhard Wirth, Michael Arnold and Ralf Morshäuser, Corporate Law in Germany, (Mark 
Greene (tr), 2nd edn, C.H. Beck, 2010) 67. 




almost unanimous consent.19 Consequently, fundamental differences have persisted 
between the UK and Germany for more than a century; falsifying Hansmann and 
Kraakman’s predicted convergence and vindicating the proliferation of a path 
dependent trajectory.20   
Regarding Greece, there are indications that the trend is to move towards an 
intermediate stance between these two approaches; Greek Law is steadily moving away 
from the German standards of contractual freedom. The reform of the Law on Public 
Limited Companies by enactment of Law 3604/0721 introduced a broader system of 
optional ("opt-in" and "opt-out") rules than the pre-existing ones;22scattered across the 
body of Law 2190/1920. Working to the same, enabling effect is Law 2190/1920, 
article 2 paragraph 1a (inserted by virtue of the 2007 amendment); which prescribes 
that unless a derogation from the default statutory provisions is instituted, the corporate 
constitution does not have “to include provisions that merely constitute repetition of 
the legal provisions in force” in order to be considered valid and therefore binding inter 
partes (including provisions conferring rights to shareholders).23 It appears that Greece 
had its own version of Satzungstrenge,24 founded upon the same (underlying) principles 
(e.g. legal and commercial certainty), but employing different levels of strictness. The 
legislator recognised the alienation of the Law from the commercial reality and the 
recent reform produced a more enabling statute. However, the strict and typical nature 
of the Greek Law on Public Limited Companies still leaves little room for contractual 
                                                          
19 For further discussion on the minutes of the 67th forum, see Jessica Schmidt ‘Reforms in German stock 
corporation law - the 67th German Jurists Forum’ (2008) 9 EBOR 637, 638-656. 
20 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’, (2001) 89 GEO. 
L.J. 439  
21 FEK 189/Α'/8.8.2007. 
22 Vassileios Antonopoulos, Law of Societes Anonymes and Limited Liability Companies, (Sakkoulas 
Publications, 2011) 41.  
23Article 2 para 1a can be said to reflect the interpretation given to the Law in the past; see Greek Council 
Of State 1861/1993 DForN 1994, 41 and Antonopoulos (n 22) , 40. 
24 For a concurring view see Nikolaos K Rokas Commercial Companies (Sakkoulas 2006) 218. 
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freedom, at least compared to Britain. Regarding corporate actions, for example, Law 
2190/1920, article 22b permits that the corporate constitution is able to decrease freely 
the prescribed quorum for a minority to file a petition. However, reducing the quorum 
is as far as contractual freedom can get in this respect. Shareholders cannot litigate 
derivatively and have instead to petition for the appointment of special representatives, 
even in cases where quorum is (contractually) set at one share.25  
A move towards a more enabling law on public limited companies may realise some 
substantial benefits for Greek companies. The most obvious one is flexibility. 
Flexibility is essential, especially for small and medium enterprises. Indeed, the 
stringency of a law designed for large corporations runs against the benefit of smaller 
companies that are subject to the same statute. This one-size-fits-all approach cannot 
be justified in a corporate environment where the majority of corporations take the form 
of public limited companies and the vast majority of the latter are SMEs. The reported 
calls in Germany for the abandonment of Satzungsstrenge26 may be viewed as 
exaggerated, because the private limited company is the most common corporate form 
and successfully serves its purpose as a flexible vehicle for small and medium 
businesses; this is not exactly the case in Greece though. In fact, the flexibility 
necessary for small corporations was a driving force for the introduction of more 
enabling provisions in the Greek statute; renowned authors refer to the introduction of 
a “small SA”27 by virtue of the bylaws, following the 2007 reform.28 However, the 
point of reference for the statute remains the ideal form of the “Big Capital Company”; 
the “small SA” and the flexibility inextricably connected with its existence constitute 
                                                          
25 Alexandra Mikroulea, Scope of Corporate Managers’ Duties and Liability (Nomiki Bibliothiki 2013) 
273. 
26 Lutter and Wiedemann (n 13) 123-148, 187-215. 
27 In German scholarship there has been a longstanding similar discussion of “kleine AG”; see Schmidt 
(n 19) 640. 
28 Perakis, The new law (n 14) 14.    
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exemptions. I believe that a shift towards the UK paradigm, where the point of 
reference is the "small" plc, would be a (belated) pragmatic response to the existing 
corporate reality.29  
Importantly in terms of this Thesis, a more enabling approach could have a positive 
impact on shareholder protection. From a shareholder’s point of view, it would allow 
the ability to offer rights and for the respective protection to be tailored to the business 
in question, even beyond the (default) level offered by hard law. There is another 
important dimension of such flexibility: the discretion to formulate rights and duties 
not anticipated in the time of formation of hard law, especially when the latter largely 
depends on statute.30 For instance, the European Directive on Shareholder Rights 
cannot be said to have resulted in a paradigm shift in the English corporate reality, as 
many of the elements it harmonised regarding voting in GMs were already 
implemented in practice by virtue of the corporate bylaws.31 Arguably, an alert 
legislature may equally mitigate the deficiency entailed in an outdated statute by 
regularly updating it.32 In any case, an enabling statute may capture the benefits of 
fostering innovation in corporate matters, including shareholder protection, by 
allowing parties to privately regulate issues not predicted by the legislator. 
However, contractual freedom in the corporate context, be it within the ambit of the 
corporate constitution or shareholder agreements, suffers from a similar problem of 
unpredictability. Contract cannot cover every potential conflict of interests that may 
                                                          
29 For similar views see Christina Livada, 'Introductory Comments to Articles 18-22B' in Perakis 
Evanghelos (ed.), Sociétés Anonyme’s Law (3rd edn, Sakkoulas, 2013) 863-879, 867. 
30Alessio M Pacces, ‘Corporate Governance and the Coase’s Legacy: A Reply to Henry Manne’ in 
Alessio M. Pacces, (ed), The Law and Economics of Corporate Governance: Changing Perspectives, 
(EE 2010) 210.      
31See Nolan for further discussion, ‘Shareholder rights’ (n 7) 583. 
32For the effect that changes on default rules had on CG, see Henry Hansmann ‘Corporation and 
Contract’, (2006) 8 ALER 1.   
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arise in the course of corporate business, due to the latter’s long-term nature.33 This is 
a reason why the law imposes open-ended standards of conduct on directors, in the 
form of statutory duties.34 Derivative actions, as a means of the latter’s enforcement, 
retain thus their importance, even in an enabling corporate law environment. 
Enforcement of directors’ duties by means of shareholder suits may also help clarify 
their precise content, in a dynamic fashion. It would lead to accumulation of precedent, 
delimiting which conduct is permissible and which is not.35  
Furthermore, it is questionable whether an enabling approach would alone suffice to 
contractually protect parties whose bargaining power is meagre. In the corporate 
context, the majority has the decisive say in negotiating and re-negotiating the terms of 
corporate membership. Therefore, the importance of an enabling approach is qualified, 
regarding the majority-minority agency problem, by the majority’s willingness to make 
concessions. But even when such concessions are made in the design of the corporate 
constitution, they will not necessarily concern all minority shareholders, as would be 
the case in a minority shareholders’ right to appoint the director of his or her preference. 
A fortiori this applies to shareholders’ agreements, due to their binding force being 
primarily inter partes.36 From that perspective, provisions on the protection of 
minorities’ interests by mandatory law, such as the derivative action, are essential, as 
they disconnect protection from bargaining power. Furthermore, as explicated in 
Chapter 2, derivative actions aim to protect the interests of the company, not 
                                                          
33 Arad Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance: Theory and Operation, (OUP 2007) 
53. 
34 Reinier Kraakman John  Armour, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus 
Hopt, Hideki Kanda & Edward Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law A Comparative and Functional 
Approach (2nd edn OUP 2009) 40; Reisberg (n 33) 53; John Coffee Jr ‘The Mandatory/Enabling Balance 
in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role’ (1989) 89 Colum.L.Rev. 1618. 
35 Reisberg (n 33) 53-54. 
36 See Evanghelos Perakis Contractual Restrictions of the Shareholder’s Voting Right (1976). Under 
Greek law, a shareholders’ agreement becomes “part” of the corporate bylaws if all members are 
signatory parties; see Athens Single-member Court of First Instance 5079/2002 EEmpD 2002, 572 and 
Rokas Commercial Companies (n 24) 217. 
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exclusively those of the claimant. Protection thus is afforded not only to shareholders 
as a group, but also to all corporate stakeholders. 
Finally and congruent with the last argument, derivative actions, being a means of 
enforcement of directors’ duties and a check on majority abuse, constitute a public 
good.37 For this reason, rendering derivative litigation a matter of private bargaining is 
ill-advised, as it would exclude those unable to reach an agreement due to their lack of 
bargaining power.38 Even granting permission to individual or minority shareholders 
to litigate on behalf of the company, in lieu of the provisions in the corporate 
constitution, would be undesirable from this perspective, due to the possibility of 
frivolous or vexatious suits being brought before court. Conversely, the right to sue on 
behalf of the company should not be negotiable, as this would frustrate the objectives 
of minority protection and the deterrence of corporate misconduct.39 From this point of 
view, the line consistently followed by Greek case law in not permitting minorities to 
forfeit their right to petition for a corporate action, is absolutely justified.40 
In conclusion, private bargaining cannot substitute for the weaknesses of shareholder 
suits on behalf of the company under Greek law, not only because contractual freedom 
is restrained in the context of national corporate law, but also because of the different 
functions and objectives served by each instrument of shareholder protection. An 
enabling approach allowing for more contractual freedom would of course be welcome, 
for the reasons delineated above. Derivative actions should in any case be understood 
as adopting a complementary function to private contracting, providing substance to 
                                                          
37 See Chapter 2. See also Reisberg (n 33) 69, 70. 
38 Reisberg (n 33) 69, 70; IH Chiu, ‘Contextualising Shareholders’ Disputes—A Way to Reconceptualise 
Minority Shareholder Remedies’ [2006] JBL 312, 338. 
39 Reisberg (n 33) 70. 
40 See Greek Supreme Court 350/2011 ChrID 2011,691; Athens Court of Appeal 3494/2007 DEE 2007, 
1193; Athens Multi-Member Court of First Instance 6881/2005 DEE 2006, 625.  However, after a claim 
of the company comes to existence, minorities may opt (contractually) not to enact or even waive their 
right to file a petition under L.2190/1920 article 22b regarding this claim, as the exercise of the right is 
a matter of private initiative.  
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the provisions in the corporate constitution by enforcing a claim which belongs to the 
company as a separate legal person. 41 
  
4.3. Collective litigation 
It is often highlighted in the literature that derivative actions in the US, where the 
remedy has thrived for decades, are losing ground against other forms of collective 
shareholder redress and, in particular,  securities class actions.42 The question therefore 
arises as to whether the need to enhance shareholders’ derivative litigation under Greek 
law is qualified by the existence of such or similar alternatives. 
Considering the applicable Greek law, this question is answered in the negative. Such 
alternatives cannot be said to exist, despite the fact that some forms of collective redress 
are procured, within the statutory legislation on consumer protection.43 Regarding 
consumer protection, Greek jurisprudence is still unclear as to whether shareholders fit 
the definition of “consumer”.44 From a certain point of view, issuers and stockbrokers 
provide services that fall within the ambit of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union and thus their clients, the end-owners of shares, may enjoy the benefit 
of a declaratory judgment for damages. Following such a judgment, the only further 
action they have is to execute the res judicata decision within a reasonable timeframe 
                                                          
41 A violation of the corporate constitution may constitute a cause of action for the company, as long as 
the rights affected are the company’s, in all three jurisdictions. Regarding the enforceability of rights 
conferred to members, even under the pro-contractarian approach of English law, the law is riddled with 
uncertainty. See Janet Dine and Marios Koutsias, Company Law, (8th edn, Palgrave MacMillan 2014), 
31ff  and Ben Pettet, John Lowry and Arad Reisberg, Pettet’s Company Law, (3rd edn, Pearson 2009),  
85 ff; both discuss the lines of case law set by the decisions in Eley v Positive Government Security Life 
Association Co. Ltd (1876) 1 Ex.D. 88, Hickman v Kent or Romney Marsh Sheep-breeders Association 
[1915] 1 Ch 881 and Quin & Axtens Ltd v Salmon [1909] AC 442. 
42 See Kenneth B Davis, ‘The Forgotten Derivative Suit’ (2008) 61 Vand. L. Rev.  378. 
43 Elisa Alexandridou and Magdalini Karypidou 'Evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of 
collective redress mechanisms in the European Union – country report Greece' available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/redress_cons/finalreportevaluationstudypart1-final2008-11-
26.pdf> accessed 2 November 2014; Stelios N Kousoulis ‘Ta apotelésmata apófasis epí syllogikís 
agogís. Idíos epí chríseos katachristikón GOS, en ópsei tis AP 1219/2001’ [2002] 11 DEE 1097. 
44ibid, 1.5.2.  
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set by the statute. No case law exists so far though and the discussion remains academic. 
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether conferral to shareholders of consumer status would 
alone be of any help towards better board accountability, as this objective can only be 
attained by sophisticated regulation of securities law. This situation is problematic. 
Compensation for corporate wrongs, in companies with significant dispersion of share 
ownership, cannot be easily facilitated by means of the ordinary Civil Procedure rules, 
as the numbers of prospective claimants in such cases are usually dazzling. If the 
ordinary procedure is followed, then courts face a daring threat to their workload. 
Once again, Greek law appears less developed on the issue of shareholders’ access to 
judicial redress, as other countries explicitly allow for shareholders’ collective 
litigation.  German Law considered collective securities litigation mechanisms in the 
introduction of the KapMuG (Capital Markets Model Case Act); this Act was initially 
provisional in force, being a response to the extraordinary number of claims, by 
German standards, against Deutsche Telekom between 2000 and 2003. The statute 
provides that for certain violations of the Law on Capital Markets, the pending 
individual claims may be merged into one, to be adjudicated as a "model" case,45 should 
certain requirements be fulfilled.46 Thereafter, having a model decision on the merits 
in common, the stayed proceedings may continue, making use of the decision in the 
collective claims procedure. In any case, this mechanism lacks the attractive element 
of the opt-out rule, as well as the element of time efficiency, given that the claims have 
to proceed individually. Furthermore, its scope is limited strictly to certain forms of 
                                                          
45 "Model case" should not be confused with "test case"; the decision of the former is binding for the 
individual claims. See Stefan Wrbka, Steven Van Uytsel, Mathias Siems, Collective Actions: Enhancing 
Access to Justice and Reconciling Multilayer Interests? (CUP 2012), 35. 
46 For more detailed analysis see Mathias Reimann, Cost and Fee Allocation in Civil Procedure: A 
Comparative Study (Springer 2011) 160ff and Paul G. Karlsgodt, World Class Actions: A Guide to 
Group and Representative Actions Around the Globe (OUP 2012), 246ff. 
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securities fraud, thus narrowing the remedial avenues for shareholders in group 
litigation.  
The UK undertakes a position similar to Germany. Apart from the long-existing 
representative action, the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR, Part 19III) provide for the so-
called Group Litigation Order (GLO) whereby, when similar claims reach a certain 
number, group litigation proceedings may be triggered. The attractive feature of this 
procedure, from a shareholder perspective, is that it is available for any kind of civil 
dispute. However, there is no evidence yet of shareholders availing themselves of this 
mechanism in order to achieve redress against losses to their investment, such as losses 
accruing from misstatements under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
(FSMA 2000) sections 90 and 90A, where application of the mechanism seems 
appropriate (securities class actions), if we are to follow the US paradigm.47 
However, even if Greek law improves its mechanisms of collective redress for 
shareholders,48 the need for an effective framework of derivative litigation would not 
be eclipsed. Class actions certainly have great potential in addressing agency problems 
and costs, similarly to derivative actions. By virtue of collective litigation, easier access 
to justice is purported, as a single court award benefits all participants. Thereby, the 
investment risk is minimised for micro-shareholders, who cannot afford to individually 
initiate litigation, have negligible bargaining power and whose property fortunes 
effectively rest on the benevolence of the investee’s management. Most importantly, 
compensation for their losses is direct and certain, contrary to what applies with 
                                                          
47 Jonathan Cary and Jo Rickard ‘Section 90 of FSMA: time for collective action?’ (2012) 23 PLC 23-
29. 
48 There has been some EU initiative on the matter recently. See Commission Recommendation 
2013/396/EU of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress 
mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law [2013] OJ 
L201, 60–65. For a comparative analysis see John C. Coffee Jr. ‘Litigation Governance: Taking 
Accountability Seriously’ (2010) 110 Colum.L.Rev. 288. 
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derivative actions. For the same reason, however, derivative actions should be 
understood as complementary to other forms of collective redress.49  
Firstly, the cause of action in derivative litigation does not necessarily overlap with that 
in class actions. Collective litigation refers to the representative means of enforcement 
of shareholders’ direct claims, en masse, in cases where a plethora of  shareholders 
share the same cause of action against corporate wrongdoers and/or the corporation. 
Such a shared cause of action usually concerns cases where the company and/or its 
management is directly liable to shareholders, particularly when the veracity of 
statements regarding quoted securities is disputable.50 It follows that their scope of 
application does not coincide with that of derivative actions, neither is it meant to. 
Secondly, their relevance to non-listed companies, particularly closely-held ones, is 
somewhat limited, for the very reason that the regulatory design of class actions is 
intertwined with securities law and does not cover other forms of misfeasance. Thirdly, 
they are devoid of the derivative actions’ “public policy” effect described in Chapter 2, 
as it is principally shareholders who benefit from the outcome of litigation, not the 
company’s coffers. Against this background, my opinion is that even if class actions or 
similar mechanisms of collective redress become available in Greece (as they should), 
by virtue of extension of the “consumer” status to accommodate shareholders as 
claimants or otherwise, they will not be able to satisfy the same needs and achieve the 
same objectives as the derivative action.  
 
                                                          
49 See also Robert B. Thompson and Randall S. Thomas, ‘The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: 
Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions’, (2004) 57 Vand. L. Rev. 133, 168-69   
50 For a succinct overview of the UK and German law on the matter, see David Greene (ed), Shareholder 
Claims (Jordans 2012), 12-29 (report on UK by David Greene), 89-116 (report on Germany by Klaus 
Rotter and Thomas Ertl). 
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4.4. Remedies against oppression, abuse and unfair prejudice 
Spyridonos, author of the leading monograph on minority shareholders’ protection in 
Greece, considered the absence of a “general clause” on minority protection the most 
significant caveat of Greek shareholder law.51 The “general clause” he envisaged in 
2001 is meant to remedy majority oppression, giving the courts significant discretion 
as to the appropriate order and award. Even though such a rule does not exist under 
Greek or German law, it has long been a key component of UK law. To a great extent, 
Spyridonos drew his inspiration from UK Companies Act 1985, section 459.52 Times 
have changed and judicial practice, along with the new article 35a of Law 2190/1920, 
have rendered the need for such a clause less imperative. 
Extensive analysis of the statutory provisions and precedent relevant to the unfair 
prejudice remedy falls beyond the scope of this Thesis and the purpose of this Chapter; 
yet, in order to understand the current position of Greek law compared to the UK model, 
we shall briefly explain what it is all about. Sections 994 and 996 UK Companies Act 
2006 go beyond the other provisions in statute and in the Articles of Association, to 
remedy conduct which may not be “in any way unlawful”.53 The term refers to a 
somewhat open-ended category of conduct, leaving courts with much discretion as to 
how to apply the statutory remedy and thus formulate a precedent clarifying what 
exactly amounts to unfair prejudice.54  To date, case law has been clear in identifying 
that the sections are meant to protect the “legitimate expectations” of members or 
                                                          
51 Spyridonos (n 1). 
52 The position of UK law has not changed significantly since then. “Although Pt 30 is set out somewhat 
more expansively than was its predecessor, the aim was not to reform the substance of the unfair 
prejudice provisions”: see Geoffrey Morse (ed), Palmer's company law (Sweet & Maxwell 2015), 
8.3801. 
53 Gower & Davies’(n 12), 722. 
54 See Joseph EO Abugu ‘A comparative analysis of the extent of judicial discretion in minority 
protection litigation: the United Kingdom and United States’ (2007) 18 ICCLR 181, 190-193. 
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“equitable considerations”.55 This again is a rather broad criterion, despite the fact that 
limitations accrue from the study of case law. For instance, “sophisticated investors” 
are presumed to be capable of reaching formal arrangements in order to protect their 
interests and therefore fall outside the protection afforded by section 994.56 
Furthermore, not every member expectation is protected. Unless there is a breach of 
law or the bylaws or an informal arrangement among members, protection is unlikely 
to be afforded.57 In fact, the unfair prejudice remedy has proven particularly useful in 
protecting members from having the informal arrangements on their participation in 
the company frustrated. That is, arrangements and mutual understandings that go 
beyond the content of the Corporate Constitution or other contractual agreements.58 
Overall, the remedy bears relevance mostly to closely-held company situations, as it is 
easier to identify the existence of informal arrangements in such cases.59 Of particular 
significance is also the courts’ discretion in making an order, should a claim be 
successful. Despite the fact that most often the order sought is that the petitioner’s 
shares are bought out by the company or other members at a fair price,60 the courts may 
make any order they may think “fit for giving relief in respect of the matters complained 
of”.61    
                                                          
55 In many cases, such as in Re Saul D Harrison & Sons Plc [1995] 1 B.C.L.C 14 [19] (Lord Hoffmann) 
the term “legitimate expectations” was endorsed; recent cases refer instead to equitable considerations, 
following Lord Hoffmann’s statement that use of the former term was “probably a mistake” (O'Neill v 
Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092, 1102). 
56 Gower & Davies (n 12), 733. 
57 In Re Blue Arrow plc (1987) 3 BCC 618, 623 (Vinelott J): “Outside investors were entitled to assume 
that the whole of the constitution was contained in the articles, read, of course, together with the 
Companies Acts. There is in those circumstances no room for any legitimate expectation”. 
58 O’Neill v Phillips at 1102 (Lord Hoffmann); see also Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] 
A.C. 360, 379 (Lord Wilberforce). 
59 “In the case of larger companies a legitimate expectation based upon an informal understanding 
supplementing the articles will be more difficult to establish”, Palmer’s (n 52) 8.3816.  
60 CA 2006, s. 996 (2) (e). Regarding the valuation of shares see Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd [1986] 
Ch. 658 (Oliver LJ); under the CA 2006 see Sunrise Radio Ltd, Re  [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch); [2010] 1 
BCLC 367  [276]-[309] (Purle QC); Shah v Shah [2011] EWHC 1902 (Ch)  [44]-[55] (Roth J) 
61 CA 2006, s. 996 (1)  
194 
 
Is Greek law completely devoid of such protection? Certainly not. Equitable 
considerations may not be developed in Greece in the same way as in the UK. However, 
the general principles of the Civil Code, performing functions similar to equitable 
considerations, do apply to public companies. Accordingly, any “exercise of right is 
prohibited, if it obviously goes beyond the limits set by good faith, bona mores or the 
social or economic purpose of the right”.62 If there is abuse, damages may be 
awarded.63The Greek company law statute now further clarifies that abuse on the part 
of the majority, under the conditions of Civil Code article 281, may also constitute the 
ground for a 2% share capital minority to challenge a GM resolution.64 This provision 
pays significant resemblance to the French remedy of “abus de majorité” against 
abusive resolutions.65 Law 2190/1920 goes further to provide that, in case shareholders 
do not reach the requisite minority threshold, they may be compensated for the direct 
loss/damages they suffered because of the adopted resolution (article 35a paragraph 
4).66 However, the Greek approach should not be understood as coinciding with the UK 
one. 
To a certain extent, the grounds upon which a resolution may be challenged overlap 
with the definition of the UK Companies Act concept of “unfairness”: the latter may 
“consist in a breach of the rules or in using rules in a manner which equity would regard 
as contrary to good faith”.67 However, Law 2190/1920, article 35a, confers a right 
                                                          
62 GCC, art. 281.  
63 GCC, arts. 914 & 919. Cf the German BGB art. 826, according to which: “anyone who intentionally 
causes injury to another person in a manner contrary to public policy shall be held liable for damages” 
(as translated by Rotter and Ertl (n 50) 108). 
64 Art 35a (2)(b). It is questionable whether this limitation is appropriate, as minorities may also be 
abusive in the exercise of their rights; see Giovannopoulos ‘Void General Meeting Resolutions’ in 
Perakis Sociétés Anonyme’s 2013 (n 29), 1348, with further references on the German treatment of 
“binding minorities” (Sperrminoritäten) 
65 ibid, 1346. 
66 ibid; reflective loss is not compensated. 
67 O’Neill v Phillips, [1999] 1 WLR 1092, 1099A. 
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exercisable against the company only.68 This is in contrast with the unfair prejudice 
remedy under the UK Companies Act, where defendants may also be fellow 
shareholders and directors. Furthermore, the scope of the Greek remedy has only 
recently begun to crystallise. Particularly, in Greek literature it is supported that there 
are matters which, under Greek law, fall under the exclusive competence of the GM 
and where the majority rule is not subject to review by court; an example being the 
appointment and removal of directors.69 The contrary view has also been expressed and 
was endorsed by the Supreme Court in 2006;70 a decision which, rather disappointingly, 
did not go to great lengths of analysis.71 The number of reported subsequent cases on 
the matter is very limited and therefore the precise scope of what is covered by the term 
“abuse” cannot be defined with much certainty yet. Additionally, the remedy under 
article 35a paragraph 2(b) is considered to be subject to the criterion of the company’s 
interests; thus adding another hurdle for petitioners to overcome.72 In contrast, the UK 
courts have entertained a number of claims on similar facts and substantial case law on 
frustration of shareholders’ expectations regarding participation in the management 
exists.73 Furthermore, the test of unfairness under the UK Companies Act is an 
objective one, disconnected from the intentions of the controllers.74 In any case, 
“abuse” is a narrower concept than “fairness” under Part 30 of the CA 2006.75 What 
                                                          
68I. Dryllerakis, ‘Abusive exercise of the right to vote in a GM of a S.A. regarding the election of a 
member of the B.o.D.’ [2008] DEE, 435. 
69 ibid, 439. 
70 Greek Supreme Court 1121/2006 DEE 2007, 583, with commentary by M Varela. 
71 Notably, the issue as to whether the understandings inferred by a shareholder’s agreement can form 
the basis of abuse on the part of the majority was referred to the plenary session of the Supreme Court; 
for procedural reasons, the latter never decided on the matter. 
72 Giovannopoulos (n 64), 1350-6. 
73 Gower & Davies’ (n 12) 725-729. 
74 See Gower & Davies’ (n 12) 733, referring to Re Saul D Harrison & Sons plc [1995] BCLC 14 [17] 
(Hoffman LJ); cf the Greek approach as described by Varela ‘commentary’ (n 70) 592, according to 
which abuse is constituted where “the subjective element of the majority’s intent purports to either 
pursue the majority’s interests, or to weaken or damage the interests or rights of the minority”.  
75 See Evanghelos Perakis, Rights of Minority Shareholders (Bruylant 2004) 41ff. 
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could complement the notion of abuse and work towards better minority protection, 
would be the imposition of fiduciary duties on the majority, against the company and 
fellow shareholders. This has been the case for some decades in Germany. Following 
the doctrine set by the Federal Supreme Court, fiduciary duties were imposed on 
controlling shareholders, whose scope and content depends on particular 
circumstances.76 Recently Greek academia became receptive to the German doctrine 
and there is growing support of the idea of shareholders’ duties,77 particularly within 
the context of closely-held companies.78 The fiduciary duties are determined in the 
literature on a sliding scale: the more control exerted, the greater the responsibility 
against the company and/or other shareholders.79 However, to date the discussion has 
been confined to academic circles and neither statute nor contemporary judicial practice 
can be said to endorse this approach.    
Regarding the use of the provisions in the Civil Code for conduct outside the ambit of 
GMs, the situation is still somewhat unclear concerning their application to factual 
situations within a corporate context. The leading decision on the matter is Greek 
Supreme Court 1298/2006, concerning a closely-held company.80 The company had 
five shareholders, of which some held a position in the board and were executives 
(except for the minority claimant). 81 The company (“K”) had as its single asset stocks 
in another company (“A”), which was about to make an initial public offer (IPO) in the 
Athens Stock Exchange. This move would be presumably profitable, as the Greek 
                                                          
76 BGH, BGHZ 103, 184, 194–5 (Linotype); BGH, BGHZ 142, 167, 170 (Hilgers AG); see Hüffer (n 6) 
258-260 
77 Following the decision in BGH BGHZ 129, 136; ZIP 1995, 819 (Girmes), the German doctrine places 
duties upon minorities as well. 
78 For extensive discussion, see Eleni Karamanakou, Shareholders’ Fiduciary Duties (Nomiki 
Bibliothiki 2013). 
79 Georgios Trantafillakis, ‘Business failure and the response to it- the role of the duty of loyalty’ [2014] 
DEE 204, 211. 
80 ibid. See also Giovannopoulos (n 64), 1349.  
81 Three shareholders, all defendants in the case at hand, shared family connections. 
197 
 
stock-market was then thriving.82 In view of this prospect, three of the shareholders 
requested that the claimant sold them his shares, or they would divert the company’s 
shareholding to a company of their ownership, registered in Luxemburg. Following the 
claimant’s refusal, they sold the shares to their company, at a value significantly lower 
than the value expected by the IPO. The claimant succeeded in establishing that such 
conduct was contrary to good faith and caused damage to his shareholding. The 
Supreme Court upheld the Court of First Instance decision, asserting that such actions 
resulted to direct damage of the claimant; that the defendants intended to damage the 
claimant’s proprietary interests; and that their actions were contrary to bona mores. The 
decision raises questions as to what is considered direct and what is considered 
reflective loss under Greek company law. It also raises the question whether recourse 
to article 914 and, predominantly, article 919 of the Greek Civil Code may render the 
requirement to sue derivatively, in cases where the shareholders-litigants suffered 
losses in their investment, an empty letter of law.  
The decision is, as a matter of legal reasoning, not perfectly sound.83 In fact it is 
problematic in most of its assumptions. To begin with, a fundamental mistake in its 
opening paragraphs would strike even an undergraduate student of company law. It 
conceives that shareholder rights include a "co-ownership right to the proprietary assets 
or the property (as a whole) of the company".84  Furthermore, the decision relied 
heavily on the finding that the aggrieved shareholder suffered direct loss. However, the 
law as it now stands does not examine to whom the intent of the wrongdoing was 
directed to; it rather focuses on the recipient of the wrongful act or omission, to 
                                                          
82 Ironically, several months after the wrongdoing took place the stock exchange crashed spectacularly 
(September 1999). 
83G Sotiropoulos ‘Comments on Supreme Court 1298/2006’, (2006) NZ’ EEmpD 601, 605 graphically  
refers to the reasoning of the judgment as an “interpretative coup d’état” 




distinguish between direct and indirect (reflective) loss.85 Here, the recipient was 
clearly the holding company, which had absolute and exclusive ownership of the shares 
in "A"; the claimant's shares would only reflect the increase in "K"'s market value. The 
Supreme Court erred in ascertaining that the damaged person was the claimant. 
Despite some subsequent decisions following the rationale of this decision and, 
surprisingly, repeating these obvious mistakes,86 it cannot be held to have formulated 
a clear precedent for direct shareholder claims. However, the factual circumstances in 
this case, wherefrom liability against fellow shareholders arose, have been referred to 
obiter by subsequent decisions as examples for grounds on which direct claims may be 
brought.87 Much uncertainty remains, as evident in decisions of the Athens Court of 
First Instance Nos. 12468/2012 and 9669/2014.  
Both decisions concerned a multi-million Euros case which received much media 
attention, namely the collapse of Proton Bank A.E. Petitions concerned the same facts 
and sought freezing orders regarding the company’s assets. However, the results were 
diametrically different. The main issue was whether shareholders suffered direct loss 
from the company’s mismanagement. The factual background of the case is highly 
complex, involving a series of allegations for misfeasance and criminal activity 
(including fraud and embezzlement).88 In order to defraud the supervisory authorities, 
money going out of the bank –mainly in the form of credit- followed a tangled 
trajectory to companies (of dubious creditworthiness) established by the wrongdoers in 
                                                          
85 ibid, 603 
86 Athens Single-member Court of First Instance 12468/2012 EEmpD 2012, 275 reads: “The Societe 
Anonyme […] has its own property independent of that of its shareholders. The latter have, as 
shareholders, only the rights provided by law […] including the right of co-ownership of the assets of 
the company or the corporate property as a whole.” 
87See for instance Athens Court of Appeal 4960/2012 DEE 2013, 248, Athens Court of Appeal  
6900/2013 DEE 2014, 136; cf Athens Court of Appeal 877/2014 DEE 2014, 505. 
88 Athens Single-member Court of First Instance 9669/2014 DEE 2014, 1055, 1057; ‘Paramenei sti fylakí 
o L Lavrentiádis’ Ethnos (Athens 06/05/2014)  




order to conceal the true recipients and were used for purposes completely different 
than the purpose they were loaned for to the wrongdoers. The multitude of (the alleged) 
wrongdoers can be grouped into two categories, namely those who - in violation of the 
established credit/financing procedures and the law - were issuing loans to companies 
connected with the controller of the bank (majority shareholder and president of the 
BoD); and those who were receiving illegal credit, either directly or through third 
parties acting on behalf of them, with the intention to achieve (illegally) benefit.89 This 
activity, largely unbeknownst to shareholders, led to extremely high leverage and 
eventually to insolvency (at the time the company went into liquidation losses exceeded 
by 862,000,000 euros).90 
Petitioners in both cases based their claims on the grounds of diminution of their share 
property because of serious misconduct that “went beyond the limits of ordinary 
management”.91In the 2012 decision, the court found that the petitioners, two 
institutional investors, enjoyed legal standing and that the directors, one of them 
notably the major shareholder, were jointly and severally liable to both the company 
and its shareholders. The decision met with immediate academic criticism, as violating 
the no reflective loss principle.92 The embezzlement and fraud involved corporate 
assets, not the shareholders’ property, given the company’s distinct legal personality. 
This outcome was expected, as decision No. 1298/2006 Supreme Court, on which the 
court of first instance based much of its rationale, was already seen as problematic. The 
2014 decision, issued by the same court of first instance (different composition), 
dismissed the claim of other minority shareholders, despite it being brought on the same 
                                                          
89 Athens Single-member Court of First Instance 12468/2012 EEmpD 2012, 275. 
90 ibid; Athens Single-member Court of First Instance 9669/2014 DEE 2014, 1055, 1057. 
91 ibid. 
92 Isaak Gerontidis ‘I atomikí axíosi apozimíosis tou metóchou apó "synchrónos énanti tis etairías kai 
ton metóchon" adikopraktikí symperiforá tou DS stin anónymi etairía. Anaskópisi kai sképseis me 
aformí ti MPrAth 12468/2012’ [2013] EpiskED 237. 
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grounds; the principle of separate corporate personality effectively deprived petitioners 
from legal standing. The previous decision (No. 12468/2012) was considered as being 
contrary to the prevailing line of case law on reflective loss.93 The controversy could 
have been avoided if applicants (holding 5% of the company’s capital) in the 2012 
decision could bring a company’s action or had coalesced with others (including those 
of the 2014 decision) in order to be able to do so, a point illustrative of the problems 
entailed in quorum thresholds and collective action. 
The freezing order cases do not bear the (persuasive) authority of a Supreme Court 
decision. Still, they evidence the confusion surrounding direct shareholder claims under 
Greek law. They also show that the Supreme Court, in its 2006 decision, did not 
establish a precedent identical to an unfair prejudice remedy at least as the latter is 
understood under UK law. The facts of these Greek cases could possibly fit those 
behind the English court decisions on serious mismanagement, amounting to unfair 
prejudice against shareholders,94 yet there is no such remedy under Greek law; resorting 
to ordinary tort law is no guarantee for achieving results similar to section 994 UK 
Companies Act. Indeed, the factual background of the Proton Bank cases is familiar to 
the reader of UK company law, as it closely resembles the Cutland case.95 In both 
instances, misappropriation of corporate money took place at board level and 
abuse/unfair prejudice was complained for. As summarised by Lady Arden:  
without Mr Clark's knowledge, Mr Cutland had misappropriated 
from the company sums totalling £517,734. The exact method of 
his misappropriation is not material for present purposes.96 
                                                          
93 (n 88) 1057. 
94 See for instance Re Elgindata Ltd. (No. 2) [1992] 1 WLR 1207, 1219 (Beldam LJ): “mismanagement 
may amount to conduct unfairly prejudicial and it may be so even if those responsible for the 
mismanagement suffer equally with the minority shareholders the same or even greater prejudice”.  
95 Clark v Cutland and others [2003] EWCA Civ 810,[2004] 1 WLR 783. 
96 [2004] 1 W.L.R. 783, 785. 
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However, the claimant and petitioner, Mr Clark, availed himself of two remedies, 
which he could not have sought if the Greek law on public limited companies was 
applicable: he brought an unfair prejudice action and a derivative action. Despite 
succeeding in the unfair prejudice petition, the Court ordered that the company should 
be compensated and not the shareholder. This raises of the question of whether, in order 
to remedy their reflective loss, shareholders may bypass CA 2006, Pt 11, by filing a 
petition under sections 994 and 996. There are compelling arguments why this should 
not be the case, ranging from the purpose of the statutory derivative claim to achieve 
redress for the benefit of the company as a whole, to the difference between the two 
remedies regarding the nature and scope of misfeasance they are meant to address.97 
We should bear in mind that in Cutland the petitioner had already filed a derivative 
claim -which was eventually consolidated with the unfair prejudice proceedings - and 
had presumably succeeded in satisfying the standing requirements under the common 
law derivative action. But for rare and exceptional circumstances, as the law now 
stands, shareholders may achieve redress on behalf of the company by filing a petition 
under the unfair prejudice provisions only if they succeed in obtaining an order that 
they bring proceedings “in the name and on behalf of the company […] on such terms 
as the court may direct”, under s. 996(2)(c). Yet, there seems to be little reason for 
shareholders to seek such an order to start a new round of proceedings, if they are to 
succeed in their petition in the first place.98Anyway, the decision in Cutland evades 
much of the criticism that the decision of the Greek Supreme Court 1298/2006 
(deservedly) withstood, because the Court (and particularly Lady Arden) maintained 
                                                          
97 Reisberg (n 33), 280-291. 
98 See Gower & Davies’ (n 12) 735-738.   
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the orthodoxy of providing a remedy to the company; for losses suffered directly by the 
company. 
It can be stated that a more nuanced (and accurate) conclusion, as to the comparative 
disadvantage of Greek law regarding oppression remedies, would be that they are more 
limited in scope compared to the British “unfair prejudice” remedy. A move towards 
the latter could thus be beneficial, as it would render protection of minorities more 
effective, because such an “umbrella” remedy accommodates the resolution of a broad 
range of minority-majority disputes. However, even such a move would not render 
derivative actions unnecessary. The UK model of unfair prejudice actions applies 
mostly to quasi-partnership situations, where the “personal” element of membership is 
dominant. As such, its relevance to public limited companies, the subject of this Thesis, 
is limited. Furthermore, the discretion afforded to courts regarding the orders to be 
made is necessary for the operation of such a “general clause”. Even if Greece were to 
introduce such a “clause”, the deciding Court should be able to make an order that does 
not frustrate the no-reflective loss principle; as explained in Chapter 2, there is good 
reason to not compensate directly shareholders’ reflective loss. In any case, as 
persuasively argued by Reisberg on the point of the relationship between derivative 
claims and unfair prejudice petitions:  
The derivative action is simply a different apparatus: under a 
derivative action the issue for the court is doing justice to the 
company, i.e. the shareholders as a whole in a solvent company, 
and not to the petitioning shareholder.99 
As Greek law stands, there is an obvious need to improve shareholders’ derivative 
litigation, in the light of the unavailability of an “unfair prejudice” remedy and the 
                                                          
99 Reisberg Derivative actions (n 33) 298.  
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application of the provisions in the law of obligations to the context of public limited 
companies. For the framework of shareholder protection to be truly effective, both 
personal and derivative remedies are equally important. The provisions in the Greek 
Civil Code may only remedy shareholders’ direct loss, a loss difficult to establish when 
the complained behaviour took place at board level, as shown in the preceding analysis. 
In fact, these provisions cover a specific kind of misfeasance, which does not coincide 
with that covered by derivative actions. For example, it is inconceivable that 
shareholders may bring, under the provisions of the Civil Code, a direct claim for 
breach of directors’ duty of care. Furthermore, due to the different nature of the 
remedies, the recipients of redress are not the same: derivative actions are collective in 
their nature100 and provide redress for the company and its shareholders as a whole, 
whereas personal actions provide only for the claimant. An enabling and shareholder-
friendly framework for litigation on behalf of the company is thus necessary. 
Otherwise, disgruntled shareholders will persist, to their eventual frustration, in 
resorting to direct claims in order to remedy their reflective loss and controversial 
decisions such as the Athens Court of First Instance No 12468/2012 will continue to 
surface.  
 
4.5. Remedies for improprieties related to General Meeting Resolutions   
Continental European legislations are much concerned with the validity of General 
Meeting resolutions.101 Such concern is reflected in the voluminous provisions in the 
Greek and German statutes, the immense numbers of litigation on such grounds in those 
jurisdictions and the review of the relevant framework by the Greek legislator in the 
                                                          
100 Reisberg Derivative actions (n 33) 281. 
101 See Maria Isabel Saez and Damaso Riano 'Corporate governance and the shareholders' meeting: 
voting and litigation' (2013) 14 EBOR 343, 355-356 
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2007 reform. Even though common law is not devoid of protection against defective 
resolutions, the UK statute does not put any emphasis on the matter; nor has it gained 
any significant importance in court practice.102  
There are quite a few explanations for this phenomenon of divergence. First, the 
influence of the differences in ownership structures on the relevant law cannot be 
overstated. The primary forum for members is, by design, the GM and disputes between 
the minority and majority shareholders are likely to emerge therein. Furthermore, 
grievances minorities may have against influential or controlling shareholders are more 
likely to emerge in concentrated ownership structures. Therefore, it is expected that a 
remedy designed to address the minority/majority agency problem within the GM will 
be more frequently used in jurisdictions where these structures constitute the rule rather 
than the exception. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that differences, in contract law and the general law of 
obligations, existing between the Continent and common law, play their part in 
formulating such a divergence in approach. The nature of General Meeting resolutions 
is perceived to be contractual or, at least, quasi-contractual. Accordingly, Greek and 
German legal doctrines apply the rules on contractual validity by analogy to relevant 
parts of company law. Such an application is not without difficulties. The 2007 reform 
of Law 2190/1920 brought a variety of grounds to challenge a resolution under the 
scope of voidability. The legislator in fact followed the Italian paradigm in this case 
(mostly as it stood following the Draghi reforms in the nineties). Accordingly, defects 
which, by application of ordinary contract law principles or the previous versions of 
Law 2190/1920, would render a resolution (or contract) void (such as the content of 
                                                          
102 A relevant decision is Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064 
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the resolution being contrary to the prohibition on abusive exercise of rights), now only 
result in voidability of the latter.103  
These explanations are not sufficient to appreciate properly this form of doctrinal and 
functional divergence. A significant number of closely held companies do exist in the 
UK. Therefore given the minority/majority agency problem, aggrieved minorities 
would be expected, all other things being equal, to resort to such form of a remedy 
more often than practice shows. The reason for not doing so might be the existence of 
more attractive alternatives. Of particular relevance is the unfair prejudice remedy, 
overlapping to a significant extent with the grounds available for challenging GM 
resolutions, as explained in Section 4.4. 
Closer examination of the law on the validity of GM resolutions reveals divergence 
between Greece and Germany, which is relevant to the legislative and practical focus 
and, more specifically, the scope and availability of the remedy. German law recognises 
an individual shareholders’ right to have the court review the propriety of resolutions 
(“Anfechtungsklage”, AktG ss. 246, 246a), whilst Greek law constrains legal standing 
mainly to a qualified minority; depending on the grounds of the action. The Greek 
legislator, in attempting to decrease the likelihood of frivolous and vexatious litigation, 
followed the practice -common in continental jurisdictions- of restricting the 
availability of the remedy to a qualified minority, that is presumed to have its interests 
more closely intertwined with those of the company’s. The dubious doctrinal 
appropriateness -from a variety of perspectives- and efficiency of this approach in 
achieving its goals, are discussed in detail in Subsection 5.3.1.2.  
                                                          
103 Giovannopoulos (n 64), 1346-1349; the reason for this development was predominantly the avoidance 
of conferring locus standi to third parties for claims stemming from internal corporate affairs. Void 




The strategy adopted in Germany is different. Actions to set aside resolutions had been 
a frequent, disturbing phenomenon for corporate business. The motives behind 
litigation reportedly contravened the company’s interests in many cases.104 The 
German legislator decided to address the problem in a two-way fashion. First, the scope 
of the remedy was reduced by means of exceptions (also now attempted by Greek law, 
by virtue of Law 2190/1920, article 35a paragraph 5); if a procedural irregularity does 
not result to frustrating the interests of shareholders or of the company, then it is 
excused.105 Second, courts are now enabled to register resolutions (a mandatory 
requirement for resolutions to come into effect) pending litigation on their validity, 
removing much of the shareholders’ actions potential as a means of blackmail.106 
The relevance of such remedies for addressing wrongs against the company is 
interesting to consider. In common law jurisdictions, the primary remedy for wrongs 
suffered by the company has historically been the derivative action. However, this has 
been statutorily or practically unavailable in continental law jurisdictions. 
Consequently, the only avenue of litigation that could address (ex post or ex ante) 
wrongs suffered by the company is challenging the validity of GM resolutions, where 
and to the extent appropriate. The operation of the latter remedy as a substitute to claims 
on behalf of the company is illustrated by the commentary on the decision No. 
1298/2006 of the Greek Supreme Court (discussed above). It is therein suggested that 
resorting to a review by the court of the resolutions would (partially) address the 
                                                          
104 T Baums ‘Empfiehlt sich eine Neuregelung des aktienrechtlichen Anfechtungs- und 
Organhaftungsrechts, insbesondere der Klagemöglichkeiten von Aktionären?‘ in Gutachten für den 63. 
Deutschen Juristentag (Beck 2000). 
105 This is the “relevance theory” (Relevanztheorie) promulgated by Zöllner; Greek law provides only 
for limited exceptions for irregularities, under the more demanding criterion of causality (i.e. in order 
for the resolution to be set aside, the claimant has to show that the irregularity complained for materially 
affected the conduct and outcome of the resolution). See Giovannopoulos (n 64) 1336. The irregularity 
principle under common law is reminiscent of the Greek approach on causality, at least in its effects. 
106 AktG s. 246a. 
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problematic situation of a minority unable to invoke the Greek functional equivalent of 
the derivative action.107 
There is an element of truth in this assertion. In cases where law requires authorisation 
by the shareholders prior to action taken by the board, in particular, challenging the 
respective resolution may prove an effective means of addressing corporate 
wrongdoing at board level. However, the two remedies differ significantly in their 
nature and scope, despite some circumstantial overlap. The derivative action is 
designed to champion the company’s claims, particularly in cases where the board is 
unwilling to do so (in its capacity as the authorised body) or is in conflict of interests. 
Its function is mainly to compensate (the company and indirectly shareholders) and 
deter future misfeasance. On the other hand, challenging GM resolutions is a remedy 
designed to ensure the legality of a certain decision-making corporate organ. Contrary 
to the derivative action, it is not concerned with remedying the losses a company has 
suffered, on behalf of the company; shareholders-petitioners are acting on their own 
behalf, in an effort to set aside or declare invalid a resolution unduly taken. The damage 
sustained by the company and – reflectively - by the shareholders remains, unless the 
company sues the wrongdoers, or shareholders are enabled to initiate litigation on its 
behalf. For instance, if the company resolved to enter a transaction with its CEO and, 
following a shareholders’ suit under article 35a, this resolution was declared void, then 
normally the company (not shareholders) may recover monies paid to the CEO (under 
ordinary contract law or on the basis of unjust enrichment).108 The fact that actions 
challenging the validity of resolutions are not designed to provide recovery to 
shareholders is all the more apparent in view of the construction of Law 2190/1920, 
                                                          
107 Further supporting this argument is the analysis in Cahn and Donald (n 6), where the two remedies 
are grouped together; and Mikroulea (n 25) 287. 
108 GCC, arts. 904 et seq. 
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article 35a, which allows members falling below the 2% threshold to bring a claim to 
recover their losses, against the company, as long as their losses are direct. It follows 
that derivative actions and actions against the validity of GM resolutions constitute two 
mechanisms which should be understood as complementary in their function.  
 
4.6. The market for corporate control: exit as an option? 
Before continuing, we should briefly consider the market of corporate control as a 
disciplinary mechanism and its potential to operate as an alternative to derivative 
actions. This idea has occupied much of the scholarly thought on the topic of corporate 
governance, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions.109  
This comes as no surprise. An active market for corporate control first emerged in these 
regions and, for a variety of reasons, continues to proliferate. Nevertheless, any 
discussion on whether it may discipline management, or lead managers to increase 
short-term shareholder value in order to defend their positions in corporate offices, 
loses relevance in the Continental European context. Certainly, takeover activity has 
received only modest support by the relevant EU Directive,110 with its problematic 
structure and the optional character of board neutrality and breakthrough rules.111 But 
more generally, in the Continent, very few firms showcase large levels of dispersed 
share ownership at present, despite the recent growth of share dispersion in some 
countries.112  This applies particularly for Greece, where share concentration maintains 
high levels, as explained in Chapter 2. The reluctance of block-holders, such as 
                                                          
109 See Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard 
University Press 1996). 
110 Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids [2004] OJ L142/12. For thorough analysis, see Thomas 
Papadopoulos EU Law and the Harmonization of Takeovers in the Internal Market (Kluwer Law 2010). 
111 Greece has transposed the board neutrality rule, applying reciprocity; see Greek L. 3461/2006. 
112 Regarding Germany, see Wolf-Georg Ringe ‘Changing Law and Ownership Patterns in Germany: 
Corporate Governance and the Erosion of Deutschland AG’ (2015) 63 Am. J. Comp. L. 493, 508-17, 
providing detailed statistical data. 
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founding families, to cede control over their company is therefore more frequent a 
phenomenon.  
Even for the few firms that exhibit some level of share dispersion, the market for 
corporate control does not function as a perfect substitute for derivative actions.113 First 
and foremost, it lacks any compensatory value for the corporation. The only benefit to 
the company may only accrue from the promise of the incoming management, a rather 
uncertain possibility and one disputed by empirical studies.114 These considerations 
leave deterrence as the only potential for the market of corporate control. Similarly to 
derivative actions, the latter assumes an ex post and ex ante function in disciplining 
managers. Another thing these forms of “voice” and “exit” shareholder activism 
mechanisms have in common is that they deter mismanagement by leaving the stigma 
of incompetence to the incumbent directors and officers. But similarities end here. The 
first fundamental difference lies in the fact that the market for corporate control only 
incidentally serves as a disciplinary mechanism. Shareholders may hold the almighty 
position of plaintiff, judge, jury and executioner when using their right to exit, yet 
dissatisfaction with the incumbents is not an exclusive motive in selling their shares. It 
is highly unlikely that one-off violations of the law and breaches of duty would spur a 
takeover, for instance, whereas (law permitting) they would attract litigation-oriented 
types of activism such as derivative suits. At the end of the day, the market for corporate 
control may even provide all the wrong incentives to the management, such as empire-
building and short-termism.115   
                                                          
113 This argument has been persuasively advanced by Reisberg (n 33) 42-45. 
114 Chrispas Nyombi, Tom Mortimer, Rhidian Lewis & Georgios Zouridakis ‘Shareholder Primacy and 
Stakeholders' Interests in the Aftermath of a Takeover: A Review of Empirical Evidence’ (2015) 2 IBLJ 
161, 173 
115 See Nyombi  et al (n 114) 
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In any case, the stock market and the market for corporate control are not meant to 
perform the same functions as the derivative action. Instead of a remedy, they provide 
a means to keep losses at a low level. Even regarding the mitigation of agency 
problems, their function is controversial and different in scope. But most importantly 
for this Thesis, the discussion on the role of the market of corporate control in Greek 
corporate governance and shareholder protection is out of pace with economic reality. 
If the Law and Finance theorists got it right, legislative focus on shareholder protection 
may change this situation. 
 
4.7: Recent measures to improve the Greek framework on shareholder protection: 
big steps, not leaps 
4.7.1. Overview 
As explained in Chapter 2, the level of shareholder protection in Greece has long been 
perceived to be particularly low, not only by international studies and leximetric 
indices, but also by the Greek academia. Given the argument of this Thesis, that a 
reform of the provisions on shareholder suits on behalf of the company would 
strengthen shareholder protection in Greece, it is pertinent for two reasons to examine 
the efforts of the Greek legislator to bolster shareholder protection during the past 
decade. First, it is necessary to check the veracity of the findings that shareholder 
protection in Greece is low and their relevance to the law as it now stands. Apart from 
the World Bank’s “investor protection” index, which is updated annually, most 
comparative studies referring to Greek shareholder law are not up to date.116 If then a 
                                                          
116 The “Doing Business” indices cannot be said to furnish perfectly accurate a picture on the matter of 
investor protection lato sensu. Their construction is very issue-specific (focusing mostly on a 
hypothetical case of asset tunnelling by controllers, following thus a case-based, quantitative 
comparative law approach) to provide a complete and systemic view on shareholder protection, contrary 
to what one would expect by the title “investor protection”. Despite the welcome revisions of the 
methodology, some variables remain binary, whereas few others refer to controversial topics, such as 
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weak Greek framework for protection is not the case nowadays, the argument that a 
move towards an efficient model for derivative actions would be a significant step 
towards better shareholder protection is qualified as to its strength (without being 
overturned though).  Second, a study of the recent reforms will highlight fact that they 
were exhaustively focused to a particular aspect of shareholder protection that is not 
meant, nor has the potential to address the same problems as shareholder suits.  
This Section’s title succinctly reflects the mentality of the Greek legislator, as depicted 
in the wording of the preamble to the 2007 reform Act. As regards the “betterment of 
shareholders’ position” under the law of public limited companies, Part I of the 
Preamble reads: 
[...] this betterment cannot be abrupt and intense, because 
otherwise lurks the danger of overturning existing balances and 
expectations in business, with adverse results. Thus, the reform 
of minority rights is pursued, without being radical.117 
Despite the explicit focus of the 2007 reform on strengthening shareholder protection, 
the attempt to facilitate such a change was, by and large, limited within the confines of 
the law on General Meetings.118 This is also illustrated by the fact that the article in L. 
2190/1920 entitled “minority protection” (title inserted by L.3604/2007), art. 39, 
confers rights connected with participation within the General Meeting. Reform was 
based primarily on three axes of legislative action. First, making rights and remedies 
available to a wider number of shareholders, by decreasing the percentages of voting 
                                                          
whether the level of proof in civil suits (i.e. including shareholders’ enforcement of directors’ duties) is 
the same as in criminal cases. Effectively, the same caveats apply as the ones identified in Section 3.6 
about leximetric studies. 
117  Preamble to Law 3604/2007, Pt I. 
118 Other matters included deregulation of incorporation requirements and liberalising the content of the 
Corporate Constitution. See I Dryllerakis, ‘The most significant recent amendments of L 2190/1920 (a 
brief overview)’ (2007) 30 Epiheirisi 1199; A Sinanioti-Maroudi, ‘Oi vasikés paremváseis tou nómou 
3604/2007 ston n. 2190/1920’ (2008) 1 PeirN 5; M-T Marinos (ed) Issues from the New Law of the 
Societe Anonyme (Sakkoulas 2009). 
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power or share capital ownership ex lege required for invocation and enforcement of 
statutory rights. Secondly, correcting inconsistencies and obscurities in the literary and 
systemic setting of existing provisions within the Greek company law statute. Thirdly, 
alignment of Greek law with European Union law provisions was sought. However, 
further steps were necessary in this last respect, as the EU legislator has been quite 
prolific lately regarding company law.119 Notably, full implementation of the 
Shareholder Rights Directive (SRD) resulted in numerous changes in Greek law, 
amending in some instances provisions shortly afterwards they were 
introduced/reformed by Law 3604/2007. The following paragraphs investigate these 
three distinct courses of reformative action.  
 
4.7.2. Making rights more accessible 
The 2007 reform did not intend to increase the menu of shareholder rights under Law 
2190/1920; this is clear from the preamble to Law 3604/2007, which reads “the 
catalogue of rights in articles 39 and 40 Law 2190/1920 was not widened. [...] 
However, it was deemed necessary to lower the percentages for enacting minority 
rights”.120 The law in fact reconsidered its position regarding what is a minority in a 
modern legal context. Prior to 2007, many of the minority rights were given to holders 
of 30% of registered share capital. This travesty stemmed from the fact that most of the 
provisions of Law 2190/1920 on shareholder protection dated back to the early 
                                                          
119 Indicatively: European Commission, Action Plan: European Company Law and Corporate 
Governance - A Modern Legal Framework for More Engaged Shareholders and Sustainable Companies, 
Brussels, 12 December 2012, COM(2012) 740/2; Directive 2012/30/EU, OJ 2012 L 315/74, recasting 
the second company law directive; Green Paper ‘Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions and 
Remuneration Policies’, COM(2010) 284 final; Commission Recommendation 2009/384/EC of 30 April 
2009 on remuneration policies in the financial services sector, [2009] OJ 2009 L 120/22.  
120 Preamble to Law 3604/2007, Pt I. 
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sixties121 and, in some cases, the early twentieth century.122 In modern day practice, 
30% of registered share capital is in most instances a controlling percentage, being 
more than sufficient a participation in share capital in order to pass a resolution by 
majority.123 Furthermore, this percentage comes very close to the mandatory bid 
threshold of one third of voting shares, as set by Law 3461/2006. Not only is this further 
evidence of such share ownership being very close to representing control of the 
company in a modern business context, but also the Greek law on takeovers could lead 
to complications for groups of shareholders invoking such minority rights, by obliging 
them to launch a mandatory bid.124 The approach followed by Law 3604/2007 was that 
of placing minority rights within three basic categories: individual rights, “minor 
minority” rights (one-twentieth minority),125 and “major minority” rights (one-fifth 
minority)126. There are exceptions of course, such as the right to challenge voidable 
resolutions, which is provided for one fiftieth of registered share capital.127 Overall, 
Law 2190/1920 still employs a “qualified minority strategy” regarding most 
shareholder rights, in the sense that it allocates rights to minority shareholders 
representing a given percentage of share capital or voting, yet the requisite thresholds 
are significantly lower compared to the ones applicable a few decades ago.  
                                                          
121 E.g. L.2190/1920 article 22b originated to law 4237/1962. 
122 As is art. 39, on the right to information, where ownership thresholds stayed put for more than seven 
decades. 
123 Unless deviations existed within companies regarding the one-share-one vote paradigm. 
124 It could evidence that shareholders are “acting in concert”; see Pavlos Masouros, 'Is the EU Taking 
Shareholder Rights Seriously?: An Essay on the Impotence of Shareholdership in Corporate Europe', 
(2010) 7 ECL, 195, 200; Djioufas, ‘“Acting in concert” and calculation of voting rights in the public 
offer for securities’ [2005] DEE, 918 and L. 3461/2006 implementing Directive 2004/25/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids (OJ L 142, 30.4.2004). 
125 Such as the right to request information on the GM (art.39 (4)), to request from the Chairman of the 
GM to adjourn the adoption of the resolution (art, 39 (3)), to add items to the GM’s agenda (Art. 39(2)) 
and to be bought out in case a majority shareholding reaches the level of 95% of registered share capital 
(art.49b) 
126 Such as the “enhanced” right to information under art. 39 (5) (see below) and to request a special 
audit under art.40 (3) (see Chapter 3) 
127 Art. 35a (3). 
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The 2007 reform did eventually make the rights provided by Law 2190/1920 available 
to a greater audience of shareholders, but did this reform give a comparative edge to 
Greek shareholder law? It is worth comparing the Greek approach to the British and 
German approaches, from the perspective of availability of rights. Despite the generous 
lowering of ownership thresholds within Law 2190/1920, the same or functionally 
equivalent rights are available to smaller minorities in Germany and the UK. For 
instance, the right to challenge defective or oppressive resolutions under Greek law is 
given to a 2 % minority, whereas it is an individual right in the other two 
jurisdictions.128 Even considering the system of qualified minority rights as a whole, 
Greek law adopts a one-size-fits-all approach that is less favourable to small investors 
than those of its fellow jurisdictions. To clarify, in the UK and in Germany qualified 
minorities are determined not only on the basis of participation in registered share 
capital and/or voting rights, but also, alternatively, according to the financial value such 
participation represents, or the number of shareholders forming the minority group. In 
particular, in German companies with large capitalisation, it is possible for 
shareholders falling well below the usual threshold of one-twentieth of registered share 
capital to invoke the respective right, if they satisfy instead the nominal value threshold. 
According to the UK model of minority thresholds on the other hand, an aggregation 
of a certain number of members would suffice for the qualified minority right to be 
evoked, even if the sum of their shares falls short of the participation in share capital 
or voting rights thresholds.129 
The upshot is that the Greek market offers significantly more "voice premia" to 
shareholders of 5%, compared to individual ones. They constitute "premia" because, in 
                                                          
128 See Section 4.5 
129 E.g. CA 2006, ss. 338, 370 (3).  
215 
 
effect, when a single shareholder reaches such levels of participation in capital, 
eventually he or she obtains more rights compared to the aggregate of persons holding 
an equivalent percentage of share capital.  Any such right then can be viewed as a 
control premium, making the shareholding exponentially more valuable compared to 
those falling short of the requisite thresholds for the right to be conferred to them. 
Conversely, such groups of individual shareholders need to undertake the additional 
costs of coordinating their actions in order to enjoy such rights.130 Under the prism of 
the bundle of rights theory, these considerations translate into individual shareholders 
owning a property of disproportionately lower value compared to their counterparts 
who reach the qualified minority thresholds.  
Of course, this observation applies, to different extents, to every jurisdiction where 
corporate decision making depends upon majority rules, whereby majority is calculated 
on the basis of participation in capital.131 However, it is evident that Greek law is more 
demanding regarding qualified minority rights, compared at least to its German and 
British counterparts. It therefore follows that a shareholding of 1.5% in, say, a German 
company, carries more rights than an equal participation in the capital of a Greek 
company and thus bestows more control to its holder over corporate affairs and is, 
ultimately, more valuable.      
The desirability of a “qualified minority strategy” regarding certain shareholder rights 
is questionable, not only from a practical but also from a doctrinal perspective. As 
argued in Chapter 5, this is the case particularly for shareholder-initiated litigation on 
behalf of the company. Qualified minority thresholds are impractical, because of their 
                                                          
130 On the problem of collective action, see Lucian A Bebchuk 'The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise' 
(2007) 93 Va.L.Rev. 675, 688ff; Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel The Economic Structure 
of Corporate Law (Harvard University Press 1996) 66. 
131 Regarding “shareholder democracy”, see Arman Khachaturyan ‘Trapped in delusions: democracy, 
fairness and the one-share-one-vote rule in the European Union’ (2007) 8 E.B.O.R. 335. 
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failure to reflect the differences in terms of shareholding structures between listed and 
non-listed companies and due to the problems entailed in collective action. 
Furthermore, the doctrinal bases behind this approach are shaky. On the one hand, the 
presumption that block-holders have their interests more closely connected with those 
of the company is contestable and should not preclude smaller minorities from redress 
on behalf company; on the other hand, large thresholds have the potential to frustrate 
the purpose of shareholders’ (derivative) litigation as an accountability mechanism for 
the benefit of the company as a whole.  
 
4.7.3. Alignment of statute with academic and judicial interpretation; re-wording 
of provisions and gap-filling 
The 2007 reform in Greece was a unique opportunity to address long-standing issues 
regarding the literary setting of the century-old statute. The terminology used therein 
was convoluted and troubling both for business and lawyers, conceivably due to the 
direct translation of foreign provisions in the course of legal transplants. Ambiguity 
was also caused by the very structure of certain provisions, unintentionally leaving 
space for a variety of interpretations. The literary setting of Law 2190/1920 had also 
significant caveats, leaving important issues to be addressed by statutory interpretation. 
The Greek legislator proceeded to a number of changes, providing the statute with 
renewed, yet by no means absolute, clarity.  
These “corrective” interventions did not substantially improve the level of shareholder 
protection, neither were they designed to. In the context of shareholder rights, the most 
significant addition in the course of such statutory “gap-filling” can be held to be the 
introduction to Law 2190/1920 of a provision on the right to place items in the GM 
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agenda.132 Such a shareholders’ right existed prior to the enactment of Law 3604/2007, 
by virtue of teleological interpretation of the statutory provision on the right to call for 
a GM.133 Academics had reached the consensus that, given the right to call for a GM 
(and therefore to set the stage for discourse over particular aspects of corporate affairs), 
it follows a majori ad minus that a similar ability existed to influence the setting of the 
agenda of an already convened GM, as the activist minority would otherwise attend a 
discussion which may or may not include their concerns regarding the course of 
corporate business.134 Case law did not contradict the views of academics in that 
instance, yet the legislator decided to clarify the position and application of the law, by 
introducing a statutory provision to that end. The initiative undertaken by Law 
3604/2007 was welcome therefore, from the perspective of legal certainty. The law 
now provides details as to the deadlines to be met by the minority and the duty of the 
board to publish or communicate the inserted items. Nevertheless, the Greek statutory 
provision on the shareholders’ right to add items to the GM’s agenda should also be 
understood as an early alignment with the EU mandates. By the time Law 3604/2007 
was voted by Parliament, the draft version of the SRD explicitly provided for such a 
right, which eventually became the subject of the Directive’s article four.135 It therefore 
can be concluded that the motives behind the reform of Law 2190/1920, article 39 
paragraph 2, had more to do with legal certainty and transposition of the SRD, rather 
than genuine shareholder empowerment on the Greek legislator’s initiative.136 
Anyway, the case of the statutory right to add items to the GM’s agenda shows that the 
                                                          
132 L.2190/1920, art. 39 (2).  
133 The right to call for a GM existed since the early versions of L. 2190/1920. Regarding which types 
of GMs this right refers to, see E Perakis, ‘Danger to frustrate the minority’s right to call for a GM (art. 
39 par. 1 CL 2190/1920)?’ [2010] DEE 1133.   
134 See preamble to law 3604/2007. The leading work is I Markou, ‘I sýnklisi tis genikís syneléfseos tis 
AE apó ti meiopsifía’[1978] EEN 774, 776 
135 See Drakopoulos ‘Minority Rights’ in Perakis Sociétés Anonyme’s 2013 (n 29), 1498, 1499 




occasional “gap-filling” effected by Law 3604/2007 purported and resulted only in 
incremental, if any, improvement of shareholder protection. 
The recent reforms did not touch upon an array of provisions, which problematic due 
to their wording. The editors of the only available Greek to English translation of Law 
2190/1920 make no overstatement by observing that  
the fact that Law 3604/2007 was not drafted from zero basis but 
includes parts of various past laws, going back to 1920, with the 
addition of several new provisions, makes the Greek text rather 
cumbersome and, on occasion, conflicting.137  
This is particularly true regarding shareholder protection, where Law 2190/1920, 
article 22b on company’s actions maintained its highly criticised setting. It is worth 
recapitulating here the relevant observations raised in Chapter 3. Paragraph 1 of the 
article makes reference to a right of a minority of ten percent of registered (paid) share 
capital to demand that the board enforces the company’s claims against its members, 
going further to impose a duty of the directors to assert such claims, if the minority or 
the GM so demanded. However, the same paragraph contains an exception to the 
aforementioned conditions for the duty to assert corporate claims to arise, if the claim 
at question is grounded on fault.138 Furthermore, the third paragraph refers to a 
“minority’s right” to petition before court for appointment of special representatives 
with a mandate to initiate proceedings, in case the board did not do so within the period 
specified in paragraph two of the same article, despite the ten percent minority’s 
demand. There exists, therefore, ambiguity as to the content of the Greek functional 
equivalent to derivative actions. Firstly, it may be disputed that the minority in 
                                                          
137 Lambadarios Law Firm (trans. & edts.) Law 2190/1920 On Companies Limited by Shares (Sociétés 
Anonymes) Law 3190/1955 On Limited Liability Companies, Greek & English text (Nomiki Bibliothiki 
2011), VIII. 
138 This exception was inserted to L. 2190/1920, art. 22b (1), by virtue of L. 2339/1995, art. 10 (5). 
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paragraph 3 refers to the same minority of 10% in the first paragraph, even though no 
other minority is mentioned in the article.139 Furthermore, the opinion has been 
expressed that the exception of fault regarding the directors’ duty to assert corporate 
claims expands to the conditions to petition for appointment of special representatives, 
possibly under the rationale “fraus omnia corrumpit”.140 Lastly, the phrase in paragraph 
3 “[i]f pursuit of the claim is demanded by the minority or in case that the deadline set 
in the above paragraph lapses without any action being brought”, has led some 
commentators to hold that a minority-led corporate action is not subject to the deadline 
set in paragraph 2, despite the fact that paragraph 3 goes on to provide that “the Chair 
of the Court of First Instance […] may, upon application of the minority submitted 
within one month from the expiration of the deadline set in the above paragraph 
[…]appoint special representatives”.141 Despite the calls of academia for the legislator 
to fill these gaps and the fact that a new sentence on costs was inserted in the said article 
in order to “add clarity” to the provision, the long-standing ambiguity in the wording 
of article 22b pertains.142 Nevertheless, case law of the higher courts has been rather 
consistent in the interpretation of article 22b, thereby mitigating the uncertainty created 
by the convoluted literary setting of a poorly translated legal transplant.143 
                                                          
139 Cf Filippos Doris ‘I schési ton árthron 69 AK, 22 v § 3 n.2190/1920 kai 786 § 3 KPolD os rythmíseon 
gia tin apotropí tou kindýnou exypirétisis symferónton antithéton pros ta symféronta tou 
ekprosopoúmenou nomikoú prosópou’ (2002) B’ ChrID 865, 873; see A. I. Freris ‘Judicial enforcement 
of corporate claims against the members of the Board of Directors’ in VG Antonopoulos & Sp 
Mouzoulas, Sociétés Anonymes, Vol II (Sakkoulas 2013) 208 
140 G Triantafillakis ‘Duty of a shareholder exerting influence on the management of a public limited 
company’ in 12th Panhellenian Conference  of Greek Corporate Lawyers, Contemporary issues of 
Corporate Responsibility (2003), 281, 311; Spyridonos (n 1) 170. Cf Mikroulea (n 25), 252; Chrysanthis 
‘Comments on Single-member CFI of Agrinio 177/2009 EEmpD NI’ 2009, 563; SA Mouzoulas 
L.3604/07 for the reform and amendment of CL 2190/1920 on Societes Anonymes, annotated (Sakkoulas 
2008) 364; Themis K Skouras, ‘appointment and replacement of special representatives in the societe 
anonyme’[1983] EEmpD 553, 556. 
141 Doris (n 139) 873. Cf Freris (n 139), 209; cf G Sotiropoulos ‘Sýnkrousi symferónton metaxý ton 
melón tou DS kai tou nomikoú prosópou tis anónymis etairías. Schési tou árthrou 69 AK kai tou árthrou 
22b N.2190/1920. Antikatastástasi ton eidikón ekprosópon tis par. 3 tou árthrou 22b N.2190/1920’ 
(1997) 12 DEE 1145. 
142 See Freris (n 139), 208. 




4.7.4. European Union influence 
The transposition of European Union Directives has led over time to an augmentation 
of the catalogue of shareholder rights under Greek law. The vast majority of the EU-
driven amendments to Greek company law (predominantly within the ambit of Law 
2190/1920) are related to the law on shareholders meetings.144 European harmonisation 
did not have identical effects on the national legislations examined, primarily in the 
sense that differences exist regarding the scope of application of the now European-
wide shareholder rights between listed and non-listed companies.  
Interestingly, the reform on the rights connected with the conduct of the General 
Meeting under Greek law preceded the implementation of the Shareholder Rights 
Directive (SRD),145 a Directive touching heavily upon the shareholders’ right to vote. 
Even though Law 3604/2007 dealt with most matters covered by this Directive, a 
substantial part of the reformed provisions had to be subsequently amended in order to 
be satisfactorily aligned with the European standards. In fact, implementation of the 
SRD took place somewhat belatedly, as the Greek legislator only enacted Law 
3884/2010, transposing the SRD, in 2010.146 Furthermore, some of the provisions in 
Law 3884/2010 mirror well established rules and principles in Greek case law and 
academic thought. For instance, equal treatment of shareholders had always been a 
pervasive principle in Greek company law147  and the new paragraph two of Law 
2190/1920 article 30 (a verbatim translation of SRD article 4), serves more the purposes 
                                                          
144 The exception being the sell-out right, introduced to L.2190/1920 by implementation of Directive 
2004/25 on takeover bids [2004] OJ L142/12, art. 16. 
145 Directive 2007/36 on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies [2007] OJ 
L184/17. 
146 The deadline for transposition of the SRD was 3.8.2009; Greece, having failed to meet it, was handed 
a reasoned opinion by the Commission in 2010. 
147 See preamble to Law 3884/2010, explanatory notes on article 7; Konstantinos G Pampoukis The 
principle of equal treatment of shareholders (1994). 
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of legal certainty than introducing a novelty. There were instances though, where the 
EU legislator’s influence on Greek law was more substantive.  
The most influential piece of EU secondary legislation on shareholder law in the recent 
years is undoubtedly the SRD. 148  Its predominant focus was the shareholders’ exercise 
of the right to vote, with particular reference to the issues of proxy and distance voting 
(voting by correspondence), in an effort to bolster cross-border shareholder voice.149 
The outcome of the transposition of the SRD into Law 2190/1920, was the amendment 
of a variety of the existing statutory provisions, along with the introduction of new 
ones.   
Law 2190/1920, article 28 (entitlement to vote) had already been amended in 2007, for 
the first time since 1962, in order to accommodate distance voting150 and participation 
by electronic means,151 via the introduction of paragraphs six and seven. Again, shortly 
after the introduction of the respective provisions to Law 2190/1920, they had to be 
amended again in order to better accommodate the transposition of the SRD. 152   The 
Directive also resulted in the insertion of a new article 28a (“entitlement to vote in 
listed companies”) to the Greek law on public limited companies (L.2190/1920, which 
replicates verbatim the wording of the SRD. This is no surprise.  
To begin with, proxy voting, even though permissible under the pre-existing Greek 
provisions, was never a matter seriously considered by the company law legislator; it 
was left to be addressed by the general provisions of the Civil Code on 
                                                          
148 See regarding Germany: F Ochmann Die Aktionärsrechte-Richtlinie: Auswirkungen auf das deutsche 
und europäische Recht (De Gruyter 2009); regarding Greece: Christina I Tarnanidou, ‘Reform of the 
law on listed companies following the amendment of L.2190/1920 by virtue of L 3884/2010’ (2010) 2 
ChriDik 154. 
149 SRD, Recital 2. 
150 Germany did not allow voting in absentia, whilst in the UK this used to be a matter for the Articles 
of Association; see Stefan Grundmann, European Company Law, (Intersentia, 2007) 304. 
151 Cf the position in the UK prior to transposition of the SRD, where e-voting was not an option. 




representation.153 It is reasonable and to be expected that the national legislator relied 
upon the provisions of a carefully drafted Directive, which is the primary output so far 
of the Commission’s ambitious Action Plan on shareholder rights.154 The more 
sophisticated new framework on proxy voting was also welcome by Greek academia, 
as it better addresses the complexity of corporate decision-making, the conflicts of 
interests entailed therein and the difficulties involved in getting the GM resolutions to 
reflect the genuine will of the shareholders.155  
Another significant effect of the SRD on Greek shareholder law, again related to 
shareholders’ participation in the GM, was the abolition of share-blocking. Prior to the 
Directive, share-blocking in Greece consisted of the requirement to deposit shares for 
a substantial amount of days prior to the GM, the underlying rationale being that 
resolutions should be adopted by legitimate voters, meaning by persons whose 
membership is beyond doubt. However, the collateral intention of share-blocking and 
its most drastic effect upon shareholders, was the prohibition of transferring shares 
prior to the GM.156 The EU legislator saw such provisions as problematic, hindering 
not only active shareholder participation, but also the free flow of capital.157 
Consequently, the SRD, article 7, abolished share-blocking within the EU and resulted 
in the introduction of article 28a paragraph 1 to Law 2190/1920. As a means of 
shareholder status’ verification, the Directive introduced the “record date” 
mechanism.158 In this instance, the Greek legislator was somewhat parsimonious as to 
                                                          
153 A. Kouloridas ‘Entitlement to participate in the General Meeting’ in Perakis Sociétés Anonyme’s 2013 
(n 29), 1234. 
154 European Commission, Action Plan: European Company Law and Corporate Governance - A Modern 
Legal Framework for More Engaged Shareholders and Sustainable Companies, Brussels, 12 December 
2012, COM(2012) 740/2. 
155 Kouloridas (n 153) 1235; cf M Rapti, ‘Amendments of the Greek law on societes anonymes for the 
implementation of Directive 2007/36 on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed 
companies’ (2012) 23 I.C.C.L.R. 24 30. 
156 Rapti (n 155) 27. 
157 Preamble to the SRD, (3). 
158 SRD, art. 7 (2) & (3). 
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the extent of the implementation. Contrary to the approach followed in relation to other 
means of shareholder protection within the SRD, share-blocking was abolished only 
regarding listed companies.159  
It should be noted that not all the provisions of the SRD had the effect of broadening 
the scope of shareholder rights in Greece. This is particularly the case regarding the 
right to ask questions in the GM (in German: “Fragerecht”), a matter upon which Greek 
company law has always placed much emphasis.160 The Greek legislator had long 
maintained a scaled approach towards such a right to information.161 A basic right has 
been widely available to shareholders, whilst larger minorities have been granted 
recourse to the right to be informed on a wider spectrum of matters. The SRD only 
touched upon the basic right, without bringing any material change regarding its 
availability to shareholders under Greek law. Accordingly, the first sentence of Law 
2190/1920 article 39 paragraph 4 remained unchanged during the 2010 transposition 
of the SRD, conferring individual shareholders the right to request the board to provide 
them issue-specific information, under the condition that such information is necessary 
for evaluating the items to be discussed in the GM.162 In fact, the newly inserted second 
sentence to paragraph 4 has the effect of qualifying the shareholders’ right to ask 
questions, empowering the board to refuse such information, in cases where the latter 
is retrievable from the company's website.  
                                                          
159 See L. 2190/1920, art. 28.  
160 See Michael-Theodoros Marinos ‘The “material and substantive reason” as a limit to the individual 
right to information under art. 39 par. 4 L. 2190/1920’ [2008] DEE, 466 
161 The original statute was initially reformed regarding these rights by L. 5076/1931, a reform 
consolidated and codified thirty-two years later by virtue of LD 4237/1962 article 22.  
162 German law (AktG, s. 131 (1)) has a similar “specificity” requirement, which raised concerns 
regarding its compatibility with the Directive (where no such requirement is pronounced). See D Kubis 
‘Auskunft ohne Grenzen? –Europarechtliche Einflüsse auf den Informationsanspruch nach §131 
AktG‘[2014] ZGR, 608, commenting on BGH 5.11.2013 AG 2014, 87. So far Greek Courts have not 
considered the matter. 
224 
 
The SRD influenced a few other provisions, whose effect on Greek shareholder law 
mainly concerned formalities connected with the convening of the GM.163 Taken as a 
whole, the Directive can be said to have improved shareholder participation within the 
shareholder forum, the GM. These improvements had an impact not only in the cross-
border context, but also nationally.164 That is, even though the clear objective of the 
SRD was to facilitate cross-border participation in corporate affairs, Greek 
shareholders can be held to benefit from the SRD in a strictly national context as well, 
as they enjoy the rights accruing from the transposed provisions even when the cross-
border element is absent. 
Nevertheless, the facilitation of participation to the GM, the principal matter of the EU 
legislator’s focus when it comes to shareholder rights and protection so far, is 
addressing just part of the problem of effective shareholder protection. Although it 
constitutes a means to align shareholders’ views with those of the management, thereby 
reducing the respective agency costs, it does little to address the minority-majority 
agency problem.165 Therefore, the significance of the SRD and the respective 
transposed provisions in the protection of shareholders in Greek companies is qualified. 
As explained in Chapter 2, share ownership in Greece is highly concentrated and, 
therefore, the majority of votes in Greek GMs are predetermined, as they ultimately 
rest in the hands of few individuals who have intersecting interests within the company. 
Accordingly, even if minorities make best use of all their rights within the GMs in such 
ownership structures, they have to bow to the will of the majority sooner or later (save 
for the instances where a super-majority is needed, such as resolutions approving board 
                                                          
163 For instance L.2190/1920, art. 26 (2) (b), regarding invitation to the GM, art. 27 on dissemination of 
information prior to the GM.  
164 Concurring Tarnanidou (n 148), 159. 
165 See also Reisberg, (n 33) 29. It has to be noted that even in cases where the discharge of members of 
the BoD from liability is discussed in the GM, the latter members are not precluded from voting by 
L.2190/1920, art. 35, if it so happens that they hold shares. 
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remuneration); this is regardless of whether the majority’s position is creating value or 
not for the company and thus for shareholders as a whole.166 Voting cannot substitute 
shareholder remedies such as the derivative action in their function. It constitutes a 
whole different form of shareholder activism. The GM is a decision making body, with 
an authority distinct of that entrusted to directors. The right to vote becomes therefore 
of minuscule importance for minority shareholders in such circumstances, as a 
significant part of corporate decision making takes place outside the GM. Even if the 
German doctrine of the “unwritten competences” 167 of the GM were to be applied to 
Greek law, as advocated by some Greek academics, 168 in order to extend the scope of 
matters upon which the board needs shareholders’ authorisation to act, this situation 
would not substantially change: in concentrated ownership, the American-style 
activism of proxy solicitation is of little relevance, as minority shareholders cannot 
subdue the will of a GM where their opponents hold the vast majority of shares.169 
What minorities would be left with, is the option of exiting the company; not an optimal 
option though, given the effects that maladministration might have on the value of their 
shares. In any case, the GM’s monitoring potential of the decision-makers rests in the 
hands of the majority and in situations where the “ownership and control” agency 
problem gives way to the minority-majority one, participation rights for minority 
shareholders usually are, on their own, nothing more than a weapon loaded with blanks. 
                                                          
166 According to Reisberg, (n 33) 29, it is only the right to ask questions that has (slight) potential of 
deterrence, as the question may affect the reputation of the board members or executives in question. 
167“ungeschriebene Hauptversammlung-Kompetenz“, as established by BGH, BGHZ 83, 122; NJW 
1982, 1703 (Holzmüller); see Hüffer (n 6) 610, 655 for succinct analysis on the doctrine.   
168 Maria Milathianaki I katanomí ton exousión metaxý tis Genikís Synélefsis kai tou Dioikitikoú 
Symvoulíou tis A.E. (Nomiki Bibliothiki 2013). 
169 It has to be noted that, possibly for this reason, the first “proxy fight” evidenced in a German “blue-
chip” company (Infineon) took place in 2010, led by Hermes (a UK-based investment fund). See Richard 
Milne ‘Hermes bid to oust next Infineon chairman’ FT (London, 18 January 2010) < 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/e085c90a-045e-11df-8603-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3cijYNIhf> accessed 
11 June 2015.  
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Furthermore, despite its efforts to minimise the costs involved in minority 
shareholders’ voting and thus encourage participation, the SRD is not devoid of 
practical problems and insufficiencies.170 In my opinion, the greatest gap within the 
SRD is that it does not regulate the conduct of proxy advisers and other service 
providers, even though it does grant them greater power than before at the EU level; 
by liberalising the rules on appointment of proxies. However, such service providers 
create another agency problem, particularly where they become powerful enough to 
influence corporate practice; that between the owner of the shares and them service 
providers. Without regulation, there is little to ensure that they truly promote the 
interests of shareholders: fiduciary and transparency standards are needed. The UK has 
already attempted to address this problem via the Stewardship Code,171 imposing 
certain duties and transparency requirements, in the usual comply or explain basis.172 
In a similar fashion (comply or explain), the proposed Directive173 will introduce article 
3i to the SRD. The effects of this approach remain to be seen, as the proposed Directive 
has yet to come to effect. It is noteworthy that in another matter of shareholder 
protection the EU has followed (to an extent) the UK approach. 
The issue of empty voting was early detected as being left unaddressed174 and now the 
proposed Directive seeks to tackle it by inserting a new article 3a to the SRD. The idea 
behind the amendment is that, despite facilitating vote by proxy, the SRD did little to 
ensure that the intermediaries do not obstruct communication between the company 
and the shareholders; because identification of the owners remained a matter largely 
                                                          
170 See Masouros (n 124). 
171 FRC, UK Stewardship Code 2012 available at <https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-
Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Stewardship-Code-September-2012.pdf> accessed 10 
August 2015. 
172 ibid, 4. 
173 Commission, 'Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2007/36 on the encouragement of long-
term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34 on certain elements of the corporate governance 
statement' COM(2014) 213 final 
174 Masouros (n 124), 198. 
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left to national laws.175 The proposed Directive176 follows the UK paradigm;177 
whereby, the company becomes the sole recipient of information regarding 
shareholders’ identity, to the extent allowed by the fundamental right to privacy,178 in 
order to communicate with them directly. The proposed Directive also shows some 
preference to disclosure over on-demand information, particularly regarding board 
remuneration.179 It is quite probable that some provisions of Law 2190/1920 will have 
to change in order to implement the proposed Directive, depending of course on its 
content when it comes into force.180 
Evidently, the Commission’s Action Plan on Shareholders’ Rights is an ongoing 
project. As such, it cannot be said to provide a complete and optimal framework of 
shareholder rights for the Member States - including Greece -, neither should it be 
expected to have done so at this stage. Its impact so far on the Greek law on shareholder 
meetings is positive, from the perspective of shareholder empowerment and protection, 
yet the applicable EU secondary legislation does not fully address agency problems of 
particular significance for Greek company law. In particular, the agency problem 
between minority and majority shareholders, a matter that the derivative action is 
designed to remedy, cannot be satisfactorily addressed within the ambit of the GM. It 
                                                          
175 Cf. A Alexandropoulou, ‘The new proposal for a Directive regarding the strengthening of the 
shareholder’s position, board remuneration and transparency of the role of proxy advisors and 
intermediaries (2014) 10 DEE 940, 941. She argues that Directive 2004/109/EC largely addressed the 
issue by mandating disclosure of certain shareholdings; and that shareholdings falling outside the scope 
of the provisions requiring such disclosure are minor and therefore not influential. In my opinion, this 
argument disregards the very objective of the Draft Directive to facilitate shareholder engagement as a 
whole. 
176 Art. 3A. 
177 CA 2006, s. 793.  
178 Art. 16 TFEU; art. 8 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
179 Concurring Alexandropoulou (n 175) 946; the emphasis on disclosure is also obvious in 
2014/208/EU: Commission Recommendation of 9 April 2014 on the quality of corporate governance 
reporting (‘comply or explain’): <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014H0208> accessed 20 August 2015. 
180 This is particularly the case for L.2190/1920 art. 39 (4) (d). 
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remains to be seen if in the future the Commission considers harmonisation of 
shareholder suits.  
Lastly, given that transposition of EU secondary law is mandatory for all Member 
States, one should not expect Greek shareholder law to now enjoy a comparative edge 
over its European counterparts.  In fact, apart from some divergence regarding the 
extent of implementation of the Directive’s provisions and the use of the default options 
provided therein, the Directive can be said to have achieved a good level of 
harmonisation regarding significant components of the law on GMs. It is therefore 
understood that, due to the SRD, Greek law has caught up with its European 
counterparts in some respects, rather than surpassed them. This is all the more evident 
by the fact that in a variety of matters, the Directive effected an approximation of laws 
towards well-established Anglo-Saxon standards and practices. An example is the 
abolition of share-blocking prior to GMs in favour of the introduction of “record 
dates”.181 Similar observations apply to the focus of the SRD on proxy voting. In the 
Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions,182 proxy voting has been a particularly important element 
of shareholder participation and thus was therein regulated more extensively than in 
Continental Law countries such as Greece.183 The SRD had the effect of moving Greek 
                                                          
181 David Milman, 'Ascertaining shareholder wishes in UK company law in the 21st century'(2010) 280 
Co. L.N. 1, 4; Peter Bateman and Simon Howley, 'Legislative Comment. Shareholder Rights Directive: 
new general meeting requirements for traded companies' (2009) 256 Co. L.N. 1, 4. Cf the situation in 
Germany; see Till Naruisch and Fabian Liepe, ‘Latest developments in the German law on public 
companies by the Act on Corporate Integrity and Modernisation of the Right of Resolution-Annulment 
(UMAG) - shareholder activism and directors' liability reloaded’ (2007) J.B.L. 225, 233.   
182 Differences within this legal family existed and persist. Proxy voting is more heavily regulated in the 
US than in the UK, a phenomenon possibly explained by the market for corporate control as an 
alternative to proxy contests in the shareholders’ struggle to affect the constitution of the Board of 
Directors; see Mathias M Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law (CUP 2008), 105. For the position 
in the UK prior to the CA 2006 and the SRD, see R. C. Nolan, 'The Continuing Evolution of Shareholder 
Governance' (2006) 65 C.L.J. 92, 100, 101, 105.   
183 See Kouloridas (n 153) 1234; cf the position in Germany, where rules on proxy voting are “more 
detailed and systematically arranged than in the case in most other European jurisdictions” according to 
Frank Wooldridge, 'Voting rights in German public companies' (2013) 34Comp. Law. 51, 55. 
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law closer to the Anglo-Saxon paradigm, a move also dictated by modern corporate 
practice and the growing influence of institutional investors internationally.184  
 
4.8. Concluding remarks 
The Greek legislator has exhibited some activity lately, modestly enriching and 
rationalising the framework of shareholder protection. A material aspect of shareholder 
protection that was left unaddressed during the latest reforms, however, was that of 
shareholder remedies. Contrary to its counterparts, Greek law has not yet introduced a 
form of derivative action and the company’s action is a rather restrictive remedy and 
cumbersome to invoke. This often leads to inconvenient results. Exemplifying the 
unsatisfactory state of the law, is the case of the Proton Bank collapse, where 
shareholders who could not avail themselves of the company’s action brought - in one 
case unsuccessfully - direct claims against the management.  
The existing framework of protection focuses primarily on the GM and the respective 
resolutions. Shareholders are bestowed an ensemble of rights, with the objective that 
resolutions represent decision making free from abuse and conform to legal 
requirements. However, rights connected with the convening of GMs do not offer a 
complete or optimal form of protection for individual and minority shareholders; 
neither do they compensate for the shortcomings of the company’s action. This 
consideration also applies to the existing mechanism of challenging GM resolutions. 
To the extent misfeasance takes place outside the confines of the assembly, the 
shareholders’ right to challenge its resolutions is by and large insignificant. It is 
                                                          
184 Germany offers itself as a case study for this phenomenon. Since 2001, the German idiosyncratic 
model of reserving voting by proxy mainly to the banks where shares were deposited began to lose 
significance in law and business practice, giving way to models of proxy voting that resembled 
established practices in the US and the UK. See Siems, Convergence (n 182) 105, 107; for a succinct 
analysis of the German law on shareholder voting, see Wooldridge (n 182) 55. 
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therefore understood to fit the purpose of dealing with the minority-majority agency 
problem, assuming therefore a complementary function to derivative litigation within 
a shareholder protection framework. 
Other mechanisms of shareholder protection cannot compensate for the ineffectiveness 
of the company’s action either. Contractual freedom, already restricted by Greek law, 
is unable to provide shareholders with a complete and fair bargain, leaving gaps which 
the law attempts to fill by the imposition of duties and their enforcement. The market 
of corporate control, on the other hand, has a controversial effect on corporate 
governance and its relevance to the contemporary Greek corporate landscape is 
minuscule anyhow. 
Analysis has illustrated that the level of shareholder protection under Greek law has 
not changed radically during the past decade, remains relatively low in a comparative 
context and can be further improved. The EU influence on the matter has provided a 
level playing field, yet its effect on shareholder remedies is minimal so far.185 Contrary 
to the harmonisation of key rules on the conduct of GMs, shareholder remedies have 
not held a prominent position in the EU legislator’s agenda ever since the proposed and 
now abandoned fifth company law Directive. Against this backdrop, some prima facie 
extrema arise in juxtaposing the laws of Germany, Greece and the UK. The UK poses 
as the only jurisdiction providing an “umbrella” remedy for oppression, whilst Greece 
is alone in not providing for a derivative action. 
Even a move towards the foreign standards will not be optimal, lest the problems of the 
company’s action are addressed. Class actions, a mechanism largely unknown to Greek 
law, may perform a role similar to derivative actions as a tool for collective redress. 
                                                          
185 The exception is the sell-out right provision of L.2190/1920, art. 48b (triggered when the majority 
holds 90% or more of the company’s share capital). 
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Further similarities concern their compensatory and deterrent functions. However, 
similarities end here, as their scope cannot cover the misfeasance the derivative action 
is designed to remedy. Regarding the prospect of broadening the scope of Greek 
remedies against abuse, by introduction of a UK-styled unfair prejudice remedy, the 
following points have been concluded. Firstly, the latter are limited regarding their 
application in practice, bearing relevance predominantly in closely-held companies. 
Furthermore, they are rightfully classified as personal claims.186 The distinction 
between personal claims and corporate claims remains important, even in jurisdictions 
with a long-standing tradition on shareholder litigation. The view that classification 
should be based on the person suffering direct loss from a corporate wrongdoing is 
doctrinally sound. Accordingly, if a wrong is done to the company and only the 
company suffers a direct loss, then the claim should be a corporate one and pursued by 
the company or the shareholders on its behalf. This rationale follows the no reflective 
loss principle and is based on the justifications analysed in Section 2.2. Therefore, they 
do not and should not function as a perfect substitute to derivative actions. 
Against this background, shareholder suits to enforce corporate claims emerge as a 
pressing issue and reform on that matter may lead to a genuine upgrade of the national 
levels of shareholder protection. Reform would not only address the problems inherent 
in the company’s action, but it would also compensate, to a certain extent, for the 
ineffectiveness of other mechanisms of shareholder protection, such as the (in)existing 
means of collective redress.  The task of the ensuing Chapter is set accordingly.  
  
                                                          
186 Reisberg (n 33) 298: “fundamentally s 994 is a remedy for shareholders who have suffered personal 




PART 3. Derivative actions de lege 




CHAPTER 5: Proposals for a Greek Company Law more 
protective to shareholders- the case of derivative actions 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The previous Chapters identified a caveat in shareholder protection under Greek law. 
The company’s action is fraught with problems in its construction and application.  It 
was further shown that many of these problems are not encountered in jurisdictions 
where derivative actions exist. Moreover, it was illustrated that Greek company law 
offers relatively low levels of shareholder protection in a comparative context and 
cannot compensate as a system for the defects of the company’s action. 
This Chapter advances proposals for reform, for the law as it should be. The 
conclusions reached from the preceding comparative analysis shall be implemented in 
order to form the appropriate recommendations. Specifically, this part of the study 
attempts to incorporate to the existing Greek legal framework the elements that make 
the foreign legislations more protective. Furthermore, throughout this Section the 
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works of other academics on the matter are considered and attested. The proposals are 
not only based on comparative law considerations de lege lata, but also de lege ferenda; 
the views of the British and German scholarship, on how the law on shareholder 
protection should be, provide valuable insights for this Chapter.1 
The ensuing Sections thus undertake to suggest a revision of mandatory legal 
provisions that are specifically intended for the protection of shareholders, with the aim 
to reassert the effectiveness and competitiveness of Greek shareholder law. The 
recommended rules are crystallized and systematized. Furthermore, it is essential that 
the reform proposals strike the right balance between the availability of derivative 
actions and their exceptional character. The proposals have to reflect the subsidiary 
nature derivative actions have vis-a-vis claims brought by the company.  
The reform proposals must also procure a good level of legal certainty.2 Both the 
German and the UK jurisdictions deliberately purported to increase the legal certainty 
involved in shareholder litigation. Thus, the insights from the analysis in Chapter 3 will 
be of great value in constructing the right criteria. 
This Chapter unravels as follows: first, an inquiry takes place regarding the desirability 
of the introduction of derivative actions to Greek law, with particular reference to the 
German experience. Then, the study addresses the question of whether an individual 
shareholder right is preferable compared to the alternative of a qualified minority one. 
Continuing, this Chapter adopts a position in the debated issue of what kinds of 
misfeasance are to be covered by shareholders’ litigation. Furthermore, mechanisms 
                                                          
1 Klaus Ulrich Schmolke, 'Die Aktionärsklage nach § 148 AktG – Anreizwirkungen de lege lata und 
Reformanregungen de lege ferenda' [2011] ZGR, 398. Martin Peltzer 'Das Zulassungsverfahren nach § 
148 AktG wird von der Praxis nicht angenommen! Warum? Was nun?', in Ulrich Burgard, Walther 
Hadding, Peter O. Mülbert, Michael Nietsch & Reinhard Welter (eds) Festschrift Für Uwe H. Schneider 
zum 70. Geburtstag (Otto Schmidt 2011), 763, 764–65; Arad Reisberg, Derivative Actions and 
Corporate Governance: Theory and Operation, (OUP 2007). 
2 Interesting insights on the subject by Carsten Paul, 'Derivative Actions under English and German 
Corporate Law –Shareholder Participation between the Tension Filled Areas of Corporate Governance 
and Malicious Shareholder Interference', (2010) 115 ECFR 81. 
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for filtering unmeritorious litigation are considered. The proposals also consider 
regulation of costs for derivative proceedings and access to claim-related information. 
Section 5.7 concludes. 
 
5.2. Is the transition from company’s actions to derivative actions desirable? 
Insights from Germany 
Is a genuine derivative action necessary, or would a reform of the company’s action 
suffice? Until 2005, the German law on Public Limited Companies shared many 
similarities, already identified in Chapter 3, with the Greek legal order regarding the 
matter of shareholders' suits. Thus, the examination of the opinions given by the 
German legislator and academics, on why the regime of company’s actions had to 
change and what were the purposes of the reform, has useful implications for this 
Chapter. We should thus avail the privilege of having the German experience on the 
matter at hand.  
The commentaries and explanatory notes to the Reforming Act (UMAG) pinpoint the 
betterment (“Verbesserung”) of enforcement of corporate claims as the preponderant 
reason for the introduction of derivative actions; within the limits of non-abusive 
litigation.3 Consequently, the pre-existing arsenal of claims against mismanagement (id 
est AktG section 147, as it stood before UMAG) - with all its commonalities to the 
Greek one- was considered inefficient and/or inadequate. The new section 148 of AktG 
can be perceived as a first step towards the forge of a shareholder-friendly environment 
in Germany; a belated response to a cross-border trend described in Chapter 2.4  Among 
other reasons for taking more incisive steps, the failure of the KonTraG amendments 
                                                          
3 Uwe Hüffer,  Aktiengesetz, (10th edition, CH Beck 2012) 865. 




to prevent corporate scandals arising from breaches of fiduciary duties in 1999-2000 
boosted the re-consideration of the “special representatives” regime on company's 
actions.5 
To briefly recapitulate the relevant parts of the discussion in Chapter 3, prior to the 
enactment of UMAG, one could hardly distinguish between the Greek and German 
statutory company’s actions. Both jurisdictions followed the special representatives 
model, the only material difference between the two adaptations of the latter being the 
discretion of the appointed representatives to decide not to pursue the claim under 
German law. Special representatives may be anyone with capacity to act in law, 
appointed to replace the board, but only with regards to the issue of litigation of 
corporate claims.6 Therefore, the possibility exists in that model of corporate litigation 
that the persons selected by the court to act on behalf of the company may have no 
motive to exhibit any zeal in championing the company’s interests, enjoying only a 
short-term and issue-specific interim appointment and having secured compensation 
for their services. 
Nevertheless, almost ten years ago Germany introduced genuine derivative actions to 
its law on public limited companies. On the contrary, Greece has retained the former 
model, despite some changes (in 2007) on ownership thresholds and cost rules in the 
admission proceedings.7 Surely, the preparatory committees for company law reforms 
in both jurisdictions have both considered the introduction of derivative actions during 
the past two decades; yet only one materialised the thought of strengthening 
                                                          
5RegE-UMAG, BT-Drucks 15/5092,  20. 
6The plural used by the Greek statute has led many to interpret it as demanding more than one 
representatives to be appointed always, but the correct opinion supports that one person may suffice; see 
A. I. Freris ‘Judicial enforcement of corporate claims against the members of the Board of Directors’ in 
VG Antonopoulos & Sp Mouzoulas, Sociétés Anonymes, Vol II (Sakkoulas 2013) 208. In practice, 
attorneys based close to the seat of the company are preferred by courts to assume this task; see Patrai 
Court of Appeal 266/2011 NOMOS Databank; Armenopoulos 2013, 293. 
7 L. 3604/2007, art. 31(2) & (3)  . 
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shareholder protection and management accountability in such a way. It may also be 
true that German law prior to 2005 was marginally lacking, from a shareholder 
protection point of view, compared to the Greek regime on company’s actions; the 
discretionary powers of the besondere Vertretern being the main reason, alongside the 
high liability thresholds.  The German legislator went a few steps beyond eliminating 
this disadvantage and merely providing “enhancements” analogous to those of the 2007 
Greek amendment; a genuine derivative action was introduced. The derivative action 
was preferred to proposals to “enhance” shareholder control over special 
representatives, such as a right of shareholders to nominate their preferred persons to 
assume the tasks and duties of special representatives- a right already existing under 
Greek law, as we saw above.8 The rationale behind this attempted “betterment” of 
German law thus provides some insight and argumentation against the Greek 
parsimony in instituting private mechanisms of directors’ accountability.  
One of the starting points for the German legislator was that the threshold of 5% for 
legal standing in company’s actions and 10% in special audit requests was too high.9 
The coincidence of numbers with the Greek approach makes any further elaboration on 
the similarities redundant. Furthermore, the absence of judicial supervision on the 
admissibility of such actions was viewed as “absurd”.10 Now, this is another point in 
common with article 22b of the Greek statute; as long as the quorum requirements and 
                                                          
8 Jens Koch, 'Das Gesetz zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts 
(UMAG)' (2006) ZGR, 769, 778: “Compare Krieger who had proposed in view of these difficulties, 
basically to keep with the figure of the special representative, but significantly reshape their legal 
position. In particular, the minority shareholder should be given a right of proposal as to the person of 
the representative”. 
9 Nikolaos Paschos & Kay-Uwe Neumann, 'Die Neuregelungen des UMAG im Bereich der 
Durchsetzung von Haftungsansprüchen der Aktiengesellschaft gegen Organmitglieder',(2005) Heft 33 
DB 1779, 1780, 1779. 
10 RegE-UMAG, BT-Drucks 15/5092, 20. 
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“demand” are satisfied, anyone could file an application under the old version of 
section 147 III of AktG, for whatever the reason.11 
A critical departure from the old regime concerned the institution of the special 
representatives. Despite the “compromise” made by KonTraG, as admitted by the 
explanatory notes to UMAG, the “discussion on board liability never came to rest”.12 
Soon after the enactment of KonTraG, the 63rd German Jurists Forum resolved that 
change is necessary and, eventually, the German Government-appointed commission 
on CG and ultimately the legislator espoused professor Baums’ recommendations to 
the Forum.13 The idea was proposed accordingly, that it is preferable that minorities 
pursue the claim themselves; UMAG thus attempted to alleviate the concerns raised 
over the motives and representation by the special representatives. Prior to the 
amendment, the very concept of shareholders representing the company in corporate 
claims was dismissed as contrary to the tenet that, within the “corporate democracy”, 
corporate powers are distributed by statute.14 Despite the fact that the very regime of 
special representatives was in itself a deviation from those principles,15 as the latter 
constituted an ad hoc corporate organ (appointed by the court or the GM), the German 
legislator found it easier to justify from a theoretical perspective than a genuine 
derivative action.16 However, the institution (Rechtsinstitut) of special representatives 
was in various ways unattractive for minorities; not only the latter ran the risk of costs, 
                                                          
11 Procedure under s. 147 II was slightly different in this respect, as it left some discretion to the court to 
decide whether the special representative was preferable an option to the ordinary corporate organs 
capable of bringing the claim. 
12 RegE-UMAG, BT-Drucks 15/5092, 20. 
13 See, for an overview of the events leading to the UMAG, Hans C. Hirt ‘The enforcement of directors' 
duties pursuant to the Aktiengesetz: present law and reform in Germany: Part 2’ (2005) 16 ICCLR 216, 
220. 
14 Hans C Hirt, The Enforcement of Directors' Duties in Britain and Germany: A Comparative Study 
with Particular Reference to Large Companies (Peter Lang 2004), 188. 
15 ibid. 
16 The institution of special representatives may be viewed as an ad hoc appointed administration of the 
company, something common in the general commercial and company law of civil jurisdictions in cases 
of conflicts of interest. 
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but also they were limited to the admission procedure and had thus no control over the 
claim itself. Various academics voiced concerns in this respect17 and the German quest 
for an effective accountability mechanism culminated in the introduction of a 
minorities’ right to sue in their own name but on behalf of the company.  
 Overall, derivative actions should be considered an important element of 
shareholding;18 they constitute in most of the advanced economies a significant part in 
the bundle of rights that is share ownership and, as such, any jurisdiction not providing 
a functioning legal mechanism to that end should be perceived as having shares of a 
comparative lower value traded in its market(s).19 The German legislator realised that 
in 2005 and did not hesitate to amend the company law statute. There are already voices 
in Greek academia supporting the introduction of derivative actions. Apart from the 
unsuccessful attempt to include a relevant provision in the Law on Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies in the beginning of the previous decade, several 
authors have recently expressed their support for change in shareholder litigation 
mechanisms. 20 The similarity some proposals have with the German model is rather 
intriguing. A quick perusal of the relevant papers suffices to show that the 
contemporaneous ownership rule, the demand rule, litigation costs allocation (as a 
                                                          
17 See Theodor Baums, ‘Personal Liabilities of Company Directors in German Law’ (1996) 7(9) 
I.C.C.L.R. 318, 322; Hans C. Hirt, ‘The enforcement of directors' duties pursuant to the Aktiengesetz: 
present law and reform in Germany: Part 1’, 2005, I.C.C.L.R. 179, 189-190; Peter Ulmer, ‘Die 
Aktionärsklage als Instrument zur Kontrolle des Vorstands- und Aufsichtsratshandelns’ (1999) 163 ZHR 
290, 334- 336.  
18 Concurring Marcus Lutter, 'Theorie der Mitgliedschaft: — Prolegomena zu einem Allgemeinen Teil 
des Korporationsrechts', (April 1980), 180 AcP 84, 144. 
19 Quality of corporate governance affects market value; see John Coffee ‘Racing towards the Top: The 
Impact of Cross-Listing and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance’ (2002) 
102 Colum.L.Rev. 1757, 1786. 
20 See indicatively Georgios Triantafillakis From the Protection of the Minority to the Protection of the 
Shareholder, in Minutes of the 18th Panhellenian Conference on Commercial Law (collaborative work), 
Trends and Prospects of the Law of the Public Limited Company, (Nomiki Bibliothiki 2009), 117ff  and 
Christina Livada, "Filing of company claims against the members of the Board of Directors" in Perakis 
Evanghelos (ed.), Sociétés Anonyme’s Law (3rd edn Sakkoulas, 2013), 1017-1018, reproduced in 




deterrent to "predatory" litigation) and limitations on the scope of misfeasance 
remedied are all enshrined in the minds of Greek academics as necessary elements of 
an efficient framework for derivative actions. However, it was explained herein that 
the German provisions are (still) far from perfect. Therefore, the ensuing analysis will 
consider both German and UK law in its quest for the optimal framework for derivative 
litigation.   
The proposals advanced in the following Sections are most suitable for statutory 
reform. The reason is that the applicable Greek (company) law leaves little room for 
judicial gap-filling by means of interpretation and,21 in any case, cannot respond to the 
challenges posed by the complexity of derivative litigation.22 As explained in Chapter 
3, for derivative actions to be truly protective of shareholder interests, regulatory 
safeguards against undesirable litigation have to be in place, alongside incentives for 
shareholders to assume the stewardship role of the derivative claimant.  
Lastly, the de lege ferenda suggestions herein articulated do not necessarily envisage 
the replacement of the company’s action by a derivative action. Depending on the 
construction of the respective legal provisions, both can work in parallel within a legal 
system.   
In Germany, the introduction of Aktiengesetz section 148 abolished the exclusivity of 
the institution of special representatives as a means of shareholder protection against 
                                                          
21 Nikolaos K Rokas ‘Corporate Organisation and Shareholders’ Individual Action’, (2007) NH’ EEmpD 
1, 18: “the recommended solution for Greek law would be the statutory regulation of the matter” (of the 
“minority’s protection against abuses on the part of the management and the controlling shareholder”). 
It has to be noted that, according to the prevailing opinion in Germany, the company’s action under the 
old AktG s. 147 –with all its similarities to the Greek L.2190/1920 art. 22b- rendered any interpretation 
allowing for a derivative action or actio pro socio unjustified; Uwe Hüffer Aktiengesetz (2nd edition, C.H. 
Beck 1995), 622. 
22 Evanghelos Perakis ‘The Greek and International Discussion on Acceptance and Restriction of the 
Derivative Action brought by a Shareholder of a Public Limited Company’ in Hideo Nakamura, Hans 
Fasching, Hans F Gaul and Apostolos Georgiades (eds), Festschrift für Kostas E Beys dem Rechtsdenker 
in Attischer Dialektik (5th edn Eunomia 2003) 3687. 
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mismanagement, not the institution itself.23 With the necessary amendments in the 
wording of Law 2190/1920, article 22b, the company’s action and the proposed 
derivative action can co-exist. In fact, some of the ensuing proposals may even benefit 
the company’s action in such co-existence. In particular, the ability of shareholders to 
take over or join pending litigation may work towards the prudent and loyal discharge 
of special representatives’ duties. Such participation of shareholders in the proceedings 
would mitigate any agency problem arising between the appointing minority and the 
appointed representatives. Moreover, the extension of liability to controlling 
shareholders will also make the enforcement of corporate claims via special 
representatives more likely. This is evidenced in Germany where, despite the fact that 
the appointment of special representatives (even by court decision following a 10% 
minority petition) is subject to the condition that a general meeting resolution is taken 
to that effect by simple majority,24 the exclusion of the accused shareholders from 
voting has resulted, occasionally, in the appointment of special representatives.25  
In any case, by virtue of the herein proposed framework minority shareholders would 
have two options in their armoury. Accordingly, if a minority’s petition to appoint 
special representatives is likely to be dismissed, because they fall short of the quorum 
threshold or six months did not lapse since they demanded that the board brings the 
action, shareholders may resort to suing derivatively under the more permissive (from 
the viewpoint of legal standing) proposed framework. That said, we shall move to the 
discussion on which minority should be afforded legal standing in derivative 
proceedings.  
                                                          
23 See AktG s.147 (2). 
24 Barbara Mayer ‘Geltendmachung von Ersatzansprüchen’ in Albert Schröder, Barbara Mayer, Gerhard 
Manz, Hendrik Thies, Stefan Lammel Die Aktiengesellschaft: Umfassende Erläuterungen, Beispiele und 
Musterformulare für die Rechtspraxis (7th edn, Haufe 2014) 289-290; Hüffer 2012 (n 3) 862. 
25 Uwe Schneider 'Der mühsame Weg der Durchsetzung der Organhaftung durch den besonderen 




5.3. Who should be allowed to sue? 
5.3.1. Individual right instead of qualified minority one26 
5.3.1.1 Introduction 
The first question to be poised in proposing the introduction of derivative actions is "to 
whom should the right to petition for leave to bring a derivative action be conferred"? 
As explained in the previous Chapters, there are two approaches: either construing a 
minority ownership threshold (qualified minority strategy/approach), or consider the 
right to sue on behalf of the company as inherent in share ownership.     
Greek law (through its latest general reform) attempted to make company actions 
available to a wider range of shareholders, by lowering the share ownership thresholds 
required for standing to sue; similarly did the UMAG, though the reform was there 
more substantial. These developments beg the question whether the "qualified minority 
strategy" should be maintained. It is hereinafter argued that it is not only doctrinally 
inconsistent with the nature and rationale of derivative actions to confer the relevant 
right to a qualified minority, but also impractical and ineffective in restricting malicious 
litigation, as such a quantitative restriction may also bar meritorious claims.  
 
5.3.1.2.1 The problems entailed in an ex lege qualified minority approach 
It is a rather challenging task to construe appropriate ownership thresholds. The civil 
law experience shows that the required percentages have been constantly revised by 
the legislator; downwards, in most of the cases. The reason for such amendments has 
been the fact that (presumably high) ownership thresholds proved to be a stumbling 
                                                          
26 See Georgios Zouridakis ‘Introducing Derivative Actions in the Greek Law on Public Limited 
Companies: Issues of Legal Standing and Lessons from the German and UK Experience’ (2015) 26 
ICCLR 271, 274-80 
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block for litigation and often rendered statutory provisions "empty shells" with no 
practical value.27 
The previous Chapter identified regarding such criteria that, by logical necessity, they 
reflect a one-size-fits-all approach. Considering the German threshold of 1% of 
registered share capital, it may amount to hundreds,28 or millions of Euros in market 
value of shareholdings.29 This is a significant limitation of the availability of the right 
to sue to rich members only. Thus, many jurisdictions (including Germany and the UK) 
set supplementary criteria in determining the proportion of corporate capital necessary 
to enact the right to sue.30 Accordingly, some focus on the financial value of the 
shareholding and set the alternative threshold according to it;31 whilst other focus on 
the numbers of claimants, so as to make sure that in dispersed shareholdings there is 
no need to summon hundreds of petitioners for admission proceedings to be initiated.32  
If the Greek legislator wants to maintain the qualified minority approach, the second 
solution is the safest one.33 The nominal share value is a misleading concept, as the 
                                                          
27 In different kinds of litigation, the qualified minority approach did not have such adverse effects. This 
is the case of the special audit procedure in the Kingdom of the Netherlands: Martin Gelter, 'Why do 
shareholder derivative suits remain rare in continental Europe??' (2011-2012)37 Brook. J. Int'l L. 843, 
889ff.  
28 Given that minimum capital rules apply across the EU, 1% stake at a Greek company would be 260 
Euros minimum. 
29 Consider that among ten listed companies in the Athens Stock Exchange (Eurobank, Hellenic 
Petroleum, Minoan Lines, Motor Oil Hellas, National Bank of Greece, OLP, OPAP, Piraeus Bank, Titan 
and Viohalco), the lowest market capitalisation was 213.960.100 (Minoan Lines), while the largest was 
3.388.290.496,13 (National Bank of Greece) in April 2015, even following a protracted nosedive of the 
general index (values as stood in 17th April 2015; data retrieved from the official website of Hellenic 
Exchanges <http://www.helex.gr/el/web/guest/companies-map>). 
30 AktG, s. 148 I; CA 2006, s. 370. 
31In Germany, regarding AktG s. 148, it is submitted that the dual threshold attempts to strike a balance 
on the availability of derivative actions in both listed and non-listed companies; the proposal to set the 
threshold according to “listed” value did not materialise. See Koch 'Das Gesetz' (n 8), 772; Karsten 
Schmidt ‘Verfolgungspflichten, Verfolgungsrechte und Aktionärsklagen: Ist die Quadratur des Zirkels 
näher gerückt?Gedanken zur Reform der §§ 147-149 AktG vor dem Hintergrund der 
Juristentagsdiskussion des Jahres 2000’ (2005) NZG 796, 799. 
32 CA 2006, s 370. 
33 Dario Latella 'Shareholder Derivative Suits: A Comparative Analysis and the Implications of the 
European Shareholders’ Rights Directive (2009) 6 ECFR 307, 320 suggested that an alternative would 
be to introduce ownership thresholds according to the free float of (listed) companies; despite addressing 
practical concerns, this solution does not fit with the arguments in Subsection 5.3.1.2.2, as it still 
constitutes a qualified minority approach. 
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trade value may be (and usually is) way bigger. The number of members willing to 
initiate proceedings is more in line with the anti-predatory-suits rationale; in other 
words, it would be hard for a single shareholder to convince a number of his/her 
counterparts to file a strike suit.  
Nevertheless, even this "solution" is incompatible with the Greek business reality. 
Suppose that derivative actions are availed to 5% of share capital or at least 50 members 
of the company (as happens with CA 2006, section 370), it is hard to find any non-
listed corporation which actually has this number of members altogether; yet I can think 
of many that have loyal shareholders owning less than 5% of the registered share 
capital.  
In any case, the default minimum of 10% as now applicable in Greece is too high from 
a comparative and practical perspective.34 Furthermore, the pretence that the bylaws 
may lower the percentage to the minimum of one share35 should not be understood as 
having any practical significance at all; given the concentrated ownership structure of 
Greek companies, it is hard to see why the founders or the GM would decide to make 
use of such discretion.36 A look at the published Articles of Association of major listed 
Greek companies supports this argument: among ten companies listed in the Athens 
Stock Exchange, none of them has lowered the default ownership threshold.37 Anyhow, 
                                                          
34 Apart from Germany and the UK, 15 more Member States prescribe lower shareholding thresholds 
for derivative actions than Greece within the EU; see Carsten Gerner-Beuerle, Philipp Paech and 
Edmund Philipp Schuster, ‘Study on Directors’ Duties and Liability’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/board/2013-study-analysis_en.pdf> accessed 1 
May 2015, 201. 
35 Livada ‘Company claims’ (n 20) 1016. 
36 Alongside the ensuing argumentation, consider the insightful behavioural economics study of Russell 
Korobkin ‘The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules’ (1998) 83 Cornell L.Rev. 608. By means 
of controlled experiments, it supported the thesis that contracting parties exhibit a status quo bias in 
favour of default rules. From this viewpoint, a default of, say, one share to initiate the corporate action 
with a maximum set at 10% of registered share capital (i.e. the exact reverse of L.2190/1920, art. 22b) 
would most likely be in favour of minorities, as majorities would be less inclined to move away from 
the statutorily-set status quo, all things being equal.    
37 Namely, Eurobank Ergasias S.A, Hellenic Petroleum, METKA, Motor Oil Hellas, National Bank of 
Greece, OLP, OPAP, OTE S.A., Piraeus Bank and Terna Energy S.A. The sample represents 40 % of 
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any aspirations that, following the 2007 reform of Law 2190/1920, article 22b provides 
for the possibility of contractually (by virtue of the company’s bylaws) rendering the 
right to sue on behalf of the company an individual one, are wishful thinking, as 1) it 
is the institution of special representatives, not shareholders, who are afforded legal 
standing in the main proceedings under article 22b and 2) there is little reason for 
companies to avail themselves of the option to lower the quorum thresholds, especially 
in the absence of any safeguards against predatory suits other than legal standing 
restrictions under article 22b.  
Last but not least, we must consider a further problem created by such requirements. 
Even though dispersed ownership is largely unknown in the Continent, few listed 
companies do exhibit quite high rates of "free float". There, the only viable way for a 
derivative action to be brought is for a good number of shareholders to ally with the 
view of bringing a claim. The legislators are thus at pains in justifying that the right to 
sue is available to minor investors by arguing that the law accommodates, through 
various mechanisms, collective action in this regard.38 Ideally, minorities would not be 
deprived of protection, whilst predatory claimants would be isolated by the other 
                                                          
the companies comprising the FTSE/X.A. Large Cap index. The respective bylaws are readily available 



















members, acting rationally and for the benefit of the company; all this achieved by just 
picking the right numbers in devising an ownership threshold.  
Reality comes at odds with those presumptions. Collective action in respect of 
shareholder engagement remains problematic in general; in the EU context, it has been 
a matter of focus for the European Commission for some time.39 Communication 
amongst shareholders involves additional costs and the hardship of discovering who 
the fellow members are.40  Doing away with the qualified minority strategy will render 
the need for effective collective action mechanisms within the ambit of derivative 
actions redundant. 
The upshot is that ownership thresholds cannot ensure that potential champions of the 
corporate interest are not deprived from the right to sue on behalf of the company. Any 
of the available thresholds in the comparative study leaves significant minorities 
disenfranchised; a problem unlikely to be resolved by collective action mechanisms. 
The next paragraph suggests that it is not only impractical, but also doctrinally 
inconsistent to adopt a qualified minority strategy. 
   
5.3.1.2.2 A contestation of the rationale behind the qualified minority approach, 
from a doctrinal perspective 
 
An oft-produced justification for the adoption of the qualified minority strategy is that 
the interests of members holding a substantial investment in the company coincide with 
those of the latter.41 The problem with this rationale is that it is to a large extent 
                                                          
39 See Subsection 4.7.4. 
40 See on the matter, Dirk A Zetzsche, ‘Shareholder Passivity, Cross-Border Voting and the Shareholder 
Rights Directive’, (2008) 8 JCLS 289; Pavlos Masouros 'Is the EU Taking Shareholder Rights 
Seriously?: An Essay on the Impotence of Shareholdership in Corporate Europe', (2010) 7 ECL,  195. 




probabilistic. There is nowadays a fervent discussion on how to incentivise institutional 
investors within the context of corporate governance.42 Such investors are the most 
significant block-holders in Europe nowadays, but their passivity thus far defeats much 
of the argument’s strength.  
When the need for block-holders’ “voice" arose, the latter remained silent in the 
comfort of their "splendid isolation".43 Apart from shareholder apathy, an explanation 
for the latter phenomenon within the continental European context could be that block-
holders, being limited in numbers, are more readily approachable by the wrongdoers. 
An agreement between them and the management not to sue in return for a considerable 
counter-performance, although not judicially enforceable under the laws of most of 
Western jurisdictions, is a realistic option for both the Board and the block-holders.44 
After all, given that except for jurisdictions like New Zealand and the US, pursuing a 
derivative claim is not quite a profitable enterprise in general,45 such an agreement 
would most often strike the economically rational equilibrium. Potentially, block-
holders may in such situations use their right to sue as a means of extortion: either the 
board succumbs to their demands or they initiate proceedings. 
The adverse effect of this strategy is that, by expressly basing the capital thresholds on 
the rationale that members satisfying the latter have interests more closely intertwined 
                                                          
42 Dine and Koutsias, The Nature (n 4), 234. 
43 See Roman Tomasic and Folarin Akinbami, Shareholder Activism and Litigation against UK Banks 
in Joan Loughery (ed) Directors’ Duties and Shareholder Litigation in the Wake of the Financial Crisis, 
(EE 2013), 143-172. 
44 Game theory models have been deployed to explain why the qualified minority approach 
accommodates misappropriation of corporate wealth; insightful and pioneering paper on this subject is 
Kristoffel Grechenig and Michael Sekyra, 'No Derivative Shareholder Suits in Europe –A Model of 
Percentage Limits, Collusion and Residual Owners', (2007) The Center for Law and Economic Studies 
Columbia University School of Law, Working Paper No. 312 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=933105> accessed 29 August 2014. A crucial 
element of this rationale is that when the right to bring a suit is an individual one, wrongdoers find it 
more difficult to “bribe” every each one of the shareholders to not initiate proceedings and thus be 
deprived of the proceeds of misfeasance and suffer damage on their reputation as managers. This 
argument hits at the core of the derivative actions’ function as anti-block devices addressing the majority-
minority agency problem. 
45 See the Section on litigation costs, infra 5.5. 
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with those of the company, the latter assumption becomes the effect; the two 
aforementioned sets of interest equate in practice and the company eventually operates 
for the sole benefit of the block-holders.  
Overall, it may be true that shareholders with a material stake on the company’s capital 
are more likely to have their interests intertwined with those of the company, as long 
as they bear more risk. However, entrusting the corporate claims upon them excludes 
minorities which may have the incentive to act for the benefit of the company. The 
subtext in those arguments is that a quorum may deflect the threat of predatory 
shareholders; or, more profoundly, that block-holders are more trusted and thus more 
desirable investors. On the contrary, the judicially-based approach strikes at the heart 
of the problem, without disenfranchising members with a small financial stake in the 
company. If the alignment with corporate interests is to be ensured, the legislator should 
not leave it to share capital participation to decide. What should be instituted instead, 
is the courts’ discretion to ad hoc judge whether a claimant acts in accordance with the 
corporate interests or not. 
It is therefore more appropriate doctrinally to perceive derivative actions as an 
individual right accruing from membership. In essence, it is the right of every member 
to champion the corporate interests by substituting, ad hoc, the board in corporate 
decision making.46 When entering the company via shares purchase, every shareholder 
expects that the company is managed in a lawful and diligent manner. By deriving the 
right to sue for maladministration from the company the claimant seeks judicial 
enforcement of such shareholders’ expectations. It is hard thus to see why, for a 
procedure designed to benefit the company as a whole, an elitism of block-holders and 
minority groups should prevent the individual acting in accordance with the corporate 
                                                          
46 What Hirt (The Enforcement [n 13], 46ff) calls “decision rights strategy”. 
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interests to seek accountability of wrongdoers. In such a way, members with a higher 
stake in the corporate capital are privileged with additional rights, arguably disturbing 
the equal treatment of equity ownership. 
Constructing the Greek derivative action as an individual right of members may serve 
two purposes.  
First, it ensures that accountability of the management may be judicially enforced by a 
wide range of constituencies that are unaffected by the views of the board. Block-
holders can exercise de facto monitoring over the board but, on the other side of the 
coin, they might partake in damaging decision-making for the company; the question 
in situations where the ones entrusted with the right to sue derivatively are block-
holders of, say, 5% share ownership is ultimately: “who will monitor the monitors”?47  
Second, it nurtures a shareholder-friendly culture. Within the bargain for shares, the 
right to protect the equity investment from mismanagement will be in place. If the 
Greek legislator wanted to foster a more disperse ownership culture, such arbitrary a 
threshold would not exist. On the contrary, it can be said that the high threshold 
(significantly higher even than the German one) has two implications: first, it reflects 
the perception of the national legislator that the interests of the company are closely 
intertwined with those of block-holders of significant voting power and the belief that 
this is the way things should remain; and second, shareholder actions are thus limited 
to closely-held companies, where dissident minorities can easier satisfy the given 
threshold. 
A similar rationale of making rights available to smaller minorities was followed in 
Germany where a low threshold of 1% of registered capital was instituted; yet, the 
                                                          
47 The phrase appeared in a different context in John C. Coffee, Jr, 'Litigation and Corporate Governance: 
An Essay on Steering Between Scylla and Charybdis' (1983-1984) 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 789, 798. 
249 
 
quorum approach was maintained despite the otherwise drastic steps of the 2005 
reform.48 My opinion is that the Greek legislator should look beyond the statutory 
provisions of the otherwise familiar German legal order and consider the growing 
opinion in the German academia that such thresholds have no place in derivative 
actions.49  
 
5.3.1.3 Summary and further remarks 
The above paragraphs propose that the qualified majority strategy should not be 
followed in the introduction of genuine derivative actions in Greece. The doctrinal 
justifications of such an approach are, at least, shaky and outweighed by the arguments 
in favour of an individual right. An individual shareholders’ right to litigate on behalf 
of the company is more shareholder-friendly, unambiguous, reducing agency problems 
and free from the impracticalities entailed in collective action.   
In tandem with this study’s focus, only shareholders were considered as eligible for 
locus standi. Given that the derivative action purports to enforce the corporation’s 
rights, it could be submitted that other entities having a stake at the company should be 
able to avail them. The proposals in this Section and the rationale behind them do not 
necessarily refute this proposition (occasionally, they may be perceived to support it), 
but further analysis would fall outside the scope of this study.  
 
                                                          
48 Begr. RegE UMAG, BT-Drs. 15/5092, 21. See also Christoph H Seibt, ‘Die Reform des 
Verfolgungsrechts nach § 147 AktG und des Rechts der Sonderprüfung’ [2004] WM 2137, 2145ff.  
49 Schmolke, (n 1)425; G. Bezzenberger and T. Bezzenberger, ‘section 148’, in K Hopt and H 
Wiedemann (eds) Großkommentar AktG (De Gruyter 2008); Peltzer (n 1), 954, explaining the arbitrary 
determination of the quorum; see also Gelter (n 27), 879, 856ff. 
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5.3.2 Contemporaneous and continuous ownership of shares 
A further point to be addressed in the introduction of a genuine derivative action is that 
of contemporaneous and continuous ownership. As explained, due to the requirement 
that petitioners in a company’s action or claimants in a derivative action were members 
when the wrongful behaviour took place (contemporaneous ownership rule) or even 
several months prior to and for the complete duration of the proceedings (continuous 
ownership rule), civil law jurisdictions substantially limit the availability of the right 
to sue on behalf of the company.  
As a matter of policy, such rules provide favourable treatment to (presumably) long-
term investors and purport to relieve management from unnecessary judicial 
interference. The rationale for such rules - as illustrated by their proponents - is that 
shareholders satisfying these thresholds are more likely to have their interests aligned 
with those of the company; what is further proposed is that in such a way an 
“automated” filter of predatory actions is established.50 Neither of these suggestions is 
conclusive. Long-standing shareholders may well bring an action contrary to the 
corporate interests, so as to satisfy ulterior personal motives or due to lack of proper 
appreciation of the litigation’s effects on the company and its members, whilst buying 
shares only to embroil a company into litigation is a rather expensive and exclusive 
sport, whose popularity is unlikely to be seriously affected by such requirements.  
On the contrary, such rules may lead to injustice in certain situations. Suppose that, 
following the issue of new shares, tunnelling of assets takes place; the company is 
rendered an “empty shell”, to the detriment of the new members. Under Greek law, the 
aggrieved shareholders might have some luck pursuing a personal claim for damages, 
on the basis of general tort law (Civil Code, articles 914-919); however, the principle 
                                                          
50 See Ioannis Passias, To Díkaion tis Anonýmou Etaireías (1969) 695. 
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that only the company may enforce its claims will most likely prove to be a stumbling 
rock. Furthermore, due to the temporal shareholdership threshold of three months prior 
to filing the claim set by Greek law, members will be unable to exercise the right to 
appoint special representatives. Redress would thus be unavailable both for 
shareholders (reflectively) and for the company for some time and the protracted 
initiation of claims may run to the latter’s detriment. Such a threshold is of questionable 
value, even from an anti-predatory suits perspective, as “professional” litigants may 
well be patient. In any case, this threshold cannot always reflect the claimant’s 
intentions and is out of pace with modern commercial practice.51 Consider now the 
situation where, following a successful merger or acquisition, shareholders that brought 
a claim lost their membership status.52 The continuous ownership rule would debar 
them from continuing with the action; 53 this is hardly an equitable outcome, as 
claimants involuntarily lost member status, having already assumed the risk of 
litigation.54 In view of the above, it is unsurprising that in countries where 
contemporaneous or continuous ownership used to be required for a derivative action 
to proceed, the respective legislators soon realised the redundancy of such rules and 
reformed accordingly.55 
In any case, such temporal thresholds are inconsistent doctrinally with the very essence 
of the derivative action.56 Its purpose is to provide redress for a wrong done to the 
company, not necessarily to select shareholders let alone long-term ones, by assigning 
                                                          
51 See Fang Ma ‘The deficiencies of derivative actions in China’ (2010) 31(5) Comp.Law. 150, 152, 
explaining that the respective temporal threshold under Chinese law does not correspond to the average 
shareholding period. 
52 This would be the effect of a squeeze-out under L. 2190/1920, article 49C.  
53 The applicable Greek continuous ownership rule aggravates the problem, by requiring that the 10% 
ownership threshold is maintained by applicants; see Chapter 3. 
54 Similar was the factual background in the American (California) case of Gaillard v Natomas company 
173 Cal. App. 3d 410, 219 Cal. Rptr. 74 (1985).  
55 An example is Italy; see Latella, 'The Implications' (n 33), 320. 
56 For further elaboration on this argument see Travis Laster, "Goodbye to the Contemporaneous 
Ownership Requirement, (2008) 33 Del. J. Corp. L. 673, 673-694. 
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members with a stewardship role to promote the corporate interests. It should therefore 
be immaterial whether the claimant was part of the company when the wrong to the 
latter occurred, provided bringing an action fulfils this stewardship role.  
From a certain viewpoint, contemporaneous and continuous ownership rules seem to 
reflect the rationale that only those who suffered loss may litigate. Notwithstanding the 
contestability of the argument that a loss suffered by the company is a loss always 
suffered by the shareholders,57 relevance of such considerations with the legitimacy of 
the derivative claimant is questionable. It would of course be myopic to deny that there 
is a relationship in litigation practice between reflective losses and damage suffered by 
the company; indeed, should no loss be suffered by the members, the latter would 
probably be uninterested in bringing an action. However, it is hardly reconcilable with 
the rationale of derivative actions as a corporate governance mechanism to demand - 
even covertly - that reflective loss is suffered by the derivative claimant, as a condition 
for locus standi. The reason is that the purpose of the derivative action is to provide 
redress for the company (directly) and shareholders en masse (indirectly/reflectively); 
it is this uniquely “representative” nature of the remedy which distinguishes it from 
personal claims, whose primary purpose is instead to provide redress for the 
shareholder-claimant. Focus within the ambit of the procedure on derivative actions 
should therefore be exclusively on recovery of losses suffered by the company and any 
detraction of focus towards the effects of the wrongdoing on the shareholder-claimant’s 
wealth would render procedural stewardship an uncertain incident rather than a purpose 
of the remedy.  
 
 
                                                          




5.3.3 Legal standing in (de facto)58 groups of companies situations; the case for 
multiple derivative actions 
The problem of legal standing is further exacerbated in situations where the company 
may suffer injuries by mismanagement at a lower level within a corporate group chain. 
Modern-day business is often organised in parent-subsidiary structures, whereby the 
subsidiary may be fully owned by the parent. Therefore, the practical situation arises 
that it is only up to the board of the subsidiary or the parent company (acting through 
its board) to enforce the company’s claim. Due to the control exerted by the holding 
company, it is highly unlikely that any claim will be pursued at subsidiary level, in case 
damage was incurred due to its directions.  
The solution given to such problems by common law countries is the mechanism of 
multiple derivative actions; whereby, a member of one juridical entity has standing to 
sue on behalf and for the benefit of a related (usually subsidiary corporate) entity.59 As 
the case is under Common Law, standing is allowed subject to the same conditions 
applicable to single derivative actions.60 The non-inclusion of multiple derivative 
actions in CA 2006, Pt 11, may come as a surprise to the reader of UK company law, 
given that other common law countries provide for such actions, if no attempt to 
understand the law on shareholder actions in the broader context is made. 
                                                          
58 Greece and UK do not have any legislation remotely similar to that of the German Konzernrecht; see 
Janet Dine The Governance of Corporate Groups (CUP 2000), 44, talking about the British “failure to 
develop a law of the enterprise”.  
59 It is not always necessary that both entities are limited liability companies; in Universal Project 
Management Services Ltd v Fort Gilkicker Ltd and others [2013] EWHC 348 (Ch); [2013] Ch. 551 the 
parent company (Askett Hawk Properties) was an LLP. 
60 In a simple parent-subsidiary situation reference is made to "double derivative actions"; if another 
entity stands in between the two aforementioned entities (e.g. parent-subsidiary-subsidiary of the 
subsidiary structure) the term usually is "multiple derivative actions". For the sake of convenience, the 
latter is used as an umbrella term for both cases hereafter. 
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The problem that would arise in such an inclusion would be that the statute should 
normally also determine the cases in which a member of a holding company should 
enjoy locus standi in a dispute concerning the subsidiary, a completely separate legal 
entity de lege.61 The other statutory derivative action,62 shows one way around this 
conundrum; there, if the persons liable to the company are the directors of its holding 
company, both the shareholders of the holding and of the subsidiary may bring an 
action. Such claim may be brought on the grounds of section 369, which pronounces 
that the directors of the parent may be held liable if they “failed to take all reasonable 
steps” to prevent an unauthorised donation to be made. Negligence, even though largely 
excluded from the common law rules on multiple derivative actions, finds its way 
through section 370, in one of the few instances where the law expressly prescribes a 
duty of care in parent-subsidiary structures. However, the British legislator opted to 
provide such a relaxed requirement for multiple derivative actions to proceed for a very 
limited range for misfeasance, connected with the public policy objectives surrounding 
political donations. 
Therefore, the problem remains: should the members of the parent company enforce 
the claims of the subsidiary and, if yes, when?  Common law addressed this issue by 
taking the position that, when the subsidiary acted (de facto) dependently by being 
subject to the same wrongdoer control as the parent, an action pursued by a member of 
the parent but on behalf of the subsidiary may be allowed. Given though that 
“wrongdoer control” is not to be found anywhere in the CA 2006, a statutory 
pronunciation of this criterion could give rise to further problems and inconsistencies. 
The solution was provided by courts. As explained, recent judgments in the UK 
                                                          
61 It is to be noted that statutory provisions on derivative actions in New Zealand (s.165 (1)(a) CA 1993) 
and Australia (s. 236 1(a)(i) CA 2001) confer the right to sue derivatively to shareholders of the company 
and its ”related” companies/bodies corporate. 
62 CA 2006, s. 370. 
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accepted that the common law derivative action was superseded by statute, only to the 
extent of single actions.63 Therefore, “wrongdoer control” and “fraud (on the 
minority)” still survive within the ambit of multiple derivative actions.64  
Nevertheless, wrongdoer control may be hard to establish. 65 Given the particular 
reference to the interests of the shareholders as a corporate organ, it is difficult to 
ascertain the amount of votes that are controlled indirectly by the wrongdoers when 
ownership is dispersed; it is even difficult to identify a conflict of interest such 
dispersed shareholders may have vis-à-vis the company as a whole. Control of the votes 
in the GM may be easy to ascertain in certain parent-subsidiary situations; establishing 
that the same wrongdoers are in control of both companies is not. The accompanying 
requirements of “fraud” and direct benefit for the wrongdoers (excluding thus 
negligence) render the common law position incompatible with the herein proposed 
framework, as is shown below. 
The German jurisprudence offers some valuable insights. For liability to exist within 
an intra-group corporate framework, control of a particular kind has to be exerted by 
the parent. But for the cases where an express agreement exists to that end,66 (de facto) 
control can be inferred in cases where interlocking membership in the boards of the 
parent and the subsidiary exists, when both companies act as an economic unit or when 
the composition of the subsidiary’s board is dependent on the parent’s (major 
                                                          
63 Gilkicker (n 59) 173 (Briggs J); followed by Abouraya v Sigmund [2014] EWHC 277 (Ch) at [16] 
(Richards J). 
64 Both come part and parcel as the exceptions to the rule in Foss; see David Kershaw, 'The Rule in Foss 
v Harbottle is Dead; Long Live the Rule in Foss v Harbottle' (2015) 3 JBL 274, for an interesting view 
on their relevance with the statutory derivative claim. 
65 These concerns have been expressed by Lord Wedderburn (K W Wedderburn, 'Shareholder Rights 
and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle', [1957] CLJ 194, 200); for a detailed review of his Lordship’s position 
and Vinelott J’s views on the matter as expressed in Prudential, see Hirt The enforcement (n 13), 185-
199. 
66 Under German law, corporate groups may be formed by agreements; the law governing the latter 
encourages greater transparency of intra-group business and incentivises the assumption of such 
obligations by expressly permitting that (subject to conditions and compensation) the directions of the 
holding company may work to the detriment of the subsidiary.  
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shareholder) discretion; the presumption is refutable.67 What the German legislator 
identifies in such a way is the “common direction” of both the parent and the subsidiary. 
This is a good starting point for identifying the instances where multiple derivative 
actions should be allowed. 
On its own, however, de facto control over the subsidiary should not suffice for a 
multiple derivative action to be pursued. Something more is needed to ensure that, on 
the face of such litigation, the different parts of the group chain remain separate and 
directors do not face intervention to their decision-making by shareholders other than 
those of their company’s without good cause. Going back to the rationale behind 
multiple derivative actions, we identify their objective of remedying mismanagement 
that is detrimental to the (shareholders of the) parent company but, due to the separate 
corporate personality doctrine, cannot be brought before court by anyone else than the 
subsidiary itself; which, in turn, may be unable to litigate by being subject to the will 
of the parent’s administration and/or controllers. Multiple derivative actions thus make 
good of two, usually interconnected, wrongs: first, expropriation of corporate wealth 
attempted to be sheltered from litigation by (ab)using the separate corporate personality 
doctrine and; second, situations where injustice cannot be remedied by means of 
company or shareholder (of the subsidiary) litigation. This Thesis proposes that, instead 
of providing the parent’s shareholders with an unqualified decision right to litigate on 
the subsidiary’s affairs, the law has to address the specific problems expressly.   
We can identify specific occasions where it is pragmatic to allow for multiple derivative 
claims. First, such claims should be permitted where overarching influence is exerted 
by the administration of the holding company to the subsidiary. Indications of such 
                                                          
67 AktG s. 18. See Gerhard Wirth, Michael Arnold, Ralph Morshäuser (eds) Mark Greene (tr), Corporate 
Law in Germany (2nd edn CH Beck 2010), 210.  
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influence may be the (near) absolute dependence of the subsidiary’s board composition 
to the parent’s board and associated persons (as the latter are statutorily defined), 
interlocking directorates, absence of members other than the parent company and lack 
of independent business as evidenced by the annual accounts. Such criteria should be 
used in order to establish a rebuttable presumption of dominance over the subsidiary’s 
affairs, alleviating therefore the claimant from much of the burden of proof, as these 
facts are relatively easy to ascertain even in the light of the informational asymmetry 
existing between members of the company and corporate administration.  The merit in 
this approach is that it identifies the occasions where a subsidiary is not acting 
independently, without the complexity of “wrongdoer control” under English law. 
Overall, this proposal is shareholder-friendly, providing legal certainty and ensuring 
that no undue intervention by means of litigation threatens genuine and unfettered 
business decision-making. 
Second and subject to the aforementioned criterion, detrimental effect of the 
subsidiary’s mismanagement to both the subsidiary’s and the parent’s business has to 
be ascertained.68 This criterion is fully in line with the compensatory function of 
derivative actions; it sets the minimum standard of compensating damage to both the 
parent and the subsidiary, accruing from a wrong caused to the latter. Furthermore, 
such a requirement is consistent with the rationale that a shareholder may champion 
(exceptionally) the interests of her/his company.  
Lastly, if the latter condition is not met but the first one is, the court has to be satisfied 
that there is no rational expectation for the board of the subsidiary or its shareholders 
to bring the claim themselves. The reason for this additional (alternative) condition is 
                                                          
68 Contrary to the common law approach, the herein proposed framework purportedly avoids the 
wrongdoers’ benefit criterion; see Abouraya, (n 63) [24] (Richards J) regarding the application of this 
common law criterion within the ambit of multiple derivative actions. See also Trevor Mascarenhas, 
'Case Comment Multiple derivative actions under English law', (2013) 24 ICCLR 336; 337. 
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that the deterrent effect of multiple derivative actions may be compromised in cases 
where detriment on the business of the parent or the subsidiary cannot be supported by 
evidence. Admittedly, focus on the emphasized constituency of shareholders may 
render very difficult to bring a multiple derivative action in cases where the subsidiary 
has a multiplicity of shareholders other than the controlling company. Nonetheless, the 
members of the parent company should be able to intervene to the subsidiary’s affairs 
in limited, exceptional circumstances, to prevent injustice; otherwise, the argument of 
violating the separate corporate personality by virtue of the multiple derivative action 
mechanism would prove to be a strong opposition to its introduction.   
In effect, the proposed criteria for bringing a multiple derivative action reflect some 
elements of the common law rule of wrongdoer control, in its most relaxed form (de 
facto wrongdoer control); the purported differentiation from the latter adds clarity and 
legal certainty.  From a German perspective, such criteria emulate the rules of the 
Konzern, at least regarding the definition of “common direction” (einleitliche Leitung) 
69 and the cause of action under the Konzernrecht’s regime on shareholders’ claims 
(damage caused to the company that is not compensated).70 Overall, the proposal 
attempts to strike a balance between, on the one hand, a permissive regime on multiple 
derivative actions that covers a wide spectrum of liability to the company; and on the 
other hand, respect for the separate corporate personality of the subsidiary. In doing so, 
a mechanism for multiple derivative actions that accords to the underlying principles 
of and works in conjunction with the proposed procedure for single derivative actions 
is suggested. Therefore, satisfaction of these requirements should not suffice eo ipso 
for a double derivative claim to proceed. Shareholders should further meet the 
                                                          
69 See regarding the einleitliche Leitung Wirth et al (n 67) 210ff; cf the Greek perception of “connected 
companies” as reflected in L. 2190/1920 art. 42e par.5 (now replaced by L. 4308/2014, art. 32). 
70 ibid.  
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requirements applicable to single derivative actions under the proposed framework (i.e. 
claim in the company’s interests and worthy to pursue, “demand” etc), at subsidiary 
level. 
Extending legal standing to the shareholders of a parent company is not a step too far 
for the Greek legislator, if derivative actions are to be introduced to Greek law. The 
parent company’s shareholders comprise the constituency whose interests are the next 
closest to the one capable of bringing a single derivative action (that is, the parent 
company), in such situations. At least compared to creditors, who are allowed locus 
standi in the German Konzernrecht derivative proceedings, shareholders of the parent 
company do not seem so remote from the wronged company, its interests and decision-
making.71 Accordingly, if the law permits that the parent represents the subsidiary in 
court, by litigating on its behalf, there is little reason not to permit the parent’s 




                                                             
5.4. Constraints to frivolous/vexatious litigation; the admission stage 
5.4.1. Introduction 
The comparative analysis in Part 2 illustrated the different approaches the British and 
the German legislator took in restraining malicious and frivolous litigation. Some 
common denominators were identified, such as express statutory requirements that the 
shareholder-litigant acts in the corporate interests in bringing the claim. The variety of 
                                                          
71  See AktG ss 309, 310, 317, 318 and 323.  




the devices used to weed out unmeritorious suits illustrated their importance in the 
mechanics of derivative actions, providing also useful material for normative 
suggestions. 
Having said that, we can now move to the substance of the issue at hand: the conditions 
under which a derivative action may proceed according to the proposed model, tailored 
for the Greek legal order; and further constraints on non-meritorious litigation. The 
ensuing paragraphs envisage the criteria for admissibility of a derivative claim to be 
considered at a preliminary “admissions” stage. As the UK and German experience 
show, the preliminary/admission stage (Klagezulassungsverfahren) is a method to 
weed out unmeritorious claims early on and save the parties to the proceedings from 
much of the costs and time involved in a hearing on the merits.  
Accordingly, under the proposed model, the court would be called at 
preliminary/admission proceedings, before the trial on the merits commences, to 
determine the legitimacy of the shareholder to act as a procedural steward and bring 
proceedings in his own name on behalf of the company. Only if the applicant - at this 
stage - fulfils the substantive and procedural criteria to litigate on behalf of the 
company, convincing the court of the importance that enforcement of the company’s 
claim has in promoting the corporate interests, s/he would be permitted to proceed to 
the next stage (“main proceedings”) and seek such enforcement, as a (derivative) 
claimant, at a trial on the merits (of the company’s claim) and achieve a court order on 
behalf and for the benefit of the company, if successful. Defendants may be the alleged 
wrongdoers, not the company. The company may participate in the proceedings as a 




Therefore, the “preliminary stage” procedure could fall (under Greek law) either under 
the contentious (iurisdictio contentiosa) or under the non-contentious jurisdiction 
(iurisdictio voluntaria). The German law-maker opted for the former, “addressing the 
critique on old section 147 (3)”.73 The main practical implication in the choice between 
either of jurisdictions is that, contrary to the contentious jurisdiction, the non-
contentious one is inquisitory in character and allows the court significant discretion 
(thereby being closer to the English procedure). For this reason, many disputes, 
adversarial in their nature, were located by the legislator to the non-contentious 
jurisdiction.74 In the context of derivative actions, the non-contentious jurisdiction’s 
further advantage would be the fact that lis pendens excludes other shareholders from 
petitioning. However, a carefully drafted special summary procedure could make the 
best of both worlds.  
 
5.4.2. Restrictions on the scope of misfeasance 
A major point of discussion within the context of US Corporate Governance was the 
shareholders’ ability to enforce the duty of due care (and skill). In the mid-eighties, a 
vibrant discourse on the topic culminated into the publication of three papers, authored 
by an equal number of academics with the highest of reputation and input on the field: 
Professor John “Jack” Coffee Jr, Professor James Cox and Professor Kenneth Scott.75 
                                                          
73 Karsten Schmidt and Marcus Lutter, Aktiengesetz: Kommentar, (Otto Schmidt 2010) 2137. The old 
AktG s.147 fell under the Act on Proceedings in Family Matters and Matters of Non-Contentious 
Jurisdiction (FamFG). 
74 Kostas Beys, Politikí dikonomía : genikés archés kai ermineía ton árthron. 14/, V. Asfalistiká métra 
(articles 682-738) (Sakkoulas 1983) 885. Similar approach under German law; see Leo Rosenberg 
&Karl-Heinz Schwab, Zivilprozessrecht (14th edn Beck 1986) 53. 
75 Respectively: John C. Coffee, Jr, 'Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on Steering 
Between Scylla and Charybdis' (1983-1984) 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 789, James D. Cox, 'Compensation, 
Deterrence, and the Market as boundaries for Derivative Suit Procedures', (1984) 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
745, 749-752 Kenneth E. Scott, 'Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance 
Project', (1983) 35 STAN. L.REv. 927. See Marjorie Fine Knowles and Colin Flannery, 'The ALl 
Principles of Corporate Governance Compared with Georgia Law', (1996-1997) 47 Mercer L.Rev. 1, 4. 
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Read together, these articles constitute a good starting point for any inquiry as to what 
extent should the law and its enforcement intrude management decisions, compensate, 
deter and educate. Constructing the proper boundaries for the cause of action in 
derivative litigation is a matter seriously contemplated therein and relevant to this 
Thesis, as it has also been a focal point in the setting of the relevant provisions in the 
jurisdictions herein examined.  
Indeed, it has been observed that filtering derivative litigation by restrictions on the 
cause of action was a rather common strategy among EU states.76 As explained in 
Chapter 3, Aktiengesetz still limits admissibility of shareholder claims to those arising 
from dishonesty and gross violations of the law and/or the corporate constitution; also 
restrictive was the pre-CA 2006 common law “fraud on the minority” ground for 
derivative actions.77 Now the position of UK law is different; every breach of duty 
and/or the law can be litigated against, including negligence. This approach is closer to 
the existing Greek rules on company’s actions and is the right one. 
Let us first consider whether a German-like limitation to “gross” misconduct is 
appropriate a filter. We identified that Aktiengesetz, section 148 1(2) (3), is a reason 
why Germany does not experience any shareholder activism of this sort. Intuitively, 
this is an early sign why the Greek legislator should avoid the introduction of any 
similar provision. Given that further reasons were identified for the relative failure of 
the German provisions, we should consider the appropriateness of such a rule in detail.  
The “German approach” swings the pendulum of excused liability too far in favour of 
the management. It is one thing to exclude momentary lapses of judgment - within the 
course of decision making - from the possibility of litigation, on the grounds of letting 
                                                          
76 Li Xiaoning, a comparative study of shareholders’ derivative actions, (Kluwer 2007). 
77 “Fraud”, on its own, included breach of directors’ duties under common law; Estmanco (Kilner House) 
v Greater London Council [1982] 1 WLR 2.  
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corporations be run smoothly (something that the business judgment rule does 
anyway); and completely another thing to demand a high level of misconduct for a 
claim to proceed. To be sure, such a provision practically excludes liability for (mere) 
negligence; and goes even further than the business judgment rule in insulating 
directors and other potential defendants.78 Section 148 commits thus two sins; first, it 
does not learn from the mistaken common law position under the exceptions in Foss 
which,79 by limiting permissible shareholder litigation to “fraud on the minority”, 
worked to a similar effect; second, it frustrates much of the compensatory and deterrent 
effect derivative actions have, by requiring a high standard of misconduct. Ordinary 
breaches of law and the bylaws may amount to massive losses for the company; not 
being able to be compensated for under the existing regime, their impact is to be felt 
by both shareholders and the society as a whole.80 Furthermore, good corporate 
governance is not only about avoiding gross violations of mandatory and soft-law rules; 
legality of decisions, skill and diligence are required to that end. In the absence of even 
the threat of accountability (in terrorem), for misconduct falling outside such 
requirements, it is hard to see how the board is to be deterred from exercising bad 
governance. German academia has already voiced support towards lowering this 
burden of proof in the preliminary stage to gross negligence; as stated by Peltzer, “die 
Hürde ist zu hoch”.81 It has to be noted, that the latest Deutscher Juristentag (the 
seventieth German Jurists Forum) decided that the most appropriate measure to 
enhance the existing framework for derivative actions, is to relax the requirements 
                                                          
78 Gross negligence falls outside the catch of the business judgment rule, at least according to the 
American standards. We read in J Cox, 'Litigation and the Deterrence of Corporate Misconduct’ (1997) 
60 LCP 1, 29: "gross negligence and reckless behavior, though within the coverage of the standard D&O 
policy, are not protected under the business judgment rule".  
79 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 67 ER 189. 
80 Peltzer (n 1), 958ff.   
81 ibid, 958-959. 
264 
 
under section 148 paragraph 1(2) (3); the resolution on this issue was passed by a 
marginal majority (27 votes for, 26 against).82 In the context of the special audit, such 
relaxation did not amount to eliminating the "gross violations" criterion.83 Instead, such 
a hurdle was resolved to be removed, if the company suffered material financial losses 
or the applicant minority represents one tenth of registered share capital.84 The effects 
of the above resolutions on the setting of sections 148 (and 142) remain to be seen. 
Definitely, the German approach of raising the bar of misfeasance is to be avoided. As 
explained, it scares off potential claimants, as “grave violations” of the law or the 
corporate constitution is a rather ambiguous term, showing a legislative proclivity 
towards insulating negligent boards. The UK approach looks more substantiated and 
doctrinally consistent with the derivative action’s raison d'être. Nevertheless, the 
German idiosyncrasy of the two-tier system may excuse, to an extent, the strategy taken 
by section 148 (1)(3); such a constraint does not apply for the board-claimant and the 
German legislator has long put much confidence on the monitoring exerted by one 
board on the other.85 In the absence of such a structure, as happens in Greece, could the 
same be said for the analogous (in its function) body of independent directors?86 
Hardly, given the record of their behaviour.87  
Nevertheless, one should not forget that, while the UK statute has nothing in its 
wording resembling AktG, s 148 (1) III, the “ratification” condition may work to 
                                                          
82 70. Deutscher Juristentag Hannover 2014 – Beschlüsse, Abteilung Wirtschaftsrecht (70th German 
Jurists Forum Hannover 2014- Resolutions, business law section), available at 
<http://www.djt.de/fileadmin/downloads/70/140919_djt_70_beschluesse_web_rz.pdf> accessed 20 
August 2015, resolution 12(c). 
83 ibid, resolution 14(a). 
84 ibid, resolution 14(b). 
85 See Jean Du Plessis, 'Reflections On Some Recent Corporate Governance Reforms In Germany: A 
Transformation of the German Aktienrecht?' (2003) 8(2) Deakin LR 381.  
86 Klaus J Hopt in Klaus J Hopt, Hideki Kanda, Mark J Roe, Eddy Wymeersch and Stefan Prigge, 
Comparative Corporate Governance-The State of the Art and Emerging Research (Clarendon Press 
1998), 227-259. 
87 See Chapter 2. 
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similar results; wrongs that are ratified cannot be remedied by court88 and the latter, in 
exercising its discretion, considers whether the wrongs complained for are likely to be 
ratified.89 Potentially, a dichotomy arises regarding the ease of litigation between 
ratifiable and non-ratifiable wrongs.90 As explained in Chapter 3, the 
ratification/ratifiability conditions are not free of controversy and British scholars have 
advocated against them, as running contrary to the purposes of derivative actions.91 
Given that ratification does not work in the same way in Greek law, there is no reason 
to introduce a rather problematic feature of the UK law to it.  
Turning back to negligence, let us consider its propriety as a ground for derivative 
actions. Within the confines of ALI, this has been an intense discussion topic. The 
question, simply put, was: should liability for breaches of the duty of care be on an 
equal footing with those of the duty of loyalty, in light of the particularities entailed in 
the former duty?  
The duty of care has attracted special attention, in all three jurisdictions herein 
examined. Setting minimum standards of diligence in business decision-making is not 
easy. Modern business requires the (regular) assumption of good levels of risk; an ex-
post review of corporate management’s diligence by the judiciary is perceived to 
threaten profitable risk-taking and to fend off capable managers. Definitely, the law 
purports to keep business decisions as far away from the courtroom as possible, in the 
examined countries. What was acutely stressed by Lord Eldon in Carlen v Drury in the 
beginning of the nineteenth century still applies well beyond the jurisdictional 
                                                          
88 CA 2006, s. 263(2)(2). 
89 CA 2006, s. 263(3)(c)(ii). 
90 Harald Baum and Dan W. Puchniak, ‘The derivative action: an economic, historical and practice-
oriented approach’ in Puchniak W Dan, Baum Harald, Ewing-Chow Michael (eds), The Derivative 
Action in Asia: A Comparative and Functional Approach, (CUP 2012), 54. 
91 Reisberg, Derivative Actions (n 1), 198, referring to the view expressed by Boyle prior to the enactment 
of CA 2006 (A Boyle Minority Shareholders' Remedies (CUP 2002) 76–8). 
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boundaries of the UK: “[t]his Court is not to be required on every Occasion to take the 
Management of every Playhouse and Brewhouse in the Kingdom”.92 Directors’ duties 
have been recently revised, regarding the discretion afforded in managing the 
corporation in Greece; the highlight being the introduction of the US-derived business 
judgment rule.93 
The positions American academics took in anticipation of the ALI Principles varied. 
Some considered immunity from shareholder-initiated litigation regarding breaches of 
the duty of care;94 others advocated an overall cap on liability (whether enforced by 
shareholders or otherwise).95 Apparently, the rationale in the US was that, in view of 
the growing numbers of litigation, the board should be left with some assurance that 
risky decisions would not necessarily lead them to personal financial disaster. 
I cannot be persuaded that a liability cap should form part of a set of provisions on 
derivative actions. In short, what applies for the examination above of the “gross 
violations” threshold under the compensatory and deterrence perspectives, applies pari 
passu for suggestions to limit liability for negligence. Accordingly, there is a lot of 
potential for compensation in holding directors accountable for such behaviour. 
Professor Cox identified severe economic effects endemic in negligent management 
decisions.96 Not that liability for negligence is devoid of “deterrence” value; the fact 
that a good deal of corporate scandals arose from overtly risky decision-making,97 
makes deterrence of such behaviour an imperative objective for the law. 
                                                          
92 (1812) 1 Vesey & Beames 154, 158. 
93 Comprehensive monograph on the matter is Harris E Apostolopoulos, The Business Judgment Rule 
and the challenge of the firm’s insolvency (Nomiki Bibliothiki 2014). 
94 Scott (n 75) 940-947. 
95 Coffee ‘Scylla and Charybdis’ (n 75), 823. 
96 Cox ‘Compensation’ (n 75), 786 ff. 
97 See Joan Loughrey, 'The director's duty of care and skill and the financial crisis', in Joan Loughrey 




Possibly, a well-constructed liability cap could make the best of both worlds; maintain 
good compensatory and deterrence levels whilst, at the same time, protect directors 
from unwarranted threats to their wealth. However, such a cap should not be fixed; the 
arbitrariness of this approach is to be avoided in any case.98 Nor should it be confined 
to the provisions on derivative actions. There is no persuasive reason why the company 
should be compensated up to a ceiling when the proper claimant is permissibly 
substituted by a shareholder, while no such restriction applies, if the claim is brought 
by the company’s usual representatives. As this Thesis does not intend to propose a 
wholesale change of Greek company law, general ceilings on liability should be left for 
discussion elsewhere.  
In any case, directors enjoy the “safe harbour” of the Greek Business Judgment Rule, 
qualifying the duty of care and excusing liability for negligence if they acted in good 
faith, in the interests of the company and based on sufficient information.99 The rule 
originates in American law and found its way to Greek law through the German AktG, 
section 93,100 as evidenced by the fact that the burden of proof is placed upon the 
(defendant) directors in both jurisdictions (contrary to the mainstream approach in the 
US). The rationale behind the rule is basically that the court should not review genuine 
business decisions, ex post, substituting thus the management of the company with the 
benefit of hindsight.101 However, in view of this and considering the primordial state 
of enforcement mechanisms, the balance between directors’ accountability and their 
discretion is disturbed in favour of the latter, as Greek law stands.102 The herein 
                                                          
98Coffee 'Scylla and Harybdis' (n 75), 822: “Concededly, a serious problem with the approach […] is 
that any fixed ceiling is necessarily arbitrary and lacks a conceptual foundation”.  
99 BJR cannot excuse breaches of the duty of loyalty; see Coffee 'Scylla and Harybdis' (n 75).  
100 Which in turn was inspired from “Anglo-Saxon law” and the ARAG/Garmenbeck decision; see RegE-
UMAG, BT-Drucks 15/5092, 11. 
101 A Praesumptio Similitudinis in this case is justified regarding English law, considering the attitude 
of the Courts towards adjudication of business decisions. 




proposed framework attempts, by increasing the possibilities of enforcement of 
directors’ duties and facilitating thus their accountability, to reach an equilibrium. True, 
genuine derivative actions may add some extra “bite” against misfeasance ex parte the 
directors. However, they do not affect the content of the director’s duties and their 
purpose is not to make corporate decision-making overly cautious; instead, they are 
destined to operate in exceptional circumstances, where the company’s organisational 
structure fails to remedy a wrong. To put simply, if directors behave within the broad 
boundaries of discretion afforded by their statutory duties, then they have little to fear, 
particularly in lieu of the “English rule” on litigation costs; as succinctly put by 
Antiphanes’ maxim: “he who does no wrong has no need of the law”.103  
Therefore, the grounds on which a claim may be brought should include any breach of 
the duties and obligations the directors are subject to; nothing less. Narrowing the scope 
of these grounds would endanger the provision of becoming obsolete. Greek law must 
learn from the German and English (under common law) mistakes, if the rigor mortis 
of their mechanisms for derivative suits is to be avoided. However, it is proposed herein 
that the only influence that the cause of action may have on the procedure, should be 
related to the extent that the court is allowed to consider the board’s views when 
granting permission (i.e. the instances where demand may be excused); we shall revisit 
this topic in Subsection 5.4.4. 
As the law on the appointment of special representatives stands, any kind of 
misfeasance may be brought before court, upon application for a company’s action. 
This relaxed approach works as a counterweight to the restrictions posed by the other 
facets of the relevant law on shareholders’ litigation. Following the preceding 
argumentation, there seems to be no reason in moving away from this paradigm, should 
                                                          
103 The quote is often misattributed to Plato. 
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derivative actions be introduced to Greek Law. Any contrary argument, endorsing the 
restrictive German approach, fails to consider duly the idiosyncracies of the dual board 
system. As observed, the applicable liability threshold in Germany is very high, 
discouraging claimants from bringing an action from the very beginning. However, 
corporate claims against the management are an otherwise exclusive capacity of the 
Supervisory Board.104 Therefore, as explained, in drafting the statutory derivative 
action the German legislator had to consider the judgment of the Supreme court in 
ARAG/Garmenbeck, according to which the Supervisory Board may be under no duty 
to bring an action in situations where no grave violation of the law or the AoA took 
place; apparently, the rationale was that shareholders can substitute the Aufsichtsrat 
only where the latter fails to perform such a duty. However, given the absence of a 
corporate body with a similar function under Greek law, imposing such a high threshold 
cannot be justified.  
It is not unlikely (it may even be welcome a policy, but this is a discussion beyond the 
scope of this Thesis) that directors’ duties may be widened as to whom they are owed 
to; arguably, the statutory duty of loyalty now obliges the UK boards to consider the 
interests of “stakeholders” other than shareholders.105 Such an “inclusive” trend in 
corporate governance might eventually reach Greece. It thus may be possible for 
members –that is shareholders in the studied jurisdictions-, as legitimate right-holders 
to privately enforce, in the name of the company, an infringement of the corporate 
interests in this, somewhat post-modern, broader sense; id est including the interests 
of, say, the community as part of the corporate interests. This might sound as wishful 
thinking, given the conventional wisdom that shareholders are Hobbesian-minded, 
                                                          
104 Similar observation in Rokas, ‘Corporate Organisation’ (n 21), 14. 
105 See, among others, Andrew Keay, ‘Tackling the Issue of the Corporate Objective: An Analysis of the 
United Kingdom's Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach’ (2007)29 Syd LR 577.  
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individualistic actors, motivated exclusively by the prospects of returns on their 
investments.106 However, the Japanese experience has proven this tenet wrong in a 
number of instances.107 Should derivative actions be introduced to Greek law and the 
duty of loyalty become more inclusive, time will tell whether Greece affords any place 
for such kind of activism.  
In any case, constraining the scope of remediable misfeasance is not an appropriate 
strategy to repel unwanted litigation. On the contrary, extending that scope 
recommends itself as a means of improving shareholder protection. As we saw in 
Chapter 3, the company’s action is available for corporate claims against directors or 
persons to whom powers are delegated. However, in the UK and Germany, derivative 
actions can be brought also against other persons involved in misfeasance taking place 
at board level. In fact, the amendment of AktG, section 117, in order to accommodate 
suits against those intentionally exerting their influence in order to induce the board(s) 
to “act to the detriment of the company or its shareholders”, in conjunction with 
prohibiting controlling shareholders to vote against their liability (AktG, s. 136), have 
resulted in an increase of the number of suits against major shareholders, in the past 
few years.108 A move towards that direction is recommended for Greek company law. 
Given the ownership structure of Greek companies, the possibility of majority 
shareholders and block-holders causing damage to the company, by using their 
influence on the board, is higher than in other ownership structures. Facilitating the 
enforcement of their accountability is therefore essential for a Greek derivative action.  
                                                          
106 Kent Greenfield, The Failure of Corporate Law: Fundamental Flaws and Progressive Possibilities, 
(UCP, 2008), 84. 
107 See Chapter 3.   
108 See discussion and analysis of case law in Andreas Fabritius “Der Besondere Vertreter gemäß § 147 
Abs. 2 AktG” in Theodor Baums & Stephen Hutter (eds) Festschrift für Michael Gruson (Walter de 
Gruyter 2009) 138-140; Yaron Nili 'Missing the forest for the trees: a new approach to shareholder 
activism" (2014) 4 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 157, 195. See also LG München I v. 6.9.2007 – 5 HK O 12570/07, 
ZIP 2007, 1809; OLG München, Urt. v. 28.11.2007 – 7 U 4498/07 ZIP 2008, 73; BGH  27.9.2011 ZIP 
2011, 2195 (HVB/Unicredit).   
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This step is already taken within the context of the recently amended Greek insolvency 
code, in order to protect creditors against wrongful and fraudulent trading.109 There is 
good reason to afford shareholders with similar protection, particularly in the light of 
the discussion in Section 2.4.3, on the increasing importance of equity finance for 
Greek companies nowadays. An express provision, worded similarly to AktG, section 
117 (1) or CA 2006, section 260 (5), could work to that end.  
 
5.4.3. The company’s interests and derivative litigation110 
Chapter 3 identified a common position between the UK and German jurisdictions 
about the criteria on which leave proceedings are judged: whether the action serves the 
interests of the company.111 As explained, despite the differences in wording, the 
directors’ duty of loyalty in the examined jurisdictions consists of acting bona fide in 
the corporate interests.112 Consequently, this criterion puts the shareholder-claimant in 
the shoes of the management, calling the court to adjudicate on the admissibility of the 
claim on the same (or at least similar) loyalty standards applicable for the management. 
In fact, this criterion is used by many influential jurisdictions. 113  Therefore, it appears 
that one of the primary questions to be asked, when recommending the introduction of 
derivative actions to a jurisdiction, is whether the action should not be contrary to the 
company's interests. Remarkably however, under Law 2190/1920, courts are not 
supposed to review the interests which the petition to appoint special representatives 
                                                          
109 Art. 98 (1) & (2). 
110 Zouridakis (n 26)281-83 regarding pp. 271-272 in this Subsection and 281-283 in the next Subsection. 
111 According to the unanimous position in German literature, this is the case regarding AktG, s. 148: 
see Baum and Puchniak (n 90) 53; Schmolke (n 1), 420. For the UK, see Julia Tang 'Shareholder 
remedies: demise of the derivative claim?' [2012], UCL J.L. and J. 178; David Gibbs 'Has the statutory 
derivative claim fulfilled its objectives? A prima facie case and the mandatory bar: Part 1' (2011) 32(2) 
Comp. Law. 41.   
112 See Chapter 2.  
113 Including Australia, Canada and New Zealand.  
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intends to promote.114  It is worthy for the Greek lawyer and legislator to draw insight 
from Germany and the UK, regarding how such a statutory criterion for the admission 
of derivative actions may be formed and the objectives it may serve.  
The UK Law Commission, in its consultation paper, advocated the introduction of such 
a filter for vexatious litigation. In doing so, it reviewed the approaches taken by a 
number of common law countries.115 The position it took is summarised at 16.33: 
Given, however, the essential nature of this action it could be 
strongly argued that courts in any jurisdiction would not permit 
such actions to proceed unless they were satisfied on this point, 
whether or not it appears in the statute.116  
It is hard to disagree with this. By looking at the applicant's compliance with the 
director's duty of loyalty, the court effectively undertakes the task of adjudicating 
whether it has before it a "strike suit" or not. Should the claim be brought for the sole 
reason of paralysing the company's business or constitute some form of "greenmail" to 
the corporate executives, it should definitely fall outside the ambit of the duty of loyalty 
and be dismissed. Furthermore, such a rule expressly acknowledges the nature (or, as 
the Law Commission put it, "essence") of derivative actions as being brought on behalf 
and for the benefit of the company. As such, it constitutes an unavoidable question for 
the court regarding inter partes admission proceedings. Lastly, this criterion aligns the 
position of the shareholder-litigant with that of the constituency ad hoc substituted in 
derivative actions; the corporate organ entrusted with the authority to litigate. A 
deviation from the standards applicable to the board’s litigation-related decision-
                                                          
114 The similar absence of judicial supervision on the admissibility of actions under s. 147 III AktG was 
viewed as “absurd”; RegE-UMAG, BT-Drucks 15/5092, 20. 
115 Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies: A consultation Paper, (Law Commission Consultation 




making would create an inconsistency within the company law statute, from the 
perspective that litigation is, among others, a corporate decision; derivative actions 
exceptionally allocate the competence to make such decisions to shareholders. 
However, it might be argued that as a threshold it is too low to keep the floodgates of 
litigation shut.  Indeed, it is not unlikely that petitioners satisfy the court of their loyalty 
to the "corporate purpose" and success, but their claim eventually proves to be 
detrimental to the overall business profile of the company or wasteful regarding money 
and resources. Furthermore, the British experience shows that, as an absolute bar, the 
criterion under section 263(2)(2) is far from being the exclusive ground upon which 
permission has been refused in the reported cases; even when this was the case, courts 
stated that the application would be unsuccessful under the discretionary grounds. The 
reason is that UK courts would refuse leave only in cases where "no director acting 
under the duty of section 172 would bring a claim".117 However, the British experience 
itself shows a way out of this conundrum. 
In most of the UK reported cases under the statutory regime on derivative claims, the 
decisive question for the court was: "would the hypothetical director acting under the 
duty of section 172 attach considerable importance to the claim?"118 Qualifying the 
"company's interests" criterion with the importance attached to the claim intuitively 
appeals as a good formula of letting through the judicial filter only meritorious 
shareholders' actions that honest and diligent directors would bring before court. Let us 
thus bring this consideration under closer scrutiny. 
                                                          
117  Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd [2009] EWHC 2526 (Ch) [2010] BCC 420, 422 (Lewison J). 
118 E.g. decisions in Iesini, (n 117) 441-442 (Lewison J), Franbar v Patel [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch); 
[2008] BCC 885 [27]-[29] (Trower QC), Wishart v Castlecroft Ltd & ors [2009] CSIH 65 [43] (Lord 
Nimmo Smith Lord Reed Sir David Edward, QC); see review by Andrew Keay and Joan Loughrey, ‘An 
assessment of the present state of derivative proceedings’, in Loughrey (n 97) 197-202.  
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A prima facie problem for the court is finding the appropriate grounds on which to 
evaluate the importance the claim has regarding the company’s interests. In search for 
a rationale to be followed, we have to look at each jurisdiction’s perception of the 
public limited company and its purpose as a business vehicle within the society. Should 
the company be perceived as a wealth maximising entity and within the confines of 
questioning whether litigation is in the corporate interests,119  the judicial filters to 
derivative litigation should go no further than attesting whether the outcome of the 
litigation is likely to add to corporate wealth or, in case it does not and does neither 
result in a grave financial detriment, whether litigation is likely to deter future 
misconduct.120  
Nevertheless, determining whether litigation will be economically beneficial may be 
challenging. Certainly, courts assess with relative ease whether recovery, if the claim 
is successful, outweighs expenses. However, this is not the full picture regarding the 
cost/benefit analysis of shareholder litigation. Other factors are economically relevant 
and sometimes more important than the expected recovery. First, it is one thing to look 
at recovery, which by definition is a short-term return for the company; and another to 
look at the long term profitability of a management decision, against which the claim 
stands. Second, regarding listed companies and their market value, the response of the 
stock market will not be necessarily favourable to pending litigation. At least preceding 
a judgment on the merits, the adverse effect of alleged mismanagement on the corporate 
                                                          
119 Livada “company claims” (n 20) 981. A common position among the examined jurisdictions; some 
deviations exist though, as explained earlier on. As observed by Keay, despite decisions on the statutory 
derivative action in the UK touching upon s.172 in their entirety, they provide little guidance as to what 
the interests of the company are; the reason is that litigation forms a small part of decision-making in the 
corporate interests (Andrew Keay ‘The duty to promote the success of the company’ in Loughrey [n 97] 
64-65). 
120 Painted with a broad brush, this is the rationale of the “Functional and Focused Model” proposal by 
Reisberg. See also Section 2.3.2.  
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goodwill is likely to trigger the exit of existing shareholders and a fall on the stock's 
price.121  
Continuing, the deterrence argument in favour of derivative litigation, sound as it may 
be, is not so easy to be clearly defined; let alone form expressly a legal provision on its 
own. As admitted by Reisberg: 
Although the decision about the likelihood of deterrence cannot 
be made with mathematical precision, it is expected that courts 
will learn over time that some types of action, even if 
uneconomic in the sense that they fail to recover their immediate 
costs, ultimately result in beneficial deterrence of harmful 
misconduct.122 
Deterrence, as an express criterion for leave of derivative actions, seems therefore well 
suited for courts enjoying a good deal of discretion in their decisions; as are the 
common law courts and Greek courts under the non-contentious jurisdiction.  
Balancing the deterrence and compensation effects of litigation will be the task for the 
court in assessing the importance of bringing the claim. The Functional and Focused 
Model (FFM) proposed by Reisberg sets these exact two overriding criteria for 
judiciary discretion; whether the action is to benefit economically the company and/or 
whether the action is likely to deter future misfeasance.123 The rationale behind the 
FFM is, to an extent, already endorsed by courts. Particularly regarding recent UK 
decisions, it is worthy to remember Lewison J's enumeration of relevant factors to be 
considered when attesting a litigation decision under section 172: 
                                                          
121 indicatively, Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, 'The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action 
and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform', (1991)58 U Chi L R 
1; Paul Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower & Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (9th edn 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) 667.  




the size of the claim; the strength of the claim; the cost of the 
proceedings; the company’s ability to fund the proceedings; the 
ability of the potential defendants to satisfy a judgment; the 
impact on the company if it lost the claim and had to pay not 
only its own costs but the defendant’s as well; any disruption to 
the company’s activities while the claim is pursued; whether the 
prosecution of the claim would damage the company in other 
ways (e.g. by losing the services of a valuable employee or 
alienating a key supplier or customer) and so on.124  
These lines provide a roadmap on how to attest the compensatory facet of derivative 
litigation, useful for the purposes of this Section. The considerations of the learned 
judge go beyond the criterion of "recovery net of litigation costs"; and approximate a 
transaction cost efficiency test.125 However, as such, this test might fall outside the 
court's willingness to substitute the board in decision making; at least when the case 
before it is not clear. Such cases constitute the exception rather than the rule however. 
Under the proposed criterion and as it applies already in the UK,126 the task of the 
judiciary is not to make a business decision on behalf of the company; rather, it is to 
adjudicate between the competing views of the claimant and the board. Nevertheless, 
deference to the board's decision-making is not an aphorism; this is the spirit of the 
Greek business judgment rule and it is the task of the court to strike a good balance 
between desirable deference and undesirable insulation from liability in corporate 
litigation generally, including shareholder-initiated one.127 
                                                          
124 Iesini, (n 117) 441. 
125 Similar to Reisberg Derivative Actions (n 1), 208. 
126 Keay and Loughrey (n 118), 202. 
127 Apostolopoulos (n 93), 36-37. 
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In fact, as will be further elaborated upon below, regarding the subsidiarity of the 
derivative claim, the court ought to have particular regard to the views of the 
disinterested members of the board regarding the decision to litigate. Disinterestedness 
would of course be contestable. In such a way, the arguments for and against litigation, 
from the perspectives of persons having intimate knowledge of corporate affairs, will 
be better illustrated during the proceedings. This can be facilitated by having the 
company involved in the action as a mandatory non-party.128  
Complementing the aforementioned factor(s), are considerations on deterrence of 
misfeasance. It can be submitted that, at least regarding the “deterrent” effect of 
derivative litigation, grave violations (breaches) of law, bylaws or duty should be 
presumed important enough to litigate in borderline - from the perspective of 
compensation - cases.129 The solution here proposed, adopts as a rule of thumb the 
German criteria of AktG, article 148 paragraph 1(III) and (IV), in formulating a 
presumption of importance based on the rationale of deterrence. 
Another real challenge in pursuing the “Holy Grail” of derivative actions is to construe 
legal provisions for the admission proceedings that do not touch disproportionately on 
the merits of the main proceedings. To begin with, the proposals herein would not result 
to a paradigm shift in Greek company law from this perspective. In petitions for the 
convening of a special audit under Law 2190/1920, article 40, which normally precede 
litigation under article 22b, Greek courts consider whether damage is suffered by the 
company or is to be suffered, whether maladministration occurred and finally whether 
the aforementioned two are in a causal relationship.130 I cannot see how the existing 
                                                          
128 Similarly to AktG, s.148(2); the respective provisions in the GrCivProC are art. 80 et seq. 
129 The rationale aligns, to a good extent, with that in Reisberg, Derivative Actions (n 1), 212: “a 
deterrence rationale should be constrained by a compensatory ceiling”. 
130 Lucas Kokkinis “Auditors and Minority Rights” in Evanghelos Perakis (ed)Sociétés Anonyme’s Law, 
(3rd edn, Nomiki Bibliothiki 2013) 1559-1561 see also Thessaloniki Single-Member Court of First 
Instance 15126/2001 NOMOS database. 
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procedure touches upon the merits of the main proceedings less than the herein 
proposed procedure for derivative actions does. 
Practically, by attesting the importance to be attached to pursuing the claim, the court 
reviews the dispute between the shareholder-litigant and the board on the topic of 
litigation. The court, as a neutral arbiter, is in the advantageous position of considering 
both views and evaluating the credibility of evidence before it; this is the task entrusted 
on the judiciary after all.131 
Overall, no overriding problems emerge from granting the court the discretion of 
adjudicating whether the action is brought in compliance with a duty of loyalty similar 
to those of directors. On the contrary, this criterion accords to the characteristic of 
derivative actions as mechanism of ad hoc substitution of the board in matters of 
corporate litigation. Furthermore, its objective is to grant leave only to claims which, 
if successful, are likely to benefit the company. As such, it is fit for purpose and should 




5.4.4. Subsidiarity of the claim: making the company the first option 
A method of filtering out unmeritorious claims and ensuring the boars’ primacy in 
asserting the company’s claims is the “demand rule”.132 If it is to be adopted, as it 
currently applies Germany,133 the demand rule has to be supplemented by additional 
safeguards ensuring that "demand" does not result in entrenching the board’s position 
as the final arbiter of litigation. Rules, permitting shareholders to take over pending 
                                                          
131 Concurring Keay and Loughrey (n 118), 202. 
132 See Baum and Puchniak (n 90) 49-52 and Chapter 3. 
133 s. 148 (1) (2) AktG; see also Hirt, The Enforcement, (n 13), 60. 
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claims and to contest ab initio the effectiveness of demand in a given situation, have to 
be in place. The position adopted here bears some similarities to that of Reisberg’s, 
fewer similarities regarding Hirt’s proposals. This is expected, due to the fact that the 
direct or indirect source of inspiration to that matter, the law of Delaware (DGCL), is 
common. However, the ensuing paragraphs consider the Greek and German provisions 
as they now stand in their quest for insight, making (limited) reference to American 
law only where necessary. 
To begin with, what has to be clear in the law is what constitutes “demand”. Three 
possible alternatives emerge.134  First, that of a “draft suit”, in the sense of a detailed 
exposition of the facts giving rise to the claim, with clear substantiation on legal 
grounds and valuation of the claim. Second, that of a notice of facts giving rise to 
suspicion that the company suffered or will suffer damage of a particular kind, 
accompanied by a statement of intention to initiate derivative proceedings in absence 
of action assumed by the corporate representatives. The third option is that of a general 
complaint for suspected maladministration, without providing any detailed exposition 
of the damage suffered by the company.  Τhe preferable approach is the second one, as 
it neither prohibitively restrains petitioners nor it is inappropriately vague. The position 
of the Greek law as it now stands on company’s actions is closer to this solution.135 
Maintaining it in an introduced derivative action would thus be consistent an approach 
with the broader company law framework and established corporate practice. But we 
should not stop here. 
                                                          
134 See Reisberg, Derivative Actions (n 1); Filippos Doris ‘I schési ton árthron 69 AK, 22 v § 3 
n.2190/1920 kai 786 § 3 KPolD os rythmíseon gia tin apotropí tou kindýnou exypirétisis symferónton 
antithéton pros ta symféronta tou ekprosopoúmenou nomikoú prosópou’ (2002) B’ ChrID 865, 877.  
135 Doris (n 134) 877; cf Patrai Court of Appeal 266/2011 Armenopoulos 2013, 293, where specification 




The Greek legislator should revisit the existing timeframe for the board to respond to 
the shareholders’ demand. Six months comprise a considerable amount of time in 
business, thus the respective threshold not only runs to the detriment of the company 
from an economic perspective, but also allows the wrongdoers to dispose of any 
evidence of their misfeasance.136  It is therefore suggested that the existing threshold is 
replaced by a more reasonable timeframe that reflects modern corporate practice. If the 
German approach is to be followed thereto, such a threshold should be set at two 
months’ time.137 However, it is for the best to allow courts some discretion in judging 
what is reasonable and what is not, following consideration of the company’s size, 
organisational structure (for instance whether the company has an in-house legal 
department), business environment and other factors. In such a way, a reduced 
threshold would not burden disproportionately small corporations.   
Futility of demand in certain circumstances is a further matter to consider. Temporal 
thresholds, such as that of Law 2190/1920 article 22b, become too onerous when 
demand is presumed to fall on deaf ears, or when litigation is a matter of urgency. It is 
an understatement to hold that there is no bright-line rule. The American jurisprudence 
has an extensive (yet controversial and mostly state-specific) line of case law and 
scholarship to provide to that end.138 Painting the US experience with a broad brush, 
demand is mainly excused in cases of conflicts of interest; between, on the one hand, 
the board as a whole and, on the other hand, the company.139  
                                                          
136 The danger of loss of evidence has been highlighted in Greek academia since the early days of art. 
22b; see Leonidas Georgakopoulos, To Díkaio ton Etaireión (Sakkoulas publications 1974), 142. 
137 See Explanatory Notes: RegE-UMAG, BT-Drucks 15/5092, 22; Paul (n 2) 99. 
138 Richard M. Buxbaum, 'Conflict-of-Interests Statutes and the Need for a Demand on Directors in 
Derivative Actions', (1980) 68 CLR 1122, Victor Arnell DuBose, ‘Whose Corporation Is It, Anyway? 
Abolishing the Futility Exception In Derivative Litigation', (1991-1992) 12 Miss. C. L. Rev. 197; Jessica 
Erickson, ‘Corporate Misconduct and the Perfect Storm of Shareholder Litigation’ (2008-2009)  84 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 75.  
139 Buxbaum, (n 138) 1124. 
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This Thesis proposes that futility (or redundancy) of demand can be established under 
two broad criteria; when demand is reasonably presumed to be rejected by the board 
no matter the merit of the case to be made and when it is a matter of absolute urgency 
that litigation is initiated.140 The first criterion could be fulfilled in cases where the 
composition of the board is involved in the wrongdoing to an extent that does not (and 
should not, under Greek Civil Code article 66) permit an unbiased decision on 
litigation.141 The second criterion could be of relevance in claims running the risks of 
imminent prescription or further damage to be suffered by the company. In any case, 
shareholders pleading for demand to be excused should run the risk of their claim being 
rejected as inadmissible, if they do not meet either of the aforementioned criteria. 
A clear-cut rule on how "demand" should operate would entail a number of benefits. 
First, it ensures that the primacy of the board, as the corporate body entrusted with 
representation of the company, is not compromised. The board of directors would be 
called to take action, or substantiate the choice not to do so to the concerned 
shareholders, within a reasonable amount of time. In such a way, multiplicity of 
proceedings is avoided142 and broader communication between the board and the 
company's members is encouraged.143 
Second, a properly constructed "demand" rule would provide the court with the board's 
view on the decision not to litigate. The position here adopted is that the board's opinion 
should not be preclusive; rather, the court, in adjudicating whether the action fosters 
the corporate interests and its significance justifies the continuance of a claim as a 
                                                          
140 This proposition deviates from Greek law as it now stands; see Supreme Court 1256/2011 DEE 2012, 
29. 
141 Art. 66 pronounces: “member of the management is not entitled to vote, if the decision concerns […] 
the initiation of court proceedings […]between the legal person and the member or its spouse or its 
relative by blood up to the third degree”. 
142 Similarly Paul (n 2), 101. 
143 Without the need to call for an extraordinary resolution and place the item of suspected misconduct 
in the agenda. 
282 
 
derivative one, should have particular regard to the views of disinterested decision-
makers.144 Otherwise, the risk emerges that shareholders will always attempt to devise 
an argument of futility (e.g. by suing the entire board), so as to increase their chances 
of having their case heard.145 
The effect of the demand requirement and the accompanying discretion of the court to 
have particular regard to the views of disinterested directors on the matter of litigation 
will most probably filter out much of the unmeritorious litigation. The court will be 
provided with a useful roadmap on whether an honest director - with knowledge of the 
company’s business - would bring litigation or not; particularly where, by virtue of the 
2002 law on corporate governance, (truly) independent directors are in place.146 A 
problem endemic in this approach is that courts may defer to the views of the board too 
often in reaching a decision. Nevertheless, it is better for the law on derivative actions 
to emphasise the views of disinterested directors, than be silent on the matter. It is an 
ostrich’s approach to deny that courts are inherently reluctant to review management 
decisions; express rules and guidelines on the matter address the problem rather than 
aggravate it.  
Finally, the demand rule should not apply for liability based on fault.  Greek law, as it 
now stands, poses an obligation on the board to assert claims that arise from such 
misconduct; but no such obligation if the alleged breach arises from negligence, unless 
the GM or a 10% minority so requested.147 This rule should remain unaffected and the 
                                                          
144 In the US (particularly Delaware), the effect of the Business Judgment Rule makes pursuit of 
derivative claims following rejection of demand almost impossible, as Courts review the decision of the 
board under this “filter” and the claimant might find it hard to prove that the defendants fell foul of the 
rule; however, were the American approach be transposed to Greek law, the outcome would be different, 
because of the reversal of the burden of proof to the defendants (directors). 
145 As happens in the US; see Ralph C. Ferrara, Kevin T. Abikoff, Laura Leedy Gansler, Shareholder 
Derivative Litigation: Besieging the Board, (Law Journal Press 2013), 6.03 et seq; Erickson (n 138), 
1772. 
146 L.3016/2002, art. 3, FEK 110/2002: “among non-executive members there shall be at least two 
independent members”. 
147 L. 2190/1920, article 22b (1) ad finem. See Livada (n 20) 1013.  
283 
 
introduction of derivative actions should endorse the zero tolerance on such levels of 
culpability. This can be achieved by exempting such cases from "demand" overall. 
Otherwise, an inconsistency would arise, whereas the board is under an unqualified 
obligation to assert the claim itself but the shareholder-claimant has to undertake the 
time and effort to request them consider initiating proceedings.    
Before concluding, let us consider whether demand should be addressed to 
shareholders (“universal demand”). As we saw, the UK, being a shareholder-centric 
jurisdiction, has historically put much emphasis on the views of disinterested 
shareholders on prospective litigation, even though it does not pose universal demand 
as a procedural requirement for derivative litigation. Such a requirement, in my 
opinion, adds an unnecessary layer of criteria in the court’s decision-making.148 
Notably, most US state jurisdictions have abolished such rules.149 What the majority of 
the shareholders think fit may be relevant in judging whether a suit is brought in good 
faith and for the benefit of the company, but establishing that the majority rule should 
preclude a claim from being brought may lead to unfair results for both the company 
and minority shareholders.  
A “universal demand” requirement could be of use only if shareholders disinterested 
in the alleged misfeasance and the decision (not) to litigate exist at the time the claim 
is brought, with clear and informed views on the proposed litigation. In closely-held 
companies such shareholders would be a handful at best, whilst in listed companies 
with high ownership dispersion it can be expected that they reach good numbers. Given, 
however, that shareholders may be easily reproachable by the wrongdoers (particularly 
in the first case), whilst disinterested shareholders may also be apathetic in their 
                                                          
148 See also Hirt, The Enforcement (n 13) 349ff. 
149 Arnell Du Bosse (n 138), 202. 
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majority (particularly in the second case), such universal demand rule would pose a 
task for claimants and courts that is either futile or overly difficult to discharge, save 
for the cases of few closely-held companies. A further problem with “universal 
demand”, is that it lacks practicality and adds significantly to the costs of the derivative 
suit, because of the sheer numbers the addressees may reach. Addressing demand to 
shareholders collectively, even within the ambit of the shareholders’ meeting, does not 
solve this problem, as it involves the difficulties of convening a GM on the minority’s 
initiative or placing a motion in an already convened GM.  
Overall, the proposed framework acknowledges the primacy enjoyed by the board in 
initiating litigation. A “demand rule” makes the board the first option among corporate 
organs in asserting the company’s claims; and together with the accompanying rule that 
the court should consider the views of disinterested directors, they deter and limit the 
volume of frivolous and vexatious litigation. Nevertheless, the law has also to consider 
the fact that directors might purportedly bring proceedings before court, even with the 
blessings of the majority, with the sole objective to frustrate a shareholders’ action by 
application of lis pendens; this is the “dark side” of board primacy in corporate 
litigation. The following paragraphs elaborate further on this issue. 
 
5.4.5. The ability to take over a pending claim150 
For shareholders’ derivative litigation to be effective, it is important that a claim is not 
brought for the same cause of action by the company in bad faith, so as to prohibit 
members from pursuing the claim diligently. Indeed, the possibility that the 
wrongdoers sabotage in such a way the procedure, in order to insulate themselves, is 
very real and such incidents have been complained for before Greek Courts even under 
                                                          
150 See Zouridakis (n 26)278-79. 
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the regime of special representatives; as explained in Chapter 3. The proposals shall 
thus provide for ways to combat the phenomenon, taking into account the procedural 
complexities associated with such a rule. 
Let us first consider whether it should be permissible for shareholders to bring a suit 
while an action, brought directly by the company or derivatively by other shareholders, 
is pending. The literature on the procedurally similar actio pro socio, within the ambit 
of the law of partnerships and associations, supports the position that if the company 
brings a suit, shareholders cannot litigate derivatively and vice versa.151 The rationale 
is that the defendant(s) should not sustain the burden of standing in separate 
proceedings.152 Ceteris paribus, the same rationale may apply to derivative actions, 
under the herein proposed framework. However just and fair this approach may be for 
defendants, it leaves the problem identified in the previous paragraph unresolved.   
An important facet of the UK provisions on derivative claims is the ability of members 
to take over pending proceedings, in certain circumstances.153 Arguably, such a rule 
stems from and conforms to the pro-shareholder attitude that English law traditionally 
had. However, should the examination of such a substitution rule focus exclusively on 
the nature of derivative actions and their purpose, an argument against it is hard to 
substantiate. Substitution rules are in place to ensure that proceedings brought in bad 
faith do not block meritorious litigation.  
They essentially constitute a procedural mechanism. As explained, such a right is 
unavailable to shareholders as Greek law now stands; should the board initiate 
                                                          
151 Panagiotis I Kolotouros Actio Pro Socio: i Dikonomikí Diástasis tis Etairikís Agogís (Sakkoulas Edt 
2006) 41-42; concurring, regarding private limited companies (EPEs), the later Greek Supreme Court 
1280/2012 EEmpD 2013, 616. Actio pro socio is herein perceived in its “ut singuli” form, similar to the 
derivative action in that it allows shareholders to sue on behalf of the company. Similar the German 
literature and case law; see OLG München, Beschl. v. 21. 10. 2010 – 7 W 2040/10; ZIP 2010, 2202. 
152 Kolotouros (n 151) 41. 
153 CA 2006, s. 264 (269 for Scotland). 
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proceedings, there is no legal avenue of replacing them (as claimants) with special 
representatives.154 The matter was brought before court under the current regime of 
special representatives, but the judgment dismissed the claim that the proceedings 
initiated with the view of never achieving redress against the wrongdoings of 
incumbent managers, on the basis that there is no statutory provision to that effect. The 
court went further to ascertain that corporate claims are by statute a capacity of the 
board. 155 Accordingly, cases where the claimant needs be substituted are not part of a 
purely hypothetical scenario. I doubt that in case Greek courts enjoyed the discretion 
afforded to common law ones such injustice would be excused. It is therefore suggested 
that this caveat is finally filled within Law 2190/1920 and, to that end, the Companies 
Act 2006 has some insight to offer. 
UK law provides a roadmap as to how Greek law should be reformed on that matter. 
Claimants should be permitted to overtake proceedings from the company or fellow 
shareholders, if they can prove that pending litigation amounts to an abuse of process.  
Doctrinally, as long as the provision in the Company Law statute expressly permits so, 
a substitution rule is not inconsistent with the broader Greek legal context; a similar 
procedure can be found in the civil procedure code regarding substitution of interim 
corporate management by court decision.156 However, this procedural rule has 
apparently limited scope, referring explicitly to representatives of the company and 
express provision to that end is preferable, if not necessary. To explain, even if 
derivative actions are introduced to Greek law on public limited companies, its wording 
cannot be easily understood as permitting members to take over proceedings initiated 
                                                          
154 A Spyridonos, Minority Rights in the Company Limited by Shares (Nomiki Bibliothiki, Athens 2001) 
628, also views the board’s and majority’s ability to block shareholder-instigated proceedings as one of 
the major flaws of art.22b. 
155 Patrai Court of Appeal 266/2011 NOMOS Databank; Armenopoulos 2013, 293. 
156 786 GrCivPrC.  
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by the company.  Furthermore, it could be interpreted as allowing members to take over 
proceedings from fellow members, only under the perception that a derivative claimant 
acts in a formally representative capacity. A derivative claimant acts in his own name 
and on his own right to sue derivatively though, thus the existing article 786 of the Civil 
Procedure Code cannot be literally interpreted to extend to derivative actions.  
A similar effect could be captured by enabling shareholders to join pending 
proceedings, whether initiated by the company or otherwise, by means of 
intervention.157 Under the Greek law of Civil Procedure, if a claim is brought to enforce 
the company’s rights, such intervention can only be in support of the existing claimant 
or defendant, unless the intervenor has a cause of action against both existing parties to 
pending litigation. The latter case is not readily applicable to the enforcement of 
directors’ duties, as derivative claimants enforce the company’s claims and would 
normally not have a(n) (independent) cause of action against the company. The former 
case on the other hand, allows substitution of the claimant by the intervenor only upon 
agreement of all parties. Anyhow, regarding both alternatives, an express provision 
would be necessary, as Greek law does not allow shareholders to intervene, as it now 
stands.158 Such provision may be placed in Law 2190/1920 instead of the Civil 
Procedure Code, in a similar fashion to the German Aktiengesetz, section 148 (3).159  
It is to be noted that Greek academics have advocated the introduction of a “substitution 
rule” in favour of the company, following the German protype, should a Greek 
derivative action come to existence. 160 The obvious rationale for such a rule, is to 
ensure that the company has the first say in the litigation throughout the course of 
                                                          
157 This position has long been advocated by Rokas ‘Corporate Organisation’ (n 21) 17. 
158 See Rokas ‘Corporate Organisation’ (n 21) 17.  
159 However, shareholders are allowed to intervene under German law only up to conclusion of admission 
proceedings for a derivative claim; see Schmidt and Lutter (n 73) 2133. 
160 Triantafillakis (n 20) 128. 
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proceedings. The German experience, however, exhibits that this substitution rule not 
only proved to be of no use in practice, but also rendered AktG, section 148, an 
irrational option for potential claimants; it has been suggested that the provision is 
removed from the statute.161 A “substitution rule” in favour of the company is a rather 
catastrophic idea, unless the intent is to frustrate the function of derivative actions in 
practice and merely use the introduction of such a shareholders’ right merely as a 
“signal” to the international market. However, this is not the intent of the proposals this 
Thesis offers. 
 
5.4.6. Summary and further remarks 
The expression of the company’s will and interests normally lies within the board of 
directors. However, derivative actions should be conceived as a mechanism through 
which the board is substituted, in exceptional circumstances, regarding the capacity to 
assert corporate claims. Under this prism, the proposed model attempts to strike a 
balance among various competing factors; such as access to justice and excessive 
litigation, deterrence of managerial misconduct and business-making discretion. In 
doing so, the proposed rules endorse the "decision rights" strategy and the "trusteeship 
strategy", whereby the court acts as the (external) trustee of the company by being the 
arbiter of whether the derivative action is meritorious or not.162 Among a variety of 
alternatives considered, the conclusion is that the court should primarily attest whether 
the action serves the corporate interests and is important enough for the company to 
proceed. However, all considerations were made on the grounds that the proposed 
criteria would be applicable in a single inter partes stage. 
                                                          
161 Peltzer (n 1) 959. 
162 Detailed explanation of these strategies in Hirt, The Enforcement (n 13). 
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Therefore and for the sake of completeness, as a final point let us consider the 
desirability of a multi-staged admissions procedure. Chapter 3 showed that this 
approach was endorsed in the UK by a last-minute inclusion of the "prima facie" ex 
parte procedure to the bill.163  
The reasons put forward by the UK Law Commission in rejecting the idea of a 
preliminary stage for the permission process was that such an option would increase 
the likelihood of a mini trial on the merits taking place in the ex parte stage; involving 
thus more costs and time than desirable.164 
Setting aside any elucidation on the motives of the legislator in introducing this stage 
in proceedings, practice so far has illustrated that the “prima facie case” stage is, to the 
greatest extent, redundant. Courts have examined the applications pending before them 
ex parte, often using the same criteria (i.e. those of CA 2006, section 263) as in the 
inter partes hearings.165 Interestingly, in the latter stage, whether the claim represents a 
prima facie on the merits is to be considered again.166 In essence, the only undisputed 
difference between the two stages in practice relates to the defendants’ standing, putting 
thus the necessity of such a procedural duality to question. Furthermore, as illustrated 
before, courts are willing to allow the merger of the stages into one; on the rationale of 
time and cost efficiency.167   
Some British academics have put forward the idea of limiting the first stage to an 
examination, on paper, of whether the applicant satisfies the formal requirements for 
legal standing and the claim is appropriate for the derivative claims procedure.168 
                                                          
163 Keay and Loughrey (n 118), 194; see also Hansard, HL May 9 2006 Vol.681, col.883.  
164 ibid. 
165 ibid 195; Bridge v Daley [2015] EWHC 2121 (Ch)  [8], [75]-[76]  (Hodge QC). 
166 Stainer v Lee, [2010] EWHC 1539 (Ch) [29] (Roth J). 
167 Franbar v Patel, [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch); [2008] BCC 885 [24] (Trower QC); see also commentary 
by Julia Tang, "Shareholder remedies: demise of the derivative claim?" [2012], UCL J.L. and J. 178. 
168 Keay and Loughrey (n 118), 195. 
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However, even if we are to consider such construction of a dual stage admission 
procedure for a proposed model of derivative claims under Greek law, strong 
arguments against such duality remain. Under the viewpoint of the need for expeditious 
resolution of disputes, such an addition of a judicial layer may work to the detriment 
of meritorious litigation. Even though the Greek judicial system does not face problems 
- pressing in other jurisdictions - regarding the quality of the judges’ legal background 
and expertise, the slow rhythm under which Greek Justice operates has been an issue 
for decades and only a miracle will extinguish it overnight.169 At its heart lies the 
disproportionality between the numbers of judges and the volumes of litigation,170 as 
well as the very design of certain procedures (for instance, lengthy deadlines for the 
parties to submit particulars). The recently passed Law 4334/2015, reforming 319 
articles of the Greek Civil Procedure Code and taking effect in January 2016, 
constitutes an effort to re-distribute work among courts and speed up justice, but we 
should not expect too much of it at such an early point in time. If derivative actions are 
to be introduced, experience with the reformed Civil Procedure will tell whether an 
“extra judicial layer” is a reasonable, let alone desirable, option. 
 
 
5.5. Removing the disincentives of litigation costs 
It is a common concern among comparative studies on derivative actions, that the costs 
entailed in the litigation often fend off meritorious claims.171 As explained, the 
strategies adopted by the studied jurisdictions attempt to curb the disincentive of the 
                                                          
169 For Greek justice in a comparative context see the “Rule of Law” index of the World Justice Project 
available at  <http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/> accessed 1 November 2015. 
170 CEPEJ ‘Report on "European judicial systems – Edition 2014 (2012 data): efficiency and quality of 
justice"’ <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/2014/Rapport_2014_en.pdf> 
accessed 20 August 2015. 
171 Baum and Puchniak (n 90), 35ff. 
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“loser pays” principle; by imposing, with qualifications, the shareholder-
claimant’s/petitioner’s litigation costs on the company. This Subsection adds to the 
proposed framework the important dimension of costs indemnity and the appropriate 
exceptions to it, particularly when the claim is brought in a frivolous or vexatious 
manner. 
The crucial point for determining the allocation of the costs of the proceedings should 
be the admission stage. It is then where the shareholder claimant should be judged as 
appropriate to substitute the board in its function and as acting in the corporate interests. 
It should be thus mandatory that the company assumes the costs from that point on. 
Otherwise, the adverse result of incurring massive costs in the main proceedings may 
work as a disincentive. Notably, the German literature has identified that, despite the 
low costs of the admission proceedings by virtue of the statutory cap in place, an action 
may reach millions of Euros in litigation costs in the main proceedings; as no such cap 
applies.172 
As Greek law stands, the rule that the company assumes the costs of the admission 
proceedings has only the merit of counterweighing important restraints on legal 
standing, found elsewhere in the relevant provision. Should, however, Greek law move 
from redress on paper to actual and efficient redress, this practice cannot be maintained. 
The reason is simple: up to obtaining clearance to proceed, it is just the member’s 
decision whether to file a petition or not. The motives can be good or vexatious. Why 
then encourage “pirate” litigation by removing any financial risk? 
In another provision within the Greek company law statute (article 35b, on annulment 
of GM resolutions), which is more likely to be used before court than the company’s 
                                                          
172 T Baums, ‚Die Prozesskosten der aktienrechtlichen Anfechtungsklage‘, in Uwe Schneider (ed) FS 
Marcus Lutter zum 70 Geburtstag, (Otto Schmidt 2000), 283, 284. 
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action, a different standard applies; the court can decide that costs are borne by the 
company, the claimant or both, in the event of an unsuccessful claim. This seems to be 
a more pragmatic and suitable approach for admission proceedings on derivative 
claims, particularly considered in conjunction with the fact that Greek law follows the 
loser-pays principle.173 In the context of company’s actions and derivative litigation, 
there is real risk for the company to assume the directors’ expenses, them being winning 
defendants. 
Furthermore, the examination of the other two jurisdictions showed desire to relieve 
shareholders from the risk of incurring extensive litigation costs;174 yet, with 
considerable parsimony so as to keep the floodgates of litigation closed. The Greek 
legislator should be cautious enough not to permit suits brought in a (at least) vexatious 
manner to become a financial detriment to Greek companies. Some qualifications 
should be put in the admissions procedure, similar to but not identical with those of 
Law 2190/1920 article 35b.  
The discretion of the court should be limited in imposing costs upon litigants that failed 
to show any level of loyalty to the "corporate purpose" in bringing the action; that is, 
when no person acting under the duty of loyalty (as defined in the Greek company law 
statute) would bring the action.175 Effectively, this criterion covers much of the 
definition of what "vexatious litigation" is. The proposed rule is thus issue-specific and 
clear-cut. Furthermore, it limits itself to only a subset of dismissed claims; litigants that 
honestly believed their claim to be in the company's interests but failed to persuade the 
                                                          
173 GrCivPrC, art 176; exceptions to the principle in arts. 177, 179, 184, 185, 186.  
174 Indemnification via a “Wallersteiner order” in the UK and AktG, s.148 (6) in Germany. 
175 The English reader is familiar with such criterion; case law under the statutory derivative claims 
procedure defined it as the benchmark of failure/success to satisfy the mandatory requirement of CA 
2006, s. 263 (2)(a). See Subsection 3.3.4. 
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court of its importance, will be reimbursed by the company, despite their claim being 
dismissed.  
A final point concerns the allocation of costs when the shareholder applicant sought to 
have demand excused. For the demand rule to have any prospect of attaining the goals 
set in the previous paragraphs, namely to give priority to the company in decisions on 
corporate litigation and to provide the court with a substantiated opinion on the matter, 
shareholders-litigants should run a risk in their effort to by-pass the company’s ordinary 
decision-making processes. It is therefore suggested that any claimant, whose petition 
before court to have demand declared futile is eventually dismissed, should bear the 
costs of litigation. This approach does not weigh disproportionately against 
shareholder-claimants. Rather, such allocation of costs effectuates the exceptionality 
of the “demand excused” rule under the proposed framework. 
Indemnity of costs is, of course, not the only strategy available to remove disincentives 
or provide incentives for derivative claimants to enforce the corporate claims. Many 
view the American “success story” as the outcome neither of a litigation culture nor of 
relaxed rules on the admission of shareholder suits, but instead of the ability to conduct 
contingency fees arrangements.176 The rationale is simple: these arrangements alleviate 
the burden of the costs from the claimant and place it on the shoulders of the attorney(s); 
if the claim is successful, the latter retain part of the proceeds or a fixed sum, as agreed 
upon at their appointment.  
Oftentimes, contingency fees arrangements are hard to reconcile with the broader legal 
context. English law and the common law tort of champerty had for long provided such 
                                                          
176 M Siems, 'Private enforcement of directors' duties: derivative actions as a global phenomenon' in 
Stefan Wrbka, Steven Van Uytsel and Mathias Siems (eds.), Collective Actions: Enhancing Access to 
Justice and Reconciling Multilayer Interests? (CUP 2012) 93-116; Gelter (n 27), 866; Hirt The 
enforcement (n 13) 132-133; Baum & Puchniak (n 90) 41; Reisberg Derivative Actions (n 1), 262-264.  
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an example. 177 Yet, absence of such tort or any other rule to that effect under Greek 
law, evidences an approach less suspicious to such arrangements and renders the 
examination of such argumentation redundant for the purposes of this Section.178  
In view of the beneficial effects of contingency fees - as is obviously the enhanced 
access to justice for the economically weak - the latter are gradually gaining ground in 
the continent, overriding the concerns that litigation may become the playground for 
opportunist practitioners.179 In fact, under Greek Law, contingency fees have long been 
allowed; the system in place has a statutory cap on the arrangement of the proceeds and 
rules determining whether the outcome of litigation was successful or not.180 However, 
despite their doctrinal compatibility with the loser pays principle, it is hard to see how 
such arrangements may become popular in jurisdictions where the "English rule" 
applies. Particularly within the context of derivative litigation, it is expected that the 
financially weaker party will often be the shareholder-claimant; unless his/her attorney 
is very confident in having a strong case at hand, the assumption of the winning party's 
litigation fees, with or without a cap, is a risk very few rational actors would be willing 
to take. 
Another well-discussed topic in academia181 concerns the strategy of “rewarding” 
shareholders who are successful in championing the corporate interests 
(award/incentive strategy).182 This strategy is a step too far for a country which has not 
experienced derivative litigation before. It is furthermore hard to see any room for 
                                                          
177 See commentary on Wallersteiner by Reisberg, Derivative Actions (n 1), 265.  
178 It has to be noted that the Greek Attorneys’ Code (article 1) stipulates that lawyers provide “social 
service”, a “fundamental” element for the “rule of law”. 
179 Ever since the decision BVerfG 12.12.2006, 1 BvR 2576/04, NJW 2007, 979, on the un-
constitutionality of an absolute ban on contingency fees arrangements, Germany has become more 
receptive of the latter. 
180 Attorneys’ Code, art. 60. 
181 See particularly Reisberg, Derivative Actions (n 1), 246. 
182 As happens in Australia. See Section 3.2. 
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compatibility of this rule with the existing Greek legal framework, as in such a case the 
court substitutes the corporate will in distributing the proceeds of litigation. 
But, fundamentally, a reward strategy may create all the wrong incentives in pursuing 
a derivative action. Sure, it is hard to conceive how an economically rational actor 
would undertake a procedure that would potentially give trifles in return, or even worse, 
diminish (in the short term) the value of the company’s shares. On the other hand, it is 
not difficult to imagine investors with minor and/or short term interests in the company, 
taking the opportunity to make a profit out of litigation, if a reward strategy is in place.  
It may be, in the conceptual space between the short-term irrational option of pursuing 
a derivative action and rational apathy, where the appropriate filter for frivolous 
litigation actually lies. Instead of construing arbitrary percentages for legal standing in 
order to “ensure” that members with a close connection to the corporate interests bring 
the action, the legislator should realise that there is such a filter already in place: that 
is, the minor benefit the members enjoy from successful litigation in the short term. 
 
   
5.6. Access to (claim-related) information 
A well-cited author within the European scholarship on derivative actions is Latella. In 
my opinion, his major contribution to the study of derivative actions in Europe, is his 
view that access to claim-related information is one of the most significant drawbacks 
European jurisdictions showcase regarding shareholder litigation.183 Although I 
consider other factors to be more significant in explaining the imperfections of the 
relevant law in the herein studied countries, I equally believe that should the Greek 
                                                          
183 Latella (n 33), 321: "the theme I consider really fundamental to allow a full and effective exercise of 
shareholder derivative action, is that of information rights".  
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legislator want to provide a working framework for corporate litigation, information 
has to be disseminated to the shareholders effectively. After all, how would it be ever 
possible to bring a claim successfully, if evidence is unavailable and nobody but the 
wrongdoers knows of the misfeasance occurred? For the shareholders’ claim to have 
potential for success, it is important that they have access to corporate information, 
particularly prior to filing the claim.184 However, the mandatory disclosure regimes 
may not be (and usually are not) adequate to disseminate the information necessary for 
court proceedings. Greek law has already in place a (qualified) minority right to request 
a special audit; as explained, the equivalent German provision is regarded as 
complementary to the derivative action. However, the British approach allows for a 
court order to be made for case-specific investigation of corporate affairs. Both 
approaches are considered hereinafter. 
The first way to achieve anything towards the desirable end of adequate information, 
is granting “information rights” to shareholders.185 This is a matter harmonised to an 
extent at EU level; as reviewed earlier on this study.186 The problem is that the 
harmonisation focused exclusively on information to be furnished within the ambit and 
for facilitation of the GM. No significant harmonisation exists (yet) regarding records 
and registries of the company.187 Importantly, board meetings are secluded from the 
monitoring of shareholders. Mitigating the information asymmetries and agency costs 
involved is, potentially, a block-holder structure. However, only block-holders have 
access to sensitive information in this case, principally by virtue of their special 
                                                          
184 See also Chapter 3. 
185 Dissemination of information on demand is called “push system” of information rights; see the herein 
cited articles of Masouros (n 40) and Zetzsche (n 40). 
186 Chapter 4. 
187 The Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC, (OJ L 390, 31.12.2004, p.38)) mandates that significant 
shareholdings are disclosed; let alone the imperfections of the directive's objectives (no particular 
reference to end-investors), its significance within the ambit of derivative actions is limited to the extent 
that it facilitates collective action. 
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relationship with the appointed directors. Greece has not come up with an effective 
solution regarding this matter. As explained, the national legislator did not go much 
further than the Shareholder Rights Directive.  
Nevertheless, what constitutes a mechanism for pre-trial investigation is the special 
audit procedure. On that matter, Greek law much resembles the German provisions.188 
UK law does not provide the respective right of auditors’ appointment to shareholders; 
there have been studies identifying this difference in approach as a comparative 
disadvantage.189 There is good reason to maintain a rule addressing the intra-corporate 
information asymmetry and adjust it with the prerequisites for what is supposed to 
follow such discovery (unless the misfeasors voluntarily make good the damage they 
caused): shareholders’ litigation.190 
In suggesting the introduction of rules on derivative actions and their complementarity 
with the right to call for a special audit, the first point to consider is legal standing, 
regarding both procedures. The German legislator decided to eliminate disparities in 
quorum requirements, yet in Greece differences remain as to who may call for a special 
audit and who may petition for the appointment of special representatives. Having 
asserted that accumulation of information and evidence constitute a significant gear in 
the corporate litigation mechanism, it is rather absurd to restrict legal standing 
disproportionately between the respective procedures.191 At least regarding the 
“legality check” audit of article 40 paragraph 1, my opinion is that shareholder 
claimants in derivative actions should avail themselves of the latter right prior to 
                                                          
188 See Chapter 3. 
189 Reisberg Derivative Actions (n 1), 218-219; Paul (n 2) 95-96. 
190 As explained, the UMAG considered Sonderprüfung to be a procedure independent from but auxiliary 
to the exercise of the AktG, s.148 right. 
191 Concurring Suzanne Kalss 'Shareholder Suits: Common Problems, Different Solutions and First Steps 
towards a Possible Harmonisation by Means of a European Model Code' (2009) 6 ECFR 324, 342. 
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litigation, without the need to seek for allies to meet quorum requirements. Greece 
should learn by others’ mistakes on this issue.192 
The special audit under paragraph 3 is another case altogether. Being designed to 
investigate the diligence and loyalty of corporate management, it touches upon 
business-sensitive information. Its availability to shareholders has to be therefore more 
parsimonious than the cases of legality check. In recognition of that, the Greek 
legislator rightly imposes stricter (quorum) requirements.193   
The further question to ask is whether the UK approach of pre-trial discovery procedure 
is incompatible with the special audit procedure or redundant because of the latter. 
There are good reasons to hold that neither is the case. In France, the donor country of 
fundamental Greek company law rules, both rights exist in parallel. Reportedly, the 
investigation procedure is more popular in view of litigation.194 However, quasi-
equivalent investigation procedures under the Greek Civil Procedure Code are 
restricted to circumstances where evidence is in danger of being lost or when expert 
advice is expedient.  
The Greek legislator should follow the UK and French paradigms. If a derivative action 
is introduced, the right to request an investigation under the Civil Procedure Rules 
should be conferred to the prospective shareholder claimants, provided that they can 
reasonably show that a cause of action may exist, on a summary of facts substantiating 
their suspicions.195 That will constitute significant progress from a shareholder 
protection perspective, compared to the current regime of special representatives. As 
                                                          
192 France and Switzerland, despite conferring an individual right to derivative litigation, set ownership 
thresholds for the enactment of the right to call for a special audit; this position has been criticised in the 
literature. See Gelter (n 27), 875. 
193 Kokkinis (n 130) 1555. 
194 Bernard Grelon, 'Shareholders' Lawsuits against the Management of a Company and its Shareholders 
under French Law', (2009) 6 ECFR, 205, 208. 
195 Cf Latella (n 33), 323. 
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the law stands, special representatives have access to corporate information, yet their 
(vaguely defined) right to have recourse to corporate documentation is bound by their 
mandate to bring a claim within the limits set by the shareholders’ petition for their 
judicial appointment. 196 This is problematic, as the petition’s content is determined by 
the limited information available to shareholders. Allowing thus shareholders ample 
access to information, prior and following the filing of their derivative claim, will work 
towards holding wrongdoers accountable for misbehaviour that might fall under the 
shareholders’ radar pursuant to the now applicable ordinary company, civil and 
procedural law provisions.    
 
5.7. Concluding remarks 
The suggestions advanced by this Chapter envisage a meaningful framework, which 
facilitates the protection of shareholders’ interests and the accountability of corporate 
wrongdoers whilst, at the same time, minimises the risk of litigation detrimental to the 
company’s interests. A further, collateral objective was to construe a working 
framework which does not necessitate a revision of core principles of Greek law. To 
that effect, several departures from the status quo are proposed in order to make 
shareholder litigation on behalf of the company reasonable and available an option. The 
most striking ones are the marginalisation of the institution of special representatives, 
the recalibration of the minority right to petition as an individual right to sue and the 
remedy of wrongs done to connected companies. Simultaneously, the proposed 
constraints on shareholders’ frivolous and vexatious litigation focus on the decision to 
                                                          
196 See Themis K Skouras, ‘appointment and replacement of special representatives in the societe 
anonyme’[1983] EEmpD 553, 563. 
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litigate, instead of the contribution of the shareholder to the company’s capital, as is 
now the case.  
The suggested reforms followed comparative considerations. The methodology 
adopted ensures on the one hand that the competitiveness of the Greek legal framework 
on shareholder protection is reasserted in the European context while, on the other 
hand, limits the comparative advantages the reform proposals may have to the given 
cross-jurisdictional context. Other legal orders may also provide for alternative 
frameworks with considerable merit.197  
It may be true that the proposed framework resembles, to different extents, existing 
provisions in jurisdictions other than those examined; such as the Australian derivative 
action.198 This is expected. Under the tenet of praesumptio similitudinis in comparative 
law, legal orders are likely to give similar solutions to functionally equivalent legal 
problems.199 Furthermore, Western jurisdictions adopt and apply common legal 
principles and strategies; such as the proper plaintiff rule, the subsidiarity of the 
shareholders’ action, the strategy of filtering out unmeritorious litigation in an 
admissions stage and the separate corporate personality doctrine. It is in details where 
the comparative scholar should look for differences. Divergence in the weighting of 
regulatory objectives may result in significant disparities in the practical value of legal 
provisions, depending on the point of view one assumes. From a shareholder 
perspective and within the ambit of derivative actions, for instance, a qualification of 
the cause of action may result in the provision becoming inaccessible, compared to the 
                                                          
197 E.g. the American attorney-based corporate litigation model and the Federal Disclosure Rules; see, 
regarding both, Coffee ‘Scylla and Charybdis’ (n 75), 800. 
198 Corporations Act 2001, ss 236-242. 




respective law on shareholders’ remedies in another jurisdiction, where functionally 
equivalent rules exist but no such qualification applies. 
Overall, the proposed framework is designed to improve shareholder protection under 
Greek law and reassert its competitiveness. In conformity with the argument made in 
Chapter 2, that stronger protection facilitates investment and growth, this is a timely 





CHAPTER 6. Conclusion 
 
The derivative action, a beast largely unknown to Greek law up to date, is an ingenious 
and highly complex apparatus. As explained in this Thesis, it has – as a concept - 
fascinating potential in addressing the domestic law’s problems in protecting 
shareholders from wrongs done to the company.  By suing derivatively, they can 
remedy their reflective loss in an indirect, yet doctrinally acceptable, way. In fact, 
derivative actions serve the broader purpose of protecting the interests of shareholders 
in globo against the opportunistic behaviour of those in control of the company. They 
thus advance the fair and efficient administration of corporate affairs.   
The analysis highlighted the inadequacies of Greek law regarding this matter of 
shareholder protection. The company’s action, a surprisingly resilient relic from the 
early days of Greek company law, falls short of the challenges it has to meet. On the 
other hand, other mechanisms of shareholder protection cannot compensate for the 
shortcomings of the company’s action. Overall, the second Part of this Thesis showed 
that Greek law cannot protect effectively the (minority) shareholder from the 
opportunism derivative actions aim to deter and remedy. The law is strict and the 
hurdles are often insurmountable. In some instances, problems of shareholder 
protection are not even considered.  
Undoubtedly, the most significant contribution of the comparative approach to the 
objectives of this study, is the exposition of existing alternatives to the Greek status 
quo. The analysis showed that other jurisdictions provide for more effective responses 
to problems that are significant and common. Yet, as an exercise of seeking differences 
in the law, it showed that there is no silver bullet solution. On the contrary, laws on the 
matter remain quite divergent, a phenomenon best explained by the complexity of 
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derivative litigation. The design of legal rules on the matter necessitates the 
consideration of various and often contradictory objectives. The law aims to encourage 
such litigation, in order to facilitate the accountability of corporate wrongdoers and the 
consequent protection of shareholders’ interests; yet, at the same time, it attempts to 
deter derivative litigation, to the extent that the latter does not promote the company’s 
interests. The legal framework on derivative actions, being a cog in the wheel of 
shareholder protection and part of the system of checks and balances on the 
administration of corporate affairs, has to strike a delicate balance between use and 
abuse, incentives and restrictions.  All this is very challenging. Within the scope of this 
research, no jurisdiction proved to discharge of this task flawlessly; still, some do 
perform better than others. However, the comparative considerations show the way 
forward.   
The de lege ferenda suggestions in Chapter 5 concluded the search for the “better law”. 
The proposed framework attempts to distil the insight Germany and the UK have to 
offer to Greek law. The end result aspires to delineate a derivative action that protects 
the company’s interests. Concordantly, it calls for a shift of focus from the protection 
of minorities to the protection of the shareholder as a member and investor. This is a 
timely task for the Greek lawmaker and, possibly, long overdue.  
The arguments put forward and the conclusions reached herein may concern primarily 
the examined jurisdictions, yet they also suggest themselves for the broader study of 
shareholder law and shareholder remedies. The selection of a study area covering both 
the common law and civil law traditions worked to that effect. Incidents of convergence 
and divergence among jurisdictions belonging to each legal family, similar to those 
identified in this Thesis, are likely to be found to exist. 
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As happens with most comparative studies though, the applicability of the conclusions 
and normative implications of this study to other jurisdictions should be considered 
with caution. Jurisdictions may be similar in many respects among one another, yet 
they are hardly ever identical. The comparison between Greece and Germany evidences 
the fact. Readers should carefully consider the line of reasoning and how this was 
herein affected by the broader legal context in which the studied rules operate, as well 
as the limitations of this study, before espousing (or dismissing) the output of this 
research for their jurisdiction(s). For instance, the herein considered means of redress 
of shareholders’ reflective loss and enforcement of directors’ duties - alternative to 
derivative actions - correspond to the law as it now stands in Germany, Greece and the 
UK; and the conclusion on the necessity for the introduction of the derivative action to 
Greek law was partly reached on the premises of the insufficiency of those alternatives. 
1 I expect this conclusion to bear different strength in other jurisdictions - after all, 
human reason should never be underestimated and derivative actions are not its only 
product in the effort to address issues of shareholder protection and corporate 
governance. 
Nevertheless, some of the Thesis’ conclusions may be readily applicable to 
jurisdictions falling outside its study area. This is particularly the case regarding the 
problems of legal standing in “corporate actions”. There remain jurisdictions, such as 
Austria, who follow this path up to date and where the preceding analysis may offer 
valuable insight.  
Given that the decades-long discussion on derivative actions has not culminated to a 
conclusion in statutory law, neither in academic scholarship, it would be a hubris to 
claim that this Thesis advances a universal understanding of how all derivative actions 
                                                          
1 Chapter 4. 
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should be. This has never been its purpose. What it does though, is communicate a 
substantiated argument on why and how they may assume an important role in a 
particular temporal and jurisdictional context, from a particular perspective. Contrary 
to the “Holy Grail of derivative actions”, this objective is precise and worthy; and, most 
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